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ABSTRACT 
In the summer of 1643 a series of catastrophic defeats brought the parliamentarian war 
effort to the brink. of disaster. The scale of the emergency precipitated a political crisis 
in which the House of Lords attempted to orchestrate a negotiated surrender. This thesis 
sets out to understand the reasons for parliament's military collapse and to examine in 
detail the dynamics of the ensuing political crisis. It will be argued that the events of 
summer 1643 came much closer than is generally recognised to bringing the civil war to 
an end, and that the unexpected survival of the parliamentarian cause fundamentally 
shaped the subsequent course of the conflict. 
At the heart of this thesis is a day-by-day analysis of events at Westminster during the 
first week of August 1643. Parliament's military disintegration prompted the House of 
Lords to draw up a series of peace proposals amounting to capitulation. Fear that the 
king would accept these terms induced militant activists in the City of London, led by 
Lord Mayor Isaac Pennington, to unleash an unprecedented campaign of threats and 
intimidation aimed at their defeat. The battles that raged in the House of Commons to 
decide the fate of the peace proposals marked the high watermark of parliament's crisis. 
Had the proposals been carried it was rumoured that leading members of the peace party 
would be arrested and the City would take control of the war effort. 
These truly extraordinary developments indicate the enormity of parliament's military 
failure and the pivotal nature of the resulting political struggle. This is a new 
interpretation of a neglected moment in the history of the English Civil War, one that 
seeks to re-establish the true significance of parliament's 1643 crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the high summer of 1643 parliament's war effort was plunged into crisis by a 
succession of catastrophic defeats: the destruction of Lord Fairfax's northern anny at 
the battle of Adwalton Moor (30 June), the annihilation of Sir William Waller's western 
anny at the battle of Roundway Down (13 July), and the capture of Bristol by Prince 
Rupert (26 July). Despite the fact that these unprecedented disasters brought parliament 
to the brink of a negotiated surrender, the reasons for parliament's military 
disintegration have never been properly examined or explained. Instead historians have 
tended to consider the broad sweep of the civil war from 1642 to 1644 as a 
homogeneous and self-contained period: essentially a phase of the conflict preceding 
the New Model Army in which the king enjoyed success and parliament struggled. It is 
a historiography characterised by a subconscious division of the war into two distinct 
parts: pre New Model Army - parliamentarian failure; post New Model Army -
parliamentarian success. As a result parliament's crisis has been largely side-lined in 
favour of the military instrument that ultimately decided the civil war. Therefore this 
thesis proposes to investigate the catastrophic failure of parliament's annies during the 
summer of 1643, to show how close the resulting political crisis came to capitulation, 
and to reveal the impact of the emergency on the subsequent prosecution of the war 
effort. It is the purpose of this study to re-establish the importance of this pivotal period, 
one that altered the course of the civil war and helped to determine that parliament, and 
not the king, would ultimately prove victorious. 
In presenting a new interpretation of these momentous but relatively neglected 
events, this thesis will attempt to provide a fresh understanding of both the crisis itself 
and its impact on the civil war in 1643 and 1644. The analysis will show how 
parliament's military collapse was precipitated by a debilitating lack of cooperation 
amongst commanders (a deficiency exacerbated by the remarkably effective 
collaboration of royalist generals); how the increasingly militant City of London 
overawed parliament and influenced the course of the war effort; how parliament's 
1643 crisis was considered by contemporaries to herald an almost inevitable royalist 
victory; and how parliament's unexpected survival minimised and clouded the 
collective and historiographical memory of this critical period. 
In terms of historiographical position this thesis is not a strict military history, 
neither is it a wholly political analysis, it is an attempt to synthesise the two in order to 
deepen our understanding of an underrepresented yet vital period of the conflict. 
Parliament's 1643 crisis is important because it describes the very real possibility of a 
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royalist victory or parliamentarian surrender. The disintegration of parliament's war 
effort during the summer of 1643 sparked a political crisis that came perilously close to 
ending the war in a negotiated surrender. One vital aspect of the emergency, generally 
underplayed by historians, is the key role of the City of London. It will be argued that at 
the height of the crisis in the first week of August 1643, the City's threat to take control 
of the war effort compelled the House of Commons to overthrow a capitulation peace 
initiative drawn up by the House of Lords. Contemporary evidence suggests that these 
abject terms would have been readily accepted by the king and that the war would have 
been brought to a swift conclusion. This thesis will argue that the Lords' attempt to 
impose a political surrender was defeated by the menaces and intimidation of a militant 
minority in City of London led by radical Lord Mayor Isaac Pennington. 
Consequently this study will attempt to convey the full magnitude of 
parliament's crisis and the great sense of danger it engendered. In mid April 1643, when 
the Oxford peace talks reached deadlock, a parliamentarian army officer recalled that 
'our army was master of the field.' 1 But by early August, when the Lords attempted to 
reopen negotiations with the king, 'parliament had no army capable of keeping the 
field.'2 The military situation had been transformed and the strength of Charles' 
position was undeniable. Some historians have argued that in early August 1643 a 
determined push for London would have swept all before it. In the north and the west 
parliamentarian resistance had crumbled, while all that remained of Essex's once 
impressive field army had fallen back towards the capital. After more than a month of 
catastrophic setbacks, parliament faced the prospect of imminent defeat. 
Parliament's crisis is also important because it dictated the subsequent course of 
the civil war and prosecution of the parliamentarian war effort. Following the defeat of 
Lord Fairfax's northern army at Adwalton Moor on 30 June the Houses authorised the 
negotiation of a military alliance with the Scots. This thesis will show how the deep-
seated political and religious divisions that crystalized as the Independent-Presbyterian 
split were a direct consequence of the Solemn League and Covenant and, therefore, of 
parliament's 1643 crisis. This is an important connection, generally unrecognised by 
historians, but essential for a proper understanding of the gravity of the crisis. The 
Scottish alliance was absolutely critical. Once parliament had rejected a reopening of 
peace talks only one course of action remained: total war. It was this stark new reality 
that enabled John Pym, widely regarded as parliament's unofficial political leader, to 
pursue a more resolute, efficient, and effective war effort. Amongst these initiatives the 
I C. H. Firth (ed.), Memoirs o/Edmund Ludlow (Oxford, 1894), p.SO. 
2 C. H. Firth (ed.), Life o/William Cavendish Duke o/Newcastle (London, 1906), pp. x-xi. 
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Solemn League and Covenant was paramount. For parliamentarians like Pym, and the 
increasingly militant City of London, the king's advantageous military position 
disqualified any real prospect of meaningful talks. It had long been suspected that 
Charles' only objective was absolute victory; if he would not negotiate a settlement at 
Oxford in April 1643, why should he do so in August when his military prospects had 
never been better? As far as parliament's committed supporters were concerned the hard 
won religious and political gains of the Long Parliament must not be abandoned. 
Capitulation would surely witness a reintroduction of 'that arbitrary and boundless 
prerogative which the King endeavoured to set up over the people' .3 
It is therefore appropriate at this point to familiarise ourselves with the military 
campaigns that led to parliament's crisis in the summer of 1643. This preliminary scene 
setting is not intended to provide an extensive or thoroughly detailed analysis - that will 
form the basis of subsequent chapters - it is merely to provide a framework that will 
facilitate a ready grasp of the arguments to be deployed. Because of the manner in 
which the civil war developed, it is best achieved by dividing the campaigns of 1643 
into three sections: the central front where Robert Devereux third earl of Essex 
commanded the principal field army; the northern front where parliament's forces 
where led by Ferdinando Lord Fairfax; and the western front where Sir William Waller 
commanded Parliament's Western Association. It was the near simultaneous demise of 
these three armies that plunged parliament into crisis and opened up the prospect of a 
decisive royalist victory. 
We will begin with the earl of Essex and the critically important cenlraI front. 
By the close of the Oxford peace negotiations in mid April 1643 Essex had assembled 
an army of no less than 19,000 men. On the 13 April he marched from Windsor towards 
Reading, intent upon laying siege to the town or bringing the king's Oxford based army 
to battle.4 Three months later the earl's plans were in tatters. He wrote to parliament on 
9 July suggesting, in a letter seized upon by his political opponents, that negotiations 
with the king should be reopened, and that the war should be settled by a prearranged 
battle if talks prove unsuccessful. S Essex's once numerous army had been reduced to 
only 6,000 foot, of which half were sick and unfit to march, plus a cavalry arm of no 
more than 2,500 horse.6 This alarming wastage was not however the consequence of 
some catastrophic defeat inflicted by the invincible Rupert, but the result of a 
devastating outbreak of camp fever, a serious want of pay and clothing, widespread 
3 Firth (ed.), Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, p. 52. 
4 V. F. Snow, Essex the Rebel (University of Nebraska, 1970), p. 359. 
S W. B. Devereux, Lives and Letters of the Devereux Earls of Essex /540-/646 (London, 1853), vol. ii, pp. 367-369. 
Journal of the House of Lords. vol. vi, p. 160. 
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desertion to other parliamentary armIes, and a scurrilous attempt to denigrate the 
competence and character of the earl and his senior officers.7 Essex complained to the 
Speaker of the House that 'unless present order be taken for the supplying the army 
with money, their necessities are so great, it will be impossible for me to keep them 
together. ,8 
By early August the earl had withdrawn the remainder of his forces to a 
defensive position centred on Uxbridge to the west of London. While the disintegration 
of the army was serious enough, the general sense of crisis was magnified by the 
personal position of Essex. As both General of parliament's forces and Member of the 
House of Lords, Essex embodied (as no other) the conflict of interests inherent in the 
soldier-statesman, a conflict that would ultimately pave the way for the Self Denying 
Ordinance and the formation of the New Model Army. The earl's commitment to the 
war effort was absolutely crucial, particularly for men such as John Pym who believed 
that the religious and political gains of the Long Parliament could only be secured by 
military victory. At the same time the peace party recognized that a disenchanted and 
disgruntled Essex might well throw his weight behind new proposals to treat with 
Charles. This is an important point for this study. The possibility that the earl would 
abandon the armed struggle stands at the heart of current historiography concerning the 
political crisis of late July and early August.9 It is an orthodoxy this thesis will seek to 
challenge. 
In the north of England parliament's forces were commanded by Lord Fairfax, 
ably assisted by his son and lieutenant general, the soon to be famous Sir Thomas 
Fairfax.lO Throughout 1643 the earl of Newcastle's large and well-drilled royalist army 
dominated Yorkshire. That the hopelessly outnumbered parliamentarians were able to 
maintain an effective resistance, under the severest of pressure, testified to the courage, 
tenacity and ingenuity of the Faifaxes. Yet by the close of the Oxford peace talks in 
April a difficult military situation was becoming much more serious. In February, the 
queen's return from the continent, accompanied by significant quantities of money and 
munitions, provided a new impetus for the royalist war effort. Sir Hugh Cholmley, who 
held Scarborough and its castle for parliament, quickly defected to the king, while 
7 Devereux, Lives and Letters. p. 375. 
• Ibid., p. 370. 
9 The importance of Essex's adherence to Pym's political programme is a constant theme of the 
secondary literature. See, for example, S. R. Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War (London, 1904), 
vol. i, ch. IX; J. H. Hexter, The Reign o/King Pym (Harvard, 1941), ch. V-VII; Snow, Essex the Rebel, 
ch.14. 
10 The introductory outline given here of Parliament's northern campaign 1642-1643 is based upon 
Gardiner, Great Civil War vol i; P. Young and R. Holmes, The English Civil War: A Military History 0/ 
Three Civil Wars 1642-1651 (London, 1974); P. R. Newman, Atlas of the English Civil War (London, 
1985). 
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Captain John Hotham, son of the parliamentarian governor of Hull, concluded a private 
agreement with the earl of Newcastle by which parliamentarian forces would not attack 
the queen and her convoy if Newcastle would spare the East Riding. In addition the 
governor of Hull, Sir John Hotham, whose animosity had been simmering since the 
summer of 1642, refused to lend any assistance to the increasingly beleaguered 
Fairfaxes. What might have been an effective triumvirate of relatively small 
parliamentarian armies based on Scarborough Castle, the walled port of Hull, and the 
seat of Fairfax power in the West Riding cloth towns, disintegrated under the 
accumulated weight of mutual mistrust, rivalry and ambition. I I 
Consequently, on 30 March, the Fairfaxes were compelled to abandon their 
quarters around Selby and fall back on Leeds, suffering substantial casualties at 
Seacroft Moor in the process. Though the Fairfaxes retained an army in being they were 
effectively confined to the West Riding cloth towns, with little or no prospect of 
assistance from either Scarborough or Hull. On 30 June the they were completely routed 
at Adwalton Moor near Bradford, taking refuge at Hull, where the governor, Sir John 
Hotham, had been arrested two days earlier on suspicion of treason. All of Yorkshire, 
save for the walled port, now lay under royalist control, and by the end of July most of 
Lincolnshire had been similarly subjugated. Both Gainsborough and Lincoln fell to 
Newcastle as the earl belatedly pushed south. At the beginning of August an alarmed 
Oliver Cromwell moved his cavalry to Peterborough, in order to protect the eastern 
counties, while desperately imploring the County Committee at Cambridge to mobilize 
all forces without delay. As Gardiner correctly observed, 'If Newcastle could break 
through Cromwell's scanty band of troopers, London, and with it the whole 
parliamentary cause, would be gravely imperilled.' 12 
In the west of England the civil war was altogether more complicated. 13 A 
royalist breakthrough in the spring of 1643 propelled the campaign through four 
counties in a matter of weeks, eliminating in the process almost all parliamentarian 
resistance, and creating the circumstances in which many historians believe Charles 
threw away his best chance of outright victory. When, in mid April, parliament 
withdrew from the Oxford peace talks, hostilities in the far south west had just 
recommenced following a forty day truce agreed by local commanders. The campaign 
had reached stalemate: the Cornish royalists were unable to break out of their native 
II For a detailed analysis of the personal animosities that beset parliament's commanders in Yorkshire 
see, A. J. Hopper, "The Readiness o/the People" (University of York, 1997); A.J. Hopper, 'Fitted for 
Desperation,' History, vol. 86 (April, 200 1). 
12 Gardiner, Great Civil War. vol. i, p. 192. 
13 The introductory outline presented here of parliament's 1642-1643 campaigns in the west and south-
west is based upon the secondary sources given in footnote 10. 
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county, and the Devonshire parliamentarians were likewise unable to make any 
headway west of the Tamar. By early August the situation had changed beyond 
recognition; two large parliamentarian armies had suffered decisive defeats, leading to 
the fall of the entire west and South West save for a handful of isolated towns and ports. 
The deadlock had been broken in May when Sir Ralph Hopton, commander of 
the Cornish royalists, won an astonishing victory at the battle of Stratton against a much 
stronger parliamentarian army commanded by the earl of Stamford. During the first 
week of June at Chard in Somerset Hopton facilitated a long planned rendezvous with 
royalist forces under the command of Prince Maurice and the marquis of Hertford. In 
response the parliamentarian general Sir William Waller concentrated his forces around 
Bath, blunting the royalist advance in a fierce encounter at Lansdown on 5 July. 
However the reprieve was short lived. Eight days later his army was completely 
destroyed at the battle of Roundway Down near Devizes in Wiltshire. Waller's defeat 
enabled the victorious royalists to storm the strategically important port of Bristol on 26 
July, a triumph that marked the high water mark of the king's war, and the onset of 
parliament's political crisis. 
By the beginning of August 1643 the crushing defeat of parliament's northern 
and western armies, plus the catastrophic loss of Bristol, had opened up the alarming 
prospect of a royalist advance against London, the king' s primary objective since his 
enforced departure from the capital in January 1642. In addition the earl of Essex's field 
army, operating in the Thames valley against the king's Oxford army, had virtually 
ceased to exist as a fighting force. Disease, desertion and want of pay had destroyed any 
prospect of offensive action, leaving the bedraggled remainder to fall back towards 
London. The war effort had collapsed; parliament was on its knees facing an almost 
inevitable royalist victory. 
This thesis will argue that a combination of two diametrically opposed factors 
brought parliament to the brink of defeat in 1643. On one hand an almost total lack of 
cooperation amongst parliamentarian commanders, and on the other, a complete 
willingness of royalist commanders to collaborate effectively together. While this 
remarkable contrast in military effectiveness undermined the parliamentarian war effort 
in 1643, its reversal in 1644 led to the royalist disaster of Marston Moor and the loss of 
the old royalist north. As we shall see, these findings represent a new emphasis in the 
study of the English Civil War and a new interpretation of the military course of events. 
It is also appropriate at this juncture to say something about the political crisis 
that followed parliament's military collapse. During the first week of August 1643 a 
whirlwind of activity in the House of Lords and the House of Commons determined not 
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only the immediate fate of the parliamentarian war effort but arguably the outcome of 
the civil war itself. It is these tumultuous days at Westminster that lie at the heart of this 
thesis. In the wake of parliament's military disintegration the House of Lords rushed 
through a series of peace proposals intended to end the war in a negotiated surrender. 
The sheer panic of this knee-jerk clamour for peace is indicated by a comparison of 
these proposals with the settlement terms demanded by the king four months earlier. 
Talks had convened at Oxford on 1 February 1643, but after a month and a half 
of proposal and counter proposal agreement remained beyond reach. The king 
submitted his final terms on 12 April 1643, only to have them rejected by parliament 
two days later. Charles required satisfaction on a number of key points: the restoration 
of his revenues, magazines, ships and forts (to be controlled by royal appointees); the 
restoration of all members of parliament expelled since January 1642; and the physical 
relocation of Lords and Commons to a new site not less than twenty miles from 
Westminster (thereby preventing unruly and intimidating public demonstrations against 
the king and his supporters).14 Significant, then, that the proposals endorsed by the 
Lords in early August should closely match those demanded by Charles in April. The 
king was now to be granted his revenues, navy, forts and magazines - commanded by 
those he deemed fit - while all excluded members were to be readmitted to parliament, 
guaranteeing an immediate royalist majority in the upper chamber and an almost certain 
numerical superiority in the Commons. In addition the Assembly of Divines, convened 
at Westminster on 1 July to consider further reformation of the protestant religion, was 
to be abandoned in favour of a new ecclesiastical Assembly directed by the Crown. As 
Gardiner put it, • Such propositions as these were not a compromise but a capitulation. ' I S 
The Lords were convinced that the war was lost and that these carefully crafted terms 
represented a final opportunity to salvage an agreement before it was too late. 
Conceived by a committee of the upper chamber, the peace proposals received 
the assent of the House of Lords on 4 AuguSt. 16 Aware that any move to reopen talks 
with Charles would face considerable opposition in the Commons, peers attempted to 
justify their actions in a preamble specifically addressed to the lower house: 
My Lords believe that it is all too visible to the Understanding of all Persons, 
that this Kingdom, with all those Blessings of Plenty and Abundance, the fruits 
of our long and happy Peace, must be forthwith turned into the Desolation and 
Famine that accompany a Civil War; and that those Hands and Hearts, which 
should secure this land, do now endanger it, by our unnatural Division; which 
Considerations have moved my Lords to return again Propositions to His 
14 Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, p. 108. 
IS Ibid, vol.i, p. 184. 
16 Journal of the House of Lords, vol. vi, p. 17 1. 
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Majesty, in which they do desire your Concurrence; the Reasonableness and 
Justice of them being such as, if they be rejected, our Cause may thereby be 
strengthened, and the Kingdom encouraged to preserve themselves in their just 
Rights. 17 
The hopes of the Lords were initially raised. On the following day, Saturday 5 August, a 
majority of the Commons, following a 'very large and serious debate: 18 decided by a 
majority of29 to take the proposals into 'further Consideration.' 19 However, the session 
ended without resolution, and was adjourned until the morning of Monday 7 August, 
when, in a dramatic finale, two separate votes were required to settle the opinion of a 
sharply divided House. The first ballot declared in favour of the Lord's peace proposals 
by a margin of only two votes (81 for, 79 against), but the 'House not being satisfied 
with the report of the Tellers,20 divided again, and this time overturned the propositions 
by a majority of seven votes (81 for, 88 against). To the consternation of the peace party 
tenns would not be submitted to the king and the war would continue. 
This, in brief, represents the current interpretation of events at Westminster 
during the first week of August 1643. However, this thesis will argue that the Lords' 
proposals were not defeated by the democratic process of the House of Commons, but 
by a wave of intimidation reinforced by the City of London's thinly veiled threat to take 
control of the war effort. Valerie Pearl had shown that in moments of crisis a vociferous 
and highly organised minority of radicals, backed by influential supporters like the 
City's puritan Lord Mayor Isaac Pennington, were fully capable of seize the initiative.21 
It was this burgeoning militancy that lay behind the rejection of the first ballot on 7 
August and the imposition of a second vote in which the proposals were defeated. 
Political chicanery and coercion overturned a narrow Commons majority in favour of 
peace. The City's threatened takeover forced the war party to sacrifice parliamentary 
procedure in order to retain control of the lower House and the war effort. These 
admittedly controversial findings underpin the re-establishment of parliament's crisis as 
a truly pivotal moment in the history of the civil war. 
17 Ibid. 
18 British Library Thomason Tracts (BL IT), E. 249, 31, A perfect diurnall 0/ some passages in 
parliament, 31 July-7 August 1643. 
19 Journalo/the House o/Commons, vol. iii, p. 196. 
20 Ibid., p. 197. 
21 The City radicals drew their support 'from one or two highly placed individuals on the Militia 
Committee, some City clergymen, and more humble followers in the City and suburbs'. V. Pearl, London 
and the Outbreak o/the Puritan Revolution (Oxford, 1961), p. 274. 
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Historiography 
The structure adopted in this thesis requires the historiography of the 1643 crisis to be 
divided into two parts. The first, discussed here, examines the impact of crisis, while the 
second, part of chapter four, considers the causes of crisis. By and large historians have 
not considered parliament's near fatal emergency sufficiently important to justify 
detailed scrutiny. As an event the crisis has been somewhat marginalised, and 
parliament's military collapse has not been seen as a determining moment in the history 
of the conflict. Consequently identifiable historiography is predominantly indirect, and 
even historians who have attempted to explore these events more fully have often done 
so without specific reference to the crisis itself. It should be noted that the following 
survey is confined to historians who have specifically addressed the period, and is not 
intended to represent a general historiography of the English civil war during 1642-
1643. 
Samuel Gardiner's History of the Great Civil War is an appropriate starting 
point for any historiographical treatment of the 1643 crisis.22 Gardiner, according to 
Ivan Roots, is largely responsible for the creation of John Pym as the dominant figure in 
the House of Commons during the early years of the Long Parliament. 23 This is 
significant because Pym' s pre-eminence is now universally recognized, while his 
supervision of the Commons during July and August 1643 has become synonymous 
with parliament's response to the crisis. However, despite a clear acknowledgement of 
Pym's central role during the period of greatest danger,24 it is Gardiner's evocation of 
the mood at Westminster, and in the City of London, that is particularly striking. Amid 
the gloom and despondency that later historians were to emphasise, Gardiner presents 
an almost heroic image of a parliamentary leadership fiercely determined to overcome 
all adversity, allied to a City authority equally resolute in its support for parliament'S 
cause.
25 Gardiner draws attention to the critical issues which pressed most heavily upon 
Pym: the need to secure the loyalty of the earl of Essex in the face of a desperate peace 
party campaign to win the Lord General's support for negotiations, and the diplomatic 
imperative of securing a military alliance with the Scots. Gardiner's interpretation 
presents a crisis that did not prompt a widespread defeatism, but rather a clarion call to 
arms, to which parliament's leaders and their supporters readily responded. Gardiner 
does not view the menaces of the City of London as the real reason for the defeat of the 
22 Gardiner. Great Civil War. 4 vols. 
23 I. Roots. 'Gardiner. Samuel Rawson (1829-1902)'. Ox/ord Dictionary o/National Biography. Oxford 
University Press. 2004. 
24 Gardiner. Great Civil War. vol. i. p. 258. 
2.5 Ibid, p. 175 & p. 180. 
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Lords' peace proposals. Instead he paints a picture of a defiant parliament, rejecting the 
propositions as a matter of principle, and not as a result of threats and intimidation. 
Half a century later, Professor J.H. Hexter subjected John Pym's political 
conduct during 1642 and 1643 to a rigorous and searching scrutiny.26 Setting out to 
challenge a widely held view that Pym had led the war party in the House of Commons, 
Hexter conceived a new balance of forces in which Pym, supported by a small but 
shifting group of political allies (the Middle Group), steered a moderate course between 
the extremists in both Lords and Commons. With Pym centre-stage, Hexter conjured up 
the despair of London during the summer of 1643, speculating that only a miracle 
appeared likely to save parliament. And yet if there was a miracle, argued Hexter, it was 
performed by Pym, whose astute political management constructed an administrative 
machine that secured the long-term survival of the parliamentarian war effort.27 The 
significance of Professor Hexter's research is widely recognized: John Morrill, for 
example, paid tribute to its elucidation of both Pym the man and Pym the political 
operative.28 In terms of this study Hexter's political biography is notable for the fact 
that it subjects parliament's crisis to a far greater scrutiny than the standard histories of 
the period. 
C. V. Wedgwood's The King's War is arguably the most well known and widely 
read general history of the English Civil War?9 The book was intended to form the 
second part of a civil war trilogy: preceded in 1955 by The King's Peace 1637-1641, 
and eventually followed by The English Republic. However, the projected third 
instalment was abandoned in favour of the Trial of Charles l which appeared in 1964?O 
In terms of methodology Wedgwood was at pains to explain that, as a narrative history, 
The King's War necessarily subordinated the question why to a consideration of what 
happened and how it happened.31 Nevertheless Wedgwood depicts, amid the 
desperation of crisis, Pym's composed and guiding hand, correctly observing that the 
alliance with Scotland became an 'urgent necessity' upon the defeat of the Fairfaxes at 
the battle of Adwalton Moor. This contrasts sharply with the more pervasive, but 
erroneous, view that Sir William Waller's later defeat at the battle of Roundway Down 
finally pushed parliament into the Solemn League and Covenant.32 The Lords' peace 
proposals, Wedgwood argued, were voted down when it became clear that Essex was 
26 Hexter, King Pym. 
27 Ibid., pp. 130-132. 
28 J. S. Morrill, The Revolt of the Provinces (London, 1976), p. 52. 
29 C. V. Wedgwood, The King's War 1641-1647 (London, 1958). 
30 C. V. Wedgwood, The King's Peace 1637-1641 (London, 1955); C. V. Wedgwood, The Trial of 
Charles I (London, 1964). 
31 Wedgwood, King's War, p. 11. 
32 Ibid, p. 239. 
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not prepared to support negotiations on such 'pusillanimous' terms.33 Although the 
major issues are addressed, the brevity of Wedgwood's approach tends to reinforce the 
historiographical status quo. 
Despite its primary purpose as a textbook for teachers and students of sixteenth 
and seventeenth-century parliamentary history, Conrad Russell's The Crisis of 
Parliaments deals in some detail with the Civil War and its consequences.34 Russell 
touches briefly upon the crisis of 1643, highlighting poor parliamentarian morale and a 
number of desertions to the king during the course of the year. It is, however, in his 
treatment of the Scottish alliance that Russell produces a characteristically telling 
analysis. Making the point that Pym had to rescue parliament's military situation 
without concession to those radicals who would scare more supporters to the king, 
Russell argued that the political and religious conservatism of the Scots would enable 
parliament to secure a moderate settlement once Charles had been defeated in the 
field.3s Given the perilous state of parliament's affairs during July and August 1643, 
the Solemn League and Covenant appeared to offer a timely and workable solution: a 
more effective prosecution of the war effort underpinned by a strong determination to 
preserve the political and social order. However, this thesis will emphasise parliament's 
urgent need for military assistance, arguing that considerations such as the social and 
political conservatism of the Scots did not enter into the equation. 
Lawrence Kaplan broke important new ground in a highly perceptive study of 
the Scottish alliance and its political background.36 Kaplan's thesis, argued from a Scots 
perspective, provided an illuminating dissection of the complex and often delicate 
process by which the Solemn League and Covenant was forged. Kaplan demonstrated 
that the English parliament completely underestimated Scottish willingness to take up 
arms against Charles, so much so that an agreement could have been reached earlier and 
on less demanding terms. By the time parliament opened serious negotiations the Scots 
were fully aware of the dire military situation south of the border. It was readily 
understood in Edinburgh that the English call for help was solely the consequence of 
imminent disaster, and not, as some Scots had earlier dared to hope, a shared and 
principled desire for uniformity of church government. Parliament's decision to 
despatch commissioners to the Scottish capital represented an official recognition of 
crisis. As the Scots would come to realise, such an emergency had to exist before both 
Lords and Commons would accept the religious and financial price of Presbyterian 
33 Ibid., p. 242. 
34 C. Russell, The Crisis o/Parliaments: English History /509-/660 (Oxford, 1971). 
3S Ibid, p. 355. 
36 L. Kaplan, 'Steps to War: the Scots and Parliament, 1642-1643', Journal o/British Studies, 
IX 2, (May, 1970). 
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military assistance. It seems certain that Pym could not have secured parliamentary 
backing for a Scottish invasion of northern England without the catastrophe of Lord 
Fairfax's defeat at the battle of Adwalton Moor. 
One of the best military histories of the English Civil War is that published by 
Peter Young and Richard Holmes in 1974.37 Despite a quite natural concern to describe 
campaigns, battles and sieges, there is a limited attempt to place the war in a political 
context. In terms of the 1643 crisis Young and Holmes take the view, perhaps 
surprisingly, that Pym's strategy amounted to little more than a day to day management 
of a steadily deteriorating situation. Pym's contribution is acknowledged to be vital, but 
only in so far as it influenced parliamentarian morale.38 This interpretation is indeed 
notable, for it contrasts markedly with Hexter and others, who see in Pym's patient 
programme a long-term appreciation of administrative and military requirements. In 
addition Young and Holmes correctly identify the desperate campaign to relieve the 
siege of Gloucester (10 August - 5 September), and the subsequent battle of Newbury 
(20 September), as a critical rebuff to an increasingly decisive run of Royalist triumphs. 
Had the earl of Essex failed here, the war, in all probability, would have been quickly 
and decisively lost.39 
John Morrill's celebrated survey of provincial reaction to the civil war assesses 
the impact of the 1643 crisis in terms of an increasingly draconian parliamentarian 
response. Morrill described how the principles of the Petition of Right were largely set 
aside in favour of a series of tyrannical ordinances, 'outrages committed to custom, 
tradition and the common law' .40 The imperative of self-preservation underlined the 
seriousness of parliament's crisis. As Morrill demonstrated, the pressing need to avoid 
defeat - at virtually any cost - quickly justified an unprecedented ruthlessness. 
Mark Kishlansky, without specific reference to the 1643 crisis, characterised the 
1642-1644 period as one in which parliament and its war effort lurched from one crisis 
to another.41 The Houses waged a desultory and defensive war, intending only to avoid 
military defeat and calculating that this would be sufficient to bring the king to a 
negotiated settlement. As Kishlansky's purpose was to account for the emergence of the 
New Model Army, it is perhaps understandable that his perspective should tend towards 
a homogeneous treatment of the pre 1645 civil war. Nevertheless, Kishlansky's work is 
broadly indicative of English Civil War historiography as a whole. The later 
significance of the New Model Army has tended to overshadow the events ofmid-I643; 
37 Young and Holmes, English Civil War. 
38 Ibid, p. 124. 
39 Ibid, pp. 149-150. 
40 Morrill, Revolt o/the Provinces, pp. 52-53. 
41 M. A. Kishlansky, The Rise o/the New Model Army (Cambridge, 1979). 
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to the extent that parliament's crisis does not figure as a pivotal event in the history of 
the conflict. 
Barry Coward has provided an alternative interpretation of parliamentarian 
failure. As the spring and summer of 1643 progressed, so the increased likelihood of an 
unconditional royalist victory effectively sabotaged the possibility of a negotiated 
settlement.42 The inference appears to be that Charles was not prepared to compromise 
while he and other leading royalists remained supremely confident of a relatively quick 
and decisive military victory. Though Coward's analysis may well be correct, it is 
nevertheless the case that the greatest royalist successes took place during the summer 
of 1643. In addition, the King's ability to fight an effective campaign remained severely 
restricted until a large supply convoy of arms and munitions reached Oxford in May. As 
this thesis will show, Royalist momentum did not become decisive until the end of July 
1643. 
The joint editorship of John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer produced in 1998 an 
important military and political survey of the entire civil war period up to the 
Restoration of 1660.43 Underpinned by a firm belief in the 'British' nature of the 
English Civil War, the editors set out to emphasise the interconnected nature of politics, 
religion and ultimately military action in the three Stuart kingdoms. Describing the civil 
wars in Scotland, Edward Furgol lent support to the views discussed earlier of 
Lawrence Kaplan; that the prospect of a royalist victory in England fostered a ready 
willingness north of the border to recommence military action against Charles.44 A 
second distinguished contributor, Ian Gentles, reinforced the significance of 
parliament's Scottish alliance, observing 'It is now possible to see that the [military] 
tide turned [against the king] in the first months of 1644. ,45 Although the crisis is not 
singled out for particular attention, Gentle's emphasis on the Scottish alliance, which 
was a direct consequence of parliament's crisis, indirectly flags up the significance of 
parliament's military collapse. 
Austin Woolrych' s Britain in Revolution, a magisterial survey of virtually the 
entire seventeenth century, provides a fitting tribute to the career of a notable civil war 
historian. In terms of parliament's 1643 crisis, Woolrych argued that the approval of the 
Lords to seek Scottish assistance was only granted as a consequence of crisis, and that 
the inconclusive first battle of Newbury, fought in September 1643, emphasised, as 
42 B. Coward, The Stuart Age 1603-1714 (London, 1994), p. 207. 
43 J. Kenyon and J. Ohlmeyer (eds.), The Civil Wars: A Military History of England. Scotland and 
Ireland 1638-1660 (Oxford, 1998). 
44 E. Furgol, 'The Civil Wars in Scotland', in Kenyon and Ohlmeyer (eds.), The Civil Wars: A Military 
History of England. Scotland and Ireland 1638-1660, p. 49. 
45 I. Gentles, 'The Civil Wars in England', in Kenyon and Ohlmeyer (eds.), The Civil Wars: A Military 
History of England. Scotland and Ireland 1638-1660, p.137. 
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Edgehill had done a year earlier, the inability of the principal parliamentarian and 
royalist field annies to secure a war-winning victory.46 There was a clear need for 
outside help. Fortunately for parliament, John Pym lived long enough to negotiate the 
Solemn League and Covenant, and, argues Woolrych, to implement those 
administrative reforms upon which victory was ultimately achieved. Indeed, Woolrych 
claimed that Pym's contribution to parliament's eventual triumph was greater than that 
of its generals.47 This echoed John Morrill's bold assertion that 'The battles which were 
fought in the inns and secluded manor houses of rural England were to prove more 
decisive in deciding the outcome of the civil war than were most of the events on the 
battlefield. ,48 However Ronald Hutton reached a different conclusion, strongly 
suggesting that battles did indeed have a decisive effect upon the course of events.49 
This thesis will demonstrate that in 1643 at least, it was the tide of military events that 
drove the political agenda. Parliament's military collapse not only necessitated the 
Solemn League and Covenant, but also precipitated a political crisis that nearly ended 
the war in a negotiated surrender. The evidence strongly suggests that the campaigns 
and battles of the civil war dictated both the course of events and the final outcome of 
the conflict. 
In 2004 John Adamson transported parliament's crisis into the realms of a 
fleeting historiographical fashion dealing with counterfactual history. so It is perhaps 
indicative of way in which the crisis is perceived that a long overdue analysis such as 
this should emerge in the context of a historical 'what might have been'. While 
Adamson's work is exceptionally perceptive, its inclusion in a volume of similar crystal 
ball attempts to predict alternative historical outcomes tends to recast the crisis as 
somehow less than serious, existing only in a kind of science-fiction world occasionally 
visited by historians for light relief or public entertainment. Nevertheless, having made 
what may appear a rather harsh judgement, it has to be conceded that Adamson builds a 
vivid and strongly coherent picture of the events which provide Charles I with a war 
winning opportunity in the summer of 1643. One unfortunate consequence of the terms 
of the essay, however, is that the focus of the argument becomes a royalist missed 
opportunity rather than a battle for control of the parliamentarian cause. There is no 
mention of the tumultuous parliamentary debates in the Lords and Commons that 
decided the fate of the peace proposals, or the threat of Lord Mayor inspired militants to 
46 A. Woolrych, Britain in Revolution (Oxford, 2002), pp. 265&267. 
47 A. W oolrych, Battles of the English Civil War (London, 199 1), p. 49. 
41 J. S. Morrill, The Revolt in the Provinces (London, 1999), p. 74. 
49 R. Hutton, The Royalist War Effort 1642-1646 (London, 1982), p. 203. 
50 J. Adamson, 'King Charles I Wins the English Civil War', in A. Roberts (ed.), What Might Have Been 
(London, 2004), pp. 40-58. 
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take control of the war effort. This is a great shame because Adamson is without doubt 
the best equipped historian to cut through the inertia of the current historiography and 
produce a definitive account of these neglected days. 
In 2005 Richard Cust published an important and deeply empathetic political 
biography of Charles I. Cust correctly identified the king's military victories in the 
summer of 1643 as a vital breakthrough, providing the royalist with the potential to 
deliver 'a decisive blow'. In addition, Cust linked the political crisis which followed 
parliament's military disintegration with the publication, on 30 July, of a royal 
declaration. As we shall see in chapter three, it was this proclamation that prompted the 
House of Lords to draw up a series of peace proposals amounting to surrender. The 
king's declaration, Cust observed, was a carefully calculated attempt to exploit his 
military victories by splitting the parliamentarian movement apart. Cust's analysis 
represents an important contribution, confirming the seriousness of parliament's crisis 
from a royalist perspective. 51 
This review of the 1643 crisis has revealed a variety of historiographical views 
and conclusions. Though divergences of opinion are apparent, there remains a broad 
consensus in terms of importance. The period is occasionally described as pivotal, 
offering the very real prospect of a royalist triumph, but instead producing a renewed 
parliamentarian determination to continue the war. Although the crisis has not been 
subjected to a thorough and detailed analysis, two particular themes have nevertheless 
emerged: firstly the leadership of John Pym and secondly the creation of the Solemn 
League and Covenant. 
Pym's pre-eminence is perhaps remarkable given the absence of a well-defined 
or officially constituted party structure within the parliamentary system. According to 
Hexter, Pym managed a loose and fluid coalition of like-minded politicians, the 
composition of which, at any given moment, reflected the business in hand. Pym 
emerges as both a short-term fixer and a long-term planner. He has become 
synonymous with parliament's survival, the man who orchestrated the relief of 
Gloucester and paved the way for the Scottish alliance. It is Pym's political skills, rather 
than the crisis itself, which have become the dominant feature of this critical period. 
Pym's historiographical reputation has effectively relegated the near terminal condition 
of parliament's war effort to a stage upon which Pym performed his magic.52 This thesis 
will take an alternative tack, emphasising the key political differences between Pym and 
SI R. Cust, Charles I A Political Life (Harlow, 2005), pp. 378-379. 
S2 The whole tenor of Hexter's King Pym is that of the master-craftsman at work. See, for example, pages 
3 ]-34 for a telling assessment ofPym's political acumen. 
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London's radical Lord Mayor and war party MP Isaac Pennington. It is in this context 
that we shall view Pym's role in the dramatic events of early August 1643. 
Though the summer crisis of 1643 is eminently visible right across the 
historiography of the period, it has not to date received the kind of attention proposed 
here. While historians clearly acknowledge the existence of an emergency, its real 
significance as a pivotal moment in the conflict is not adequately expressed. Here we 
return to the point made at the beginning of this Introduction: Fairfax's New Model 
Army, the device by which the civil war was won, has effectively usurped parliament's 
crisis. The emergence of this war-winning force has divided the conflict into two 
distinct periods, its decisive impact obscuring the real importance of summer 1643. In 
redressing this historiographical imbalance it is the purpose of this thesis to show that 
parliament's crisis was as significant as the army that ultimately decided the conflict. 
Sources 
Historians of the English Civil War are fortunate to be able to draw upon a wide range 
of source material. The diversity of the surviving records allows a relatively detailed 
reconstruction of most civil war events. While the following survey is not exhaustive, it 
is nevertheless representative of the primary evidence underpinning this thesis. 53 
Indispensable to any student of the civil war are the daily records of the Houses 
of Parliament. The Journal of the House of Commons and the Journal of the House of 
Lords provide an important chronological account of parliamentary procedure and 
business. While the Journals do not present a verbatim account of debates and 
speeches, they nevertheless supply a detailed report, enabling complimentary sources to 
be identified and located. For example, the Journal of the House of Commons dated 5 
July 1643 reports a letter from Thomas Stockdale concerning events in the north of 
England. Though somewhat concise - the Journal outlines the contents of Stockdale's 
letter in the most succinct terms - it is possible to trace a complete transcription in a 
volume of the Historical Manuscripts Commission. 54 In addition, the Journal's matter-
of-fact recording of daily events supplies much raw data for close and detailed studies 
of specific aspects of the civil war. Jack Hexter's political biography of John Pym and 
Lotte Glow's analysis of the Committee of Safety are two particularly good examples.55 
53 G. Davies and M. F. Keeler (eds.), Bibliography of British History: Stuart Period /603-17/4 (London, 
1970); G. E. Aylmer and J. S. Morrill, The Civil War and Interregnum: sources for local historians 
(London, 1979). 
54 Journal of the House of Commons, vol. iii, p.155; Historical Manuscripts Commission (HMC), 
Portland Mss., vol. i, p.7l8. 
5S Hexter, Reign of King Pym; Lotte Glow, 'The Committee of Safety', English Historical Review, 80 
(1965), pp. 289-313. 
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The Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660 provide an excellent 
example of a printed primary source that works in perfect hannony with the Journals of 
the Lords and Commons. 56 Consisting of complete transcriptions of individual pieces of 
parliamentary legislation, the Acts and Ordinances supply some of the fine detail 
lacking in the Journals. Here are to be found the fruits of parliament's daily labours: the 
unprecedented imposition of direct and indirect taxation, the financial punishment of 
committed royalists, the direction of military policy, and the provisioning of the anned 
forces. Although dry, mundane, and often dauntingly voluminous, the invaluable detail 
of the Acts and Ordinances rarely fails to illuminate the wider military and political 
situation. 
The Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series is a similarly important and 
complementary source of official information. The Calendars contain full summaries of 
government papers received and despatched. The accuracy and coverage of the 1640-
1660 transcriptions are such that consultation of the originals is generally considered to 
provide little additional data. 57 Also calendared, in a parallel series, are the papers of 
two parliamentary revenue-raising committees established in 1643: the Calendar of the 
Committee for Compounding with Delinquents and the Calendar of the Committee for 
the Advance of Money. These committees represent important financial innovations, 
and are indicative of the increasing complexity, scale and gravity of the conflict. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for this study, the Calendar of the State Papers 
Venetian contains an enormous amount of pertinent material. The correspondence of the 
pro-royalist Venetian ambassador reveals a unique and thoroughly candid picture of 
political life in the capital. 
The Thomason Tracts, an extensive collection of political and religious 
publications assembled between 1640 and 1660 by the London bookseller George 
Thomason, constitutes one of the most celebrated collections of primary sources 
associated with the civil war.58 Though a good proportion of the books, pamphlets, and 
newspapers exhibit a clear propaganda function, many contain valuable political and 
military information, which can, on occasion, be crosschecked with more reliable 
sources. In order to obtain a better understanding of what parliamentarian newspapers 
were anxious to conceal or downplay, this thesis has made extensive use of the rival 
royalist publication Mercurius Aulicus. Though it is undoubtedly the case that the 
56 C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait (eds.), Acts and Ordinances o/the Interregnum. 1642-1660. (London, 1911). 
S7 Aylmer and Morrill, The Civil War and Interregnum: sources/or local historians, p. 6. 
SI The importance of the Thomason Tracts may be gained from the fact that in 1908 the British Museum 
published a two volume index of the collection. British Museum Dept. of Printed Books, Catalogue o/the 
pamphlets. books. newspapers, and manuscripts relating to the Civil War. the Commonwealth. and 
Restoration, collected by George Thomason, 1640-1661 (London, 1908),2 vols. 
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Thomason Tracts have to be handled with extreme care, especially the weekly 
newspapers, it is equally evident that the collection represents an indispensable aid to 
civil war study. 
John Rushworth, a contemporary of Thomason, was also an avid collector of 
civil war tracts. Many formed the basis of the later volumes of his Historical 
Collections, an attempt to allow the documentary 'evidence' of the 1640s to speak for 
itself, devoid of any interpretation or commentary. During the early years of the civil 
war Rushworth held the position of clerk-assistant to the House of Commons, an 
appointment that helps to explain royalist attacks upon his impartiality as a historian. It 
was Rushworth' s method to arrange his documents, reports and speeches 
chronologically, so that the reader was informed of the events they described without 
the interpolation of the historian. Consequently Rushworth's Historical Collections 
became an invaluable tool for later historians, and remains an important adjunct to the 
Thomason Tracts and other collections of printed works. 
The Historical Manuscripts Commission maintains and publishes further 
collections of printed works. The Commission began its work towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, making available calendared reports of a large number of privately 
held collections, many of which contained substantial quantities of civil war material. 
The reports, which include the testimony of both royalists and parliamentarians, 
emanate from all parts of the kingdom, and are an important indicator of provincial 
outlook and non-official London opinion. In addition, some of the reports contain 
transcripts of documents that cannot now be traced~ the example quoted above, Thomas 
Stockdale's letter to the House of Commons, being a case in point. 
Clarendon's illustrious History of the Rebellion is the most important 
contemporary history of the civil war.59 Edward Hyde (created earl of Clarendon in 
1661 )60 was elected MP for Saltash in the Long Parliament, but spent the war years as 
Charles' principal civilian adviser. A moderate and constitutional royalist, Clarendon 
favoured a negotiated settlement with parliament. Though rewarded with rank and 
office at the Restoration, Clarendon's subsequent political career was a disaster, ending 
in the humiliation of an Act of Banishment and lifelong exile. However, Clarendon's 
close proximity to the king placed him at the very centre of national events, and helped 
to secure a posthumous accolade of the highest order: the greatest writer of 
'9 W. D. Macray (ed.), The History o/the Rebellion by Edward, Earl o/Clarendon (Oxford. 1888),6 
vols. 
60 B. H. G. Wormald, Clarendon: Politics. Historiography and Religion 1640-1660 (London, 1951); 
R. W. Harris, Clarendon and the En4fs;, lie s .Jlltje" "ndon, 1983). 
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'contemporary history' in the English language.61 Clarendon has become the official 
voice of the royalist war effort. An almost encyclopaedic recollection of personalities 
and events provides historians with an incomparable account of the entire civil war. 
Although partisan and forthright, Clarendon's position at the epicentre of the king's war 
bestows an unimpeachable importance upon virtually every word. 
We turn now to the military campaigns of 1642 and 1643. The publication of a 
number of eyewitness memoirs (many of whose authors held positions of command or 
seniority) has afforded an invaluable insight into the battles and strategy of the civil 
war. Several memoirs are directly concerned with parliament's 'crisis' armies of 1643, 
illuminating the campaigns that brought parliament to the brink of total defeat. 
Although Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, Lord General of parliament's forces, 
failed to leave an autobiographical account of his military service, much of importance 
can be gathered from his surviving letters and dispatches.62 Furthermore, a number of 
those that served under the earl during 1642 and 1643 subsequently committed their 
experiences to writing. One such was the regicide Edmund Ludlow (1616-1692), who 
enlisted in Essex's bodyguard at the outbreak of the civil war.63 A vehement opponent 
of the king, Ludlow first saw action at Edgehill (23 October 1642) and was also present 
at Turnham Green (13 November 1642). Although he did not witness Essex's captw"e of 
Reading in April 1643 or the disintegration of the army in the weeks that followed, 
Ludlow's testimony nevertheless provides important evidence for the 1642 campaign 
and a more realistic assessment of Essex himself. 
A day-to-day record of the earl's army for 1643-1644 is supplied by the Journal 
of Sir Samuel Luke. 64 Having fought for parliament as a captain of horse at EdgehiU, 
Luke (1603-1670) was commissioned by Essex in January 1643 to raise a regiment of 
dragoons in his native Bedfordshire. Present during the siege of Reading (for which his 
diary was published in 1802), Luke distinguished himself at Chalgrove Field (18 June 
1643) alongside the mortally wounded John Hampden. He accompanied the earl's anny 
on the march to relieve Gloucester, and took part in the first battle of Newbury. The 
Journal, a product of Luke's appointment as scoutmaster-general in January 1643, 
documents his service from February 1643 to March 1644, during which time he was 
twice the recipient of official parliamentarian thanks. The importance of the Journal 
61 C. P. Hill, Who's Who in Stuart Britain (London, 1988), p. 103. For a further endorsement of 
Clarendon's literary and historiographical achievements, see Paul Seaward, • Hyde, Edward, fU"St earl of 
Clarendon (1609-1674),' Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004). 
62 W. B. Devereux, Lives and Letters of the Devereux, Earls of Essex, 1540-1646 (London, 1853), vol. ii; 
John Morrill, • Devereux, Robert, third earl of Essex (1591-) 646)' , Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography. 
63 Firth, Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow. 
64 I. G. Philips (cd.), Journal of Sir Samuel Luke, (Oxfordshire Record Society, 1950-1953),29,31,33. 
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lays in its unusually detailed portrayal of reconnaissance and infonnation gathering, 
despite the editorial reservations of I. G. Philips over the effectiveness of the 
intelligence itself. Always at the forefront of the action, Sir Samuel Luke earned a 
reputation for efficiency, dogged commitment and personal courage. 
A brief glimpse of everyday rank and file life in the earl's army is provided by a 
small collection of letters written by Nehemiah Wharton, a junior officer.6s A native of 
London, Wharton probably enlisted in the capital during July 1642. His correspondence 
records the progress of the parliamentarian army from its arrival at Acton on 8 August 
1642 to the occupation of Worcester on 24 September. The date of Wharton's final 
letter, written at Worcester on 7 October, prompted speculation that he might have 
perished at Edgehill on 23 October. The modem reader would almost certainly be struck 
by Wharton's emphasis on religion. Whether describing the frequent preaching of 
uplifting sennons, the Lord's part in healing divisions within the parliamentary army, or 
the ungodliness of the citizens of Worcester and Hereford, man's relationship with the 
Almighty was never far from the author's thoughts. Wharton's piety - and that of others 
like him - supports the argument that the issue of religion was the principal cause of the 
civil war. 
Essex's campaigns of 1642 and 1643, waged against the king's principal field 
army, brought the earl into direct confrontation with the most dynamic royalist 
commander of the war: Prince Rupert. Rupert's ceaseless activity generated an 
enonnous correspondence, much of which was administered by his secretary Colonel 
Benett. The collection, consisting of more than one thousand letters, formed the basis of 
Eliot Warburton's Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers. 66 Warburton makes it 
clear that the work was intended as a source of reference rather than a definitive portrait 
of Rupert's career. While the Memoirs are undoubtedly a useful starting point for any 
military study of the civil war, of particular interest is the political situation in which the 
book was conceived. Published in 1849 (a year after continental Europe had been 
convulsed by a series of revolutions), Warburton argued that England had avoided a 
similar fate because divisive constitutional issues had been resolved by the civil wars of 
the seventeenth century. However, the author went on to warn the nation's leaders that 
educational and material neglect might well persuade the lower orders to follow in the 
footsteps of their European counterparts.67 
65 Sir H. Ellis (ed.), Nehemiah Wharton, 'Letters from a Subaltern Officer of the Earl of Essex's Anny" 
Archaeologia, 35 (1853), 310-334. 
66 E. Warburton, Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers (London, ] 849). 
67 Ibid., voU, pp. 14-16. 
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The memOlrs of Sir Thomas Fairfax (1612-1671) record the Yorkshire 
campaigns of parliament's northern army from 1642 through to 1644.68 Commanded by 
Sir Thomas' father, Ferdinando Lord Fairfax, the northern army was confronted from 
December 1642 by the earl of Newcastle's relatively well-trained and numerically 
superior royalist forces. Appointed general of the horse and second in command to his 
father, the younger Fairfax captured Leeds in January 1643 and stormed Wakefield 
against tremendous odds four months later. Though the northern army suffered a 
crushing defeat at Adwalton Moor (June 1643) the Fairfaxes refused to capitulate. 
From within the stronghold of Hull new forces were quickly raised, which proved to be 
a constant thorn in royalist flesh throughout the remainder of 1643 and into 1644. 
Though Sir Thomas' memoirs were composed towards the end of his life, they remain 
an invaluable account of the relatively neglected but fundamentally important northern 
war. 
One of the two principal royalist memoirs of the Yorkshire war occurs in a 
biography of William Cavendish, earl of Newcastle, commander of the king's northern 
army, written by Margaret Lucas his second wife.69 Though published during 
Newcastle's lifetime, Lucas relied upon John Rolleston, her husband's secretary, for 
details of his military career. The paucity of information provided by Rolleston, when 
he would in all probability have known a great deal more, is a defect much regretted by 
the biography's twentieth century editor Charles Firth.7o However, it appears that 
Lucas' primary purpose was the rehabilitation of her husband's reputation. Newcastle's 
flight into exile following the devastating parliamentarian victory at Marston Moor in 
July 1644 left a long shadow over the earl's loyalty to the royalist cause. 
In the west of England Sir William Waller was commissioned Major General of 
parliament's Western Association army in February 1643. Although Waller (1598-
1668) left several accounts of his life, none could be described as a military memoir in 
the conventional sense. Sir William's Recollections provide the greatest detail, but even 
here the narrative takes the form of a philosophical reflection rather than a campaign 
history.71 It was Waller's unflinching conviction that his battlefield triumphs, and a 
number of timely deliverances from a variety of dangers and disasters, were a 
manifestation of God's providence. Conversely, he was equally convinced that his 
several defeats were instances of divine punishments, the inevitable consequence of 
68 Thomas Lord Fairfax, 'A Short Memorial of the Northern Actions During the War There, From The 
Year 1642 Till 1644,' Yorlcshire Archaeological Journal, vol. viii (1884). 
69 Firth (ed.), Life of William Cavendish. 
70 Ibid., p. ix. 
71 William Waller, 'Recollections,' in H. Cowley, The Poetry of Anna Mati/da (London, 1788), pp. 103-
39. 
28 
regrettable lapses in character. Despite Waller's determination to reconcile the vagaries 
of his civil war experiences with a strongly held belief in the intervention of the Lord, 
Recollections nevertheless contains one or two useful insights into parliament's western 
campaign of 1643. For example, Waller attempted to explain his defeat at Roundway 
Down by accusing Essex of a dereliction of duty in not preventing the decisive 
intervention of reinforcements from the king's Oxford army. 
The course of the western war in 1643 pitted Waller against one of the most 
effective commanders of the entire conflict. Sir Ralph Hopton (1596-1652), lieutenant 
general of royalist forces in Cornwall, led a remarkably tenacious and extremely 
effective army. Bellum Civile 72 records Hopton's epic struggle against Waller during 
July 1643 when the royalists narrowly avoided disaster at Lansdown, were almost 
compelled to surrender at Devizes, and finally triumphed in spectacular fashion at 
Roundway Down. Hopton's memoire is supplemented by additional eyewitness 
accounts of Lansdown, Roundway Down and Prince Rupert's storming of Bristol, 
rendering the work an indispensable source for the entire west-country campaigns of 
1642-1644. 
Methodology and Structure 
The way in which historians construct their work and the methods they employ vary 
greatly. Many historical works take a themed approach in which a concept is developed 
to illustrate a larger truth relating to the subject under consideration. This may be 
justified on the grounds that a particular aspect of a historical investigation or 
controversy is particularly relevant to a deeper understanding of a wider problem. 
Approaches such as this are undoubtedly valuable and have found an increasingly 
prominent place in both academic and popular histories. This thesis, which 
acknowledges the validity of such techniques, will nevertheless adopt an altogether 
more traditional approach. Because of the nature of parliament's crisis it is appropriate 
to pursue, in some parts of the thesis, a day-by-day dissection of events. This adherence 
to the strict discipline of chronology is required to unlock the truth about a crucial but 
largely hidden period of the English Civil War. The events of the first week of August 
1643 have received a passing and sometimes perfunctory treatment by historians. This 
failure to dig deep has ensured that a pivotal moment in the conflict has languished in 
almost complete obscurity. Perhaps hindsight has prevented a proper appreciation of the 
real gravity of the situation. For example, Michael Braddick has observed that historians 
72 c. E. H. Chadwyck Healey (ed.), Bellum Civile: Hopton's narrative o/his campaigns in the West, 
1642-1644, (Somerset Record Society, 1902), 18. 
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are able to impose some kind of artificial order on the various campaigns fought in 
different parts of the country. Yet for those living through the civil war, news received 
on a weekly basis was probably confusing and made much less sense.73 It is precisely 
this type of real time analysis that will be employed in this thesis to cut through the fog 
of a retrospective approach and uncover the truth about an unrecognised turning point in 
the civil war. 
The structure adopted in this thesis consists of six chronologically sequenced 
chapters. The first two consist of a military and administrative study of the 
parliamentarian war effort from the outbreak of fighting in the summer of 1642 to the 
eve of crisis in mid to late June 1643. Chapters three and four describe the crisis itself, 
portraying the calamitous high summer of July and August 1643, and presenting a 
detailed analysis of the military and political factors that led to the collapse of the 
parliamentarian war effort. Chapters five and six focus on reactions and effects, 
examining both parliamentary and royalist responses to the crisis, and illustrating the 
longer-term military, political, and religious consequences. 
Chapter one provides a military examination of the parliamentarian war effort 
from the beginning of the conflict in mid 1642 to the eve of parliament's disintegration 
in June 1643. The discussion concentrates upon the respective commanders and 
campaigns of parliament's 'crisis' armies: Robert Devereux earl of Essex (Lord General 
of the principal field army), Ferdinando Lord Fairfax (General of the Northern Army) 
and Sir William Waller (Major-General of the West). The chapter is divided into three 
case studies, exploring the military capabilities of each general, their individual 
campaigns, and the wider impact of war effort. The case studies aim to evaluate Essex, 
Fairfax and Waller as potential causes of crisis, while simultaneously elucidating the 
course of campaigning during the first year of the civil war. The results of this approach 
will be fully discussed in a wider analysis of parliamentarian failure in chapter four. 
Chapter two seeks to consider the development of parliament's political and 
fmancial strategy as a potential cause of crisis. The chapter will show how parliament's 
. inherent caution resulted in an administrative machine that was largely unfit for 
purpose. During the first half of 1643 the overbearing influence of the peace party 
ensured that negotiations received the same priority as the military pursuit of the 
conflict. The outcome was a war effort that teetered towards crisis as peace talks broke 
down and the king grew in military strength. 
Taken together, chapters one and two form the background to parliament's 
crisis, revealing the events that led to the eventual collapse of the war effort in the 
13 M. Braddick, God's Fury, England's Fire (London, 2008), p. 266. 
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summer of 1643. The separate campaign studies of chapter one sit alongside and 
complement the political analysis of chapter two. These chapters attempt to emphasise 
factors that are normally ignored or underplayed, resulting is a fresh view of the civil 
war from a largely neglected angle. 
Chapter three describes and analyses the disintegration of the parliamentarian 
war effort from late June through to early August 1643. The chapter describes a 
withering succession of royalist military triumphs, resulting in a political emergency 
that almost ended in parliamentarian capitulation. The seeming inevitability of defeat 
persuaded a dwindling and demoralised House of Lords, supported by similarly pacific 
elements in the Commons, to offer a political surrender in order to avert a military 
catastrophe. Parliament, it appeared, was now prepared to abandon the hard won 
religious and political gains of the Long Parliament in exchange for a pardon and a way 
out. The crisis came to a head in the House of Commons on 7 August 1643 when peace 
proposals matching those demanded by the king four months earlier were defeated by 
intimidation and political chicanery. Parliament was hauled back from the very edge of 
capitulation by the City'S threat to take control of the war effort. It is an extraordinary 
and largely untold story, affirming the importance of parliament's crisis and the defeat 
of the peace proposals. 
Chapter four will attempt to explain the collapse of the parliamentarian war 
effort during the summer of 1643. The first section examines the way in which 
historians have understood and commented upon the causes of parliament's crisis; the 
second brings together evidence provided by chapters one and two of the thesis; while 
the third consists of a comparative analysis of both historiography and thesis findings. 
The chapter will argue that a failure to properly investigate the causes of parliament's 
military collapse has resulted in a diminution of the crisis in current histories of the 
conflict. 
Chapter five describes contemporary reactions of both parliamentarians and 
royalists to parliament's military collapse, revealing the extent to which a sense of 
parliamentarian defeat was matched by a comparable sense of royalist triumph. This is 
important. The degree to which the king and his supporters believed the crisis to 
constitute a genuine war-winning opportunity is a significant indicator of the situation's 
true gravity. The contemporary impact of the emergency once again reveals the extent 
to which modem historians have failed to appreciate the real seriousness of parliament's 
crisis. As far as those caught up in these epic events were concerned, parliament's 
military collapse signalled the end of the civil war. 
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Chapter six discusses the repercussions of parliament's crisis, showing how the 
disintegration of the war effort affected the subsequent course of the conflict. The 
urgent need for military assistance forced parliament into a Scottish alliance - the 
Solemn League and Covenant - which compelled both sides to make important and at 
times uncomfortable compromises. A hugely significant consequence of the Solemn 
League and Covenant was the emergence of the Independent-Presbyterian split, a series 
of religious and political divisions that characterised parliament's war effort for the 
remainder of the conflict and beyond. The significant point, as far as this thesis is 
concerned, is that these divisions were a direct result of parliament's 1643 crisis. Finally 
the chapter will demonstrate that the dramatic upturn in parliament's military fortunes 
during 1644 was due to a transformation in cooperation between commanders and a 
corresponding failure of cooperation amongst royalist commanders. This twist in the 
story of military collaboration underlines the importance of cooperation, both as a key 
to parliament's crisis and to military success as a whole. 
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Chapter One 
THE MILITARY ROAD TO CRISIS: 
ESSEX, FAIRFAX AND WALLER, JULY 1M2-JUNE 1643 
The catastrophic collapse of the parliamentarian war effort during July 1643 resulted 
from three military disasters: the disintegration of parliament's principal field army 
commanded by Robert Devereux earl of Essex; the destruction of parliament's northern 
army commanded by Ferdinando Lord Fairfax; and the annihilation of parliament's 
Western Association army commanded by Sir William Waller. In order to identify the 
reasons for these failures, chapter one will examine the campaigns of Essex, Fairfax, 
and Waller from the outbreak of civil war in July 1642 to the eve of military breakdown 
in June 1643. Relevant findings will be incorporated into a detailed examination of 
parliament's crisis in chapter three, followed by a wider analysis of parliamentarian 
failure in chapter four. 
Robert Devereux earl of Essex 
As one historian with considerable understatement put it 'Historiography has not been 
kind to Robert Devereux, third earl of Essex.,74 With one or two exceptions7s the earl's 
military reputation has been subjected to an almost continual assault, and the view that 
Essex 'was a mediocre general even by the amateurish standards of the Civil War' is 
now fairly well entrenched.76 Samuel Gardiner set the tone, declaring that 'During the 
whole of his career [Essex] never showed any sign of ability to regard a campaign as a 
whole, in which the activities of each separate force is to be combined for the 
achievement of a common end.,77 And as if to account for, or possibly excuse, the 
virulence of these attacks it has been explained that 'His deficiencies are more obvious 
to us than they were to his contemporaries in 1642.,78 However, it will be argued here 
that criticism of Essex's 1642 and 1643 campaigns largely fails to appreciate the serious 
difficulties that confronted the Lord General. Indeed, it is the purpose of this study to 
demonstrate that the earl's military abilities were not incommensurate with the onerous 
74 G. Seel, 'Cromwell's Trailblazer? Reinterpreting The Earl of Essex,' History Today (April 1995), p. 
23. 
7S Most notably G. Davies, 'The Parliamentary Army under the Earl of Essex, 1642-1645', English 
Historical Review, 49 (1934), pp. 32-54. 
76 A. Wooirych, Banles o/the English Civil Wor(London, 1991), p. 13. 
77 S. R. Gardiner, History o/the Great Civil War 1642-1649 (London, 1904), vol. i, p. 134. 
71 J. Kenyon, The Civil Wars o/England(London, 1988), p. 33. 
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demands placed upon him, and that historians have generally ignored the real reasons 
for his apparent ineffectiveness. 
The question of the earl's character, as opposed to his military prowess, has 
elicited a much more favourable response from both contemporaries and historians 
alike. It is these well-attested qualities that provide a much surer guide to his mettle 
during the arduous campaigns of 1642 and 1643. Edmund Ludlow, who fought in the 
earl's army at Edgehill, declared that nothing could 'hinder him from discharging 
vigorously that trust which the Parliament had reposed in him.' 79 In the 1940s Jack 
Hexter asserted that Essex 'had accepted a trust which men less resolute than himself 
would have shirked; he was the only man Parliament was willing to put in charge of an 
army.'80 It is not surprising' therefore that the earl's manifest integrity should 
recommend itself to his soldiers, for as Essex's most recent biographer has commented 
'He was a good commander, showing concern and compassion for his men, and they 
followed him loyally.,8l 
As the Lord General failed to provide an account or memoir of his participation 
in the civil war, the grounds upon which he opposed the king have given rise to 
alternative explanations. His principal biographer places the earl's dissatisfaction and 
antagonism within the late medieval context of aristocratic opposition to royal policy. 
Essex, it is argued, would 'foster the removal of those councilors who surrounded the 
King,' retaliating 'against his enemies through parliamentary means. ,82 This analysis, 
however, tends to bracket the earl with the great majority of those politically or 
religiously alienated by the king and his advisers. It places Essex in the mainstream and 
rather inadequately defines his opposition as unexceptional. The earl was the leading 
aristocrat in the House of Lords to side with parliament, and as an earlier biographer 
deduced, his conduct betrayed a more personal agenda: 
I would therefore conclude, that the ambition of leading a great party, and of 
being a principal means in humbling the Sovereign by whom he conceived he 
had been ill-used, added to the suspicions he entertained of Charles's sincerity, 
led Lord Essex to adopt a line of conduct which was certainly inconsistent with 
his professions of loyalty. 83 
79 c. H. Firth (ed.), Memoirs 0/ Edmund Ludlow (Oxford, 1894), pp. 36-37. 
80 J. H. Hexter, The Reign o/King Pym (Cambridge, 1941), pp. 92-93. 
II John Morrill, 'Devereux, Robert, third earl of Essex (1591-1646),' Ox/ord Dictionary o/National 
Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
12 V. F. Snow, Essex the Rebel (University of Nebraska, 1970), p. 300. 
13 W. B. Devereux, Lives and Lellers o/the Devereux, Earls o/Essex, 1540-1646 (London, 1853), vol. ii. 
pp.340-341. 
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In fact it was Charles' father, James I, who initially slighted the earl. In 1613 Essex was 
forced to suffer the disgrace and ridicule of a Royal Commission of Inquiry into his 
marriage with Frances Howard. Following the personal intervention of the king, the 
union was humiliatingly dissolved on the grounds of impotence.84 It is from this point 
that Essex became an assiduous opponent of royal policy; in every parliament from 
1614 onwards he was a principled but dogged 'thorn in royal flesh.'85 
Clarendon's assessment of the earl was altogether more charitable. He 
exonerated Essex of knowingly committing treason, but believed he was manipulated 
by dishonorable and superior intellects. A muddled figure, sadly out of his depth in the 
politics of rebellion: 
No man had credit enough with him to corrupt him in point of loyalty to the 
King ... But the new doctrine and distinction of allegiance, and of the King's 
power in and out of Parliament, and the new notions of ordinances, were too 
hard for him, and did really intoxicate his understanding. 86 
This relatively moderate, if misguided, political position appears to have coincided with 
the earl's religious views, for as John Morrill has recently commented, 'He was a man 
of conventional godly piety' who 'showed precocious alarm at the demands for a 
reconstruction of the church settlement, clearly fearing the political and social 
consequences of root and branch reform.,87 Thus Essex was neither a religious radical 
nor a rabid threat to the institution of monarchy, so the ease with which he appears to 
have drifted into armed rebellion is interesting. It is perhaps significant that following 
his public humiliation in 1613 Essex was advised by a sympathetic friend to remember 
that he was the son of a great man, a national hero.88 Essex, it seems, was determined to 
prove that he was not impotent when it came to matters of politics and principle, and 
that he was prepared to lead armed opposition to the king if the situation demanded it. 
Here was an opportunity to face down those lesser men who had found his marital 
affairs amusing, and to show that he was a figure to be reckoned with, much as his 
father had been before him. He would demonstrate, on the most public of stages, that he 
was worthy of the Devereux name and the earldom of Essex. 
The earl's military experience was greater 'than anyone of his rank in the 
English peerage.,89 Yet, according to John Morrill, the effect of serving in largely 
... Ibid., pp. 246, 254, 256, 271-272. 
IS Morrill, 'earl of Essex' ,Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
16 W. D. Macray (cd.), The History of the Rebellion by Edward Earl of Clarendon (Oxford, 1888), vol. ii, 
Pi ~~;';II, 'earl of Essex' , Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
8. Devereux, Lives and Letters of the Earls of Essex, vol. ii, pp. 272-273. 
19 Morrill, 'earl of Essex', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
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unsuccessful protestant armies in the Rhineland from 1620 to 1624 made Essex 'a 
negative and reactive commander, which helps to explain his failings in the civil 
wars.'9O But on the eve of political breakdown the military setbacks of the 1620s 
mattered little to the House of Commons. During the spring and summer of 1642 Essex 
led parliament's military and diplomatic preparations, initially to suppress the Irish 
rebellion, and subsequently to raise an army to fight the king. Such was the earl's 
prestige that a resolution to appoint him 'General in this Cause' passed unopposed in 
both Houses on 12 July. Without the slightest reticence or hesitation, parliament 
emphatically declared that it would 'live and die with the Earl of Essex.'91 
One important factor often overlooked by historians is the degree to which 
Essex's strategy during 1642 and 1643 was influenced by the sheer unreliability of 
many of his soldiers. To a greater or lesser extent this would have been a consideration 
for all civil war commanders, but the fact that Essex carried parliament's political fate 
onto the battlefield only made a difficult situation worse. He appeared to adopt a 
cautious approach because a single defeat could bring about the collapse of the entire 
parliamentarian cause. Essex had to balance the military capabilities of his untried army 
against the onerous burden of his political responsibilities. When he first reviewed his 
forces at Northampton on 14 September 1642 he was confronted with widespread ill 
discipline and insubordination. Nehemiah Wharton, a junior officer, described how his 
regiment had threatened to 'surrender their arms' unless arrears of pay were made good, 
and how units of parliamentarian cavalry 'sometimes pillaged and wounded' their own 
infantry.92 The king's secretary of state, Sir Edward Nicholas, wrote from Derby on 15 
September that 'Essex's men are very mutinous, saying still that they are all fellow 
traitors, insomuch that he stirs not with them out of Northampton. ,93 Five regimental 
commanders wrote to Essex warning that unless discipline improved, the army 'will 
grow as odious to the country as the cavaliers. ,94 Essex was forced to petition the Lord 
Mayor of London for a 'speedy loane of one hundred thousand pounds,' explaining 
'you well know our Anny consists of such as cannot be kept one day together without 
pay: what a ruine it would bring upon us all if a disbanding should happen' .95 Part of the 
90 Ibid 
91 Snow, Essex the Rebel, pp. 301-307; House o/Commons Journal, vol. ii, p. 668. 
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problem may have arisen from a lack of officers, for as early as 7 August 1642 it was 
observed that 'for want of others, many Scotchmen are entertained to assist the 
commanders of the Parliament forces.'96 If Essex had shared the optimism of the future 
regicide Edmund Ludlow, 'that the justice of that cause I had engaged in ... [was] so 
evident, that I could not imagine it to be attended with much difficulty,' then the 
situation at Northampton would have quickly dispelled any complacency.97 
The first skirmish of the campaign, at Powick Bridge south of Worcester on 23 
September, provided the earl with further cause for concern.98 A royalist detachment 
commanded by Prince Rupert defeated forward units of the parliamentarian army as 
they approached the town. Though consisting of less than 2,000 combatants all told, the 
action nevertheless exerted a significant influence upon Essex's subsequent strategy. 
Once broken the parliamentarian troopers fled in considerable disorder, despite the 
efforts of one or two officers to maintain discipline. Particularly worrying was the 
manner in which the earl's lifeguard, uninvolved in the fighting, became caught up in 
the blind panic of retreat. An eyewitness reported that the lifeguard 'retired to the army 
in a very dishonorable manner,' where they 'received but cold welcome from the 
general.'99 The ignominy of the lifeguard's flight was such that 'nothing but some 
desperate exploit will wipe [it] Off.'IOO While Powick Bridge established Prince Rupert's 
reputation as a fearless and terrifying cavalry commander, Essex was faced with the 
growing worry that his soldiers were simply not up to the job. 101 
On 24 September the earl entered Worcester where the army remained for 
almost four weeks. Parliament instructed Essex 'to fight, at such Time and Place as you 
shalljudge ... the Army raised in his Majesty's Name' and 'in some safe and honourable 
Way, to cause the Petition of both Houses of Parliament ... to be presented to his 
Majesty.,I02 Parliament's petition was crucial because it was intended as a precursor to 
any major military action. The document humbly beseeched the king to withdraw from 
the 'wicked Persons' assembled about him, so that they might be 'suppressed by that 
Power which [the parliament] have sent against them.'103 Essex has been criticized for 
96 CSPD. 1641-1643, p. 367. 
97 Firth (ed.), Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, p. 38. 
98 For a detailed accolDlt of Po wick Bridge see P. YOlDlg & R. Holmes, The English Civil War: A 
Military History of the Three Civil Wars 1642-1651 (London, 1974), pp. 69-71. 
99 Firth (ed.), Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow. p.41. 
100 Ellis (ed.), Nehemiah Wharton, p. 326. 
101 Malcolm Wanklyn has suggested that the shock of Rupert's victory at Powick may have deterred 
Essex from further attempts to disrupt the concentration of the king's army at Shrewsbury. M. Wanklyn, 
Decisive Battles of the English Civil War (Bamsley, 2006), p. 36. 
102 Journal of the House of Commons, vol. ii, p. 778. 
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the length of time spent at Worcester,l04 but it was 18 October before he was able to 
inform parliament that Charles, who was recruiting an army at Shrewsbury, had refused 
the second of two protracted attempts to present the petition.105 Moreover it was 
obvious to Essex that his men were in no condition to fight, so the delay at Worcester 
was occupied with much needed drill and weapons training. In a speech given to his 
officers before the town was entered, Essex revealingly requested: 
that you be careful in the exercising of your men, and bring them to use their 
arms readily and expertly, and not to busy them in practicing the ceremonious 
forms of military discipline; only let them be well instructed in the necessary 
rudiments of war, that they may know how to fallon with discretion, and how to 
retreat with care; how to maintain their order, and make good their ground. 106 
If, as one historian has suggested, parliament underestimated the size of the task that lay 
ahead, then the battle of Edgehill, fought on 23 October, must have come as a sobering 
experience.107 The evidence presented above strongly suggests that Essex was acutely 
aware of the army's shortcomings. But what the earl cannot have foreseen, and what 
many historians have tended to misunderstand, is the real nature of the crisis that 
confronted the Lord General in the immediate aftermath of the first great clash of arms. 
Charles I left Shrewsbury on 12 October hoping to reach London before Essex 
could intervene. The earl had intelligence of the king's movements by 18 October but 
was unable to place his forces between the royal army and the capital. Essex is 
sometimes criticized for allowing Charles to interpose his forces at Edgehill, but as 
Clarendon candidly admitted 'neither army knew where the other'was.,108 In early civil 
war England large armies moved slowly (particularly during the wet autumn) and 
reconnaissance was poor. Essex was in fact no better or worse than the king. 
There was a hope, an expectation even, that Edgehill would finish the war at a 
stroke. I09 Yet it has been suggested that Essex was reluctant to attack first, 110 that he 
was honour bound to allow Charles I to initiate combat. This is a misreading of 
circumstances. Clarendon stated that once the two armies made contact it was in 
Charles I's interests to precipitate a battle: 
104 Peter Newman stated that 'the earl showed a fateful indecisiveness,' P. R. Newman, Atlas of the 
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two of [parliament's] strongest and best regiments of foot, and one regiment of 
horse, was a day's march behind With their ammunition ... the King's numbers 
could not increase, [but] the enemy's might. III 
If it appeared that Essex was in no hurry to fight it was because he was waiting for 
reinforcements. But when the opposing armies were finally drawn up it was, in fact, 
Essex who began the battle! The official royalist account states that the parliamentarian 
ordnance opened fire first, I 12 and Edmund Ludlow recalled that part of the 
bombardment was directed 'upon that part of the army wherein, as it was reported, the 
King was.' 113 These are hardly the actions of one who took a deferential view of 
fighting his king. 114 
Edgehill is generally considered to be a draw. I IS Though the severity of the 
fighting shattered both armies the critical consequence, as Vernon Snow has 
demonstrated, was that a royalist seizure of London was forestalled. 116 The day after the 
battle Essex received the 4,000 reinforcements he had been waiting for, but to the 
dismay of some parliamentarians the earl ordered a withdrawal to Warwick rather than 
a reengagement with the enemy.117 As a result, it has been claimed, Essex lost his 
reputation as a general. I IS What these criticisms fail to recognize, however, is the almost 
terminal condition of the parliamentary army in the days that followed Edgehill.119 
Clarendon stated that the number of parliamentarian dead was far greater than reported, 
and that the subsequent failure to prevent the loss of Banbury revealed Essex to be 
'more broken and scattered than at first he appeared to be.' 120 Two days after the battle 
Prince Rupert discovered 'houses full of wounded and sick men' behind the now 
evacuated parliamentarian lines.121 In addition the official Parliamentary account, 
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written jointly by six senior officers because Essex was too busy,122 conceded that the 
army required three or four days rest before any resumption of the campaign could be 
contemplated.123 Clarendon added that the earl had lost a great many officers taken 
prisoner, and that the king's herald, following an interview with Essex himself, reported 
'so much trouble and disorder ... and so much dejection' that Essex and his army 'had no 
farther ambition than to keep what they had left.' 124 It seems clear that the 
parliamentarian army was in a pretty desperate condition. 
Because parliament knew in advance of the king' s strategy to strike for 
London,125 it is assumed that following Edgehill the Lord General's overriding priority 
became a race to reach the capital before Charles I. The evidence, however, suggests 
otherwise. In withdrawing to Warwick on 25 October it is clear that Essex abandoned 
any thought of an immediate march southward. Rather, one is forced to conclude that 
the earl's principal concern became the consolidation of his depleted forces. The official 
royalist account of the battle claimed that 'the sudden returning back of the rebels to 
Warwick is ... a sure argument of the weakness of their army.'126 And the official 
parliamentarian account concluded with an appeal to the Houses to raise the southern 
counties standing between the king's army and London. 127 While Charles advanced 
unhindered, it was reported that an increasingly nervous parliament dispatched 
'Expresses ... to the Earl of Essex, to make all possible Haste with the Anny to London, 
and prevent the King's Coming before him.'128 
But the earl was unable to respond, and it is the view of the present writer that 
his sole objective became, quite simply, the preservation of the army he commanded. At 
Edgehill the parliamentarian cavalry, save for a couple of regiments deployed amongst 
the foot, had been chased from the field. The infantry had fought with real 
determination, led by Essex himself,129 but had sustained critical losses in terms of 
casualties and subsequent desertions. 130 The Lord General feared that the remnants, 
though reinforced, were unlikely to prevail in a second battle, particularly as the 
parliamentarian cavalry had been so decisively defeated at both Powick Bridge and 
Edgehill. Essex realized that political resistance at Westminster would disintegrate ifhe 
122 Ibid., p. 305. 
123 J. Rushworth, Historical Collections (London, 1721), vol. v, p. 38. 
124 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. ii, p. 365. 
12' Snow, Essex the Rebel, p. 333. 
126 Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 35. 
127 Ibid, p. 38. 
121 Sir Richard Bulstrode cited in Young, Edgehill, p. 273. 
129 The official parliamentary account revealed that Essex 'did gallantly adventure himself' exposing 
'himself to more danger than we would have wished.' Rushworth, Historical CollectiOns, vol. v, p. 39. 
130 Malcolm Wanklyn has argued that Essex 'must be praised for keeping his head' at Edgehill 'and 
making the most effective use of the forces he had left.' Wanklyn, Decisive Banles, p. 49. 
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were to be defeated in the field, and so it became his main concern to avoid any 
confrontation with the royal army, a priority that took precedence over out marching the 
king to London. 131 Essex almost certainly calculated that the capital would organize its 
own defence so long as he remained at the head of an undefeated parliamentary army. 132 
In the event it was the dilatory progress of the king that enabled Essex to reach 
the capital first.133 Vernon Snow has demonstrated that the earl's overriding 
consideration remained his disintegrating army. Between 1 and 5 November Essex 
wrote to the deputy lieutenants of Lincolnshire and Buckinghamshire, earnestly 
requesting arms and equipment, and to John Pym at Westminster, appealing for a search 
of London and the county of Essex for those soldiers who had deserted the army.134 But 
it was not long before the king's army reached the outskirts of the capital, attacking 
Brentford on 12 November. 13S Despite fierce resistance Prince Rupert stormed the town 
and inflicted severe casualties. Parliament immediately ordered the London Trained 
Bands, together with the remaining Edgehill veterans, to rendezvous at Turnham Green. 
The following day the two armies faced each other without coming to blows. Though 
Essex commanded 24,000 men (an advantage of two to one), he was fully aware of the 
folly of abandoning his strong defensive position in favor of an assault. Rupert had 
triumphed in three successive engagements; a fourth defeat now would herald nothing 
less than total and final defeat. Thus Essex declined to outflank the royal army with 
forces positioned to the south at Kingston, and later aborted a similar encircling 
movement via Acton to the north. 136 When the king finally withdrew many disgruntled 
parliamentarians believed certain victory had been squandered. 'The Parliament-men 
and Gentlemen that were Officers, were for engaging, but the Soldiers of Fortune,' on 
whose judgment the Lord General most relied, 'were altogether against it.' 137 Essex was 
guided, rightly, by the reality of the military situation, for 'it was too hazardous to 
follow the enemy, and honour and safety enough to the parliament ·that the king was 
I3J The Venetian Ambassadorreported that Essex 'has taken a route away from the royal army.' CSPV, 
1642-1643, p. 198. 
132 On 16 October, one week before Edgehill, 'the captains of the trained bands of the City renewed, in 
the name of the 8,000 men whom they commanded, their resolution to live and die with the parJiament, 
and the great majority of the men declared themselves ready to follow their leaders in the service of the 
City even beyond the City precincts.' Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, p. 38. Before this, on 26 August, 
Lords and Commons had directed Essex to leave two regiments of foot and four troops of horse for the 
safety of the City. C. H. Firth & R. S. Rait (eds.), Acts and Ordinances o/the Interregnum J642-J660 
(London, 1911), vol. i, p. 24. 
133 The future James II, who was present at Edgehill, observed that the king 'delayed his opportunity so 
long that he lost it and the Earl of Essex got before him to the city.' Young, Edgehill, p. 280. 
134 'The situation was grave, Essex admitted, but all was not lost.' Snow, Essex the Rebel, p. 340. 
I3S Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 59. 
136 Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, pp. 58-59. 
137 Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p.60. 
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retreated. ,138 Although Essex had avoided disaster, the campaign created a perception 
that he was a sluggish and reactive commander, and that an opportunity to win the war 
had been squandered. However, as the above analysis has demonstrated, Essex 
prevented a royalist victory at Edgehill with an unreliable army, denied the king an 
opportunity to destroy the remnants of his forces in the aftermath of battle, and, heavily 
reinforced, defended the capital at Turnham Green. By carefully preserving the army 
entrusted to his command, Essex ensured the survival of the parliamentarian cause. 
It has been argued that during the winter of 1642-1643 'Essex was quite 
prepared to hibernate' and 'was only too happy to live a quiet life.' 139 This assessment 
fails to appreciate the earl's priorities in the wake of the Edgehill campaign and the 
great problems that prevented any major offensive until the spring. While the king 
withdrew to fortify Oxford the Lord General concerned himself with the defence of the 
capital. Having established his headquarters at Windsor, Essex 'got as much ground as 
at that time of the year could reasonably be expected' and 'brought those adjacent 
counties entirely under the obedience of the parliament, which would at least have kept 
themselves neutral.' 140 Despite political pressure to launch an attack, the poor condition 
of the parliamentary army precluded any possibility of a winter campaign. Reduced in 
terms of quality and quantity by reorganization, desertion, sickness, want of pay, and 
even defections, Essex could in reality do little more than 'defend the home counties 
from royalist incmsions.'141 
On 13 April 1643, the day after the collapse of the Oxford peace negotiations, 
Essex finally set out to besiege Reading (and ultimately Oxford) with a newly recruited 
army of 18,000 men. 142 The earl was able to recommence hostilities so quickly because 
parliament had continued military preparations throughout the period of talks. 143 It was 
vitally important that parliament brought the king' s forces to battle before substantial 
reinforcements reached Oxford from Yorkshire. l44 By late March early April it was 
reported that he Icing's situation was so precarious that he would make for the north if 
parliament launched an offensive. 145 The Venetian ambassador wrote of 'the utmost 
131 B. Whitelocke, Memorials o/the English Affairs (Oxford, 1853), p. 193. 
139 Young & Holmes, English Civil War, p. 83. 
140 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. ii, p. 429. Essex also garrisoned Gloucester, Bristol, Exeter, Dover, 
Southampton, Plymouth and Marlborough. Snow, Essex the Rebel, p. 347. 
14\ Ibid., pp. 346-353. See also G. Davies, 'The Parliamentary Anny under the Earl of Essex', pp. 38-40. 
142 15,000 foot and 3,000 horse. Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 265. 
143 A joint declaration of both Houses dated 2 November 1642 proclaimed 'That the Preparations of 
Forces ... shall be prosecuted with all Vigour.' Journal o/the House 0/ Lords, vol. v, p. 431. 
144 The Queen landed at Bridlington with a large shipment of soldiers, money and munitions on 22 
February 1643. The earl of Newcastle escorted the convoy to York on 5 March. Gardiner, Great Civil 
War, vol. i, pp. 94-95. 
145 I. G. Philips (ed.), Journal o/Sir Samuel Luke (Oxfordshire Record Society, 1950-1953),29, pp. 46-
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danger to the king and his house unless he receive prompt assistance from his victorious 
forces in the north. ,146 At Oxford there was only sufficient ammunition for an action of 
four hours, and less than 'a hundred spare arms in the magazine.' 147 And at Reading it 
was reported that a determined siege might reduce the town in four days due to want of 
powder, arms and munitions. 148 Royalist and parliamentarian sources agreed that the 
king's situation was critical. Indeed, Clarendon was later to recall that an advance 
against Oxford, had it taken place, might well have succeeded.149 This relatively 
neglected aspect of the Thames Valley campaign was to have an important bearing on 
subsequent events. 
Superficially parliament's operation to take Reading appeared to be a success: 
Essex began the siege on 15 April, repulsed a royalist attempt to rescue the 3,000 strong 
garrison ten days later, and finally negotiated the surrender of the town on 27 Apri1. 1SO 
Yet according to Clarendon the parliamentarian assault opened with a debate, the 
cavalry officers favoring a storm while the commanders of foot pushed for a more 
cautious approach. lSI Essex elected to pursue the latter, arguing in a letter to the Lords 
that Reading was too strongly fortified to 'to venture the Soldiers upon such works, 
being probable that many may be lost.' IS2 Strategically it was absolutely crucial that 
Essex preserve his forces for a siege of Oxford, or, if the king elected, a pitched battle. 
The weather however was appalling - 'colder than the winter,IS3 - and problems of food 
supply, which had to be transported from London, meant that the soldiers suffered 
severely. In order to bring the siege to a close - before it had to be abandoned - Essex 
granted extremely generous terms of surrender, including the return of the garrison 
soldiers to Oxford. But importantly, as Clarendon claimed, Charles was delighted, 'for 
indeed the men and the arms were all that the king desired, and the loss of either of 
which was like to prove fatal to him.'IS4 
Though Essex had achieved his first objective, the poor condition of the army 
now threatened further progress. I ss The frosts and rain to which the soldiers had been 
exposed 'produced great decay and sickness,' rendering Essex immobile at Reading for 
146 CSPV, 1642-1643, p. 269. 
147 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 65n. 
14S Philips (ed.), Journal of Sir Samuel Luke, pp. 48-49. 
149 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 25. 
ISO Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, pp. 128-130. 
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IS2 Journal of the House of Lords, vol. vi, pp. 16-17. 
IS) CSPV, 1642-1643, p. 269. 
1S4 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, pp. 23-24. I" The royalist press crowed that the capture of Reading had 'cost his Excellency very many of his men, 
which have been either killed by the defendants, or perished by sickness and disease, or made 
unserviceable by their wounds, or else were run away to avoid those dangers.' BLIT, E. 101[10], 
Mercurius Aulicus, 17,23 - 29 April 1643, p. 215. 
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about six weeks.156 An insufficient and erratic supply of pay only added to the growing 
number of desertions. 157 On 12 May, while his soldiers grew ever more restless, Essex 
returned to Westminster to plead for money and provisions, 'which is the Reason why 
the Army cannot march, and take the Advantages which occur to them.' 158 This was a 
view shared by the enemy, for Sir Samuel Luke, parliament's scoutmaster general, 
reported that the royalists at Wallingford believed Essex's army to be greatly reduced 
by a lack of regular pay.159 Essex's inability to push on from Reading was effectively 
cancelled out by the king's apparent inability to launch any offensive action from 
Oxford. The existence of what amounted to a military stalemate in the Thames Valley 
has largely escaped the attention of historians. It is important nevertheless to recognise 
this delicate balance of power because the manner in which it was overturned placed 
Essex at a severe disadvantage. 
On 15 May - while Essex continued to petition parliament - forty wagonloads of 
vital arms and munitions dispatched from York by the queen reached the safety of 
Oxford unopposed. 160 As a result the situation in the Thames Valley was completely 
transformed. Essex was furious, complaining to the House of Lords: 
That he gave command to the Lord Gray, Colonel Cromwell, and other forces in 
the north, to draw themselves into a body, which has not been done according to 
his direction, by which neglect, the convoy with wagons of ammunition are 
come to the king without any interruption. 161 
While the Lord General's army continued to hemorrhage men,162 royalist forces were 
now restored. 163 The king 'sent a very courteous message to parliament' declaring that 
'God, favouring the justice of his cause had put him in a position in which he had 
nothing to fear.'l64 He was particularly keen to emphasise that 'the condition of his 
1S6 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 53. 
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annies In several parts, the strength of horse, foot, artillery, [and] his plenty of 
ammunition, (when some men lately might conceive he wanted) [are] well known and 
understood.' 165 Meanwhile, of course, Essex's sickly, disintegrating anny was in no 
condition to confront the king's rejuvenated forces. This lack of mobility, as Michael 
Braddick has pointed out, is something that was held against Essex. 166 However, it was 
the inability, or reluctance, of parliament's regional commanders to combine in 
accordance with the Lord General's orders that proved vital, in stark contrast to the 
efficient collaboration which allowed the queen's convoy to march unmolested from the 
northern theatre to the central front. This, clearly, is an important but relatively 
neglected aspect of the campaign. 
On 6 June Essex broke camp and advanced towards Oxford. Though the anny 
had been reinforced and supplied with money, Clarendon claimed that Essex was 
merely responding to political pressure. 167 Without a full payment of arrears the 
Venetian Ambassador seriously doubted whether Essex could 'induce his sickly and 
undisciplined troops to march.' 168 However on 10 June he occupied Thame to the east 
of Oxford, scattering his forces over a wide area despite the risk of attack to which his 
soldiers were thus exposed. 169 This appears to confirm Vernon Snow's conclusion that 
the 'army was totally unprepared for a siege or a direct engagement with the 
Royalists. ,170 Essex's deployments amounted to a tacit admission that the army was in 
no condition to fight, and may have been influenced by the need to contain future 
outbreaks of camp sickness, as well as to receive badly needed supplies. It suggests, 
moreover, that Essex sought to avoid any confrontation whatsoever with Charles' 
replenished forces, less 'the looseness and inconsistency of the soldiers' 171 result in total 
defeat. Once again factors beyond the Lord General's control dictated strategy. As in 
the aftermath of Edgehill, Essex's political responsibilities meant that his vulnerable 
army could not be risked. To do otherwise would have been to court disaster. 
Unfortunately for Essex the military situation continued to deteriorate. On 18 
June John Hampden, the celebrated politician and colonel, was mortally wounded in a 
fierce encounter with Rupert's cavalry. Clarendon hailed the skirmish at Chalgrove 
Field a great victory and Hampden's death a mighty blow, for he was 'much more relied 
165 BLIT, 245: 669.f.7[16), His Majesties Message, 20 May 1643. 
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on by that party than the general himself.' In Rupert's triumph, coupled with the loss of 
Hampden, appeared to confirm Charles' recent boast of military supremacy.I?3 The king 
no longer feared that Essex might lay siege to Oxford or seek to engage the royal army 
in battle. It was a clear indication that by the middle of June 1643 the tide had turned 
and that Essex, for the present at least, could only interpose his forces between the king 
and the capital. 
Until the arrival of the queen's supply convoy Charles was incapable of facing 
Essex in the field or defending Oxford against a prolonged and determined siege. As 
long as the king remained short of arms and ammunition he was unable to threaten 
Essex's deteriorating forces. But the inability of parliament's northern commanders to 
intercept the queen's convoy overturned this delicate balance of power and left Essex's 
enfeebled army at the mercy of Rupert's cavalry. Essex was effectively undermined by 
what appeared to be a wilful lack of cooperation amongst regional generals, a 
development that placed his weakened forces firmly on the defensive. Essex has been 
traditionally portrayed as something of a military buffoon, but his martial abilities were 
clearly not to blame for parliament's declining prospects in the Thames Valley. Rather, 
this study has shown that Essex' heavy political responsibilities were a determinant 
factor in military strategy, and that the non-cooperation of subordinate commanders was 
a primary cause of royalist supremacy. This emphasis is new, representing an 
alternative explanation for the apparent ineffectiveness of Essex as a general and the 
slow and painful decline of his army. The accuracy of these findings will be further 
considered in chapter three when attention turns to parliament's military collapse and 
political crisis of July and early August 1643. 
Ferdinando Lord Fairfax 
In contrast to the earl of Essex, Lord Fairfax's leadership has produced a more evenly 
balanced division of historiographical opinion, largely because historians have 
separated the circumstances in which Ferdinando assumed command of parliament's 
northern army from the manner in which he subsequently exercised military authority. 
In 1870 Clements Markham praised Lord Fairfax's skill, enterprise, bravery and 
resolution as a military leader.174 Samuel Gardiner, on the other hand, chose to criticize 
Ferdinando's attempt, upon becoming general, to negotiate a pact of neutrality with 
172 Clarendon claimed that three or four enemy regiments were utterly broken and lost. Macray (ed.), 
Clarendon, vol. iii, p. S9 & 63. 
In The royalist press reported that the scale of the victory at Chalgrove was much greater than originally 
believed, particularly the mortal wounds suffered by John Hampden. BLIT, E. 59[8], Mercurius Aulicus. 
25, 18 - 24 June 1643. pp. 323-324. 
174 C. R. Markham, Life o/the Great Lord Fairfax (London. 1870), p. 34. 
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Yorkshire's royalist leaders. 175 While Markham sought to highlight the tenacity with 
which Lord Fairfax prosecuted the war effort from October 1642 onwards, Gardiner 
emphasized parliament's hostility towards Fairfax's arrangements for a local peace 
treaty in September 1642. Similarly, Andrew Hopper has depicted as a major failing the 
'procrastination and reluctance to take up arms' which characterized Lord Fairfax's 
initial response to civil war,176 an assessment that may have provoked Jack Binns' 
rejoinder that 'Ferdinando proved himself to be a gifted military commander' superior 
'to both Newcastle, his opponent, or Essex, his senior.' 177 There seems therefore to be 
a puzzling inconsistency between Fairfax's rather reticent behaviour in September 1642 
and his subsequent conduct as a fully committed military leader. This apparent 
contradiction, as the following analysis seeks to explain, reflects the volatile nature of 
national politics as the country drifted towards armed conflict. While the prospect of 
peace remained alive Lord Fairfax strove to neutralise Yorkshire and to keep military 
activity out of the county. When civil war became inevitable Fairfax, under the 
influence of his immediate circle, fully embraced his role as parliament's northern 
general. Indeed, Ferdinando would prove to be an extremely effective commander 
demonstrating a 'high level of strategic vision. ,178 
Remarkably perhaps the earliest known reference to Lord Fairfax's military 
abilities provided no indication of his future success. His father, Sir Thomas Fairfax, is 
reported to have complained, 'I sent [him] into the Netherlands to train him up a soldier, 
and he makes a tolerable country justice, but is a mere coward at fighting.' 179 Though 
Ferdinando commanded one of the Yorkshire trained bands in the first Bishops' War 
(1639), his troops were ordered, frustratingly, to Westmoreland, well away from the 
main English army.180 Fairfax was thus denied the opportunity to prove himself in 
action and confound his cantankerous old father. It is hardly surprising that the 
disastrous and humiliating Bishops' Warsl81 should force Ferdinando into opposition. In 
September 1640 he assisted the Yorkshire gentry in petitioning the king for a recall of 
parliament, and the following year participated in the trial of the earl of Strafford.182 
When the king set up court at York in March 1642 Ferdinando headed a committee of 
MPs representing parliament. Charles greeted the delegation with 'displeasure and high 
175 Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, p. 33. Gardiner's history of the civil war was flTSt published in 
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indignation' and subsequently 'did severally threaten their imprisonment' when 'some 
private passage' was disclosed to the House of Commons. 183 Ferdinando also disagreed 
with king' s controversial ecclesiastical policies.184 During the 1629 parliament he 
appeared to share the hostility of the Commons to the growth of Arminianism,185 and in 
1641 he reacted sympathetically to the Bill to circumscribe the power of the Bishops.186 
On the eve of civil war Ferdinando was clearly recognized, by both parliament and 
Charles I, as an opponent of royal policy. 187 
Before leaving Yorkshire on 16 August 1642188 the king was dissuaded from 
arresting the Fairfaxes and their closest associates by the county's leading royalists. 
Although 'governed by two or three of inferior quality,' it was generally conceived that 
neither Ferdinando nor his son, Sir Thomas Fairfax, 'were transported with over-
vehement inclinations to the parliament, [and] would willingly sit still, without being 
active on either side.'189 Indeed Sir Thomas confirmed his father's resolve 'not to stir 
from his own house' despite the king's intention to make him a prisoner. l90 The 
situation was however transformed by royalist attempts to execute the Commission of 
Array at York. A reluctant Ferdinando, 'being much importuned by those that were 
about him,' was thus persuaded to abandon neutrality.191 On 29 August 1642 he lead the 
Declaration of Otley, a protestation against 'the raising of forces of Horse and foot in 
this County, the levying of monyes for the maintenance of them, and taking away the 
Annes of some peaceable SUbjects.'192 Eighteen Yorkshire knights and gentlemen 
signed the document, including, no doubt, those who had persuaded Ferdinando to 
become actively involved. One such was Thomas Stockdale, a Justice of the Peace and 
close associate. 193 As secretary to Lord Fairfax, Stockdale was to exercise, along with 
fellow signatory Sir Thomas Fairfax, a significant influence upon subsequent events. 
Although Lord Fairfax had been compelled to re-engage, he did not anticipate 
offensive military action on behalf of parliament. The Declaration of Otley demanded 
the preservation of peace in the county, and a commitment to uphold it if an outbreak of 
183 Minster Library, C. W. T. 42-05-24, 'Horrible News from York, Hull and Newcastle.' 
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fighting or an invasion of foreign forces took place. It was principally a political 
statement; any resort to arms would be purely defensive. However, during September 
1642 both sides sought to strengthen their position, and a meeting of parliamentarian 
supporters at Leeds on 19 September elected Lord Fairfax commander of Yorkshire's 
forces. 194 But instead of preparing for military action, Ferdinando organized a treaty. On 
29 September he authorized six of the Otley signatories, including Sir Thomas Fairfax 
and Thomas Stockdale, to agree a countywide pact of neutrality with six leading 
royalists. 19S Lord Fairfax clearly felt an obligation to provide political leadership; his 
concerns were for peace, order and security. Yet the attempt to impose the Declaration 
of Otley in partnership with the enemy provoked a furious response. Parliament 
repudiated the treaty as 'very prejudicial and dangerous to the whole Kingdom,' 
providing 'advantage [to] the Forces raised against the Parliament.'l% Sir John 
Hotham, the parliamentarian governor of Hull, and his son, Captain John Hotham, 
condemned the pact as both a personal insult and a breach of parliamentary privilege. 197 
Contemporary reports suggest that Lord Fairfax may have negotiated the agreement on 
condition of parliamentary approval, and thus abandoned it when none was 
forthcoming. 198 Equally, he may have renounced the treaty in response to warrants and 
commissions issued by Charles in mid-October 1642 authorising Yorkshire royalists to 
'plunder the estates, to kill and destroy all those that are well affected to the 
parliament.,I99 
Clarendon argued that Yorkshire's gentry agreed to neutrality because the first 
battle of the war was expected to prove decisive,200 which may explain the support of 
Sir Thomas Fairfax and Thomas Stockdale. But it is possible that Lord Fairfax's peace 
initiative was in fact based on sound and advantageous military principles. It is recorded 
that following his commission in June 1642 to command the four northern counties of 
Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland and Durham, the earl of Newcastle 'took 
a resolution to raise an army for his Majesty's service,' and that he had 'put them in a 
condition to march' by the beginning of November 1642.2°1 By organizing an act of 
neutrality Lord Fairfax may have sought to prevent the earl's army marching through 
Yorkshire to join the king. The Declaration of Otley, signed by Fairfax on 29 August, 
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vowed to resist any invasion of Yorkshire by 'foreign' (i.e. non-county) forces. 202 A 
pact of neutrality would thus undermine the wider royalist war effort by blocking 
Newcastle's army before the first, and possibly decisive, battle of the war had taken 
place. 
Once it was clear that the treaty was dead Lord Fairfax abandoned political 
leadership for that of military command.203 Earlier in 1642 he had sponsored a series of 
sermons reminding West Riding congregations of the murderous fate suffered by 
Ireland's Protestants during the rebellion of November 1641. Consequently many of the 
county's 'middling-sort' linked the Irish uprising to a royalist backed Catholic plot to 
destroy the godly in England. Anti-catholic fears enabled the Fairfaxes to recruit highly 
motivated soldiers who saw the king as the enemy and the defence of the protestant 
religion as the principal issue.204 On 21 October Lord Fairfax's embryonic army 
defended Bradford against an attack by Leeds based royalists, and with the assistance of 
horse and dragoons under Captain Hotham, forced the cavaliers to retreat to York. 205 
Although Captain Hotham' s interjection provided much needed support, his earlier 
invasion of the West Riding had so alarmed the county's royalists206 that they requested 
the earl of Newcastle's northern forces to march to their rescue. Negotiations had 
commenced on 26 September, three days before senior royalists signed Lord Fairfax's 
pact of neutrality. Royalist desperation to secure either military assistance or some form 
of pacification indicates that Lord Fairfax's leadership, allied to 'Mr Hotham's infesting 
the country ;207 gave parliament the upper hand in Yorkshire during the early months of 
the war. 
The earl of Newcastle entered Yorkshire on 1 December 1642208 at the head of 
6,000209 relatively well-drilled soldiers, which combined with those formerly 
commanded by the earl of Cumberland, provided Charles I with a northern army of no 
fewer than 8,000 horse and fOOt.21O Newcastle's overwhelming numerical superiority 
202 It has been observed that provincial forces were sometimes raised to prevent invasions, and that 
treaties were organized to prevent extremists dividing the county. M. A. Kishlansky, The Rise a/the New 
Model Army (Cambridge, 1979), p. 4. 
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transformed the civil war in Yorkshire.21l In desperation Lord Fairfax wrote to 
parliament, describing how his own forces had been compelled to retreat from 
Tadcaster to Selby and how the forces commanded to support him had retreated to their 
strongholds or simply melted away. About 800 of the 1000 men raised in 
Richmondshire, Cleveland and North Yorkshire had returned to their homes, while Sir 
Hugh Cholmley, the governor of Scarborough Castle, had taken the 700 strong garrison 
back to the port, despite orders to reinforce Fairfax at Tadcaster. In addition Colonel 
Boynton's regiment of 800 foot had set off towards Hull, also in direct contravention of 
orders to join Lord Fairfax. And despite requests to Sir John Gell in Derbyshire and Sir 
Anthony Irby in Lincolnshire there was no prospect of assistance from neighboring 
counties.zlz The refusal of parliamentarian commanders to support Lord Fairfax is an 
important yet relatively neglected feature of the campaign, standing in marked contrast 
to the cooperation that allowed the earl of Newcastle's forces to enter Yorkshire at the 
behest of the county's beleaguered royalists. Moreover, it provides a further example of 
the kind of parliamentarian insubordination that would allow the queen's supply convoy 
to pass unmolested from York to Oxford in May 1643. Just as Essex would complain 
about the failure of subordinate commanders to intercept the Queen's arms convoy, so 
Lord Fairfax warned that unless men and money were urgently supplied the enemy 
would 'become absolute masters of Yorkshire,' forcing 'contributions and succours 
from the country,' and raising 'a very formidable army,' which will 'put the whole 
. '1 ,Z13 cause mpen. 
Newcastle's invasion drove a wedge between Lord Fairfax's army at Selby and 
parliament's heartland of West Riding cloth townS.Zl4 Royalist garrisons in Leeds and 
Wakefield destroyed all local trade, prompting Sir Thomas Fairfax to declare that unless 
the parliamentarian army launched an offensive the increasingly impatient people 'must 
rise of necessity of themselves in a thing of so great importance.' He virtually begged 
his father to 'raise the country to assault the enemy,' optimistically predicting the 
recruitment of 3000 men or more.ZIS While Sir Thomas was clearly moved by the pitiful 
condition of the populace, Lord Fairfax's secretary, Thomas Stockdale, supported a 
2JI Stanley Carpenter has argued that the 'disadvantage in troop numbers forced Lord Fairfax to 
prosecute a war of attrition by strategic defence,' in practice a 'series of attacks and retreats as 
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general mobilisation for quite different reasons. A committed Calvinist, Stockdale was 
acutely aware of the violent anti Catholic feeling generated by the Irish rebellion of 
November 1641.216 He was particularly keen to harness the radical Puritanism of the 
West Riding cloth workers 'in opposing that Popish army commanded by the Earl of 
Newcastle. ,217 Lord Fairfax wasted little time in approving what amounted to a popular 
rising; within two weeks Sir Thomas had mustered a small but enthusiastic army of 
1300 men.2lS In the absence of support from parliamentarian commanders in the 
region, Lord Fairfax's decision to 'join with the readiness of the people,219 amounted to 
a last ditch attempt to oppose Newcastle's conquest of the county.220 
However, the mobilisation of the lower orders horrified the Hothams.221 Though 
Captain John Hotham had terrorized Yorkshire's royalist gentlemen during the autumn 
of 1642, the prospect of the poor and religiously radical in arms filled him with dread. 
He opened a correspondence with the earl of Newcastle, who now appeared a saviour 
rather than an enemy, in which he praised the earl's intervention and warned of the 
'utter ruin of all the nobility and gentry' should the 'necessitous people ... rise in mighty 
numbers.'222 And when Sir Thomas Fairfax stormed Leeds on 23 January 1643,223 at the 
head of this new and dangerous army, Hotham's hostility boiled over. Sir Thomas 
complained to his father that 'No order will be observed by [Captain Hotham] but what 
he please.,224 Finally, in order to appease the Hothams, the earl of Essex was forced to 
grant both father and son complete autonomy of command.22s Once again Lord Fairfax 
was denied the assistance and cooperation of a fellow parliamentarian officer. In 
defying the king from the walls of Hull during the summer of 1642, while Lord Fairfax 
quietly attempted to remain at home, the Hothams had risked everything. Overcome 
with resentment, they indignantly refused to recognize Ferdinando's commission to lead 
parliament's northern army.226 Even the intervention of the earl of Essex, who hoped to 
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establish a 'happy concordance betwixt your lordship [Fairfax], Sir John Hotham, and 
his son Captain Hotham',227 had little or no effect.228 The circumstances in which the 
Fairfaxes operated meant that they were particularly vulnerable to a lack of assistance 
from disaffected fellow commanders. In the words of Andrew Hopper: 
They had no fortified castles or towns to defend. They received little money or 
effective assistance from parliament. They had only a slim base of support 
amongst Yorkshire's leading gentry, and their foremost ally, Sir John Hotham at 
Hull, eagerly awaited their destruction?29 
It was a situation that completely undermined military opposition to the earl of 
Newcastle and further isolated the increasingly desperate Fairfaxes. 
On 22 February 1643 the disembarkation of the Queen at Bridlington on the 
Yorkshire coast signalled a further deterioration in parliament's affairs.230 Accompanied 
by substantial supplies of weapons, soldiers and money,231 Henrietta Maria's return 
from the continent acted as a catalyst for further anti-Fairfax collusion. Captain Hotham 
negotiated an agreement with the earl of Newcastle by which the Queen's safety would 
be guaranteed in exchange for an absence of royalist military activity in the east 
riding.232 It is ironic that having objected so vehemently to Lord Fairfax's pact of 
neutrality, Hotham should take it upon himself to orchestrate what amounted to a local 
cessation. But even worse was to follow. On 20 March 1643, after a clandestine 
audience with the Queen, Sir Hugh Cholmley, the parliamentarian governor of 
Scarborough Castle, defected to the king?33 Clarendon maintained that Cholmley's 
support for parliament rested on nothing more than a personal friendship with Sir John 
Hotham. In the absence of any real ideological commitment, Sir Hugh was easily 
persuaded to abandon the rebel cause.234 Recent research suggests however that 
Cholmley's position was altogether more complicated. Binns has argued that Sir Hugh 
227 Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, vol. i, p. 37. 
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reconcile them, yet they still stand upon their distance.' BL IT, E. 245[36], Mercurius Aulicus, 3, 15-21 
January 1643, p. 28. 
m Hopper, 'Black Tom', p. 33. 
230 Young &. Hoimes, English Civil War, p. 102. 
231 The queen brought' 1000 old experienced soldiers as a guard to her person, 2000 case of pistols, a 
good proportion ofarms and other ammunition, and £80,000 in ready money.' BLIT, E. 86(41), 
Mercurius Aulicus, 9, 26 February -4 March 1643, p. 109; 'Weapons for 10,000 soldiers, 32 canon, a 
thousand mercenary soldiers and a staggering £80,000 in ready money.' Binns, Yorlcshire in the Civil 
Wars, p. 63. 
232 Hopper, 'Fitted for Desperation,' p. 143. 
233 BL IT, E. 59(9), If true and exact Relation of all the proceedings o/Sir Hugh Cholmley's Revolt 
(London, 7 April 1643), p. 5; The royalist press reported that 'at night Sir Hugh Cholmley in a disguise 
kissed the Queen's Majesties hand, and the next day delivered Scarborough into the hands of Lieutenant 
General King.' BLIT, E. 96[5], Mercurius Aulicus, 13,26 March - 1 April 1643, p. 165. 
234 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. ii, p.468. 
53 
sided with parliament to protect his north riding possessions from royalist raids. But by 
March 1643 Newcastle's increasing dominance meant that only a change of allegiance 
could safeguard both his territory and tennantry.235 Moreover, Sir Hugh had reluctantly 
come to the conclusion that 'the preservation of Religion ... and [the] liberties of the 
subject' were no longer safe in parliament's hands?36 Cholmley's abandonment of Lord 
Fairfax further imperilled parliament's increasingly fragile presence in Yorkshire.237 
The occupation of the county by Newcastle's overwhelming numbers was serious 
enough, but the intervention of a dynamic and divisive Queen finally destroyed any 
prospect of cooperation amongst parliament's northern commanders.238 
The Fairfaxes were now isolated and desperate. Sir Thomas described how the 
intrigues of Captain Hotham 'almost ruined my father and the forces that were with 
him; For being now denyed help & succor from Hull & the East Riding, He was forced 
to forsake Selby, and retire to Leeds.'239 On 30 March 1643 the parliamentarian army 
withdrew in two columns, and while that commanded by Ferdinando reached Leeds in 
safety, Sir Thomas' contingent was badly mauled by royalist cavalry on Seacroft 
Moor.240 Though the younger Fairfax managed to escape, 200 men were killed and as 
many as 800 captured.241 This disastrous turn of events was seized upon by the 
Hothams to prepare the way for their own defection. The Venetian Ambassador 
reported that intercepted letters dated 7 April from Sir John Hotham and his son to the 
House of Commons blamed the ineffectiveness of the military campaign in Yorkshire 
on Lord Fairfax's decision to retire to the west riding. They warned that the earl of 
Newcastle's anny was both numerous and well officered, and that Thomas Stockdale 
and his associates had so discontented the county that 'all men of courage have left [the 
Fairfaxes] but their own clan.'242 Having completely undermined the Fairfaxes in 
Yorkshire, the Hotham' s were determined to discredit their detested rivals in the eyes of 
parliament itself. Such open hostility and unwillingness to cooperate was a major factor 
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in circumventing the undoubted military talents of the Fairfaxes, the one advantage 
parliament possessed over the numerically superior forces of the earl of Newcastle. 
The Fairfaxes however responded with characteristic audacity and dynamism. 
On 21 May 1643 Sir Thomas attacked Wakefield with the intention of taking sufficient 
prisoners to exchange for those captured at Seacroft Moor.243 Wakefield turned out to 
be one of the most astounding engagements of the civil war; an incredulous Sir Thomas 
described it as 'more a miracle than a victory. ,244 Having completely underestimated the 
strength of the royalist garrison, Sir Thomas successfully led 1100 men against a 
defending force of more than 3000 horse and foot. This astonishing triumph resulted in 
no fewer than 1500 prisoners, which were quickly swapped for those taken at Seacroft 
Moor.24s Even royalists observers were compelled to acknowledge 'the greatest loss that 
hath befallen His Majestie in the North, during the course of all this War. ,246 Wakefield 
provided a stunning demonstration of Fairfax tenacity and leadership, an indication of 
what might have been achieved had Lord Fairfax and his son enjoyed the wholehearted 
support and cooperation of the Hothams and Sir Hugh Cholmley.247 
Despite the euphoria of victory the Fairfaxes remained confined to their 
strongholds of Leeds, Bradford and Halifax.248 In a long letter to the Commons dated 23 
May 1643, Lord Fairfax described how he had abandoned Wakefield because 'Numbers 
and Strength [were] too weak to keep it;' how Newcastle's invasion of the county had 
stopped all provision 'both of Com and Flesh, and other Necessaries' so that the people 
'now begin to be sensible of Want;' how pay for the army was so far in arrears that the 
soldiers 'grow very mutinous;' how powder, arms and ammunition 'cannot be supplied 
until the Passage to Hull be forced open;' and how he will be compelled 'to accept of 
dishonorable Conditions' unless 'the Aids often promised may presently march away to 
us,' including 'Colonel Cromwell, with his Horse and Foot,' so that 'being joined 
together I may be able to draw this Army into the field. ,249 And in a second letter to the 
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Commons, written on the same day, Thomas Stockdale urgently reiterated the pressing 
need for reinforcements: 
If we had now any Force of Horse to join with us, we should in all Probability 
utterly rent the Enemies in this Country, or shut them in Holes; which if it do not 
speedily come, we shall be in Danger to perish, if the Enemy draw his whole 
Force upon US.250 
It was reported that Newcastle, reeling from the loss of Wakefield, had ordered royalist 
regiments based in Derbyshire to concentrate at Pontefract Castle.251 As Lord Fairfax 
and Thomas Stockdale had warned, a royalist counter stroke would not be long in 
coming. 
By late May/early June 1643 a strong parliamentarian force of 6,000 horse and 
foot had assembled at Nottingham with the intention of marching into Yorkshire to save 
the Fairfaxes.252 Colonel Cromwell was indeed one of the commanders present. On 28 
May he wrote to the Mayor of Colchester emphasising the danger posed by Newcastle's 
northern army and the absolute need for urgent assistance: 
I thought it my duty once more to write unto you for more strength to be 
speedily sent unto us ... We assure you, should the force we have miscarry, 
expect nothing but a speedy march of the enemy up unto you ... judge you the 
danger of the neglect; and how inconvenient this improvidence, or unthrifty, 
may be to you .. .1 tell you again, it concerns you exceedingly to be persuaded by 
me ... The enemy draws more to the Lord Fairfax: our motion and yours must be 
exceedin~ll speedy, or else it will do you no good at all...1 beseech you hasten 
supplies. 5 
Unfortunately for Lord Fairfax the increasingly duplicitous Captain Hotbam was also 
present at Nottingham. On 2 June Hotham wrote to Fairfax explaining that due to the 
weakness and 'distraction' of Newcastle's army, and a strong royalist presence only 
four miles from Nottingham, 'we think it best to stay here, and not to draw down into 
Yorkshire. ,254 Though signed by five parliamentarian commanders the letter 'was in the 
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handwriting of Captain Hotham, and doubtless it conveyed his sentiments. ,255 Lord 
Fairfax angrily rejected Hotham's excuses and demanded that he march immediately: 
with all the forces you have, and join with me to suppress this Popish army here, 
which else, whatsoever report gives it out to you, is of power, without God's 
miraculous deliverance, to destroy our force, and so by degrees to ruin the 
kingdom.256 
But Fairfax's protestations fell on deaf ears, sabotaging any hope of substantial 
reinforcements. It would appear that the younger Hotham was able to exaggerate the 
success of Sir Thomas Fairfax's victory at Wakefield and convinced his fellow 
commanders at Nottingham that the real danger lay in the Midlands and not Yorkshire. 
While Captain Hotham's enmity isolated the Fairfaxes, Newcastle's forces were 
permitted to recover from the disaster of Wakefield and prepare for a further assault. 
On 4 June 1643 Henrietta Maria finally left York with a large contingent of 
soldiers and supplies for the king's Oxford army.z57 The earl of Newcastle accompanied 
the queen as far as Pontefract Castle in order to prepare for a major campaign against 
the West Riding.258 The intensions of the royalists were however well known to the 
Fairfaxes. Two important letters captured at Wakefield revealed that Colonel George 
Goring, Newcastle's Lieutenant General of horse, had been urged to 'get between 
Bradford and Leeds' and 'Cudgel them to a treaty.'2S9 Goring's correspondent betrayed 
the increasing desperation with which the royalists sought to crush their obstinate 
opponents, and inadvertently paid a fitting tribute to the tenacity with which the 
Fairfaxes had opposed Newcastle's much larger army. 
By mid June 1643 the situation in Yorkshire had reached crisis point. Isolated by 
the treachery of Cholmley and the disaffection of the Hothams, Lord Fairfax had taken 
refuge in the parliamentarian heartland of West Riding cloth towns. In the continued 
absence of substantial assistance from outside the county, he faced the very real 
prospect of imminent and total destruction. Despite a huge disadvantage in troop 
numbers Lord Fairfax and his dynamic son had proved remarkably resourceful and 
determined opponents, demonstrating a 'degree of aggressiveness, boldness and risk 
taking,' that had 'made Newcastle reticent to engage in bold operations outside the 
north. ,260 However, they were continually undermined by a crippling lack of support 
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and cooperation from fellow parliamentarian commanders. At Nottingham in early June 
the open treachery of Captain Hotham effectively sacrificed the Fairfaxes and virtually 
handed the north to the earl of Newcastle. The hostility, disloyalty and insubordination 
of supposed comrades in anns imperilled the cause and threw the campaign into crisis. 
Such a prevalent and damaging lack of cooperation was clearly a major reason for 
parliament's military decline in Yorkshire. Its importance as a potential cause of 
parliament's crisis will be subjected to further examination in chapter three. 
Sir William Waller 
Sir William Waller will forever be remembered as the author of the civil war's most 
celebrated letter. Written in June 1643 to his friend and royalist adversary Sir Ralph 
Hopton, Waller lamented how 'That great God who is the searcher of my heart knows 
with what a perfect hatred I detest this war without an enemy.'261 Waller's political and 
military activities up to June 1643 were relatively uncontroversial, and have not 
provoked the condemnation visited upon Essex or the polarity of opinion generated by 
Fairfax. His skillful exploitation of battlefield terrain was readily acknowledged in 
contemporary royalist writing,262 while his insistence on military victory as a necessary 
precursor to constitutional negotiations has also been emphasised.263 Rather less certain 
is the claim that Waller's 'considerable talent for the art of war' helped to save 
parliament from 'the lethargy and limited strategic sense of Essex as a commander-in-
chief. ,264 It is a view contested by David Underdown who has argued that 'Waller had a 
somewhat inflated reputation as one of parliament's few commanders who had won any 
battles at all. ,265 In seeking to establish which of these contradictory claims is closer to 
the truth, this study will assess the extent to which Sir William can be held responsible 
for the demise of parliament's western campaign in the summer of 1643. 
Clarendon attributed Waller's support for parliament to a personal grievance in 
which he was fined a considerable sum following a violent altercation with a royal 
servant. This, Clarendon claimed, 'produced in him so eager a spirit against the court 
that he was very open to any temptation that might engage him against it. ,266 Adair 
dismissed Clarendon's story as uncorroborated, arguing instead that Waller had been 
alienated by the king's favour of papists, and that he 'was a constitutional monarchist 
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who believed that the traditional order needed restoring rather than abolishing.'267 
Consequently Waller deemed it 'necessary in 1642 to resort to arms to defend this 
conservative equilibrium.'268 It was Sir William's profound belief that God's 
providence had preserved him in childhood and youth for a purpose, and that his active 
participation in the civil war was in accordance with a higher cause.269 
It seems that Waller's pre civil war military experience was rather limited. 
Although Clarendon reported that he 'spent some years abroad, and some time in armies 
there, [and] returned with a good reputation,'270 the idea that Sir William could be 
considered a professional soldier was completely rejected by Austin Woolrych?71 
Indeed, John Adair concluded that Waller's service in the Venetian army during 1617 
and his participation in Sir Horace Vere's expedition to the Palatinate in 1620 'could be 
better called part of his general education than an apprenticeship to war. ,272 Yet the 
impression cu1tivate~ by Clarendon, that Waller possessed a respectable degree of 
martial ability, may account for his election to parliament's Committee of Safety on 4 
July 1642. As Adair has pointed out, the appointment took place after only eight weeks 
service as an MP, and as Sir William had demonstrated no interest in county politics or 
the House of Commons before the civil war, his elevation may well reflect 'an 
exaggerated contemporary notion of his military experience.,273 This in turn sheds some 
light upon the decision of the Commons in August 1642 to entrust the reduction of 
Portsmouth to an army under Waller's command. 
Because Portsmouth was a vitally important port for French aid, local 
parliamentarians expressed their concern to the Commons when the governor, Colonel 
George Goring, unexpectedly declared for the king.274 On 15 August 1642 it was 
reported that Waller, ably assisted by the Scottish professional Colonel John Urry, had 
launched a vigorous siege.27s And when parliamentarian forces stormed Southsea castle 
under the cover of darkness on 4 September, a royalist mutiny forced Goring to 
surrender.276 There can be little doubt that the capture of Portsmouth reflected well upon 
267 Adair, Roundhead General, p. 37. 
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Waller, for as one parliamentarian source proclaimed, 'we have great cause to praise 
God, considering the great terrors the design there menaced not only these parts, but the 
rest of the kingdom.'277 Yet Adair's conclusion that a 'more likely candidate for high 
command could scarcely be found in the ranks of parliament,278 is perhaps a little 
premature, particularly when one considers Clarendon's thinly disguised 
disappointment in Goring and the royalist garrison?79 
Following the heady success of Portsmouth, the battle of Edgehill (23 October 
1642) proved to be a sobering experience. While most of parliament's cavalry was 
swept away, the stubborn resistance of the earl of Essex and the roundhead infantry 
saved the day. Waller's regiment was one of many ignominiously routed by Rupert's 
cavaliers - but the ordeal provided a valuable lesson. Thereafter Waller ensured 'that his 
horse never stood still to receive a cavalry charge, but spurred forward to take it at the 
trot. ,280 Despite the trauma of defeat, it was not long before Sir William was presented 
with an opportunity to redeem himself. The failure of Edgehill and then Turnham Green 
to bring the civil war to a conclusion prompted the establishment of a number of 
royalist garrisons to the south west of London. Waller spent the remainder of 1642 
successfully reducing these outposts, earning the appellation 'William the 
Conqueror. ,281 But as the following analysis will attempt to show, the public acclaim 
that attended Waller's triumphal progress may well have been misplaced, particularly as 
it appears to have taken little account of the favourable circumstances in which it was 
achieved. 
The campaign began at Farnham in Surrey where 'the poet-courtier Sir John 
Denham, with a party of gentlemen and their servants,' seized the castle in the name of 
the king.282 Clarendon contemptuously recalled how these gentlemen-soldiers 'were 
taken with less resistance than was fit by Sir William Waller.,283 Though Clarendon 
ungraciously failed to mention the personal bravery with which Waller led the assault, 
the inference that the castle should have been defended with greater detennination 
perhaps qualifies Sir William's achievement. Three days later on 3 December 1642 the 
royalist Lord Grandison occupied Marlborough in Wiltshire with four troops of horse 
and 600 dragoons, threatening the passage of trade between London and Bristol. Waller 
led a substantial force of between 2,000-3,000 mounted men, forcing Grandison to 
retreat to Winchester, where Sir William accepted the surrender of the castle on 14 
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December 1642.284 Though Grandison had proved to be a tougher opponent than the 
gentlemen of Famham/85 Waller's conduct in the aftermath of victory placed a question 
mark against his credentials as a commander. A parliamentarian source revealed how 
'the Towne by paying 1000 pounds made their peace with US,'286 yet Sir William 
permitted his soldiers to sack the city. The royalists complained bitterly that 'it was our 
men's misfortune to be so treacherously used at Winchester. ,287 Though much to 
Waller's subsequent regret,288 the episode was nevertheless symptomatic of the way in 
which Sir William's troops were to gain a reputation for ill-discipline?89 
In mid November 1642 'some well effected gentry of Sussex ... possessed 
themselves ... of the city of Chichester, which, being encompassed with a very good old 
wall, was very easy to be so fortified. ,290 The royalist garrison consisted of no fewer 
than 1,000 men supported by a number of large cannons from the arsenal at 
Portsmouth?91 Waller arrived on 21 December with a force of 2,500 horse and foot,292 
and after his men 'besieged the City ... seven days and nights, and had given several 
assaults upon it, to the losse of about twenty men of both sides, it was surrendered. ,293 
Clarendon was once again dismissive of what he believed to be an inexcusably feeble 
resistance; 'they were compelled, upon no better articles than quarter, to deliver that 
city, which could hardly have been taken from them. ,294 A condition of the surrender 
was that the town should not be plundered; yet Waller's unruly soldiers sacked the 
cathedral, blackening his reputation still further.295 One irate royalist complained 'At 
Chichester they used the same perfidious treachery they had formally shown at 
Winchester. ,296 
But none of this mattered at Westminster. In the wake of the king's march on 
London in mid-November, and Newcastle's invasion of Yorkshire in December, any 
news of parliamentarian success was welcomed with open arms. On 16 January 1643 
the Commons ordered that 'Mr Speaker do give thanks, from the House, to Sir William 
Waller, for the great Service he has done. ,297 It is undeniable that during this short 
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campaign Waller acted swiftly, diligently and efficiently. And although Clarendon 
(hardly an impartial observer) continually bemoaned the quality of royalist resistance, it 
would be churlish to deny the impact of Waller's achievements. He created an 
impression of dynamism that contrasted markedly with the perceived inertia of the earl 
of Essex. However, such a comparison fails to recognize the wholly different 
circumstances in which the two commanders operated. Essex carried the hopes and 
aspirations of at least half the political nation, and the defeat of his army would, at a 
stroke, render all of Waller's triumphs irrelevant. 
Yet as the war drifted unresolved into 1643 it became clear that parliament, 
while continuing to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement, would have to 
prepare for conflict on a wider scale. On 11 February 1643 Waller was commissioned 
Sergeant Major General of the newly formed Western Association.298 Intended to co-
ordinate military activity in Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Somerset, Worcestershire and 
Shropshire, the Association stood 'between the royalist capital of Oxford and the 
royalist recruiting grounds of south Wales.'299 In order to control this vital corridor, 
Waller was granted 'wide-ranging powers to levy money from delinquent's estates and 
by taxation to raise up to ten regiments'. 300 The Association signaled the establishment 
of a regional strategy in the west, and confirmed Waller's status as a commander 
worthy of responsibility. 
Sir William's first objective was Bristol, which he entered unopposed on 15 
March following a series of expertly executed night marches. His immediate concern 
was the parliamentary garrison of Gloucester, under threat from 2,000 newly levied 
Welsh foot and horse under the command of Lord Herbert.301 Striking northeast, Waller 
headed first of all for the royalist garrison of Malmesbury in Wiltshire. Arriving with 
2,000 - 3,000 men in the early afternoon of 20 March, Sir William found the town 
strongly fortified and defended by 300 foot. 302 By the early hours of the following 
morning three determined assaults had been repulsed, and having decided to withdraw, 
Waller assembled his forces in order to mask his real intentions. Fearing a further attack 
the garrison panicked, requested a parley, and surrendered the town upon quarter.303 
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Though the success was undoubtedly blessed with good fortune, it nevertheless 
demonstrated Waller's grasp of tactical subterfuge, a talent he quickly repeated in 
dealing with the threat to Gloucester posed by Lord Herbert. 'By a sudden night march 
(in which he was very dexterous and successful),'304 Waller crossed the Severn to the 
south of the town and, in a surprise attack, destroyed Herbert's inexperienced Welsh 
royalists at Highnam on 24 March.30s Importantly for parliament Sir William's victory 
secured Gloucester, while Clarendon's disparaging verdict, that the Welshmen 'kindly 
delivered up themselves and their arms, ,306 reflected a keenly felt sense of royalist 
disappointment.307 The triumph was however diluted by news that Malmesbury had 
fallen to Prince Rupert only days after Waller vacated the town.30S Sir William 
explained to parliament that 'It was not for us to have stood long there, nor for the 
Advancement of your Service for us to garrison Towns, unless it is intended we shall 
leave the field.'309 Like the Fairfaxes in Yorkshire, Waller's resources did not permit an 
active field army and an extensive chain of properly garrisoned townS.310 
Sir William's crushing victory at Highnam prompted a rapid royalist response, 
one that presented a new and much more formidable opponent: the king's nephew 
Prince Maurice. While Waller advanced into Monmouthshire in early April, Charles 
dispatched the prince with a detachment of the Oxford field army into the Severn 
Valley.311 Having rendezvoused with Lord Grandison at Tewkwsbury, Maurice 
deployed his forces in the Forest of Dean, intending to prevent Waller's return to 
Gloucester.312 But Sir William was alive to the danger, and by a skillful division of his 
forces, in which the foot, baggage and ordinance crossed the Severn at Chepstow, 
Waller led his mounted troops through the forest to safety, skirmishing with the enemy 
at Little Dean.313 Though Sir William re-entered Gloucester on 11 April the situation 
remained hazardous. In order to forestall Maurice, Waller ordered the governor of 
complained that 'the like perfidiousness we hardly fmd examples of amongst Christian nations'. BLIT, 
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Gloucester, Colonel Edward Massey, to secure the passage over the Severn at 
Tewkesbury.314 While this relieved the immediate threat, Maurice could not be 
prevented from reaching the bridge at Upton, below Worcester, on the evening of 12 
April, allowing his men to cross to the east bank the following morning.3lS Despite 
Waller's best efforts a major confrontation was now inevitable. Sir William's advance 
into the sensitive 'frontier' counties of Gloucestershire and Monmouthshire was always 
likely to provoke a determined royalist counter stroke. The war in the west was in effect 
entering a new stage, for in Prince Maurice' William the Conqueror' now faced a much 
more tenacious and tactically proficient adversary. 
On the morning of 13 April Waller marched north from Tewksbury, perhaps still 
hopeful of beating Maurice to Upton Bridge.316 As Adair has pointed out, Sir William's 
small army of 1,500 men included only 100 foot and a few pieces of ordinance, totally 
inadequate for a pitched battle in open terrain yet potentially sufficient to hold a 
bridge.317 Unfortunately Waller encountered Maurice three miles north of Tewkesbury, 
just beyond the village of Ripple. Following an ineffectual artillery duel and a brief 
foray by the Roundhead cavalry, Sir William concluded that he possessed too few foot 
to oppose a 2,000 strong royalist army. Despite the enthusiasm of some officers, Waller 
reluctantly ordered his men to withdraw.3lS Waller's line of retreat lay along a narrow 
lane, and though he attempted to defend the vulnerable entrance with musketeers, 
'Maurice fell so unexpectedly upon the enemy with his main body that he made them 
flie, killing 80 in the place besides as many more who were drowned in the river 
attempting to escape. ,319 It was only the intervention of reinforcements from 
Tewkesbury under the command of Colonel Massey that prevented further loss. While 
it is true that Maurice was the first royalist general to inflict a serious defeat upon 
Waller, some historians have attributed his failure to an uncharacteristic misuse of 
terrain.320 It may be pertinent to note however that this was Waller's first experience of 
command in a conventional battle situation, with the enemy properly deployed to 
receive him. Worst still, he was handicapped by a chronic shortage of infantry and 
totally incompetent artillery. It is hardly surprising that he was unable to make any 
headway against Maurice's balanced and effective army. Disadvantaged by 
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circumstance and opposed by a resolute enemy, Ripple Field confirmed that the defence 
of the west would be no easy matter.321 
Ironically, it was the timely breakdown of the Oxford peace talks that came to 
Sir William's rescue. As described above, Essex marched to besiege Reading as soon as 
parliament rejected the king's final terms on 12 April. Consequently Charles recalled 
many outlying garrison forces, both to strengthen the defences of Oxford itself and to 
permit the mounting of a substantial relief effort. When Maurice was ordered to return 
to Oxford,322 Waller fortuitously found himself unopposed in the Severn valley, a 
situation he quickly exploited.323 He had received intelligence that Hereford was 
vulnerable to a surprise attack. 324 On the morning of 24 April Waller 'assaulted the 
Town in three several places, and some sallies and contestations there were; but before 
three of the clock, their Sallie was turned to a Parley' .325 Sir William completed the 
formalities of Hereford's surrender the following morning. Though Clarendon once 
again ridiculed the half-hearted resistance of the garrison,326 a second royalist source 
admitted that the town could have been defended with greater determination.327 Waller 
however had no intention of keeping Hereford. Mindful of the royalist snare that almost 
trapped him in Morunouthshire, he returned to Gloucester in early May carrying 
captured munitions and a collection ofmoney.328 
Waller's repeated capture and subsequent abandonment of royalist towns and 
garrisons may suggest a lack of strategic awareness. However, his actions need to be 
considered in terms of his leadership of the Western Association and his role in the 
wider war-effort. Complete domination of the Severn Valley lay beyond his resources, 
but as long as he controlled Bristol and Gloucester he could disrupt royalist plans to 
move recruits from south Wales or to land soldiers from Ireland. The longer he starved 
the king's Oxford army of such reinforcements, the greater the chance that Essex might 
deliver a decisive victory. And as Warmington has demonstrated, Waller's presence 
created sufficient security to reinvigorate the collection of much needed revenue from a 
whole swathe of parishes strongly disposed to parliament, and may even have helped 
prepare Gloucester for the siege of August and September 1643.329 
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Yet it was Waller's handling of a new threat that ultimately plunged 
parliament's western campaign into crisis, and which brought to an end his hard earned 
reputation as 'William the Conqueror.' Royalist correspondence captured in April 1643 
revealed that the king' s general in Cornwall, Sir Ralph Hopton, had been commanded 
by Charles to march his army towards Oxford.33o This was as yet impossible because 
the earl of Stamford, parliament's general in the South West, commanded substantial 
forces in Devonshire. But on 16 May the outnumbered Hopton destroyed Stamford's 
army at Stratton in perhaps the most brilliantly conceived and executed victory of the 
civil war.331 Crucially, this stunning royalist triumph coincided with the arrival at 
Oxford on 15 May of the first of the queen's great supply convoys, allowing Charles to 
dispatch westwards towards Hopton a substantial force of cavalry under Prince Maurice 
and the Marquis of Hertford. Essex, as we have seen, ordered the interception of the 
queen's convoy and was understandably furious to receive news of its successful 
passage, particularly as the disintegration of his own forces around Reading meant that 
Charles was free to reinforce Hopton without concern for the security of Oxford.332 This 
strategic breakthrough linked the three major theatres. The convoy of foreign arms and 
munitions had been assembled in Yorkshire under the supervision of the earl of 
Newcastle, while its arrival at Oxford strengthened the king's position on the central 
front and permitted the redeployment of cavalry to augment the western campaign. 
These breathtaking examples of inter-regional cooperation, which stood in marked 
contrast to the disunity of parliament's failing war effort, threatened the destruction of 
Waller's Western Association and a royalist march against the capital. With the benefit 
of hindsight it seems obvious that Waller should have done all in his power to prevent 
the union of Hopton's western army with Maurice and Hertford's cavalry.333 But from 
what happened next it is evident that Sir William had other objectives, which he clearly 
believed were more pressing and strategically more important. 
Sir Walter Earle, the puritan MP for Lyme, rode from Dorchester to Gloucester 
to impress upon Waller the absolute imperative of confronting Maurice and Hertford at 
Salisbury before Hopton could join them. But to Earle's astonishment and frustration 
Sir William decided to march in the opposite direction towards Worcester.334 Sir 
Robert Cooke, a member of the committee at Gloucester, defended Waller in a letter to 
parliament dated 2 June. It was necessary, Cooke explained, to slight Worcester first so 
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'that it might not remain a strength for parliament's enemies.'335 However Waller's 
assault was fiercely resisted, and when, on the evening of 29 May, he received a 
succession of urgent messages 'out of the west, exclaiming that all would be lost there, 
if he did not immediately advance that way,'336 the attempt on Worcester was 
abandoned.337 But worse was to follow. On returning to Gloucester a mutiny broke out 
amongst Sir William's soldiers, 'for want of money neither can the new [regiments] be 
completed, nor the old encouraged.'338 Disastrously Waller remained immobilized at 
Gloucester for a whole week whilst the two royalist armies joined together at Chard in 
Somerset on 4 June.339 Sir William's decision to safeguard the Severn Valley before 
opposing Maurice and Hertford had backfired and now appeared a grave error of 
judgment. 340 If his troops had not mutinied at Gloucester he may still have been able to 
intercept Maurice and Hertford somewhere between Salisbury and Chard, but it was by 
no means certain and would have been a close run thing. 
Yet even at this eleventh hour there remained a faint glimmer of hope. Waller's 
admittedly demoralized forces still stood between the united royalists and further 
progress towards Oxford or possibly London. Underdown has argued that although 
Waller's infantry couldn't hope to match Hopton's Cornish foot, he was well provided 
with cavalry from the capital, among them Sir Arthur Heselrig's heavily armoured 
regiment of 'Lobsters,' and he may even have enjoyed a numerical superiority if the 
parliamentarian garrison at Bristol was inc1uded.341 Nevertheless, the material point is 
that Waller's inability to prevent the union of two potent royalist armies threw the 
campaign into crisis, imperilling parliament's fragile hold on the region and opening up 
the possibility of a royalist advance against London. 
Summa" 
The case studies presented above have attempted to highlight potential reasons for 
parliament's military collapse in the summer of 1643. Perhaps surprisingly, in an 
analysis concerned with military failure, the fighting abilities of parliament's principal 
commanders do not appear to be the point of contention. The evidence suggests that 
Essex's often-criticised strategy was in fact governed by political necessity, and that he 
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fought effectively at both Edgehill and Reading despite the dubious quality of his 
troops. He successfully maintained the parliamentarian cause in difficult and trying 
circumstances, not least an irregular supply of pay and a debilitating outbreak of camp 
sickness. Despite these problems Essex managed to preserve an army in being, which, 
crucially, sustained the political cause upon which parliament's hopes depended. In the 
north the Fairfaxes fought tenaciously amid great adversity, demonstrating a quality of 
leadership and martial skill that was superior to that of their opponent the earl of 
Newcastle. They were let down however by an unrelenting failure of fellow 
parliamentarian commanders to provide desperately needed support. It was this total 
absence of cooperation that allowed the first of the queen's great supply convoys to 
reach Oxford unopposed, rescuing the king's principal field army at a critical juncture 
in the campaign. The replenishment of the Oxford army frustrated any possibility of an 
attack on the royalist capital by Essex's disintegrating army, and permitted the 
deployment of substantial forces to reinforce Sir Ralph Hopton's campaign in the west. 
Although Waller performed energetically, and with some degree of success, the 
aggressive Maurice finally brought a check to his run of victories. But much more 
serious was the strategic miscalculation which permitted the union of Hopton's army 
with reinforcements from Oxford under Maurice and Hertford. 
What emerges from this analysis is not a consistent or clear-cut picture of 
parliamentarian inferiority, either in terms ofleadership or fighting ability, and certainly 
not one that accounts for parliament's military collapse. Overall Essex, Fairfax and 
Waller appear perfectly capable of holding their own against their royalist opponents. 
And if they failed to achieve decisive victories, they similarly failed to suffer decisive 
defeats. While the king may appear to hold some kind martial edge, symbolised most 
effectively by Rupert's cavalry, the truth is that by June 1643 this supposed superiority 
had not produced a war-winning breakthrough. Instead we are presented with a 
remarkable and highly significant contrast. While parliament's war effort was 
continually undermined by a destructive lack of cooperation, royalist forces worked 
effectively and efficiently together. As we shall see, this key difference appears to 
explain royalist success and parliamentarian failure during the high summer of 1643. 
Royalist armies continued to mount combined operations in pursuit of the king's 
military objectives; whereas parliament's insubordinate and independent minded 
commanders remained incapable of this basic military requirement. It was an 
advantage that would enable Charles to take the strategic initiative and bring the 
parliamentarian war effort to the brink of disaster. These important and hitherto 
68 
neglected findings will be developed further in chapter three. In the meantime attention 
turns to the political causes of parliament's military collapse. 
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Chapter Two 
THE POLITICAL ROAD TO CRISIS 
JULY 1642-JUNE 1643 
This chapter will attempt to show how parliament's political and administrative 
preparations for civil war were essentially defensive, and how this reticent approach 
contributed towards the onset of the summer 1643 crisis. During the first twelve months 
of the conflict parliament pursued a reactive war effort, designed to avoid defeat rather 
than inflict a crushing victory. However, the king's detennination to supress 
parliament's rebellion by force, and bring its treasonous members to account, exposed 
the deficiencies of this overly cautious policy. It would take the collapse of the war 
effort, and the prospect of imminent defeat, before parliament would abandon its 
defensive outlook and attempt to win the war from a position of military supremacy. 
King and Parliament: Contrasting Attitudes and Experiences 
Charles I entered the civil war with important advantages over his parliamentary 
opponents, advantages that have not been fully recognised by historians. First, Charles 
had developed a strong disposition to resort to force when diplomatic means appeared 
incapable of yielding appropriate results. Second, he had gained valuable experience 
raising armed forces for the Bishops' Wars without the financial support nonnally 
afforded by parliamentary taxes. And third, after more than a decade of Personal Rule, 
Charles had grown accustomed to ruling the country without the participation of 
parliament. As the following analysis will demonstrate, these significant advantages 
sprang from the historically unequal relationship between crown and parliament. 
In the seventeenth century parliaments did not sit in continual session; they were 
'called on an ad hoc basis whenever the monarch felt the need to consult more widely 
among his subjects; most commonly in times of war or political instability.,342 The right 
to call and dissolve parliament was a fundamental royal prerogative, as was the 
authority to veto any legislation passed by the two Houses.343 In marked contrast to the 
sweeping powers wielded by the crown, parliament's principal functions were much 
more modest; to offer counsel to the monarch, to vote taxes, and to pass laws.344 
Parliament had, in effect, inherited the subservience of its medieval predecessors. As 
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the king's great council it remained devoid of executive power and any direct 
involvement in governing the country.345 In the national consciousness however 
parliament was more than a mere legislature, it was the protector of English liberties 
'such as habeas corpus and the principle of no taxation without consent.,346 David 
Smith has argued that during the Personal Rule the 'perception of parliament as a 
valuable conciliar body and a remedy for grievances remained especially strong in the 
popular memory,.347 And David Scott has pointed out that 'regular parliaments were 
thought to act as lightning conductors for domestic discontent', vitally important in a 
country where 'government depended upon the consent of the governed and the 
voluntary cooperation of local office-holders,.348 But as a decade of Personal Rule 
demonstrated all too clearly, parliament's ability to fulfil its constitutional obligations 
depended entirely on the willingness of the crown to summon its members to 
Westminster.349 
Charles was strongly disposed to rule without parliament if, in his view, the 
Houses became too obstructive or acted in an overtly critical manner. As far as he was 
concerned parliament did not possess an inalienable right to sit. It convened, as we have 
seen, at the express wish of the monarch, whenever it was deemed necessary. 
Parliament was in every conceivable sense the junior partner in an emphatically unequal 
relationship. Eleven years of Personal Rule had merely served to confirm this 
constitutional imbalance, revealing a king determined to assert the role of the crown, 
even if it meant alienating the political nation and denying parliament its accustomed 
role. Little wonder then that in 1640 'widespread anger' should prompt the Long 
Parliament to pass a series of measmes 'intended to prevent such a prolonged period of 
non-parliamentary government from happening again. ,350 
It will be argued that the experience of Personal Rule encouraged Charles to 
fight the Bishops' Wars of 1639 and 1640 from a position of financial weakness, and 
that this, paradoxically, provided the king with a future advantage over parliament. In 
order to wage his Scottish campaigns Charles twice mobilised and financed large armies 
without the consent or cooperation of a parliament. According to Mark Fissel the king 
was 'politically, financially and administratively' unprepared to deal with the Scots, 
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'yet he persisted rather than alter his political agenda'. 3SI As a result the king became 
accustomed to the difficulties of recruiting substantial military forces in the absence of 
parliamentary taxes. Even though these campaigns turned out to be unmitigated 
disasters, they prepared Charles for the unparalleled financial demands of civil war. 
Moreover, the fact that Charles was prepared to risk two Scottish conflicts without 
parliamentary finance demonstrated a resolve to deal forcefully with rebels. As one 
historian has pointed out, 'Charles I went about making war in the same way as he had 
governed during the Personal Rule. ,352 
In the case of the First Bishops' War (1639) this amounted to an improvised 
strategy involving full use of local government officials, a ruthless exploitation of the 
crown's feudal prerogatives, the personal contributions of councillors and courtiers, and 
financial expedients such as loans based on future crown receipts.353 Despite these 
desperate measures the First Bishops' War ended in a hastily arranged treaty, partly 
because Charles realised his army was unfit to fight, and partly because he suspected his 
officers and commanders did not support his Scottish adventure.354 David Scott has 
argued that the king's decision to negotiate with the Scots in 1639 rather than risk battle 
was one of the greatest mistakes of his life, and that the 'enormity of his error quickly 
became clear to him. ,355 So when the Short Parliament refused to back another Scottish 
war Charles dismissed it and set about raising a second army. The Lords and Commons 
were adamant that eleven years of grievances should be redressed before anything else 
was considered.356 But Charles, on the other hand, was only interested in raising money 
for his army.357 Characteristically, the king took the view that parliament should not sit 
unless it supported royal policy. Instead he would secure loans from London's 
mercantile community, while Ship Money would be collected as never before. This, the 
king was assured, would be more than enough.358 
Charles' relentless determination to dispense with disobedient parliaments 
provided a steely resolve with which to deal with the constitutional fallout of the 
equally disastrous second Bishops' War. The Long Parliament met in November 1640 
to oversee the political and financial arrangements by which the crown planned to settle 
with the victorious Scots. However, the strength of national feeling aroused by the 
injustices of the Personal Rule ensured that it quickly developed into a forum for 
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unrelenting attacks on royal policy.359 On 4 January 1642 Charles attempted to arrest his 
severest critics, five members of the Commons and a member of the Lords, on a charge 
of treason.360 This 'blunder' shattered the fragile relationship between king and 
parliament and, according to Anthony Fletcher, 'did much to make the political crisis 
insoluble' .361 Charles' unsuccessful use of armed aggression against his principal 
opponents meant 'that he must either accept a massive humiliation or raise the stakes 
and fight a civil war.'362 
The debacle of the Five Members provided further evidence of the king's 
reliance on force. He was absolutely insistent that neither parliament nor the Scots 
should be allowed to challenge his authority. Such an attitude, hardened by bitter 
experience, provided a potentially decisive psychological advantage over intrinsically 
political parliamentarian opponents. Charles, it seemed, had single-handedly redefined 
the role of the monarch. Anthony Fletcher has argued that as a result the king could not 
be trusted to rule according to the law.363 Following the prayer book rebellion in 
Scotland, and the insolent demands of the Long Parliament, Charles stood ready to 
assert the rights of monarchy by force of arms. In the view of the present writer it was 
an attitude that afforded a tangible advantage once the breach became irreparable and 
the fighting began. 
The failed attempt to arrest the Five Members appeared to be a disastrous 
miscalculation, but once again a royal calamity would furnish the king with yet another 
advantage over parliament. In the resulting furore Charles quickly decided 'that his 
capital had become too hot to hold him' and that his only option was to leave as quickly 
as possible.364 Clarendon stated that: 
They who wished the king best were not sorry that he then withdrew from 
Whitehall; for the insolence with which all that people were transported, and the 
animosity which was infused into the hearts of the people in general against the 
court, and even against the person of the king, cannot be expressed.365 
When Charles vacated London he took with him his secretaries, a whole family of 
departments that formed the royal household, and the bulk of the Privy Counci1.366 This, 
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as John Adamson has pointed out, 'left a power vacuum at Westminster - and a gaping 
hole in the edifice of government'. 367 Parliament was left with little alternative but to 
take up the reins of executive power. 'From being an instrument of the king's 
government, with legislative, judicial and conciliar functions, the Houses now became 
an alternative to that government'. 368 As parliament had never previously held executive 
power, a new system of government had to be improvised, 'and many of the functions it 
was now forced to undertake were therefore pretty much unprecedented' .369 However, 
as John Adamson has perceptively observed, there was a general belief that parliament 
was 'ill equipped to make the sort of managerial decisions necessary for the efficient 
conduct of war' .370 This provided Charles with a significant administrative advantage. 
While the bulk of government officeholders joined the king at Oxford, parliament was 
left bereft of experienced administrators.371 
It is clear that parliament entered the civil war at a distinct disadvantage. The 
machinery of government was in the process of vacating the capital, leaving parliament 
to fill the void created by the departure of the Privy Council and royal household. In 
order to raise the necessary finance to equip an army and fight a major battle parliament 
had little choice but to form an alternative government. Set against this the king had 
recruited two armies for the Bishops' Wars, which although unsuccessful, nevertheless 
provided invaluable experience of financing armed forces without parliamentary taxes. 
In addition the failure of the Scottish wars did not dissuaded the king from using force 
when he believed it necessary - as the attempt to arrest the Five Members 
demonstrated. Charles had developed a psychological toughness and a disposition to 
rely on force, while the Personal Rule revealed a real strength of purpose to rule without 
parliament. Anthony Fletcher has argued that the king's experiences gave him 'a 
jaundiced view of parliaments', and that the Bishops' Wars 'strengthened his belief that 
Puritans were inherently seditious. ,372 But it is perhaps the views of Kevin Sharpe that 
provide a closer understanding of the king and his attitudes. Charles, Sharpe 
maintained, 'was no politician, but a man of profound conscience and deep principle'. 
Throughout his reign 'honour and order were the principles he held to'. Charles was 
absolutely convinced that he 'pursued courses for the good of the commonweal', that he 
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held convictions 'a politician might have surrendered', and that he believed some 
principles 'worth adhering to whatever the political repercussions' .373 
So how precisely do Sharpe's insights inform our perception of the king? 
Originally it was intended to argue that Charles was mentally prepared for conflict, that 
he was accustomed to dealing with parliament as an adversary rather than a partner in 
government, that 11 years of Personal Rule had reduced his tolerance of parliament and 
opposition in general, and made him more likely to lash out with armed force, as the 
Bishops' Wars appeared to demonstrate. But in the light of Sharpe's assertion that 
Charles was 'no politician, but a man of profound conscience and deep principle', can 
we see the king in a slightly different way? Do we need to think of Charles as a quasi-
religious figure rather than a political operator? It is possible that his very status as 
monarch provided a fundamental advantage over parliament, not because he was head 
of state and ruler of the kingdom, but because he believed he was entrusted by God to 
govern a peaceful and harmonious realm, one that respected a natural order of God, 
king and man. If this order was threatened, if the equilibrium was destabilised, it was 
incumbent upon Charles to rectify the position, even if it meant the use of force. A 
potential consequence of this interpretation is that we are presented with a subtle 
difference between peace and natural order. A peace that fails to reflect this divinely 
ordained relationship is not a real peace because it denies a natural order of God, king 
and man. This is perhaps why Charles had to have peace on his terms, because in his 
view they were God's terms. Thus the Personal Rule was intended to restore, as Charles 
believed, a natural order in governance; similarly the Bishops' Wars were required to 
restore a natural order in religion following the prayer book rebellion; and the Long 
Parliament had clearly gone too far, and had to be curtailed, because it was on the point 
of assuming for itself prerogatives that underpinned royal authority, and by defmition, 
the natural order. It is entirely possible that Charles saw himself as the custodian of this 
divine hierarchy, and believed that the Almighty would hold him to account if it were 
overturned. So perhaps it was for these reasons that the king was willing to rule without 
parliament, reasons of 'profound conscience and deep conviction', and why he was 
equally prepared to crush parliament's leaders if they became too threatening or 
destabilising. It was, if true, an uncompromising mind-set, one bolstered by bitter and 
keenly observed experience, and one which provided a strong advantage over 
parliament in the build-up to civil war. 
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Descent to War 
Parliament's preparations for conflict were essentially a reaction to actual or perceived 
royal aggression. The following analysis is intended to show that Charles' propensity 
for belligerence left parliament with little option but to act in self-defence, a course of 
action that has often been interpreted as escalatory, provocative and pre-emptive. In 
reality parliament faced an almost intractable problem, primarily because the king's 
authority was universally recognised, and any attempt to challenge that authority would 
be construed as an act of sedition. The spectre of treason prompted parliament to tread 
carefully, to react to the actions of the king rather than pre-empt them. This, by 
definition, placed the Houses on the defensive, and ensured that they adopted a reactive 
and proportionate approach. In matching the king' s preparations parliament hoped that 
conflict would be averted and a negotiated settlement would result. But once Charles 
raised the royal standard at Nottingham on 22 August 1642 this became more difficult, 
principally because the king had effectively declared war on his parliament. The Houses 
were confronted by a monarch who was determined to retain the political initiative and 
to demonstrate that royal authority could not be compromised. As far as Charles was 
concerned pre-emptive action was justified on the grounds that parliament had 
orchestrated a rebellion and committed treason. The Houses, on the other hand, were 
equally determined to defend the reforms of the Long Parliament, and so were prepared 
to respond in kind when the king appeared to threaten force or the possibility of civil 
war. Thus two factors were in play: royal insistence that the authority of the king should 
be maintained at all costs, and parliamentary reticence to go any further than was 
absolutely necessary. The combination of these conflicting dynamics gave rise to a 
parliamentarian war effort that was both reactive and defensive. 
A prime example of parliamentary self-defence construed as a calculated act of 
open hostility concerned the enactment of the Militia Ordinance on 5 March 1642. In 
the judgement of Austin Woolrych nothing 'led so inexorably to war' as the quarrel 
over this particular piece of legislation.374 It is clear from the text of the Militia 
Ordinance that parliament felt genuine fear at the prospect of renewed royal violence. 
37S In the wake of Charles' attempt to arrest the five members it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that parliament's decision to take control of the country's armed forces was 
anything other than a defensive measure.376 Conrad Russell has argued that the Lords 
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concurred with the Commons over the Militia Ordinance in order to prevent a royal war 
against parliament.377 Certainly, the Militia Ordinance could be interpreted as a 
peacekeeping initiative, a necessary expedient to prevent Charles getting his hands on 
the nation's arms and soldiers. Anthony Fletcher has argued that it was essentially 'a 
defensive tactic and a political weapon, rather than a means to wage war' .378 What 
needs to be emphasised here is that the battle for the Militia Ordinance provided a first 
example of parliament's defensive and reactive approach. The conviction that Charles 
was poised to unleash armed force against his unrepentant parliament compelled the 
Houses to create a legal instrument emasculating the king. The Militia Ordinance was 
not intended to precipitate armed conflict. It was, in the view of the present writer, a 
bold and necessary measure designed to prevent the mobilization of a royal army. Far 
from angling for military confrontation, parliament was doing all in its power to prevent 
it. 
By early June 1642 parliament was as certain as it could be that the king was 
preparing for civil war. Charles had summoned the Yorkshire gentry to attend him at 
York on 20 April, and had subsequently raised a personal bodyguard. On 3 June the 
king invited all ministers, freeholders, farmers and substantial copyholders to gather on 
Heworth Moor outside York. Reports put the crowd at anything between forty and a 
hundred thousand.379 Andrew Hopper has argued that Charles intended the gathering as 
a reminder to the Yorkshire gentry of their allegiance to their king, and that his real 
purpose was to win their armed support in order to 'capture the critical arms magazine 
at Hull. ,380 Lords and Commons agreed the need to raise finance, but such a decision 
had to be justified if it was to allay the suspicion of treason. On 9 June the preamble to 
The Propositions, an ordinance 'for bringing in Plate, Money and Horse', set out the 
position as parliament saw it.381 The king had been seduced by wicked counsel and fully 
intended to make war against the parliament. He had actually begun to raise horse and 
foot and had issued a summons throughout the county of Yorkshire. Others in the royal 
service had been employed elsewhere to raise troops in the king's name, while 'several 
sorts of malignant men,' who were close to His Majesty, continued to threaten the 
overthrow of parliament by force. In order to preserve 'the blessed fruits of this present 
parliament' the Houses appealed to the 'well affected' for material assistance. The 
voluntary terms on which the Propositions requested plate, money and horse 
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encapsulated the defensive nature of the ordinance. Parliament intended to do no more 
than replicate the king' s military preparations, reacting to the threat of royal aggression 
in proportionate tenns. All donors would have their money repaid at a set rate of 
interest, their plate valued, and the expense of providing horses would be met in full. 
But just as important was the precise use to which the proceeds of the ordinance would 
be put, for these were exactions that broke new ground and had to be explained in 
purely defensive tenns. No mention was made of a war against the reigning monarch; 
instead the ordinance was intended to protect the protestant religion, the person of the 
king, the law of the land, and the privileges of parliament.382 In fact Mark Kishlansky 
has argued that parliament's claim to fight for the king actually prevented an offensive 
war.
383 
During the remainder of June the king prepared openly and energetically for 
war. Charles issued orders to the Lords Lieutenant of each county to execute 
Commissions of Array in order to raise forces for the royal cause; the king's 
commander in the north, the earl of Newcastle, seized the port of Newcastle and began 
to fortify the river Tyne; and in the Netherlands Henrietta Maria assembled large 
quantities of arms and munitions for shipment to England.384 At York Charles gathered 
a small army and, at the beginning of July, marched to besiege Hull.38s Austin 
Woolrych has argued that the king's activities provided the Houses with a 'pretext' for 
reciprocal belligerence.386 But the evidence appears to suggest that Charles provided 
Parliament with a valid reason rather than a 'pretext'. Consequently, on 4 July, Lords 
and Commons agreed the appointment of a Committee of Safety, a war cabinet initially 
composed of five activists from the upper chamber and ten from the lower.387 Charged 
with the organisation and direction of parliament's war effort, the committee was 
intended 'to fill the void created by the withdrawal of the Privy Council.' John 
Adamson has pointed out that the committee came into existence without an 
empowering ordinance, and that the Privy Councillors remaining at Westminster seem 
to have constituted themselves, along with leading members of the Commons, as a 
suitable body to deal with the forthcoming campaign.388 Lotte Glow has argued that the 
committee's real purpose was to exclude from government those who might favour 
peace at any cost.389 But the addition of a large number of peers in September 1642 
312 Ibid, p. 9. 
313 M. A. Kishlansky, The Rise o/the New Model Army (Cambridge, 1979), p. 6. 
314 W oolrych, Britain in Revolution, p. 228. 
315 C. V. Wedgwood, The King's War 164/-/647 (London, 1958), p. 106. 
316 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, p. 228. 
317 Journal o/the House o/Commons, vol. ii, p. 651. 
311 Adamson, 'Triumph of Oligarchy', p. 102. 
319 L. Glow, 'The Committee of Safety,' English Historical Review, vol. 80 (1965), pp. 291·292. 
78 
meant that the committee became, in effect, 'the politically active membership of the 
House of Lords. ,390 This, as we shall see more fully in chapter four, led to a 
conservative and peace orientated war effort in which the committee's principal aim 
was to work towards a negotiated settlement by avoiding defeat.391 Indeed, by the 
summer of 1643 the body that had been formed to 'facilitate the waging of war' was 
considered a positive obstruction to military success.392 
The very first act of the Committee of Safety was to respond to the king's siege 
of Hull. On 6 July parliament passed an ordinance for the raising of two thousand men 
to relieve the port, the troops to be recruited in the City of London and the counties of 
Middlesex, Essex, Kent, and Surrey.393 Three days later the Commons voted by a 
majority of 125 to 45 to recruit an army often thousand volunteers, again from the City 
of London and its environs. 'Considering the [king's] preparation in the north it is 
desired these may be put into a speedy way of dispatch; and that within three or four 
days, if possible.,394 And on 15 July parliament appointed Robert Devereux, earl of 
Essex, a member of the Committee of Safety, to be Captain-General and Chief 
Commander of all its forces.395 No matter how unconstitutional or treasonous the 
raising of forces may appear, it is difficult to avoid the impression that these were 
essentially defensive and proportionate measures, deemed necessary by the king's pre-
emptive action. This was the position adopted by the future regicide Edmund Ludlow, 
who enlisted for parliament because the king was 'resolving to impose that by the force 
of his arms which he could not do by the strength of his arguments.'396 
By 18 August the mobilization of a royal army appeared so far advanced that 
the Houses declared the king' s supporters to be traitors.397 A report from the north 
stated that the king had left Yorkshire, escorted by as many as four thousand horse and 
a smaller number of foot, intending to raise the royal standard at Nottingham on 20 
August.398 In his place Charles appointed the earl of Cumberland to raise an army for 
the defence of the county and to levy contributions for its support on the local 
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populace.399 As we have already seen in chapter one, it was the escalation of affairs in 
Yorkshire that finally persuaded a reluctant Lord Fairfax to abandon neutrality and 
openly declare himself for parliament. And in the south there was further cause for 
alarm. By 18 August the parliamentarian commander Sir William Waller had begun a 
siege of Portsmouth, which, unexpectedly, had declared for the king. The port was of 
immense strategic importance, particularly as a landing point for potential French aid 
for the royalist cause.4OO The news reaching Westminster must have painted an alarming 
picture. Charles was moving south, recruiting soldiers as he marched, while Goring had 
declared Portsmouth for the king. In addition the Houses had been informed that 
Charles would shortly raise the royal standard at Nottingham. As far as parliament was 
concerned the king was intent upon war and was assembling the wherewithal to fight. 
The raising of the royal standard amounted to a categorical declaration of war. It 
was the act of a monarch determined to retain the initiative and to demonstrate that he 
was dealing with a rebellion. No matter how difficult the king's military preparations 
may have been,401 this deeply symbolic act of aggression could only increase tension at 
Westminster. Given parliament's manifest apprehension, one might have anticipated a 
ready willingness to enter into peace talks. Yet when the king proposed such a course of 
action on 25 August402 it was rejected with an intransigence that suggested both fear and 
mistrust. Gardiner has argued that the king was 'sincerely anxious to make peace, if it 
could be made on his own terms,' but it was also likely that he intended to 'place his 
opponents in the wrong, or even gain time to prepare for war. ,403 Unless Charles was 
prepared to retract 'those several proclamations and declarations against both the houses 
of parliament, whereby their actions are declared treasonable, and their persons 
traitors ... and until the standard set up in pursuance of the said proclamations be taken 
down' negotiations could not take place.404 This was, in the view of parliament, a 
position of principle, forced by the king's wholly unwarranted declaration of war. 
Parliament's dogmatism appeared to make war more likely, but it is a strategy that 
cannot be divorced from the example of the Bishops' Wars. The Scots had twice 
demonstrated that an unflinching defence of key national principles could bring a 
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humbled Charles to the negotiating table.405 It is inconceivable that parliament's 
rationale was not influenced by the events of 1639 and 1640. 
Parliament had attempted to avert war by standing up to the king and defending 
the achievements of the Long Parliament. It was an attitude typified by Sir Symonds 
D'Ewes on 16 May 1642: 
For mine own part I think they must have a wisdom beyond the moon that 
dream of any happiness to themselves after the ruin of this parliament, which I 
shall never desire to over live.406 
Until the raising of the royal standard it was hoped that such a policy would persuade 
Charles that his opponents could not be overawed, and that meaningful negotiations 
were the only realistic solution. However, the king would not compromise what he felt 
were fundamental royal prerogatives, most notably the unprecedented Militia 
Ordinance. Parliament's gamble had therefore failed, leaving the Houses to face the 
inevitability of civil war. By 15 October a mounting sense of apprehension was evident 
in parliament's order to ready the trained bands: 
Two English armies are near together, even ready to join in a dreadful and 
bloody encounter ... the king ... hath raised an army ... giving liberty to plunder 
and rob all sorts of people ... [the trained bands] for the most part their arms are 
taken from them, and put upon those who are more mercenary ... and so likely to 
be fitter instruments of rapine and spoil ... [the king] would march towards 
London, those rich and fruitful counties in the way being like to yield them a 
supply of their necessities ... where they likewise think to find a party, which, 
upon His Majesty's a~roach, may make some disturbance, and facilitate their 
designs upon the city.' 7 
The threat was clear, for 'if the king's army prevail ... the kingdom will again fall under 
the government of those mischievous counsels, who before this parliament had even 
brought both religion and liberty to ruin; and we shall have no hope left of any more 
parliaments, but such as shall be concurrent and subservient to these ends. ,408 Lords and 
Commons were now resigned to a pitched battle. In 1639 and 1640 the Scottish 
Covenanters had successfully defended cherished national interests by military force. ' 
Two years later in the autumn of 1642 it seemed that parliament would have to emulate 
their northern neighbours or face the certainty of royal retribution. 
405 Clarendon described the English defeat at the battle of New bum in the Second Bishops' War as that 
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Edgebill to tbe Treaty of Oxford: Preparing for a Longer War 
When Essex finally faced the king at Edgehill on 23 October the savagery of the 
fighting and the horrific possibility of a second battle provoked an immediate demand 
for peace. Within days the Lords had brought forward a proposal to reopen 
negotiations:409 'that it might be taken into consideration, how to prevent further 
bloodshed between the two armies; and to consider of some means to beget a peace.'410 
On 2 November Pym declared that while the Committee of Safety would prepare an 
address aimed at renewing negotiations, the continued preparation of armed forces 
'shall be prosecuted with all vigour.'411 The following analysis will attempt to 
demonstrate that Pym' s dual track policy was the result of parliament's military 
weakness in the aftermath of Edgehill and the standoff at Turnham Green. 
Between the king's march on the capital in November 1642 and the collapse of 
the Oxford Treaty in April 1643 parliament was forced to expand the war effort on a 
huge scale. The failure of Edgehill to bring the conflict to a conclusion pushed the civil 
war in to uncharted waters. Parliament had to face the possibility that the Oxford talks 
might not deliver peace and that the principal field armies of king and parliament would 
once again face each other in a major confrontation. The voluntary and temporary 
nature of parliament's preparations for the Edgehill campaign required a complete 
overhaul once it became clear that the conflict would pass unresolved in to 1643. Hence 
Pym's insistence that military preparation would continue alongside the search for a 
negotiated settlement. It was a strategy described by Hexter as 'treat for peace and 
prepare for war' ,412 but explained by Kishlansky as an example of parliament's search 
for consensus; where agreement could not be found, contradictory policies would be 
simultaneously pursued.413 Although parliament had to construct the means to support a 
new war effort, its principal initiatives during this period indicate a shoring up of a 
defensive position. It appeared, as we shall now see, that the intention was to avoid 
defeat rather than launch a major offensive against the king. 
As 1642 drew to a close parliament had to face a new danger gathering force in 
the northern most counties of the kingdom. As we have already seen, by the beginning 
of November the earl of Newcastle had assembled an army of 8,000 horse and foot in 
Northumberland and County Durham and was poised to march south to reinforce the 
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410 Journal o/the HOWIe o/Lords, vol. v, p. 424. 
411 Ibid., p. 431. The Venetian Ambassador claimed the Commons only agreed to talks in order to buy 
time and to appear committed to an accommodation. A. B. Hinds (ed.), Calendar o/State Papers 
Venetian (London, 1925), 1642-1643, p. 199. 
412 J. H. Hexler, The Reign o/King Pym (Harvard, 1941), p. 21. 
413 Kishlansky, New Model Army, pp. 18-19. 
82 
king.414 The threat was so great that on 7 November parliament issued a direct invitation 
to the Scots to enter England and suppress Newcastle's army. The king, parliament 
declared: 
Hath given commission to divers eminent and known papists to raise forces and 
compose an army in the north ... for the destruction of this parliament, and of 
the religion and liberty of the kingdom. And hereupon we further desire our 
brethren of the nation of Scotland ... to assist us in suppressing the army of 
papists and foreigners. Which, as we expect, will shortly be on foot here; and if 
they be not timely prevented, may prove as mischievous and destructive to that 
k· d I 415 mg om, as to ourse ves. 
Parliament's approach to the Scots indicated the seriousness of the situation. It was an 
appeal that would be repeated in earnest eight months later when Newcastle finally 
crushed Lord Fairfax's northern army at Adwalton Moor. But Parliament's willingness 
to request Scottish assistance long before Adwalton Moor in November 1642 revealed 
the underlying weakness of the position in the north. With Newcastle preparing to 
march south, a shell-shocked parliament had little option but to plead for Scottish help. 
In addition to the deteriorating military situation parliament's financial 
programme constituted a further source of weakness. The outbreak of civil war placed 
parliament in a new situation; instead of dealing with government requests for taxation 
the Houses now faced the need to raise and disburse large sums of money. Initially 
parliament attempted to finance its war effort through loans and contributions, but in 
London not all City merchants were eager to lend, and as we have seen, the 
Propositions depended upon the willingness of the public to donate money and 
materials.416 As Hexter quite correctly pointed out, by November 1642 the Houses 'had 
yet to pass even the most necessary and obvious measures for the successful 
prosecution of a war.' Parliament had no regular revenue and no machinery to collect 
taxes; it had only a volunteer army paid by voluntary contributions.41} Parliament's 
financial provisions were essentially temporary, an expedient rather than a coherent 
strategy. On 1 February 1643 the inadequacy of this system became startlingly apparent. 
Sir Gilbert Gerard, treasurer of the army, announced 'that he had not a penny left with 
which to pay the troops,' and that it was now essential to replace the system of 
voluntary contributions with a programme of regular taxation.418 
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On 24 February, the Lords gave their assent to an ordinance establishing a 
weekly assessment of every county and city in England and Wales. All persons and 
corporations were to be taxed, Popish recusants would be charged double and those who 
unjustly avoided taxation would pay treble. The ordinance created a network of county- . 
based committees, each charged with the appointment of assessors and collectors. The 
first instalment was due on or by 1 March, while subsequent weekly payments would 
continue for three months, 'unless the king's army shall be disbanded in the 
meantime.'419 Clarendon, though obviously hostile, placed, with chilling effect, the 
unprecedented scale of the new tax in a nationai and historic context: 
They passed an ordinance for a weekly assessment throughout the kingdom 
towards the support of the war; by which was imposed upon the city of London 
the weekly sum of ten thousand pounds, and upon the whole kingdom no less 
than a weekly payment of three and thirty thousand five hundred and eighteen 
pounds, amounting in the year to one million seven hundred forty-three 
thousand pounds; a prodigious sum for a people to bear who before this war 
thought the payment of two subsidies in a year, which in the best times never 
amounted to above two hundred thousand pounds, and never in our age to above 
one hundred and fifty, an insupportable burden upon the kingdom; and indeed 
had very seldom borne the same under all the kings that ever reigned.420 
And on 27 March the Houses passed an ordinance sequestering the estates of those who 
assisted the king.421 The preamble declared that 'it is most agreeable to common 
justice, that the estates of such notorious delinquents, as have been the causers or 
instruments of the public calamities ... should be converted and applied towards the 
supportation of the great charges of the commonwealth. ,422 Yet for Clarendon and other 
royalists the sequestration ordinance was a source of even greater indignation than the 
weekly assessment. 'By their own authority they directed all the land~ of bishops, 
deans, and chapters to be sequestered, and inhibited the tenants to pay any rent to 
them. ,423 The royalist newsbook Mercurius Aulicus claimed that the ordinance was little 
more than a device to reward parliament's leading supporters 'with the rents and lands 
of the king's good subjects.'424 But as far as parliament was concerned the ordinances 
for the weekly assessment and the sequestration of delinquents represented a necessary 
sea change in strategy. Long before the' Oxford Treaty drew to an unsuccessful 
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conclusion in April 1643 it was obvious that parliament's finances were totally 
inadequate and required a thorough overhaul. The weekly assessment and the 
sequestration of delinquents confirmed that the war had entered a new stage, and would 
now be managed on a scale previously unimagined. 
Parliament's mounting financial and military difficulties were exacerbated still 
further by the gradual removal of government departments from the capital. Following 
Turnham Green the king set up headquarters at Oxford and began to establish the 
university town as a new seat of government. The dean's lodgings at Christchurch 
became a royal palace, the law courts reopened for business in the Oxford Schools, the 
exchequer operated out of All Souls, and the Ordinance Office established workshops at 
Christchurch and the Schools. Although this fledgling system of government retained at 
its heart the old Privy Council, authority was now shared with the king's council of 
war.425 The departure of governmental infrastructure to Oxford left parliament seriously 
bereft of administrative expertise and, moreover, the cloak of legality. The Houses had 
little alternative but to establish an alternative government as best they could, adding to 
the military and financial problems outlined above. 
Yet another parliamentarian difficulty concerned the large quantities of arms, 
commanders, and soldiers reinforcing the royalist cause from abroad. From the 
beginning of the civil war parliament's control of the capital meant that the king could 
not have secured sufficient weapons from domestic suppliers, so he was compelled to 
import them on a colossal scale. Without arms shipments it would have been impossible 
for Charles to sustain an effective war effort. Indeed Peter Edwards has argued that the 
loss of royalist ports in 1644 and 1645 'proved fatal to the king's cause' .426 But in 1642 
the problem of royalist imports was so acute that on 29 November parliament 
introduced an ordinance 'for the speedy setting forth of certain ships (in all points 
furnished for war) to prevent the bringing over of soldiers, money, ordnance, and other 
ammunition from beyond the sea, to assist the king, against the parliament' .427 The 
ordinance made specific reference to the 'very great quantities of ordnance, arms, and 
other warlike ammunition brought into Newcastle and other parts of the kingdom', and 
empowered the fitting out of ships to act as privateers 'to prevent and hinder all such 
supplies as shall be sent from any foreign parts to the prejudice of this nation,.428 In the 
longer term, as Peter Edwards has observed, parliament's control of arms industries in 
the south east would prove significant. But at the outbreak of hostilities the situation 
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was completely different; royalist arms imports and the relocation of the Ordnance 
Office to Oxford meant that parliament was in disarray. 429 
The king's acquisition of Oxford and the earl of Newcastle's invasion of 
Yorkshire on 1 December 1642 resulted in a major parliamentarian initiative: the 
grouping together of neighbouring counties to form regional Associations. On 15 
December Northampton, Leicester, Derby, Rutland, Nottingham, Huntingdon, Bedford 
and Buckingham were drawn together - 'for the mutual defence of one another' - to 
form a Midland Association.43o Five days later Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Cambridge, Isle 
of Ely, Hertfordshire and Norwich were similarly combined into an Eastern 
Association, and on 31 December Warwickshire and Staffordshire were also 
amalgamated.431 It was intended that the constituent shires of each association would 
raise armed men· under the direction of a committee; they would then be placed under 
the overall command of a Major General, who would have the power to lead them 'to 
such places as he shall think fit.' Of particular significance for this study is the 
geographical distribution of the associations themselves. The king' s withdrawal to 
Oxford and the earl of Newcastle's march into Yorkshire defined, in effect, a new front 
line. Despite Michael Braddick's assertion that these measures lacked coherence, the 
counties associated in December 1642 broadly acknowledged this development, running 
in a wide sweep south of Yorkshire and to the east ofOxford.432 This did not mean that 
Yorkshire was to be given up or that any thought of advancing on Oxford was to be 
abandoned. Rather, it focussed attention on a large section of England that now fell 
between the principal areas of royalist and parliamentarian domination. As far as the 
Houses were concerned these crucial counties stood in the path of the king's Oxford 
army and Newcastle's northern army, royalist forces that needed to subdue London in 
order to achieve victory. 
Gardiner has argued that the decision to combine counties was based on a 
realisation that individual shires were too small to provide effective military forces.433 
Peter Newman, on the other hand, believed that they were intended to counter the 
effects of localism, a militarily debilitating condition characterised by a determined 
neutralism or 'an attachment to local defence and localleadership.'434 Clearly there is 
an element of truth in these assertions, but given their geographical distribution it would 
appear more likely that they were a defensive measure. Parliament's offensive strategy 
429 Edwards, Dealing in Death. p. 211. 
430 Firth & Rail (eels.), Acts and Ordinances, vol. i, p. 49. 
431 Ibid., pp. 51 &53. 
432 Braddick, God's Fury, England's Fire, p. 268. 
433 Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, p. 77. 
434 P. R. Newman, Companion to the English Civil Wars (Oxford, 1990), p. 91. 
86 
depended upon Essex defeating the king's principal field army while parliament's 
regional forces held local royalists in check. The associations were intended to supress 
county-based enemy action and to prevent locally raised reinforcements reaching the 
king. These large swathes of amalgamated counties represented a physical reaction to 
the trauma of the king's drive towards London following the battle of Edgehill. The 
defence of the capital would become a greater preoccupation for parliament than 
actually defeating the king's army. As long as London held out Charles would have to 
consider reopening negotiations. This, essentially, was parliament's fallback position, 
security against the possibility that Essex might prove unable to secure outright victory 
on the field of battle. 
This review of the post Edgehill and Turnham Green situation has emphasised 
the weakness of parliament's position. It is an aspect of the civil war that has to some 
extent been obscured by the opening of the Oxford Treaty on 1 February 1643. 
Parliament's military, financial, and administrative frailties during this period have 
tended to remain unrecognised, but as we shall see in chapter four, they played an 
important part in the onset of the summer crisis. 
Spring to Summer 1643: The Slide to Crisis 
When military operations recommenced in the Thames Valley following the collapse of 
the Oxford Treaty in mid-April 1643 parliament was thwarted by the inadequacy of its 
fmancial programme. It was a weakness that allowed the royalists to escape the 
consequences of a major parliamentarian offensive at a time when the king was in a 
vulnerable position. The ramifications of parliament's inability to exploit a momentary 
military advantage would be profound, enabling the royalists to recover and bring 
parliament to the brink of total defeat in a little over three months. At the same time that 
parliament's fmancial problems were undermining military effectiveness; the security 
of the capital became an increasing source of concern. The following analysis will show 
how parliament's military hopes were dashed by a chronic inability to finance the war 
effort, and how the incessant scheming of the king and his advisers almost hatched a 
plot that captured the capital and ended the war. It was during the months of spring and 
early summer 1643 that parliament showed the first indications ofa slide towards crisis. 
As we have already seen in chapter one, the demise of the Oxford Treaty 
enabled Essex to launch a new campaign in the Thames Valley with a large and freshly 
recruited army. 43S When Reading surrendered to the Lord General on 26 April 
parliamentarian intelligence indicated that the king's military position was weak and 
43S Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, p. 258. 
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that a determined assault against Oxford might well succeed.436 However, on 29 April 
joy quickly turned to despair when news reached Westminster that Essex's army could 
not advance until his troops were paid.437 It was a setback that could not have occurred 
at a worse time. Only four days earlier, as Essex was about to bring the siege of 
Reading to a successful conclusion, the Houses were forced to deal with the equally 
onerous financial demands of Lord Fairfax in Yorkshire and Sir William Waller in the 
Severn Valley. Reluctantly declining Fairfax's request for immediate assistance against 
the earl of Newcastle, the speaker of the Commons bluntly admitted: 
The true reason is, that, in this general combustion of the kingdom, the 
contributions of most counties are consumed in their own defence; and the City 
hath been so extremely exhausted, that it can hardly support the Lord General's 
army, unto which a great arrears remains unpaid, both for pay and supplies of 
the magazine.438 
And in the same session the Lords passed an ordinance appealing for horses, armed men 
and money to be lent to the army of Sir William Waller, which had been badly defeated 
by Prince Maurice at Ripple Field on 13 Apri1.439 
At a time of rapidly increasing military expenditure parliament's inability to 
finance Essex, Fairfax, and Waller demonstrated the inadequacy of the taxation and 
disbursement system. The seriousness of the situation meant that Essex was denied the 
means to capitalise upon a potentially decisive breakthrough, while both Fairfax and 
Waller were effectively left to fend for themselves. The reality was that the weekly 
assessment and sequestration ordinances had yet to achieve an efficiency of extraction 
that could even begin to address parliament's needs. Since its introduction on 1 March 
1643 the Eastern Association's weekly assessment, for example, should have produced 
a total of £4,367 every seven days.44o But 'in two months the whole of the payments 
from the five counties which composed the association reached no more than £3,372, of 
which the share borne by the single county of Cambridge, in which Cromwell's 
influence was the highest, was little less than £2,000. ,441 The financial crisis prompted 
royalist agents in London to report that parliament 'want money for their army 
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extremely' .442 As Hexter has demonstrated, there was an impossible balance to be 
struck between imposing unprecedented financial burdens and retaining political 
sUpport.443 Though the Lords and Commons had passed the weekly assessment and 
sequestration ordinances during the Oxford Treaty, Pym's other revenue ralsmg 
measures, most notably the Excise, were strongly rebuffed.444 'A tax on 
consumption', Michael Braddick has observed, 'was regarded with deep hostility in 
Stuart England'. There was outrage that Pym 'who pretended to stand so much for the 
liberty of the subject should propose such an unjust, scandalous, and destructive 
project' .44S While negotiations continued a tax. on consumer products remained a step 
too far for the majority of members. It was the inevitable reality of the early civil war 
that Pym' s legislative agenda could not attract sufficient support until faced by the crisis 
of imminent defeat. It was only after the destruction of parliament's northern and 
western armies at Adwalton Moor (30 June) and Roundway Down (13 July) 
respectively that the 'inhibition about the Excise was fmally broken' and the measure 
reluctantly adopted (22 July).446 
On 5 May it was announced in the Lords that the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and 
Common Council of the City of London had agreed to make an emergency loan of forty 
thousand pounds for the support of the army. However, the advance was accompanied 
by a number of considerations, which the Lords were invited to take into account. One 
of the considerations desired: 
that their Lordships would please pass the ordinance brought from the House of 
Commons, for the cessing of the twentieth parts of the estates of ill-affected 
persons, in the several counties of the kingdom, because divers citizens that have 
got great estates in land have left the City, and live in the country.447 
An ordinance to assess non-contributors had been passed by the Commons on 4 
February 1643,448 but for three months it had 'lay neglected and apparently quite dead 
in the House of Lords' .449 The City authority was a financial source the Houses could 
not afford to alienate under any circumstances, and so the following day, after 
consultation with the lower chamber, the Lords gave their assent to the required 
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ordinance.45o Royalist propaganda claimed that the Lords capitulated because the 
Commons threatened to enact the ordinance independently, thus creating a precedent for 
future legislation.451 What is certain, however, is that the City'S thinly disguised threat 
to withhold the loan provided an early example of the growing militancy of the Lord 
Mayor and Common Council. As we shall see in chapter three, the strong arm tactics of 
the City militants would playa decisive role in averting a parliamentarian surrender at 
the climax of the summer crisis in August 1643. 
As mentioned above, a further problem preoccupying parliament during this 
period concerned the safety of London. At the collapse of the Oxford Treaty, as Essex 
marched away to confront the king's forces in the Thames valley, the Houses prepared 
to defend the capital in the Lord General's absence. On 12 April the Lords gave their 
approval to an ordinance authorising the militia committee of London to recruit, train 
and command new regiments of volunteer soldiers. These would guard the city, 
parliament and parts adjacent 'in these times of imminent danger. ,452 It seems pretty 
clear that parliament was anxious to avoid a repeat of the near panic that had swept 
London in the wake of Edgehill. The Houses were absolutely determined that adequate 
forces would be ready to repel any future attack. However, the threat posed by the 
king's army was not the only danger to parliamentarian security. On 6 June Pym 
reported the discovery of a plot which, had it succeeded, would have ended the war at a 
stroke.453 
While the Oxford peace talks were in progress Charles had issued a secret 
commission authorizing seventeen prominent London citizens to organise an armed 
rising in the capital.454 At the end of May the plot was uncovered and the conspirators 
exposed. Chief amongst them was the MP and poet Edmund Waller, who had only 
recently acted as a parliamentarian commissioner during the Oxford Treaty. The details 
of the plot were truly shocking. Leading members of the Commons and City authority 
were to be seized in their beds, while pro-royalist members of the capital's trained 
bands would enable a force of 3,000 men to enter the city and crush the rebellion. 
Though Mercurius Aulicus scoffed at 'such a noise and tumult raised about it over all 
the City, as if the powder treason had not been half so horrible, ,455 the situation was in 
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fact deadly serious. In the days that followed parliament enacted two ordinances 
. f 456 amountmg to a state 0 emergency. 
On 9 June the Houses passed, with almost no opposition, an ordinance 
authorising a national covenant binding the kingdom to reveal plots. The preamble 
declared that 'there hath been a treacherous and horrid design lately discovered', which 
required 'all who are true-hearted and lovers of their country' to 'bind themselves each 
to other in a sacred vow and covenant. ,457 The oath committed the populace to a 
reaffinnation of support for the parliamentarian cause, and an obligation to expose and 
oppose any further plots. The covenant amounted to a pledge of allegiance and all who 
refused would be deemed delinquent and an enemy of the state. Edward Vallance has 
observed that the Vow and Covenant 'failed to claim that it was made for the defence of 
the king's person and authority'. Instead it emphasised that parliament's forces were 
justly raised for the security of the two Houses, the true Protestant religion, and the 
liberty of the subject, against the armies raised by the king.458 The introduction of a vow 
and covenant represented a personal triumph for Pym. Before the battle of Edgehill, and 
at every subsequent opportunity, he had unsuccessfully pressed the Houses for an 
association of the Godly.459 Following the discovery of the 'Waller Plot,' parliament 
finally accepted that the royalist/papist threat had penetrated the walls of parliament 
itself.460 
On 14 June the Houses gave their assent to a further instrument of state control, 
. an ordinance regulating the press.461 It was intended to suppress the 'late abuses and 
frequent disorders in printing many false, forged, scandalous, seditious, libellous, and 
unlicensed papers, pamphlets, and books to the great defamation of religion and 
government'. The ordinance attempted to bring the entire publishing industry under 
licensed control, from the authorised printing of parliamentary orders to the proper 
supervision of all books, pamphlets and papers. The ordinance empowered a range of 
officials to search for unlicensed printing presses, to apprehend those responsible, and 
'in case of opposition to hack open doors and locks'. The enactment of the national 
covenant and the imposition of press censorship revealed a growing sense of unease at 
Westminster. Although parliament had yet to face the military catastrophes that would 
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shortly precipitate a political crisis, the discovery of the Waller plot served to underline 
the sheer vulnerability of the parliamentarian cause. 
Summary 
This chapter has attempted to show how parliament entered the civil war at an 
administrative and political disadvantage. The departure of government departments to 
Oxford left parliament bereft of administrative expertise, while the fear of committing 
treason ensured that the Houses adopted a defensive approach. The result was a reactive 
war effort that attempted to do no more than match the king's preparations. As Conrad 
Russell put it: 
At Westminster, the aim had never been to start a war, but to use the threat of 
war to force Charles to come to a political settlement which would enable them 
to avoid fighting. It took a long time for many members to appreciate that their 
mere appearance in arms would not be sufficient to convince Charles that they 
meant business, and to bring about satisfactory negotiations.462 
Before the war, as Russell intimated, the king established a reputation for dealing with 
disobedience by force. He had gained valuable experience raising armed forces for the 
Bishops' Wars without the support normally afforded by parliamentary taxes. And 
during a decade or more of Personal Rule the king had become accustomed to ruling the 
country without parliament. Charles's determination to uphold the obligations of a 
divinely bestowed kingship provided an important psychological advantage. In stark 
contrast to the defensiveness of his opponents, the king was adamant that parliament 
had orchestrated a rebellion, overturning the natural order of God, king and man, and 
that he was honour bound to suppress it. 
Once the war began parliament's strategy centred on a single campaign followed 
by a negotiated settlement. However, after Edgehill parliament was thrown onto the 
defensive by the inadequacy of its voluntary financial system, substantial royalist arms 
imports, and the threat posed by the earl of Newcastle's northern army. In December 
1642 the creation of county associations signalled a defensive reaction to these 
developments, intended to provide the capital with a buffer against further royalist 
attacks. The bankrupt state of parliament's finances meant that the capture of Reading 
could not be exploited, a setback that enabled the royalists to recover with disastrous 
consequences. Though the original system of voluntary contributions had given way to 
a programme of taxation in 1643, monetary yield fell way short of what was actually 
462 C. Russell, Crisis of Parliaments /509-/660 (Oxford, 1971), p. 342. 
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required. Despite the clear need for increased revenue, members were reluctant to 
endorse more draconian financial legislation while the prospect of a negotiated 
settlement remained alive. As spring turned to summer, the discovery of the Waller plot 
seemed indicative of parliament's slow slide towards crisis. Although Pym recognised 
that diplomatic progress was impossible as long as the king remained undefeated, it 
seemed that even the advocates of war simply wished to avoid military defeat.463 As we 
shall now see, it would take the collapse of parliament's armies, and the imminent 
prospect of an overwhelming royalist victory, before Pym could win support for a more 
vigorous prosecution of the war. As Mark Kishlansky put it, 'until they were palpably in 
danger of losing it, the men at Westminster were never intent on winning the war. ,464 
463 Kishlansky, New Model Army, p. 24. 
464 Ibid. p. S. 
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Chapter Three 
CRISIS: 
MILITARY FAILURE - POLITICAL ANARCHY 
JUNE-AUGUST 1643 
Chapter three will show how the disintegration of the parliamentarian war effort 
precipitated a political battle for control of the war effort. This was not, however, a 
struggle confined to the peace and war parties in parliament, but a much more sinister 
clash involving a radical faction in the City of London led by Lord Mayor Isaac 
Pennington. It was a momentous confrontation that came to a head in the first week of 
August 1643. As the following analysis will try to demonstrate, a City campaign of mob 
violence, backed by the threat of a political coup, succeeded in overthrowing a 
desperate attempt by the House of Lords to orchestrate a negotiated surrender. 
Adwalton Moor. Rouanay Down. and Bristol 
Parliament's crisis began on 30 June 1643 when Lord Fairfax's northern army was 
completely destroyed by the earl of Newcastle's forces at the battle of Adwalton Moor. 
As we saw in chapter one, the disaster was precipitated in late May by the failure of 
parliamentarian commanders at Nottingham to march 6,000 reinforcements into 
Yorkshire. The abandonment of the Fairfaxes enabled the earl of Newcastle, still reeling 
from the devastating loss of Wakefield, to launch a new offensive against his stubborn 
adversaries. At Pontefract in early June Newcastle ordered a council of war, at which it 
was decided to divide the army, a proportion would escort the queen and her second 
great supply convoy to Oxford, while the bulk would advance into the West Riding to 
confront the Fairfaxes.46S The royalists struck first at Howley Hall, taking it by storm on 
22 June.466 Then, as Sir Henry Slingsby recalled, Newcastle 'lay to consider of that 
which must be the master piece, the taking of Leeds and Bradford, or giving battle if my 
Lord Fairfax durst venture in the field. ,467 
In anticipation of an imminent assault the Fairfaxes concentrated all available 
forces at Bradford. They had been reinforced, at the eleventh hour, by a contingent of 
46$ Rev Daniel Parsons (cd.), The Diary o/Sir Henry Slingsby (London, 1836), p. 95; Oliver Cromwell 
reported that the Queen's escort consisted of 1200 horse and 3000 foot. Newcastle's ability to spare such 
numbers gives an indication of the size of the army at his disposal. Historic Manuscripts Commission 
(HMC), Seventh Report, Appendix, pp. 551-552. 
466 John Rushworth, Historical Collections (London, 1721), vol. v, p. 279. 
467 Parsons (cd.), Slingsby Diary, pp. 95-96. 
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1500 infantry from Lancashire, increasing their normally small army of around two 
thousand men to no fewer than four thousand horse and foot. 468 These modest additions 
hardly alleviated Lord Fairfax's desperate plight, but in the absence of the six thousand 
parliamentarian reinforcements resting idly at Nottingham, they at least provided an 
opportunity to defend the west riding. Bradford however 'was a very untenable place,' 
made worse by the fact that there was 'not above 10 or 12 days provisions for so many 
as were necessary to keep it. ,469 With no prospect of withstanding a prolonged siege, 
and little chance of defeating Newcastle's ten or twelve thousand men in a conventional 
battle, the Fairfaxes decided to: 
attempt his [Newcastle's] whole army as they laid in their quarters [at Howley 
Hall], 3 miles off: hoping thereby to put him into some distraction; which could 
not (by reason of the unequal number) be done any other way.'470 
Encouraged by Sir Thomas' stunning capture of Wakefield in May, which had been 
achieved against overwhelming odds, a surprise attack on Howley Hall represented a 
calculated, albeit audacious, gamble. 
However, the earl of Newcastle had also resolved to launch an attack on the 
morning of 30 June. While the parliamentarian army marched towards Howley Hall, 
Newcastle was advancing in the opposite direction towards Bradford. Sir Henry 
Slingsby described how the simultaneous mobilization of both armies provoked a battle 
that neither commander foresaw.471 When the respective armies unexpectedly ran into 
each other, close to the small village of Adwalton, the parliamentarians immediately 
suspected that they had been lured into a trap. Thomas Stockdale complained that the 
royalists, 'hearing of our preparation had left their quarters about Howley and chosen 
that place of advantage being both a great hill and an open moor or common, where our 
foot could not be able to stand their horse. ,472 Sir Thomas Fairfax went one step further, 
claiming that a fellow officer, Major General John Gifford, had been ordered to ensure 
that the army was ready to march at four o'clock in the morning, but 'so delayed the 
execution of it, that it was 7 or 8 before we began to move; and not without much 
suspicion of treachery in it. ,473 Yet as Slingsby revealed, the confrontation at Adwalton 
was quite simply an accident, as unexpected for Newcastle and his commanders as it 
was for Stockdale and Sir Thomas. 
461 HMC, Portland Mss., vol. i, p. 717; SLIT, E. 59[1), Certaine InformatiOns, 26 June - 3 July 1643. 
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What is remarkable about the battle of Adwalton Moor is just how close the 
parliamentarians came to victory. Despite a numerical disadvantage of two or three to 
one,474 the sheer tenacity of Fairfax's men almost carried the day. Initially, in fierce 
close quarter fighting, the parliamentarians expelled large detachments of royalist 
infantry from a series of hedged enclosures. Here the parliamentarians halted, for as Sir 
Thomas Fairfax recalled, 'we kept the enclosure, placing our musketeers in the hedges 
in the moor, which was good advantage to us who has so few horse. ,475 Newcastle then 
sought to regain the initiative by launching his cavalry against Fairfax's well-
entrenched foot. Sir Thomas described how 'they strove to enter, and we to defend; but 
after some dispute, those that entered the pass found sharp entertainment; and those that 
were not yet entered, as hot welcome from the musketeers that flanked them in the 
hedges. ,476 Despite two ferocious attacks the massed ranks of royalist horse were forced 
to retreat. 
It was at this critical juncture that the parliamentarians plucked defeat from the 
jaws of victory. Thomas Stockdale bemoaned the fact that 'the success of our men at the 
first drew them unawares to engage themselves too far upon the enemies. ,477 It appears 
that the repulse of the royalist horse enticed cavalry under Sir Thomas Fairfax and 
infantry under Major General John Gifford to pursue their fleeing opponents across the 
moor. John Rushworth described how the parliamentarians 'almost encompassed the 
earl's train of artillery, and put his forces to the rout, when a stand of pikes gave some 
check to their success. ,478 This was confirmed by Sir Thomas, who described pursuing 
the broken enemy horse as far as their cannon, only to be halted by Newcastle's pike, 
which 'broke in upon our men' who 'lost ground.,479 Though Fairfax and his cavalry 
retreated to the relative safety of the enclosures, the infantry under Gifford, disordered 
by Newcastle's pike, finally broke. Stockdale described how the royalists swiftly 
exploited their unexpected success, sending 'some regiments of horse and foot by a lane 
on the left hand to encompass our army, and fallon their rear, which forced us to 
retreat, and our men .. .instead of marching fell into running.'480 Sir Thomas accused 
Gifford of failing to mobilise the reserve, 'which the enemy seeing, pursued their 
advantage by bringing on fresh troops. Ours being herewith discouraged, began to flee, 
474 Thomas Stockdale, whose account of Adwalton Moor was written the day after the battle, estimated 
the parliamentarian anny at around 4,000 horse and foot, while Sir Thomas Fairfax, who committed his 
recollections to paper many years later, stated that the royalist anny consisted often or twelve thousand 
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and so were soon routed.'481 It was a remarkable transformation, 'the fortune of the field 
being changed in an instant, Fairfax's army was utterly defeated, several pieces of 
ordnance taken, four or five hundred slain, and many taken prisoners. ,482 Adwalton 
Moor was a crushing defeat. 
The Fairfaxes narrowly escaped to Hull, where, crucially, the Hothams had been 
arrested attempting to betray the port to the king.483 With only 4,000 men, of whom 
1500 were last minute reinforcements from Lancashire, they had almost defeated an 
army three times their size. Had Cromwell's 6,000 horse and foot entered Yorkshire in 
late Mayas originally planned the situation would have been entirely different. For the 
first time in the campaign Lord Fairfax would have possessed the means to defeat 
Newcastle's army, while the mere presence of Cromwell's reinforcements would have 
automatically prevented the queen and her precious convoy of men, arms and munitions 
leaving for Oxford. Andrew Hopper has argued that 'Cromwell must share the blame 
for Adwalton Moor', but as we have seen in chapter one, it was the duplicitous Captain 
Hotham who was largely responsible.484 Almost exactly one year later Cromwell would 
indeed lead his cavalry into Yorkshire, playing a decisive role in parliament's historic 
victory at Marston Moor, a success that led directly to the fall of York and the capture 
of the north. In the summer of 1643 it is highly probable that Cromwell's 6,000 
reinforcements would have averted the disaster of Adwalton Moor and created the 
possibility of a triumph similar to Marston Moor. Instead, Adwalton Moor became the 
most damaging example to date of parliament's reoccurring failure to combine military 
forces in pursuit of strategic objectives. Chapter one of this thesis identified a lack of 
cooperation amongst commanders as a principal cause of parliament's crisis. The result 
was that Yorkshire's remaining parliamentarians were now confined in Hull, leaving 
Newcastle theoretically free to advance south through Lincolnshire towards the king or 
London. The ramifications of Adwalton Moor were potentially catastrophic, and, as we 
shall presently see, were to have profound implications for parliament's subsequent war 
effort. 
The second disaster to rock parliament during the summer of 1643 occurred two 
weeks later on 13 July when Sir William Waller's western army was totally destroyed at 
the battle of Roundway Down. It will be recalled from chapter one how Waller's 
campaign in the west had been thrown into crisis by a failure to prevent Cornish 
411 Fairfax, 'Northern Actions,' p. 214. Interestingly Sir Henry Slingsby claimed that the parliamentarian 
reserve was in fact sent for, but could not arrive in time. Parsons (ed.), Slingsby Diary, p. 96 . 
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royalists commanded by Sir Ralph Hopton, and Oxford based cavaliers under the 
marquis of Hertford and Prince Maurice, joining forces at Chard in Somerset on 4 June. 
While the royalists took control of western Somerset and established their forces at 
Wells, Waller sought to make up for his miscalculation by concentrating all available 
forces at Bath. This brief interlude prompted Edmund Ludlow's rather optimistic claim 
that Waller 'was become so considerable, as to put a stop to the march of the king's 
western army.'485 The truth, however, was markedly different. Gardiner correctly 
observed 'that the advantage remained with the royalists,' Waller was 'unwilling to 
abandon the defensive,' his forces were 'weak and ill-provided, and he feared to leave 
[the parliamentarian garrison of] Bristol unprotected,,486 
Waller's difficulties were exacerbated by the quantity and quality of his royalist 
opponents. Hopton, Maurice and Hertford commanded 4,000 foot, 2,000 horse, 300 
dragoons and about 16 field pieces,487 the Cornish infantry had established their 
unparalleled worth at Stratton in May, and in April Maurice's cavalry had soundly 
trounced Waller at Ripple Field. Though it is almost impossible to determine the precise 
size of the parliamentarian army, it seems fairly clear that Waller was severely 
outnumbered. It has been speculated that he commanded around 2,500 horse,488 and this 
appears to be supported by Sir William's claim, in a letter to the Speaker dated 22 June, 
that he possessed 'a body of horse by God's blessing able to do the kingdom good 
service.'489 In addition Sir Arthur Haslerig's well-disciplined regiment of heavy cavalry 
had also arrived from London, so it is not inconceivable that Waller may well have 
matched the cavaliers in horse. But, with no more than 500 foot at his command, 
Waller's lack of infantry was a serious weakness. On 24 June the parliamentarian 
committee at Bath pleaded with the governor of Bristol to send 500 foot without delay, 
or as many as could be spared.49O The governor later confirmed that he was urged to 
march 1,200 foot to Waller at some point following the latter's arrival in Bath.491 It is 
difficult to determine the precise timing of these reinforcements, or whether they 
materialised at all. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose that in 'early July Waller 
.. , C. H. Firth (ed.), Memoirs o/Edmund Ludlow (Oxford, 1894), p.53. 
486 S. R. Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War (London, 1904), vol. i., p. 167. 
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could muster no more than between 1,200 and 1,500 foot'.492 As a result the royalists 
entered the campaign with a potentially decisive advantage in infantry and morale. 
On 2 July Hopton advanced from Wells by way of Frome to Bradford-on-Avon, 
four miles or so to the south east of Bath.493 In the early hours of 3 July, under the cover 
of darkness, Waller despatched a party of 300 horse and foot to block the Bath road at 
Monkton Farleigh. Day break revealed the inadequacy of Waller's precautions; and 
despite a belated attempt to reinforce the beleaguered parliamentarians, Hopton's 
Cornish foot stormed the pass and drove Sir William's men north to Batheaston.494 The 
retreat was described by one parliamentarian officer as 'one of our greatest 
disadvantages,' for despite the presence of Waller's main army to the west of the Avon 
on Claverton Down, the advance of the royalists threatened to encircle Bath from the 
north, compelling Sir William to retreat into the town.495 But with commendable 
forethought and energy Waller quickly re-emerged, once again during the hours of 
darkness, to occupy Lansdown Hill, interposing his forces directly between Hopton and 
Bath.496 On the morning of 4 July the dismayed royalists duly discovered Waller 
blocking further progress from the heights of Lansdown. After a morning of sporadic 
fire from parliamentarian field pieces, Hopton withdrew north east to Marshfield, 
perhaps to discuss a resumption of the advance towards Oxford.497 Waller, despite 
defeat at Monkton Farleigh, had managed to safeguard Bath by the skilful anticipation 
of the enemy's movements. His judicious deployments not only gave notice that he 
would be a tough nut to crack, but also earned the genuine admiration of at least one 
al· ffi 498 cav ler 0 cer. 
Nevertheless, Hopton's march to Marshfield suggested that any further attack 
upon Bath would almost certainly come from the north, via the high ground of 
Lansdown Hill.499 In expectation of such a move Waller occupied Lansdown on the 
night of 4 July, and early the following morning positioned the entire army on its north 
eastern edge looking towards Marshfield. Sir William erected earthworks on the brow 
for his ordinance, lined the woods to either side with musketeers, and pushed forward 
units of horse towards the royalist camps.5oo It appears that Hopton, provoked by 
Waller's cavalry raids, advanced his entire army two miles towards the parliamentarian 
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position on Lansdown Hill.50l But after a period of inconsequential skirmishing, during 
which Waller demonstrated no inclination to descend from the hill, the royalists 
abandoned the confrontation and withdrew in the direction of Marshfield.502 Waller 
aimed to exploit the situation by despatching 400 horse to disorder the retreating 
enemy,S03 but after heavy fighting his cavalry were in turn broken and pursued as they 
attempted to return to the safety of Lansdown. This unexpected reversal prompted the 
impetuous Cornish foot to call for an all out attack; Hopton, perhaps against his better 
judgement, succumbed and ordered the hill to be stormed. 504 
While the battle of Lansdown turned out to be one of the great royalist 
achievements of the civil war, it was not, as some historians have claimed, a royalist 
victory. 505 It was only the raw courage and unquenchable spirit of the Cornish foot that 
saved Hopton from a crushing defeat. As the royalists attempted to ascend the steep 
slope of Lansdown Hill, Maurice's cavalry were subjected to a withering fire, and 'so 
discomforted that of 2000 there did not stand above 600.'S06 Despite the faltering 
royalist horse, Sir Bevil Grenville, colonel of the Cornish foot, 'gained with much 
gallantry the brow of the hill ... receiving three charges of horse two of which he stood, 
but in the third fell with many of his men.'S07 Clarendon admitted that 'if the Cornish 
foot had not stood very firm when the horse was shaken, it would have proved a sad 
day.'s08 After something like nine hours of fighting, darkness found both armies 
completely spent. Waller withdrew a short distance to a low stonewall, while Hopton, 
bereft of his cavalry, stood on the precipice of the hill. As at Edgehill eight months 
before, king and parliament had fought to an exhausted standstill, and just as at 
Edgehill, 'each side pretending to the honour of a victory.'s09 
During the night Waller and Heslerig withdrew to Bath in order to replenish 
their forces, 'well knowing [they] might easily recover the hill, and so fall upon the 
enemy again to prosecute [their] victory.'SIO HOptOIl, 'possessed of the field, and of the 
dead,'S\1 appeared the victor. As at Stratton in May, the royalists had stormed a 
seemingly impenetrable position. It was without question an incredible achievement, 
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but success had been bought at a heavy price. The death of Sir Bevil Genville followed 
by the temporary blinding and incapacitation of Hopton were crippling blows, both in 
terms fighting efficiency and morale. With the air of a defeated anny the dispirited 
royalists retreated to Marshfield. The local populace, sensing that the pendulum had 
swung in favour of parliament, swiftly abandoned the provision of supplies and 
. II· SI2 mte Igence. 
It may have been at this juncture that the governor of Bristol, Colonel Nathaniel 
Fiennes, was persuaded to spare Waller the 1200 men referred to earlier.513 On the 
afternoon of 7 July, perhaps encouraged by news of Hopton's incapacitation, Waller 
marched towards Marshfield. The royalists, however, had already set out for Oxford by 
way of Chippenham, and though Sir William skirmished with their rearguard, the 
cavaliers entered Devizes on the evening of 9 July.SI4 A hastily convened Council of 
War decided that the cavalry, commanded by the marquis of Hertford and Prince 
Maurice, should ride for Oxford to request reinforcements while Hopton remained with 
the infantry and cannon to defend the town.SIS Though Waller bombarded Devizes for 
two days, the resolution of the Cornish foot, allied to his own shortage of infantry, 
meant that he was unable to breach the barricaded streets.SI6 Finally, having weakened 
the outer defences, Sir William's plans to storm the town on the evening of 13 July 
were interrupted by the approach of Lord Wilmot with reinforcements from Oxford. 
The sudden appearance of the royalist relief column provided Waller with an 
unexpected advantage. As the entire parliamentarian anny moved onto Roundway 
Down to intercept the Oxford cavaliers, Hopton correctly concluded that Sir William 
must have sighted the hoped for reinforcements. However, the majority of Hopton's 
fellow officers believed Waller's withdrawal to be nothing more than a trick, intended 
to entice the well-entrenched royalists to abandon their defences. Hopton, still weak 
from his injuries, was persuaded to delay any attempt to follow the enemy, leaving the 
fortunate Waller to face the new threat unhindered. S 17 Parliamentarian sources number 
Lord Wilmot's force at approximately 2,500 horse, almost certainly an exaggeration 
designed to excuse the inauspicious outcome of the battle.sIs It is more likely that the 
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cavalry were evenly matched, perhaps around 2,000 on each side. The difference lay in 
infantry: while Waller commanded around 1,800,519 Hopton's formidable Cornish foot 
remained in Devizes. As the two armies deployed for battle upon Roundway Down it 
must have been obvious to Sir William that he enjoyed a distinct numerical superiority. 
At about 3 o'clock Lord Wilmot gave up on Hopton and charged Sir Arthur 
Haslerig's wing of parliamentarian horse.52o One royalist officer described how 
Haslerig's troopers, breaking and disordered, caused the rest of Waller's horse to 
retreat,521 and a roundhead eyewitness stated that 'at the very first charge all our horse 
run away and left our foot. ,522 Other parliamentarian sources claimed that Waller's 
reserve of horse provided sterner resistance before it too was routed.523 While Wilmot's 
cavalry chased their opponents from the field, news reached Hopton that Waller's horse 
had fled but that the enemy foot stood firm. 524 As Wilmot rallied his cavalry and 
returned to deal with Waller's isolated and abandoned infantry, Hopton's men fmally 
marched out of Devizes towards the field of battle. The parliamentarians defended 
themselves bravely for over an hour, but pressed on all sides by the Cornishmen and 
Wilmot's horse, they were finally broken and fled. 525 A. H. Burne described Roundway 
Down as the most sweeping victory the royalists ever won.526 Though Waller and some 
of his cavalry escaped to Bristol, for all practical purposes his army had been 
annihilated.527 'Such,' wrote Waller, 'was my dismal defeat at Roundway Down.,528 
The reasons for this 'dismal defeat' lay in the truly remarkable cooperation of 
royalist commanders, which had enabled Lord Wilmot to rescue Hopton when all 
appeared lost. Less than 72 hours after Maurice and Hertford set out for Oxford, Wilmot 
returned at the head of two thousand hastily assembled reinforcements. It was a 
stunning example of combined operations, executed with such speed that it thwarted 
Waller's plans to storm Devizes. But why was it, Waller complained of Essex, 'that he 
lying with his whole army within ten miles of Oxford, should suffer the chief strength 
of that place to march thirty miles to destroy him,.S29 To his credit Waller had 
performed extremely well throughout the campaign, blunting the royalists at Lansdown, 
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and, with great detennination and energy, pursuing his adversaries to Devizes. It was, in 
fact, Waller's great misfortune to be pitted against an amazingly efficient enemy. In 
early June Hopton's union with Maurice and Hertford had put the royalists on the 
offensive, and in July, when Hopton faced defeat at Devizes, the timely arrival of Lord 
Wilmot's reinforcements had proved decisive. What needs to be recognised therefore is 
the sheer potency of royalist cooperation. Throughout the western campaign dynamic 
collaboration had sustained the king's forces, ultimately transfonning a potential 
disaster at Devizes530 into a crushing victory on Roundway Down. Royalist cooperation 
contrasted markedly with the failure of parliamentarian commanders to rescue the 
Fairfaxes before Adwalton Moor. The royalist triumph at Roundway Down and the 
parliamentary disaster at Adwalton Moor demonstrate that military success was heavily 
dependent on the willingness and ability of commanders to cooperate effectively in 
rapidly developing and often critical situations. 
The third catastrophe to strike parliament during the summer of 1643 occurred 
less than two week after Roundway Down with the surrender of Bristol on 26 July. The 
loss of the kingdom's second port and Parliament's most important western garrison 
sent shock waves through parliament. The background to this latest disaster - yet 
another example of royalist cooperation and parliamentarian disunity - concerns the 
crucial passage of the queen and her second great supply convoy. Henrietta Maria had 
parted company with the earl of Newcastle at Pontefract on 16 June, and following a 
two-week stay at Newark, rendezvoused with Prince Rupert at Stratford upon Avon on 
11 July. On 13 July, the day Wilmot's cavalry destroyed Waller at Roundway Down, 
Charles and his queen were re-united close to the battlefield of Edgehill in 
Warwickshire.S31 The queen was escorted by 3,000 foot, 30 companies of horse and 
dragoons, six pieces of cannon, two mortars, and 150 wagons ofbaggage.s32 These were 
substantial additions to the king's Oxford anny, considerably enhancing his capacity for 
offensive action.533 
The Venetian Ambassador claimed that despite orders to do so, three 
parliamentarian commanders 'with sufficient forces' had done nothing to intercept the 
queen's march from Pontefract to Newark. The suspicions of loyalty thus aroused 
prompted parliament to order the arrest of Captain John Hotham and to appoint Sir John 
Meldrum, 'a Scot of good capacity,' to command all forces then at Nottingham.s34 
$30 Clarendon stated that, 'it was evident that if the Devizes was not instantly relieved that gallant party 
must be lost.' Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 84n. 
531 Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, pp. 274-275. 
532 Henrietta Maria to King Charles, 27 June 1643, Rushworth, Historical CollectiOns, vol. v, p. 274. 
m A. B. Hinds (ed.) Calendar o/State Papers Yenetian (CSPY) (London, 1925), 1642-1643, p. 292. 
534 Ibid; Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, p.160. 
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However, this still left an opportunity to confront the queen once she departed Newark 
for Oxford, a journey that in theory at least ought to bring her within the orbit of 
Essex's forces. Unfortunately for parliament Henrietta Maria recommenced her 
progress on 3 July, just as the Lord General vacated his quarters at Thame (to the east of 
Oxford) for a new position many miles to the north-east at Great Brickhill on the 
Buckinghamshire-Bedfordshire border. 535 
On the face of it Essex's withdrawal appeared to greatly facilitate the queen's 
progress. It allowed Rupert to march in force to Stratford upon Avon on 11 July, and, 
on the same day, it freed Lord Wilmot to take virtually all the cavalry that remained in 
Oxford to the rescue of Sir Ralph Hopton at Devizes. As far as Essex was concerned the 
movements of Henrietta Maria lay well beyond his reach.536 Essex freely admitted that 
his own cavalry, in great want of supplies and recruits, were largely unable to prevent 
the royalist horse ranging at will. In addition, a great increase of sickness in the army 
meant that any design against Oxford had become totally impracticable.537 As long as 
he remained at Thame his disintegrating army would only become more vulnerable to 
an increasingly powerful and confident enemy. Vernon Snow must have been close to 
the truth when he bluntly concluded that Essex removed his army because it 'was too 
weak to fight. ,538 
It would appear that yet another failure of parliamentarian cooperation had 
resulted in the queen' s uncontested march to Oxford. But it is much more likely that this 
crucial royalist success was due to a carefully planned and efficiently executed 
combined operation. Initially, the earl of Newcastle provided the queen with a huge 
escort from York to Pontefract, and even for the march to Newark, while Newcastle was 
engaged in the west riding, she was still accompanied by upwards of 4,000 men.539 
From Newark the queen admitted in a letter to her husband that her own forces would 
be sufficient to deal with local parliamentarians if Charles could prevent Essex 
intervening.S4o Add to this Rupert's considerable assistance from Stratford to Oxford, 
and it becomes clear that royalist commanders once again acted in concert, and to great 
effect. 541 Coming so soon after the resounding victories at Adwalton Moor and 
m Essex left Thame on 4 July. V. F. Snow, Essex the Rebel (University of Nebraska, 1970), p. 371. 
536 Essex to the Speaker, Great Brickhill, 9 July 1643, Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, pp. 290-
291. 
m Ibid., p. 290. 
531 Snow, Essex the Rebel, p. 371. 
539 Cromwell estimated the queen's escort to consist of 1,200 horse and 3,000 foot. HMC, Seventh 
Report, Appendix, pp. 551-552. 
S40 Henrietta Maria to King Charles, 27 June 1643, Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 274. 
541 As if to emphasise parliament's military impotence, the queen's final escort from Edgehill to Oxford, 
in which the king accompanied her, was intentionally reduced to peacetime proportions. J. Adamson, 
104 
Roundway Down, the arrival in Oxford on 14 July of this huge convoy and substantial 
reinforcements enabled Rupert to launch an offensive that would bring the enemy to the 
very brink of defeat. 
On 15 July the Prince left Oxford to join forces with Hopton's western army, 
resulting in a combined force of 20,000 men with which to attack Bristol. 542 Sir William 
Waller, following his defeat at Roundway Down, had insisted that he did not intend to 
be besieged with his remaining cavalry, and that he would retreat if the enemy advanced 
towards the town.543 The governor of Bristol, Colonel Nathaniel Fiennes, was adamant 
that as a result of Roundway Down it 'was the general apprehension' that neither Bristol 
nor its castle was in anyway tenable.544 Fiennes declared that 'without a miracle, it was 
impossible the town should be maintained against' an enemy numbering fifteen 
regiments of foot and twelve regiments of horse 'for one week.,545 But Despite these 
misgivings the governor made every effort to strengthen Bristol's defences, 'though it 
be one of the hardest towns in England to be fortified.'546 He had at his disposal 300 
horse, 1500 foot, and 100 guns to hold a circuit of defences over three miles long. 547 
When it became clear that Rupert was advancing towards Bristol, Fiennes 
supported Waller's decision to leave because he had undertaken to raise new forces at 
Gloucester or Exeter, 'and that he would not be long ere he returned to my relief.'548 
Given Sir William's determination to avoid confinement, and his alleged promise to 
organise a relief force, it is hardly surprising that Fiennes and Waller appeared to be of 
one mind. In the event, however, while Rupert approached Bristol at the head of the 
Oxford army, Sir William passed quickly through Gloucester, Evesham and thence to 
London.s49 Waller probably said he would to return to Fiennes assistance if he was able 
to organise sufficient reinforcements quickly enough. We must assume that his 
subsequent arrival in the capital indicated that he was unable to do so, and that given his 
'King Charles I Wins the English Civil War', in A. Roberts (ed.), What Might Have Been (London, 
2004), p. 41. 
542 Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 284. 
543 BL TI, E. 64[12], A Relation by Nathaniel Fiennes, p. 12. 
,.... Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
545 Ibid., p. 6. 
S46 Ibid., p. 4; Recent research by Ronald Hutton and Wylie Reeves - Bristol was 'exceptionally difficult 
to defend' - supports Fiennes' testimony. R. Hutton and W. Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', in J. 
Kenyon and J. Ohlmeyer (eds.), The Civil Wars: A Military History of England Scotland & Ireland 1638-
1660, (Oxford, 1998), p. 218. 
547 P. Young and R. Holmes, The English Civil War: A Military History of Three Civil Wars 1642-1651 
(London, 1974), pp. 139-141. 
,... BLTI, E. 64[12], A Relation by Nathaniel Fiennes, p. 12. 
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stated intention to avoid entrapment by siege, saw no alternative but to leave the 
defence of Bristol in the governor's hands.55o 
The circumstances in which Fiennes eventually surrendered the town indicate 
what might have been achieved if Waller had managed to raise a relief force. On 26 
July Rupert ordered a simultaneous assault by all six of his besieging brigades.551 The 
fighting, bloody and fierce, lasted from dawn till dusk. At length, having been 
continually repelled by the determination of the defenders, the royalists forced a breach 
in the defences. The hesitancy of a troop of parliamentarian cavalry allowed the 
cavaliers to exploit their hard gained advantage, and shortly afterwards Fiennes agreed 
terms.552 It had been a close run thing, 'for when five out of the six royalist brigades 
were held up [Rupert] prosecuted his one !iuccess with relentless vigour. ,553 
Given the severity of the fighting, and the admirable resolution of the 
outnumbered parliamentarian garrison, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
Waller's presence might well have tipped the balance. Sir William was by now an 
experienced and able commander, and despite his defeat at Roundway Down, had 
enjoyed some success against his royalist opponents.554 The unfortunate Fiennes, who 
'was not a soldier by profession,'sss was court-martial led on a charge of premature 
surrender and sentenced to death. Essex, with some justification, later overturned the 
verdict and issued a pardon. SS6 Two years later, in September 1645, Rupert himself 
proved similarly incapable of defending Bristol against Sir Thomas Fairfax's New 
Model Army.S57 The very fact that a commander of Rupert's stature surrendered the 
town demonstrates that Fiennes had acted with great resolution, and that he might have 
succeeded had Waller managed to return. 
The critical point is that Bristol was lost to a further example of royalist 
collaboration, this time between Rupert and Hopton, leaving the parliamentarian cause 
on the verge of collapse. Adwalton Moor, Roundway Down, and now Bristol 
demonstrated the effectiveness of royalist cooperation, and provided the king's forces 
SSO Adair acknowledges Waller's resolution to form a reliefanny, but does not mention his failure to 
return. Adair, Roundhead General, p. 96. 
m Young &. Holmes, English Civil War, pp. 137-139. 
m Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 284; Hutton and Reeves have argued that once Rupert 
breached the perimeter defences 'Bristol's surrender was inevitable.' Hutton &. Reeves, 'Sieges &. 
Fortifications,' in Kenyon &. Ohlmeyer, The Civil Wars, p. 218. 
m Young &. Holmes, English Civil War, p. 141. 
SS4 Waller was described by D'Ewes as 'a man of extraordinary valour and integrity.' 1. H. Hexter, The 
Reign o/King Pym (Harvard, 1941), p. 120. 
m Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, p. 179. 
SS6 Young &. Holmes, English Civil War, p. 141; B. Whitelocke, Memorials o/the English Affairs 
~Oxford, 1853), vol. i, p. 207. 
S7 Frank Kitson observed that Rupert 'like Fiennes before him, was not strong enough to man the 
lengthy outer perimeter properly' F. Kitson, Prince Rupert: Portrait 0/ a Soldier (London, 1994), pp. 
257-262. 
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with a decisive advantage over their parliamentarian opponents. It was this vital factor 
that proved to be the key to military success during the summer of 1643, a principal 
reason for parliament's catastrophic downfall. Nehemiah Wallington, a London puritan 
artisan, clung to the belief that parliament's defeats were for the best, as the godly 
would now have to place their trust in God himself. But the surrender of Bristol was 
truly shocking, the 'great loss so discontented me that I could not settle about anything, 
nay, I could neither write, read, nor pray'. 558 Clarendon's observation - that Bristol 
'struck [parliament] to the heart, and came upon them as a sentence of death' -
conveyed the full magnitude of the disaster.559 
State of Emergency 
Parliament reacted to these devastating blows by constructing, in corresponding stages, 
an escalating state of emergency. As the following analysis will demonstrate, each 
crippling defeat was met with an appropriate military, political, or religious response, 
revealing a cause in crisis and a war effort on the brink of total defeat. 
On 5 July, five days after Adwalton Moor, news of the disastrous situation in 
Yorkshire was officially broken to a shocked parliament. 560 According to Sir Simonds 
O'Ewes an attempt was made to suppress the report. 'Some knowing it to contain ill 
news would not have it read', but O'Ewes and others called out "Read it. Read it".561 
Thomas Stockdale's graphic account of. the battle and its devastating repercussions 
vividly conveyed the scale of the catastrophe: 
Our loss of prisoners taken by the enemy was great, but the nwnber is not equal 
to the fear and distraction it has begotten in the country ... the country is wasted 
and exhausted and tired out with the weight of the troubles continually falling 
upon this part of Yorkshire, the soldiers want pay, and, which is worse, arms and 
powder and other ammunition, and are overcharged with the most potent 
strength that opposeth the parliament; insomuch as the soldiers disband and 
dessert the service, and the country overawed cannot longer assist the army; and 
if speedy supply be not sent with some considerable succour of men, the Lord 
General will be constrained to accept of some dishonourable conditions from the 
enemy.S62 
SSI P. S. Seaver, Wallington's World: A Puritan Artisan in Seventeenth-Century London (London, 1985), 
fR·169-170. 
Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 135; John Adamson concluded that 'Charles's apparently 
inexorable juggernaut' would never 'recover the momentum it had attained in those victorious weeks that 
had culminated in the fall of Bristol'. Adamson, 'King Charles I Wins the English Civil War', p. 46. 
560 Journal o/the House o/Lords, vol. vi, p. 121; Journal o/the House o/Commons, vol. iii, p. 155. 
561 British Library (BL), Harley MS, 165 (D'Ewes diary, History of Parliament Trust transcription), fol. 
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Stockdale's alarming report resulted in an immediate order to send commissioners 'into 
Scotland, by this day seventh night, or sooner if they can be ready,'563 so as 'to bring 
them in with a/l speed'564 [author's emphasis]. The sheer haste with which parliament 
sought Scottish military assistance indicates the enormity of Adwalton Moor and the 
implications of the defeat for the wider war effort. The destruction of Lord Fairfax's 
northern army provided the king with the first strategic breakthrough of the war. 
Nothing of substance now remained to prevent the earl of Newcastle marching south 
through Lincolnshire into the heart of parliament's Eastern Association, thereby posing 
a direct threat to the capital itself. There is no doubt, as Peter Newman has explained, 
that parliament greatly feared Newcastle's 'popish army'. In the panic that followed 
Adwalton Moor this large, formidable, and religiously dangerous force appeared to 
herald the destruction of the entire cause.565 The only viable solution was a military 
alliance with Scotland. 
When parliament received news of Waller's destruction at Roundway Down it 
seemed certain that two defeats of such magnitude could only be attributed to the anger 
of a higher authority. On 19 July 'out of the deep sense of God's heavy wrath now upon 
this kingdom, manifested by the late discomfiture of the forces, both in the north and 
west' parliament ordered a day 'of public and extraordinary humiliation by prayer and 
fasting' so that every soul may 'cry mightily to God for Christ his sake, that he will be 
pleased to tum from the fierceness of his wrath and heal the land.,566 And six days later, 
on 25 July, the publication of 'A Memento to the Londoners' warned the capital's 
inhabitants that 'Never were a people in such necessity as you are in. The king's forces 
are grown strong and powerful, and will in short time, if you prevent it not, be as able to 
execute their malice upon you as they are willing.' Urging the citizens to rise up -
'immediately for the wars' - the Memento concluded with a chilling warning: 'Be 
courageous, and God will bless you, lie still, and perish. ,567 Under the direction of the 
capital's 'radical lord mayor and MP Isaac Pennington', 'A Memento to the Londoners' 
formed part of a City initiative to organise a general rising of the people.s6s As we shall 
563 Journal o/the Howe o/Lords, vol. vi, p. 122. 
~ Journal o/the Howe o/Commons, vol. iii, p. 155. The request for Scottish military assistance was 
also reported in the weekly news books, BLTT, E. 59[12), Parliament Scout, 29 June - 6 July 1643, pp. 
14-15. 
565 Peter Newman has argued that the fear aroused by Newcastle's anny was, in fact, much greater than 
the threat it actually posed. Newman described the king's northern anny as one that 'seemed to promise 
much but perfonned little'. But in the shocked aftennath of Adwalton Moor only the Scots appeared 
capable of saving parliament. P. R. Newman, The Old Service: Royalist regimental colonels and the Civ;1 
War /642-46 (Manchester. 1993), pp. 262 & 264. 
S66 BLTT. 245:669. f. 7[30], Order o/Parliament, 19 July 1643. 
567 BLIT, 245:699. f. 8[16], A Memento to the Londoners, 25 July 1643. 
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presently see, this campaign to establish an independent London army reflected the 
growing power and influence of the City's militant activists. These exhortations to 
spiritual and physical action provide compelling evidence of parliament's escalating 
emergency, revealing a city in moral and mortal danger, teetering on the precipice of 
utter destruction. 
Accordingly, on 25 July, the Commons authorised the rapid recruitment of a 
new force of 7,000 cavalry to be commanded by the earl of Manchester.569 The 
ordinance establishing Manchester's 'flying army' emphasised the threat posed by the 
king's victorious armies and how this new detachment of mounted men was urgently 
required for: 
The preservation, safety, and peace of the kingdom, to resist the insolences and 
outrages committed by the soldiers of the king's army ... that Popish 
army ... which consisting for the most part in horse, do range and wander up and 
down the countries, and not only plunder, embezzle, and take away the goods 
and estates of the well-affected, but abuse their persons, and very often times 
destroy and kill them.570 
The very fact that parliament was compelled to raise such a contingent, intended for 
rapid deployment to the scene of greatest danger, emphasises the scale of the military 
crisis. The creation of Manchester's 'flying army' was a candid admission that the war 
effort had failed. Until the Scots could be brought into the conflict parliament faced 
nothing less than a fight for survival. 
When Bristol surrendered to Prince Rupert on 26 July a mood of deep 
despondency swept the capital, raising fears that the victorious royalists would soon 
march against London itself. Even the parliamentarian press found it impossible to 
conceal the gravity of the disaster. One newsbook declared that 'The malignants do 
upon the surrender of Bristol, so dishearten people, as if the parliament and kingdom 
was lost,' and that many citizens were in such fear 'of the intended approaching of the 
cavaliers that they were about to ship there goods for Holland.,571 And another 
despaired that Bristol 'strikes us dead' and 'we are afraid our scout will next week bring 
you news either of the loss of Gloucester or Exeter or both. ,572 On 27 July the 
Commons ordered a committee of six members 'to nominate a council of war; and to 
569 C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait (eds.), Acts and Ordinances o/the Interregnum 1642-1660 (London, 1911), 
vol. i, pp. 215-219. 
570 Ibid., p. 215. 
m BLIT, E. 64[10], Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, I - 8 August 1643, pp. 220-221. 
512 BLIT, E. 63[13], ParliamenlScoul, 27 July - 3 August 1643, p. 45 & 46. 
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prepare instructions for that council' 573 It was proposed 'that matters may go in a more 
secret and expeditious way than formerly. ,574 Announced in the Commons on 2 August, 
the council was directed 'to take the whole state of the war into consideration ... to 
propound to the Houses, the Lord General, the governors of towns and forts, and other 
commanders in chief ... to have monies advanced to them for intelligence ... and to make 
a protestation ... not to disclose any of their counsels. ,575 The emphasis on intelligence, 
secrecy, and the direction of strategy by a small and carefully selected 'war cabinet' is 
particularly revealing. But more important is the council's composition, which 
'included reliable junto men like Pym, Sir John Clotworthy, Colonel Alexander Popham 
and Sir William Waller' and 'not extremists like Henry Marten, John Blakiston, and 
William Strode,.576 The council of war concentrated power in the hands of trusted 
parliamentarians, broadly equating to Hexter's celebrated middle group, steering a line 
independent of the peace and war parties but working with them when the situation 
demanded.577 This is an important point for this thesis. As we shall see below, drawing 
a clear line between Pym and the extremists in parliament and the City of London 
provides a key to the dramatic events in the House of Commons during the first week of 
August 1643. The secrecy and carefully selected membership of the council of war 
reflected the gravity of the situation. Parliament's reactions to Adwalton Moor, 
Roundway Down and Bristol reveal a war effort in meltdown and London, the political 
centre of the cause, reduced to a state of emergency. 578 
Political Crisis 
During the first week of August 1643 parliament's military collapse sparked a political 
crisis of such magnitude that it almost resulted in a negotiated surrender. Had it not 
been for a dramatic twice taken vote in the House of Commons on Monday 7 August, 
the civil war would almost certainly have come to an abrupt conclusion in the late 
summer of 1643. The following analysis will show how historians have tended to 
underestimate the importance of this tumultuous week, not only in terms of its 
immediate significance in determining the fate of the parliamentarian cause, but also as 
a fundamental event in the history of the civil war. It is no exaggeration to claim that 
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this pivotal moment brought the civil war to a crossroads: would parliament capitulate 
in the wake of a series of catastrophic military defeats, or continue the fight in defence 
of the principles for which it had taken up arms? 
To contemporary opinion the circumstances in which the crisis played out 
appeared to herald the end of the conflict. Parliament divided into two almost equal but 
diametrically opposed camps. On one hand those whose only concern was an immediate 
peace before the Icing's armies delivered the coup de grace, and on the other, those who 
were convinced that the political and religious future of the country was at stake, and 
that capitulation amounted to a cowardly dereliction of the achievements of the Long 
Parliament. It was an issue of fundamental importance, a struggle to decide the future 
relationship between monarch and parliament. And yet the significance of this pivotal 
confrontation has been largely buried beneath the subsequent history of the civil war, 
particularly the events that ultimately decided the outcome of the conflict. However, the 
significance of this crisis is that it did not end the civil war, despite the real possibility 
that this dramatic week would end in parliamentarian surrender. 
Here, then, is the crisis that historians have generally underestimated. A battle of 
political wills to decide whether the war would continue or whether parliament would 
submit. The importance of this tumultuous week can hardly be overstated. It was make 
or break for parliament. Although Charles I stood on the verge of victory, he planned to 
avert the need for further military action by persuading parliament to surrender. 
Remarkably, as the following analysis will demonstrate, this is what almost took place 
in the House of Commons on 7 August 1643. It was without question a day of seminal 
importance, for it detennined that parliament would fight on and the civil war would 
continue. 
i) The King's Declaration 
Parliament's military disintegration was transformed into a political crisis by the shrewd 
and carefully planned intervention of the king. On 30 July, four days after the fall of 
Bristol, Charles issued a declaration in which he attempted to exploit parliament's 
difficulties by turning the Houses against themselves.579 The king and his advisers, of 
whom Edward Hyde earl of Clarendon was paramount, were fully aware that parliament 
teetered on the brink of collapse. By isolating the rebellion's ringleaders, and offering 
forgiveness to all who would abandon parliament and return to their natural allegiance, 
S19 Bodleian Library, WinglC2226, His Majesties Declaration To all His Loving Subjects. After His 
Victories over The Lord Fairfax in the North, and Sir William Waller in the West, and, The Taking of 
Bristol by His Majesties Forces (Oxford, 30 July 1643). 
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the royal declaration represented a premeditated attempt to undermine what remained of 
I. . . 580 par lamentanan reslstance. 
The declaration's most imposing physical feature was the title page, consisting 
of a boldly printed list of the king's victories over 'the Lord Fairfax in the north, Sir 
William Waller in the west, and, the taking of Bristol by His Majesties forces' .581 It 
was a proclamation of military prowess, intended to demonstrate that the king was in 
the ascendant and poised for final victory.582 The declaration re-emphasised the mystery 
of royal power and its command over the temporal affairs of man, a vindication of the 
king and a condemnation of a rebellion that had challenged his authority and his right. 
The declaration's most striking intellectual feature was an absolute insistence 
that only God's blessing could account for the king's remarkable victories: 
Almighty God ... to whose power alone we must attribute the goodness of our 
present condition ... God hath wonderfully manifested his care of us and his 
defence of his and our most just cause ... God hath vouchsafed us so many 
victories and successes, and hath rendered the power of those who seek to 
destroy us less formidable than it hath been.583 
Divine intervention had demonstrated the justice of the king's cause and the dishonour 
and malice of the rebellion. Indeed, the Lord's endorsement of the royal cause had 
revealed to the nation the manner in which the leaders of the rebellion had misled their 
gullible adherents, and how the king's victories had exposed the rebels as enemies not 
only of the king but also of the Almighty himself: 
God '" hath so far touched the hearts of our people, that their eyes are at last 
opened to see how miserably they have been seduced, and to abhor those 
persons whose malice and subtlety have seduced them to dishonour Him, to 
rebel against Us, and to bring so much misery and calamity upon their native 
country. 584 
The declaration relentlessly pursued the theme of divine agency by reminding the 
kingdom of the prosperous peace so recently enjoyed, when allegiance to the king was 
510 Richard Cust's observation - that the generosity of the declaration was intended to split the 
parliamentarian movement apart - is undoubtedly correct. Particularly when one considers that the author 
was almost certainly Edward Hyde, the most able of the king's political strategists. R. Cust, Charles I A 
Political Life (London, 2(05), p. 379. 
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112 
rewarded with a happiness bestowed by God.585 Disobedient subjects should now 
remember their duty and: 
consider their interests, and no longer suffer themselves to be misled ... by the 
malice of these state impostors, who under pretence of reformation would 
introduce whatsoever is monstrous and unnatural both in religion and policy.586 
And finally, having emphatically established the justice of the royal cause, and the 
blessings bestowed upon him by God, the king magnanimously declared that: 
all those who since these bloody distractions out of conscience have returned 
from their evil ways to Us, have found that it was not so easy for them to repent, 
as Us to forgive ... [and those who] shall redeem their past crimes by their 
present service ... shall have cause to magnify our mercyS87 
Despite God's self evident anger towards the rebels, Charles was prepared to offer a 
generous forgiveness to all who would admit their error and submit to royal 
obedience.s88 Here was a way out for those who now regretted their support for a 
rebellion that had clearly attracted the wrath of God. The royal declaration aimed to end 
the civil war by precipitating wholesale defections in both the House of Lords and the 
House of Commons. It was a carefully planned strategy, designed to avert the need for 
further military action by inciting a parliamentary revolt, instigated by those who were 
now convinced that the war could not be won - only lost. 
The royal declaration was undoubtedly a powerful appeal, aimed at the very 
heart of seventeenth-century belief in the intervention of God. The king's victories 
provided unequivocal evidence that the Almighty had rejected parliament's rebellion as 
a malevolent attempt to overturn the natural order of God, king, and man. This, as the 
declaration made clear, was a harmonious and divinely ordained relationship, delivering 
an abundance of peace and prosperity, and when abandoned, death, destruction and 
misery.s89 God, therefore, had delivered his verdict: the king had been vindicated and 
parliament exposed as a malicious agent of the devil. It was now incumbent upon those 
who had strayed from the path of righteousness to repent their crimes and submit to the 
king's gracious forgiveness before it was too late. This was the royal ultimatum 
m Ibid. p. 4. 
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received by the Lords and Commons at the beginning of August 164359°, a proclamation 
that was to set in chain a series of events that would decide the future of the 
parliamentarian cause. 
ii) The Lord's Peace Proposals 
According to the Venetian Ambassador, the House of Lords took heart from the 
declaration and resolved to 'consider a composition', which 'his Majesty might be 
expected to accept. ,591 On 2 August, the day the declaration first appeared in print, the 
Lords appointed a committee of six peers to 'consider some propositions fit to be 
presented to the king, for settling the present distractions' .592 Clarendon stated that: 
In this refonnation of understanding, the Lords in their House debated nothing 
but expedients for peace: there were not of that body above five at the most who 
had any inclination to continue the war. 593 
A majority of peers were convinced that parliament was being punished for breaking off 
the Oxford Treaty in April 1643.594 They were detennined to resuscitate the peace 
process by fonnulating a set of proposals commensurate with those demanded by the 
king on 12 April. S95 This, the Lords anticipated, would satisfy Charles in all essentials 
and bring the civil war to a rapid conclusion. It was a policy of total desperation. By 
granting just about everything the king had demanded at Oxford, the Lords intended to 
end the war in political surrender.596 A comparison of the Lords' propositions with 
those demanded by Charles in April 1643 reveals the lengths to which the committee 
were prepared to go. At Oxford Charles had submitted three principal conditions, terms 
that the Lords would now attempt to meet, and their opponents in the Commons would 
attempt to overthrow. It was these fundamental clauses that would decide whether the 
war would end in a rapid peace or continue unabated. 
Charles' first demand had been the immediate return of his revenues, magazines, 
ships and forts. This, as far as the king was concerned, was paramount, for it restored 
'90 According to the royalist press the declaration 'came out in print' on Wednesday 2 August 1643. 
SLIT, E. 65[13], MerCW'ius Aulicus, 31, 30 July - 5 August 1643, p. 415. 
'91 CSPJI, 1643-1647, p. 7. 
'92 Journalo/the House o/Lords, vol. vi, p. 163. 
'93 Clarendon statcd that 'In this refonnation of understanding, the Lords in their House debated nothing 
but expedients for peace: there were not of that body above five at the most who had any inclination to 
continue the war'. Macray (cd.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 135. 
594 HMC, Fifth Report, p. 98. 
'95 TIle king's final tenns. subsequently rejected, were set out in full in a message to parliament dated 12 
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complete control of the country's military infrastructure, a prerogative, he maintained, 
which had been violently taken from him. Charles' second condition had demanded that 
all members of both Houses expelled from parliament since 1 January 1641 for 
supporting the king's cause should be readmitted with the same rights of 'sitting and 
voting' as they had previously enjoyed. And the king' s third proposition demanded that 
parliament adjourn to a location at least twenty miles from London, so that 'His Majesty 
and both Houses may be secured from such tumultuous assemblies' which had 
previously ~awed the members of the same, and occasioned two several complaints 
from the Lords House'. Charles was adamant that this would guarantee his personal 
security, and that of a fully restored parliament, from intimidation or even worse. Once 
these terms were granted, 'His Majesty will most cheerfully and readily consent, that 
both armies be immediately disbanded, and give a present meeting to both his Houses 
of Parliament' .597 As Austin W oolrych has observed, 'he might have well have openly 
demanded parliament's surrender' .598 
In reply the Lords declared that they were now ready to restore the king's 
revenues, together with his navy, forts and magazines, 'in a trust and confidence that 
they shall be disposed and employed for ~e defence and security of your royal person 
and of your people'. And as for the ore-admittance of our members such as have been 
put out merely for adhering unto your Majesty', the Lords would 'endeavour to give 
your Majesty all due satisfaction'. 599 The only caveat was a Protestation issued on 4 
May 1641, which included a specific obligation to maintain and defend the protestant 
religion, the person and estate of the king, and the powers and privileges of 
parliament.600 In other words the Lords were offering a fully restored parliament in 
exchange for a commitment to respect the privileges of parliament. As for the king's 
third demand, a majority of the committee had agreed to adjourn parliament to a 
location at least twenty miles from the capital, but were dissuaded from doing so by 
Lord Say.601 Nonetheless, they were desperate to assure Charles that his safety was 
sacrosanct, and although they could not agree to relocate parliament, they begged the 
king to believe their pledges of sincerity. 'We do now most humbly address ourselves 
unto your Majesty, beseeching you graciously to accept what we have here 
represented'. This, they insisted, was the mark of their fidelity. Granting the Icing's first 
two propositions constituted proof positive of a genuine wish to come to terms, so that 
Charles would 'add [his] endeavour' to the earnest desire for peace that these 
m Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 259. 
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concessions had demonstrated.602 It was a desperate entreaty, the work of truly wretched 
supplicants. 
The anxiousness of the Lords to accommodate the king was driven by two 
separate but closely related imperatives: first, an immediate cessation of arms and 
disbandment of forces; and second, a general amnesty indemnifying all who had 
supported or taken part in the rebellion.603 The royalist press saw only too clearly the 
Lords' real purpose: 'more security unto themselves' and a free pardon for the 
instigators of the war.604 Members of the upper chamber were desperate to avoid being 
swept away in the kind of blind-panic capitulation that would have followed the 
triumphant appearance on Hounslow Heath of Charles's victorious army.60S They were 
determined to salvage what terms they could while they were still in a position to do so. 
On Friday 4 August the committee's propositions were presented to the House 
of Lords, where, 'being read and debated were agreed to'.606 A conference with the 
House of Commons was then requested for the following morning, to obtain, without 
further delay, the concurrence of the lower chamber in sending them to the king.607 
However, opposition to the proposals was already beginning to mount. According to Sir 
Simonds O'Ewes several 'violent spirits' attempted to refuse the conference, but 'divers 
others' ensured that it would go ahead as desired.608 Battle lines were being drawn, even 
before the contents of the propositions were disclosed. The Lords were absolutely 
committed to a resumption of the Oxford Treaty - all that mattered now was the quest 
for peace and a rapid termination of the war. 
iii) Saturday 5 August 1643 
Saturday 5 August marked the beginning of a titanic struggle in the House of Commons 
between those who wished to kill the peace propositions at birth (the 'violent party' as 
Clarendon described them~, and those who were detennined to send them to the king. 
The royalist press summed up the mood of the occasion, reporting that 'the discomforts 
which have late been growing between the remaining parties in the two Houses [have 
become] a civil war amongst themselves' .610 At first the conflict raged over whether the 
House should even consider the propositions, and then subsequently over whether they 
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should be debated immediately or carried forward to the following week. It was an 
extraordinary day of high drama and fierce debate, the beginning of a neglected 
parliamentary battle to decide the future of the civil war. 
Since the propositions amounted to virtual surrender, their presentation to the 
conference had to be carefully staged. An ingenious preamble portrayed the initiation of 
peace talks as a means of bolstering the war effort. The 'reasonableness and justice' of 
the Lords' proposals would, if rejected by Charles, serve only to strengthen parliament's 
cause by encouraging the kingdom 'to preserve themselves in their just rights. ,611 
Parliament, the preamble argued, would claim the moral high ground as a seeker of 
conciliation, while the king would be exposed as a war monger interested only in 
conquest. Rather ominously the propositions were received in silence. John Pym, on his 
return to the Commons, reported 'that there was nothing more said, but that the matter 
of the conference was delivered in writing, which was presented and read; and were 
propositions to be sent to his Majesty,.612 As we shall see, the cold indifference of the 
conference was but a diplomatic calm before a political storm. 
When, according to Clarendon, 'this conference was reported in the House of 
Commons, it begat a wonderful long and a hot debate, which lasted till 10 o'clock that 
night.' The violent party 'inveighed furiously against the design itself, of sending to the 
king at all, and therefore would not have the particular propositions so much as 
considered' .613 The opposition argued forcefully that parliament had received little 
encouragement from the former treaty at Oxford, and were highly unlikely to do so 
now, considering the king's recent military successes; that the Houses had despatched 
commissioners to Scotland to negotiate an alliance, and that entering upon separate 
talks with the king would dissuade that nation from providing military assistance; and 
that a peace initiative would discourage the citizens of London enlisting in a new army 
to be formed under Sir William Waller, and that the counties adjacent to the capital 
would be similarly discouraged from enlisting in Essex's army.614 It was stressed that 
these objections were not, of course, born of an antipathy to peace, merely to avert a 
great mistake. For to offer such terms while Essex's forces remained incapacitated, and 
Waller's new London army had yet to be recruited, 'would be an action neither of 
611 Journal o/the House o/Lords, vol. vi, p. 171. 
612 Journal o/the House o/Commons, vol. iii, p. 196. 
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wisdom nor safety.' Parliament, it was argued, had to negotiate from a position of 
strength, 'to present propositions before they be in a posture to defend themselves' 
would, should the propositions be denied, expose them to defeat. Proposals, it was 
declared, would eventually be sent to the king, 'but not at this time, nor these 
. . d ,615 proposItIons so sent owo. 
But despite these reasons, 'and the passion in the delivery, the terror of the 
king's successes suggested answers enough,.616 The proponents of peace replied with 
equal vigour, arguing that parliament was now being punished for breaking off the 
Oxford Treaty, and that if they failed to take advantage of this present opportunity they 
would fare much worse in the future. There was no certainty of assistance from 
Scotland, and even if it were forthcoming there was no guarantee that it would arrive in 
time 'to preserve them from the ruin at hand'. And as for the recruitment of 
parliament's armies, it was clear that 'the most substantial and rich men desired peace, 
by their refusal to supply money for the carrying on of the war'. On top of which, the 
sending of these propositions would either secure a peace, in which case no more 
armies would be required, or, if refused, 'would raise more men and money than all 
their ordinances,.617 D'Ewes stated that after three hours of debate 'Mr Pym at last rose 
up', and 'moved with much violence' that the House should desire a conference with 
the Lords, 'and that we should give them reasons why we could not consent to these 
propositions'. But as no man 'seconded Mr Pym in his motion' it was the arguments for 
peace that prevailed.618 At the conclusion of the debate the Commons resolved by 94 
votes to 65 to take the proposals into 'further consideration' .619 The first hurdle had 
been overcome: the House had rejected the objections of the 'violent party' and elected 
to debate the propositions themselves. 
As it was now late in the day it was proposed that the debate should be 
adjourned until Monday morning. But according to D'Ewes the 'violent spirits', who 
were determined to defeat the propositions without further delay, devised a cunning 
plan to out manoeuvre their opponents. They immediately instigated a bogus debate 
concerning the defence of parliament during the forthcoming treaty. Many of those who 
supported peace believed the propositions to have been set-aside until Monday, and 
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thirty or forty of their number promptly departed. At this point D'Ewes claimed that the 
opposition declared their intention to resume the debate on the propositions, 'presuming 
very strongly that they could cast out them out of the House that very evening'. The 
Commons divided again, and to the dismay ofD'Ewes and many others, the opposition 
prevailed by 70 votes to 68 to continue the debate.62o There are two pertinent facts about 
this particular vote, the relevance of which will become apparent in due course. First, 
the narrow majority of only two was not contested and was allowed to stand without 
any comment or protest. And secondly, the division had been proposed by the 'violent 
spirits' and carried by them. Despite a narrow defeat the proponents of peace were 
compelled to continue the debate with reduced numbers. 
But with remarkable energy they persuaded the House gave its consent to the 
proposition to restore the king's revenue in full, and after becoming embroiled in a 
fierce debate over the proposal to surrender control of the navy, forts, magazines and 
towns, which 'grew so great ... and the day so far spent', successfully carried a motion 
adjourning the House 'till Monday morning to consult further thereof .621 A royalist 
source claimed that it had been the hope of the 'malignant party' that 'such men as durst 
declare themselves to be well affected would be wearied with their long debates', but 
the well affected 'sat it out, and carried it for the propositions. ,622 With great tenacity 
the proponents of peace had stood their ground, demonstrating an unbreakable 
determination to bring the civil war to a rapid close. The 'violent party' had been well 
and truly thwarted, unable to quench the raging thirst for peace. It now seemed certain 
that on Monday the propositions would be carried by the House and delivered to the 
king.623 Clarendon claimed that 'without doubt, if they had then sent [the propositions], 
a firm peace had immediately ensued'. It was a momentous moment, the war hung 
precariously in the balance. Would the Commons adopt the propositions and surrender, 
or would they reject this abject capitulation and fight on? 
News that the House had voted to debate the Lords' propositions swept through 
the City.624 Isaac Pennington, London's puritan lord mayor, convened an emergency 
meeting of the Common Council, 'which was for the vigorous prosecution of the war, 
and declining all thoughts of accommodation. ,625 According to Sir Simonds D'Ewes, 
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Pennington hatched a plot to arrest, if necessary, the leading members of the peace party 
in the Lords and Commons: 
It was thereupon agreed also by some of those seditious persons that if the 
propositions of peace went forward that day in the House of Commons, they 
should by violence seize upon the persons of Algenon, earl of Northumberland, 
and of Henry, earl of Holland, in the peers house and upon the persons of Mr 
Denzil HolIes, Mr William Pierrepont, Sir William Lewis, Sir John Evelyn of 
Wiltshire, Mr Grimston, and Mr Maynard, being members of the House of 
Commons.626 
However, this draconian action was to be held in reserve. First of all an attempt would 
be made to defeat the propositions by mob intimidation.627 'They had no other way', 
reported the royalist press, 'to effect their business than to ... bring down their City 
club-men to awe the members of both Houses, and repeal those votes'. 628 Capitalising 
upon fears that Charles was about to conclude a ceasefire with the Catholic rebels in 
Ireland, Pennington and the Common Council raised the terror of a papist invasion as 
the most effective means of mobilising the mob.629 
iv) Sunday 6 Augusl1643 
The next day, Sunday 6 August, printed bills were scattered through the streets of 
London. Attached to church doors, fixed upon gates and posts, and left in most public 
places, they called on: 
All such as desire there may be a general raising of the people against those Irish 
rebels, and blood thirsty papists now in arms, (fully purposing to destroy us, our 
religion, laws and liberties) are desired to meet at Westminster Hall, tomorrow 
morning by nine of the clock, being the seventh day of this instant August, to 
move the Parliament that this may be put into speedy execution. Twenty 
thousand Irish rebels are appointed to come over against US.630 
Meanwhile 'seditious preachers filled all the pulpits with alarms of ruin and destruction 
to the City if a peace were now offered to the king'. They called on the multitude to 
'rise as one man, and to come to the House of Commons next morning, for that twenty 
thousand Irish rebels were landed' .631 At the same time the Common Council drew up a 
petition to be presented to the House of Commons before the resumption of the debate 
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the following morning. The petition expressed the Council's fears that 'if yielded unto' 
these propositions 'would be destructive to our religion, laws and liberties ... and the 
brotherly assistance from Scotland, as well as the raising and maintaining of forces 
ourselves.' The City implored the lower House 'to persist in your former resolutions, 
whereupon the people have so much depended, and wherein you have so deeply 
engaged yourselves, though you should perish in the work (author's emphasis). A 
draught ordinance empowering parliament to impress men was annexed to the petition, 
implying that further financial assistance was dependent upon its 'speedy passing', for 
d d ~ ,632 'our an your elence. 
Clearly Pennington and the Common Council intended to synchronise the 
presentation of the petition with the arrival of the London mob and the resumption of 
the debate. This is how desperate the City militants had become. They were prepared to 
scaremonger the masses with rumours of a papist landing in order to overwhelm 
Westminster with a hostile crowd. And if that didn't work they were even prepared to 
arrest leading members of the peace party in both Lords and Commons. These hard-core 
opponents of peace were absolutely convinced that only intimidation and the threat of 
violence could prevent the passage of the propositions. According to D'Ewes 'divers 
members' of the Commons and some of the Lords met to discuss whether it would be 
safe to attend parliament the next day. And although most resolved to be present, 
D'Ewes reported that 'some few did abstain from the House of Commons in respect of 
the danger than was threatened' .633 It seems that the only explanation for the City's dark 
Machiavellian schemes is that the peace proposals were judged to be a capitulation and 
their acceptance by the king a foregone conclusion. The extraordinary lengths to which 
Pennington and the Common Council were prepared to go shows just how much was at 
stake. 
v) Monday 7 August 1643 
Monday 7 August 1643 ranks as one of the most significant days in English history. 
With the civil war at a crossroads parliament prepared to debate a series of peace 
proposals that would either end the war in surrender or signal a fight to the finish. Sir 
Simonds D'Ewes wrote in his diary that this: 
was one of the saddest days that happened since the beginning of this 
parliament, in which all the privileges thereof were shaken at the very root and 
such a conspiracy, as I said openly this day in the house, had been made by 
632 Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 356. 
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certain seditious and schismatical persons in the City of London as no former 
time could parallel. 634 
The fate of the parliamentarian cause would be decided in a cauldron of baying crowds, 
heated debate, and political brinkmanship, 'as no former time could paraUel' (author's 
italics). During the morning a crowd of 'more than 5,000' of the capital's 'lower 
inhabitants' descended on Westminster.635 'The rabble came in such multitudes and 
with so great clamour,636 that the 'Lords were in danger of suffering from the barbarity 
of this mob, which was summoned for nothing else than to inveigh against the proper 
inclination to render to the king the obedience due to him, and bring peace to the 
kingdom,.637 As peers ran the gauntlet of angry demonstrators in Old Palace Yard they 
were assailed with a succession of threatening cries. Some called for 'no peace', while 
others reminded them of their 'great promises at Guild Hall, at the entrance into this 
war, that you would live and die with us'. There were even accusations that they would 
'do the commonwealth less hurt by being at Oxford', whereas 'here you destroy 
millions by giving away at a clap religion, liberty and future safety'. 638 And at the door 
they were harangued by more demonstrators, 'behaving themselves imperiously', who 
threatened that they would return 'next day with double the number' if their Lordships 
'had not a good answer' .639 D'Ewes claimed that John Pym and other 'violent spirits' 
secretly welcomed the arrival of the 'seditious multitude,.64o But as Robert Brenner has 
argued, the capital's militants 'lacked the support of either Pym or the official City 
government', and so imposed their will by the 'mass mobilization of the London 
citizenry' and the 'forging of an alliance with parliament's war party wing' .641 While 
Pym did not condone the methods of the extremists, it is important to recognise that he 
was forced to manage a volatile situation without making it worse. 
When it was discovered that the mob had been raised by 'printed papers spread 
abroad in the city', inviting people to come down to parliament 'in an unlawful 
manner', the Lords demanded a conference with the Commons to complain about this 
'great breach of privilege of parliament'. They declared their intention to adjourn until 
the following morning, or longer if the unruly crowds were not dispersed, and 
demanded that the Commons joined with them 'to find out who printed and dispersed 
the papers, and who were the authors of them, that they may be brought to condign 
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punishment' .642 Shaken and incensed, the Lords had been subjected to a hail of abuse 
from a disorderly and intimidating crowd. Parliamentary procedure had been subverted 
in a truly terrifying manner. In fear they abandoned Westminster to escape the wrath of 
the mob. According to D'Ewes the 'insolent violence' suffered by the Lords on their 
departure was even worse than the affronts offered earlier.643 
John Pym reported the bitter complaints of the peers, that the Commons, despite 
the 'great cries' and 'tumults' taking place outside, had done little or nothing to disperse 
the crowds. The Lords indignantly reminded the lower chamber of a former resolution 
by which they would adjourn their House if 'such tumults' were 'not prevented'. They 
now 'desired' the Commons to 'join in suppressing these tumults'; otherwise they 
would 'adjourn their House to a further time,.644 It is important to recognise that the 
conference amounted to a direct accusation against the lower chamber. The Lords were 
outraged by the inertia of the Commons, despite a previous order to take action against 
mobs and unruly assemblies.64s Clearly the peers would not have adjourned unless they 
believed their safety to be at risk. As far as they were concerned parliament was under 
siege, assailed by something akin to a riot. It was, as we have seen, a carefully 
orchestrated show of force, designed to destroy the peace initiative by intimidating 
members to vote against the propositions. 
Meanwhile 'divers Aldermen and Common Council' assembled at the head of 
the baying crowd in Old Palace Yard. 646 Their petition, which demanded a total 
rejection of the Lords' propositions and the enactment of a City sponsored ordinance 
raising a huge army, 647 was presented to the Commons 'with such further insinuations 
of the temper of the city as were fit for the purpose' .648 In this highly charged 
atmosphere the petition was accepted with the 'hearty thanks' of the House, and an 
order issued to the parliamentary committee liaising with the London Militia Committee 
to prepare the City's ordinance for presentation to the Commons. In addition, the 
committee was instructed to 'receive from the City such propositions as shall be offered 
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unto them for the safety of the city' , strongly suggesting that the Commons felt obliged 
to act upon further initiatives from the Lord Mayor and Common Council. 649 Clarendon 
was adamant that the intimidation of the mob persuaded the Commons to welcome the 
City'S petition, many of its members either 'withdrawing for fear' or 'others by fear 
converted' .650 
• 
Clearly the Commons felt compelled to deal with the City's delegation in a 
fulsome and accommodating manner. And the decision to go further than the immediate 
demands of the petition, and to declare a readiness to act upon further directives from 
the City, is surely revealing. It will be argued here that this apparent camaraderie and 
sense of common purpose disguised a darker and much more disturbing reality. With 
parliament's armies in disarray and the prospect of a royalist victory all but certain, the 
Lord Mayor's petition constituted a thinly veiled threat to take control of the war effort 
unless parliament rejected the Lords' propositions. Only a week earlier on 29 July (three 
days after the fall of Bristol) the Commons had been forced to accept that a new 
independent army, to be raised and maintained by the City under the direction of the 
Lord Mayor and Common Council, should be commanded by Sir William Waller, and 
that the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs should take control of the Tower of London.651 The 
City had originally petitioned the Commons on 18 July (three days after Waller's 
annihilation at Roundway Down) for an ordinance placing all forces raised in the capital 
'under the sole command of the committee for the militia', followed two days later a 
further petition, presented by 'divers inhabitants', nominating a committee of 
parliament to arm, fmance and appoint officers for the new army.652 The petition 
pleaded with parliament to 'encourage the whole nation as one man' to 'preserve 
yourselves and them before the season be over, (which passes swiftly) and it be too 
late,.6s3 The petition named '13 radical war-party MPs - men such as Isaac Pennington, 
Henry Martin, William Strode and John Blakiston - to comprise the committee' .654 'In 
flagrant violation of the privileges of the Commons', wrote Jack Hexter, 'the petitioners 
had hand-picked the committee of the House that they would accept' .655 'When laid 
before parliament', the Venetian ambassador reported, 'the suggestion was not 
approved as they saw clearly that the city aims at usurping the chief power over 
649 Journal o/the House o/Commons. vol. iii. p. 197. 
6SO Macray (cd.), Clarendon. vol. iii. p. 139. 
6j1 Journal o/the House o/Commons, vol. iii, p. 187. 
6j2 JOUl'nal o/the House a/Commons, vol. iii, pp. 171 & 175-176; SLIT, E. 61[22], Kingdom's Weekly 
Intelligencer, 18 - 25 July 1643, p. 209; CSPV, 1642-1643, p. 301. 
653 SLIT. 669. f. 8[15]. The humble Petition a/thousands o/the well affected Inhabitants 0/ ... London 
(20 July 1643). 
654 Gentles, 'Parliamentary Politics and the Politics of the Street', p. 150. 
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them' .656 But the Commons were in no position to object, 'so they mildly rebuked the 
petitioners for their breach of privilege' and then 'complied with the ultimatum and 
appointed the desired committee,.657 As Ian Roy has pointed out, military control of the 
capital was effectively transferred from the earl of Essex to Lord Mayor Pennington and 
the Common Council. 658 
In the context of these threatening developments the real purpose of the City's 
petition suddenly becomes clear: suppress the peace propositions or face further action 
from Lord Mayor and Common Council. The City, as we have seen, were assembling 
an independent anny by means of a 'general rising', and had just taken possession of 
the Tower of London, the country's foremost arsenal and fortress. And, according to Sir 
Simonds D'Ewes, rumours were circulating the capital that unless the propositions were 
defeated leading members of the peace party would be arrested. According to Keith 
Lindley 'the summer months of 1643 marked the high point of militant influence on 
parliament and city government'.6S9 It is not difficult to see why. With the king on the 
verge of victory, the capital's radicals were determined to take control of the war before 
parliament caved in. 
lt was in this maelstrom of political tension that Pym returned from the 
conference, reporting the Lords' demands that the Commons should join with them in 
suppressing the tumults.66O This created an awkward and potentially dangerous 
situation, further complicated by the presence of Lord Mayor Pennington. The City's 
petition had been presented to parliament by an alderman named Atkins,661 enabling 
Pennington, for the first time since he became mayor in August 1642, to take his seat in 
the Commons to vote against the propositions.662 A political and religious zealot, with a 
propensity for militant action and intimidation, Pennington had been elected to both the 
Short and Long Parliaments. He had gained political ascendancy 'through his self-
appointed role of intermediary between the City and the Commons, and through his 
influence and prestige among puritan clergy and parliamentary puritan citizens'. 663 
From 1640 onwards he pursued a radical agenda 'through the organisation of circulating 
656 CSPV, 1642-1643, p. 301. 6" Hexter, King Pym, p. 123; The Commons declared the petition 'irregular, and contrary to the 
proceedings and privileges of Parliament, yet, not withstanding, considering the great and invincible 
necessity the kingdom was in at this time wherein safety was to be preferred before privilege of 
Parliament, they took no further notice of it'. Journal o/the House o/Commons, vol. iii, pp. 175-176. 6,. I. Roy, "This Proud Unthankful City': A Cavalier View of London and the Civil War', in S. Porter 
(ed.), London and the Civil War (Basingstoke, 1996), p. 164. 
659 Lindley, Popular Politics, p. 304. 
660 Journal o/the House o/Commons, vol. iii, p. 197. 
661 Ibid. 
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petitions and popular demonstrations,.664 In December 1640, backed by a thousand 
citizens, he presented the Root and Branch petition to the Long Parliament.665 Shortly 
afterwards, in February 1641, he appeared to withhold City loan money in order to 
pressure parliament into action against Strafford, but was opposed (it should be noted) 
by Pym who moved that the Londoners might be compelled to lend money. The 
confrontation between Pennington and the parliamentary moderates 'provoked the 
bitterest conflict,.666 In November 1641 he was suspected of 'orchestrating mass 
demonstrations' at Westminster 'to intimidate MPs during the debate on the grand 
remonstrance, ,667 and in January 1642 he probably provided refuge for the Five 
Members at his London house.668 As we saw in chapter two, in May 1643 a City loan of 
forty thousand pounds was offered to parliament on condition that the Lords' passed a 
bill taxing the estates of the 'ill-affected' .669 And in July 1643, at the height of 
parliament's military collapse, Pennington was associated with the City's 'general 
rising'; a spontaneous mobilization of the 'well affected' intended to provide the capital 
with an independent army of 10,000 volunteers.67o During the decisive days of late 
December 1641 and early January 1642 the king accused Pennington of bringing down 
the mobs and condemned him as a traitor who would never be pardoned.671 As Michael 
Braddick pointedly observed, 'London's allegiance was not certain' .672 
By August 1643 the capital's Lord Mayor had established a reputation for 
coercion and intimidation, a man committed to achieving his objectives by almost any 
means. On the morning of 7 August, sat in the House of Commons, he had a City mob 
at his beck and call, effectively blocking all movement in and out of Old Palace Yard. 
The Lords' demand to supress the tumults therefore meant a direct confrontation with 
Pennington and the unruly crowds surrounding parliament. According to D'Ewes some 
members 'would have pretended' that the mob 'was no tumult', which so enraged 
D'Ewes that he rose to his feet declaring: 
664 Ibid., p. 210. For additional references to Pennington's career as an MP, Alderman, and Lord Mayor, 
see also pp. 176- I 84, 198-206, 210-2 16, 218-22 I, 260-265. 
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~ford, 2004). 
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669 Journal of the House of Lords, vol. vi, p. 32. 
670 BLIT, E. 59[15], Instructions and Propositions, 7 July 1643; BLIT, E. 60[9], Mercurius Civicus, 7, 
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That if this were not a dangerous tumult and which was more an unlawful 
conspiracy, I knew not was, for here were all the particulars incident to it which 
might make it of dangerous consequence. 673 
D'Ewes diary claimed that the mob had been summoned by a seditious meeting, that the 
'privilege of parliament hath been absolutely broken and violated', and that some Lords 
were even now 'in danger of their lives' as they passed through Old Palace Yard to their 
coaches.674 He accused Pennington, 'justly suspected to be a raiser and contriver of all 
this plot and tumult', to be an 'arch-hypocrite' in falsely alleging that he had done all in 
his power to prevent these disturbances, when 'those which came down this Monday 
morning did easily evince with what sincerity he had sent forth those commands. ,675 
'Divers of us', declared D'Ewes, 'did not believe it,.676 
D'Ewes stated that those 'truly religious, honest, moderate men' who wished to 
condemn the mob believed that they would be outvoted by the increase in opposition 
members attending the House.677 However, this version of events is not entirely 
supported by the Journal of the House of Commons, which states that the Lord Mayor 
was requested 'to take some course to prevent all tumults' .678 Pennington did not 
volunteer to take action until asked to do so, and although he issued a declaration 
prohibiting unlawful assemblies and printed papers - 'upon pain of incurring the utmost 
penalty of the law,679 - it is significant that the Commons as a body failed to censure the 
mob or order its dispersal. It is difficult to believe, despite the possibility that some 
members tacitly approved of the crowd, that the House was not overawed by the 
gathering in Old Palace Yard. The Lords had been compelled to abandon their sitting 
and flee for their coaches. It is hardly credible that some of those who now appeared 
ready to obstruct a denunciation of the mob did not do so out of fear for their own 
safety. Although the Lords had escaped, these men remained in the chamber, and the 
vote to decide the fate of the propositions had yet to be taken. As long as the mob filled 
Old Palace Yard, members would have been acutely aware of the possible 
consequences of their actions. The result was that the Commons failed to join with the 
Lords in either rebuking or suppressing the mob. Given the flight of the peers, it seems 
highly unlikely that Pennington and the tumultuous assembly did not overawe at least a 
portion of the lower chamber. 
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When the Commons finally resumed the debate on the peace proposals further 
evidence of malpractice began to emerge. According to D'Ewes the 'violent spirits' 
now felt confident of victory, and 'contrary to all order' and 'usual proceedings', they 
pressed to take a vote on rejecting the propositions. This in direct contravention of 
Saturday's decision to debate the propositions themselves, and indeed as D'Ewes 
pointed out, despite the fact that part of propositions had already been 'allowed of and 
agreed unto'. Parliamentary procedure was summarily overturned and the previous vote 
of the House disregarded.68o We must ask why the 'violent spirits' were allowed to get 
away with this, and why were they able to subvert normal procedure so easily? Pym 
argued fervently against the propositions, complaining that the Lords had not made their 
true meaning clear. But once again parliamentary procedure was overturned. Pym, 
according to D'Ewes, spoke against individual clauses before the House had taken them 
into consideration. Pym's arguments, D'Ewes claimed, might have had some force had 
it not been within the power of the House to alter and amend the propositions. D'Ewes 
stated that he would not pass them as they currently stood, but 'doubtless we may easily 
make them such as we would have them'. D'Ewes argued that the propositions should 
be properly debated 'whether we reject them or retain them' .681 Again we must ask why 
this eminently reasonable request was not take up, and why a House that protected its 
privileges with such jealously, and proceeded by well-established rules and regulations, 
was so ready to overturn all customary convention? 
Clearly it was a matter of extreme importance to avoid further consideration of 
the propositions, and to proceed as quickly as possible to a vote on their rejection. The 
'violent spirits' were now confident of achieving their aims. They were encouraged by 
the non-appearance of some members of the peace party, and bolstered by additional 
numbers recruited to vote against the propositions. And then there was the mob in Old 
Palace Yard, and the rumours of arrests if the peace proposals were carried. This was a 
heady cocktail of fear, intimidation, and a cataclysmic contest of political wills. It is the 
contention of the present writer that Pym was clearly intent upon defeating the 
propositions, but was prepared to overturn Saturday's vote and proceed, with others, to 
debate their rejection, because he feared that the City's threats would come to fruition if 
they were carried. Isaac Pennington, the figurehead of this menace, had taken his seat in 
, the Commons, a persistent reminder of what might lay ahead. And outside in Old Palace 
Yard a mob of '5 or 6000 of the usual hacksters', who were 'always ready for such 
610 BL, Harley MS, 165 (D'Ewes diary, History of Parliament Trust transcription), fol. 147b. 
611 Ibid. fol. 1488. 
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purposes at a minutes warning' ,682 had already compelled the Lords to abandon their 
sitting. As we have seen, the City had already established a committee of hand-picked 
war party MPs led by Pennington to oversee a 'general rising' and an independent 
army, so the infrastructure was in place to take control of the entire war effort. The 
royalist press claimed that the new committee would quickly supplant Pym's 
Committee of Public Safety, 'which howsoever it may please the Houses (which 
peradventure dare not but give way to these vast desires)' .683 
Eventually the House came to vote, and it was decided by a narrow majority of 
81 votes to 79 to send the propositions to the king. Sensationally, 'the House being not 
satisfied with the report of the tellers', a second ballot was ordered.684 D'Ewes put the 
discrepancy down to the age of the tellers for the Noes, Sir Robert Barrington (58), and 
Sir Robert Harley (64), who missed 'nine of their own number', so that in fact they 
were 88 in total. This irregularity, D'Ewes informs us, was spotted by one of those 
voting against the propositions, who lodged an objection when the ballot was 
declared.685 After 'much debate' the House again divided and this time the propositions 
were defeated by 88 votes to 81.686 D'Ewes appeared to accept the teller's mistake as a 
genuine error, and did not challenge the imposition of a second ballot or the validity of 
the final result.687 However, two aspects of this drama are somewhat suspicious and 
require further comment. First, D'Ewes was not in the chamber when the votes for the 
Noes were counted, and second, the objection to the first vote was raised by one of 
those opposing the propositions. 
It will be recalled that no protest was raised on Saturday evening when 
opponents of the propositions prevailed by a majority of only two votes in a similarly 
close ballot.688 But when the vote went against the 'violent spirits' on Monday 
afternoon a teller's error was claimed and a second vote taken. This alleged irregularity 
is, I believe, not quite what it seems. When the House divided the Yeas, of which 
D'Ewes was one, left the chamber while the Noes remained in their seats. D'Ewes was 
therefore not present when the votes for the opposition were counted and the omission 
of no fewer than nine of their number supposedly took place. What is absolutely certain 
is that by the time the second ballot was taken the Noes totalled 88. It should be 
remembered that the chamber of the Commons could be extremely busy, members 
constantly coming and going. D'Ewes himself recounts occasions on which he left the 
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House and returned later to find a debate in progress or some other business in hand.689 
This movement of people could have easily disguised the addition of nine extra 
members between the first disputed vote and the point at which the second ballot was 
taken. 
I believe it significant that D'Ewes was not present to witness the work of the 
'aged' and allegedly incompetent tellers, and that their mistake was only pointed out 
after the vote had been declared and by one of those on the defeated side. D'Ewes states 
that the error would have remained unnoticed if this unnamed member had not also 
counted those opposed to the propositions. This, together with the fact that no complaint 
was made on Saturday evening over a similar two-vote majority (which on that 
occasion favoured the 'violent party'), casts a cloud of deep suspicion over the whole 
affair. Clearly this is a controversial interpretation of a crucial event, but therein lays the 
strength of the claim. It was precisely because this was such a critical vote that some 
members, either in fear of Pennington's rumoured threats, or in absolute determination 
to prevent a political capitulation, or perhaps both, acted outside the accepted norms of 
parliamentary procedure and ensured that the propositions were defeated. In light of the 
suspicious circumstances highlighted above, I believe there is no other explanation for 
the truly extraordinary decision to retake a vote that would decide the future of the civil 
war. It should not be forgotten that this was a debate that had begun in the Lords the 
previous Friday, had raged for two full days in the Commons, brought a hostile mob to 
Old Palace Yard, and led to the abandonment of the upper chamber. It was an 
astonishing sequence of events, notable even in a period of the nation's history as 
turbulent as the civil war. It is in such desperate circumstances that the means will often 
justify the ends. 
A downcast D'Ewes tried to explain how, 'without any new reasons at all', the 
'Commons should be so much altered in two days', when on Saturday there had been 
such a clear majority in favour of the propositions. D'Ewes noted that some members 
were frightened off, some, such as Sir Christopher Yelverton, Sir William Waller, Mr 
John Glyn, and Mr Jephson reversed their votes, possibly for the same reason, and 
some, such as Mr John Moore and others, who were absent on Saturday, took their seats 
on Monday. D'Ewes bemoaned the fact that 'no means was left unassayed to procure 
suffrages' .690 The Venetian Ambassador was rather more forthright, 'the disposition of 
many of the chamber being overawed' they 'complied with the demand' of the City.691 
619 See for example BL, Harley MS, 165 (D'Ewes diary, History of Parliament Trust transcription), fol. 
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The royalist press reported that members of the peace party in both Lords and 
Commons fled by boat to Kingston to seek the protection of Essex and what remained 
of his army.692 And the earl of Holland claimed that the only reason for his subsequent 
defection to Oxford was 'the tumultuous coming down of certain mean persons to the 
two Houses of Parliament' threatening 'violence to his person,.693 Almost as soon as the 
propositions had been defeated the Commons ordered the Committee of the Tower to 
'take care to put my Lord Mayor and Sheriffs into possession of the Tower' .694 As 
Robert Brenner has argued, 'in this situation of unsurpassed military emergency, the 
London citizenry as a whole was more prepared than at any other time during the Civil 
War years to follow the radicals' political leadership' .695 
Conclusion 
An interesting and revealing aspect of these turbulent debates concerns the mathematics 
of the various Commons votes. Although more members participated in the second 
ballot on 7 August (169 as opposed to 160 in the first) the number in favour of the 
propositions remained constant at 81. Between the two divisions nine extra votes 
appeared for the opposition. The number of members voting for peace in Monday's 
divisions (81) was thirteen fewer than the first ballot on Saturday (94), confirming that 
some members had either failed to attend or changed their vote. In addition the House 
was larger by ten (169) for the second ballot on Monday than the first division on 
Saturday (159), again confirming that extra opponents of peace had been drafted in. The 
result was that the 94 members who voted for the propositions in Saturday's first ballot 
was, in fact, greater by six than the 88 members who successfully voted against the 
propositions in Monday's second ballot. If those who had voted for peace on Saturday 
had voted the same way on Monday the propositions would ~ve been carried - even 
allowing for the extra members recruited to vote against peace in the second ballot. The 
only explanation for this remarkable transformation - as the combined testimonies of Sir 
Simonds D'Ewes, the Venetian Ambassador, Clarendon, the earl of Holland, and the 
royalist press demonstrate - is that the peace proposals were defeated by intimidation, 
and not by the arguments deployed in Saturday's and Monday's debates. 
Historians have traditionally characterised the days preceding the Commons 
vote of 7 August as a 'tug-of-war' between the peace party (led by the earl of 
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Northumberland in the Lords and Denzil HolIes in the Commons) and the war party (led 
by viscount Saye and Sele in the Lords and John Pym in the Commons) for the loyalty 
of the earl of Essex and his arrny.696 However, this interpretation completely misses the 
point. Gardiner has shown that the peace party resolved to persevere with the 
propositions even when it became clear that Essex would not support them.697 The real 
battle was not between the peace party and the war party for the backing of Essex, but, 
as this study has demonstrated, between groupings in the Commons and the City of 
London for control of the war effort. David Scott's argument, endorsed by Ian Gentles, 
that the defeat of the propositions shows that the Saye-Pym group controlled the capital 
is therefore thrown into doubt.698 While Scott is surely correct in asserting that 
Pennington and the City militants were 'not the mere instruments of the Saye-Pym 
alliance', he has nevertheless failed to recognise just how much power these Godly 
citizens wielded over parliament.699 The reluctance of the Commons to condemn or 
suppress the tumults in Old Palace Yard, and the suspicious decision to quash the first 
ballot on 7 August, strongly suggest that Pennington and his henchmen actually held the 
reins of power. It was the Lord Mayor - not the Saye-Pym group - who dominated the 
capital during these tumultuous days.700 This thesis has shown in the formation of 
parliament's council of war on 2 August 1643 that Pym and his fellow members on ,the 
council held a moderate position roughly equating to Hexter's 'middle group', while 
Pennington, one of 13 war party members forced on the House of Commons as a 
committee to oversee the City's independent army, led a distinct group of extremists 
that did not include Pym or Saye. It was Pennington, not Pym, who lay behind the 
carefully orchestrated campaigns of intimidation that 'underlined the power of mass 
action to influence the course of high politics' .701 This, then, is the crisis that historians 
have missed, the real battle for the fate of the civil war and the parliamentarian 
movement. On Monday 7 August 1643 mob rule and parliamentary malpractice saw off 
the peace propositions. The prospect of a negotiated surrender was finally overthrown 
696 As the following references demonstrate, the struggle for the support of Essex has formed the focus of 
historiographical attention in the period immediately prior to 4 - 7 August: Gardiner, Great Civil War, 
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and the threat of a political take-over was averted. Ostensibly at least. the war effort 
would continue with parliament and not the City of London in control. 
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Chapter Four 
WHY PARLIAMENT FAILED 
What, precisely, caused the parliamentarian war effort to fail so spectacularly during the 
summer of 1643 has never been fully examined or adequately explained. Why did 
parliament experience these disasters and what part did the royalists play in this series 
of victories? Chapter four will attempt to fill this historiographical void by investigating 
parliament's military demise. The first two chapters of this thesis have suggested four 
potential reasons: first, the military capabilities of parliament's commanders; second, 
the inability or unwillingness of parliament's commanders to co-operate effectively; 
third, parliament's defensive approach to war; and fourth, the inadequacy of 
parliament's financial strategy. By subjecting each of these factors to detailed scrutiny, 
we will attempt to establish whether any or all of these reasons, either in combination or 
in isolation, can account for the onset of parliament's 1643 crisis. 
Historiography 
First it is necessary to review the way in which historians have understood the causes of 
parliament's 1643 crisis. (It will be recalled that the historiography of its impact is 
examined separately in the introduction to this thesis). However, one thing should be 
made clear from the outset: the causes of the 1643 crisis have not attracted a consistent 
or instantly recognisable historiography. Relevant material has to be extracted from the 
work of historians largely concerned with other aspects of the civil war. Nevertheless, 
the paucity of direct historiography does not preclude a reasonably detailed analysis, 
even though the historiography itself has to be consciously linked with the crisis. 
S. R. Gardiner's History of the Great Civil War almost hit the nail on the head 
more than a century ago. Writing in 1904 Gardiner perceptively argued that the military 
situation in July 1643 demonstrated that: 
Unity of command and unity of plan were the indispensable conditions of 
success. If the mutual distrust which had kept back the commanders in the 
Northern Midlands from hurrying to the succour of the Fairfaxes in Yorkshire 
was to be repeated in the south, a more crushing blow than that of Adwalton 
Moor would not be long postponed. 702 
702 S. R. Gardiner, Hi3lory o/the Greal Civil War (London, 1904), vol. i, p. 182. 
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As we have already seen, Gardiner's focus on 'unity of command' finds a ready 
resonance in this thesis. It is perhaps remarkable that Gardiner's insight has not been 
developed by succeeding generations of historians, and that these early thoughts on the 
matter have remained largely unexploited. This may be the result of modem trends in 
historiography and a sense that things have moved on since Gardiner's day. However, it 
has been the experience of the present writer that Gardiner's work remains an 
indispensable tool for any understanding of the civil war. 
The publication in 1902 ofC. H. Firth's 1901 Ford lectures as Cromwell's Army 
provided a considered assessment of parliament's military failings.703 Firth contended 
that during the early civil war the desultory leadership of the earl of Essex, and the 
markedly inferior quality of his soldiers, negated parliament's initial advantage in 
resources, equipment and numbers. Furthermore, Firth maintained that as a 
consequence of parliament's defective organisation and administration, the material 
superiority of 1642 was not recovered during the campaigning seasons of 1643 and 
1644. This, Firth argued, presented the king with an opportunity he was unable to 
exploit because royalist organisation was even worse than that of the parliament.704 
Although the 1643 crisis is not directly addressed, Firth appears to suggest that while 
the quality of the king's commanders and soldiers drove parliament to breaking point, 
organisational factors prevented the translation of discrete royalist victories into a 
strategically decisive blow. In addition Firth hinted that the resources available to 
parliament declined appreciably in 1643 and 1644, significantly retarding the 
effectiveness of the war effort. It is an observation that appears to support the picture of 
parliament's financial and administrative weaknesses presented in chapter two. On 
balance, however, it seems fairly clear that Firth believed the inferiority of Essex and 
his soldiers to be the major cause of parliament's military shortcomings in 1643 and 
1644. 
In contrast to Firth's emphasis on commanders, armies, and logistics, J. H. 
Hexter concerned himself with the political mechanics of parliament's early war effort. 
Hexter claimed that in 1642 and 1643 parliament's military effectiveness was 
compromised by a disproportionately high representation of 'pacific peers' on what 
amounted to Westminster's war cabinet.7os Though the Committee of Safety was the 
closest parliament came during Pyrn's lifetime to a centralised executive, Hexter argued 
that its work was dominated by a preponderance of lords more inclined to a negotiated 
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settlement than a military victory. Hexter's view - that the influence of peace lords 
retarded the Committee's usefulness - was supported by the subsequent research of 
Lotte GIOW.706 Glow described a number of factors, of which the peace lords were but 
one, that markedly diminished the Committee's capacity for successful action. Glow 
argued that the sheer volume of the Committee's work, allied to the urgency with which 
it had to be dealt, placed a heavy administrative burden upon the shoulders of 
inexperienced men. The almost constant need for innovation and improvisation, Glow 
concluded, together with the domination of the peace lords, resulted in the gradual 
failure of this necessary experiment in executive government. Hexter and Glow's 
analysis correlates very closely with the notion of administrative conservatism explored 
in chapter two. There seems to be a strong consensus that parliament's defensive 
attitude to civil war in 1642 and 1643 constituted a majorfailing. 
Hexter and Glow's findings indirectly support Conrad Russell's view that 
victory ultimately depended upon fmancial organisation and resources. Russell argued 
that while Jolm Pym' s most significant contribution to parliament's war effort was the 
creation of a financial and administrative system,707 Pym' s innovations could only take 
effect over the longer term, helping to explain parliament's acute difficulties in the 
summer of 1643. Indeed, parliament's administrative and financial apparatus remained 
incomplete during the period of crisis. It was only the prospect of imminent military 
defeat that finally overthrew the conservatives in the Lords and Commons and enabled 
Pym to complete a system of ordinances, committees and treasuries. Financial 
organisation and the related problems of disbursement were the key issues; for as 
Russell himself observed, 'an army with no ammunition could not fight; an army with 
no food usually would not fight.' 708 He might have added that an army without pay was 
likely to desert. Nevertheless, the point is that raising and distributing resources was of 
paramount importance; and in the summer of 1643 parliament had yet to fully impose 
the structures that would eventually support victory. Thus Russell's view of 
administrative immaturity and ineffectiveness compliments Hexter and Glow's 
identification of political reluctance and conservatism, adding further weight to the 
argument presented in chapter two. 
Though largely concerned with political events after 1643, David Underdown's 
Pride's Purge briefly alludes to Firth's argument concerning incompetent commanders 
and soldiers.7fY'J In describing the political agenda of the militant wing of the war party, 
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Underdown spotlighted the ineffectual leadership of parliament's armies in 1642 and 
1643. The programme of the extremists, that military victory was a non-negotiable 
prerequisite of any settlement, is here frustrated by the lukewarm commi~ent of 
parliament's generals. The reluctance of the aristocratic leadership to pursue a forceful 
campaign against a determined king had resulted in military failure. It will be recalled 
from chapter one that the theory of parliamentarian military inferiority was largely 
rejected in favour of a new argument highlighting the non-cooperation of parliamentary 
commanders and the effective cooperation of royalist commanders. However, 
Underdown's identification of pacific military and political elements supports Hexter's 
conclusion that during the early part of the war the peace party tended to dominate.710 
In describing the early evolution of what may be termed the parliamentarian war 
machine, John Morrill placed a particular emphasis on the importance of military 
organisation.711 Morrill argued that the structure devised by parliament in 1642 became 
obsolete once the battle of Edgehill and the confrontation at Turnham Green failed to 
produce a decisive result. As it became increasingly clear that the war would drag on 
into 1643, nothing was done to reorganise the basic military structure devised in 1642. 
This, argued Morrill, left parliament with a system that could not cope with the 
increasing demands and complexities of civil war in 1643 and 1644. Initially 
parliament's forces were divided into two independent parts. The Houses retained direct 
control of the local militias, charging them with the defence and pacification of their 
local areas, while a volunteer army under the command of the earl of Essex was raised 
to confront the king. Morrill argued that this was perfectly rational in the context of a 
single campaign in 1642, but wholly inadequate thereafter. Additional volunteer forces 
raised in other parts of the country were also placed under the earl's command. Thus 
Essex exercised theoretical control of all volunteer forces, regardless of geography. 
Morrill argued that this resulted in a division of military authority between parliament 
and the Lord General, and that ultimate responsibility for strategy was never made 
completely clear. During 1643 parliament's armies were therefore too independent of 
each other, while the focus of power in the person of the Lord General created 
disagreements with his regional commanders and the parliamentary committees running 
the war effort. Morrill concluded that a 'much more flexible system could have been 
devised. To attempt to adapt the 1642 model to a totally different situation was 
foolish.'712 Morrill's emphasis on the independence of parliament's armies and the 
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confused division of military authority underpins the argument deployed in chapter one 
concerning a lack of cooperation amongst commanders as the principal cause of 
parliament's military failings. Morrill's penetrating analysis provides a degree of 
support for the whole issue of parliamentary non-cooperation and royalist cooperation. 
Morrill subsequently turned his attention to John Pym, the most 'visible' figure 
in the House of Commons during the first three years of the Long Parliament.713 
However Morrill argued that visibility was not synonymous with leadership, and that 
Pym emerges as an administrator and a manager rather than as a leader or an enactor of 
legislation. Pym devoted his energies to the co-ordination of the parliamentarian 
defence programme, creating and resourcing the principal field army under the earl of 
Essex and establishing the parliamentary executive based on the Committee of Safety. 
'He did not discover at this time,' Morrill concluded, 'a preoccupation with legislation 
or even with fmance.'714 How then does Morrill's analysis affect our understanding of 
parliament's war effort during 1642-1643? All we know of Pym indicates that he 
favoured military victory as a means of imposing a satisfactory settlement on the crown. 
But in the interests of parliamentary unity he had to take account of the peace party, 
principally the conservative peers discussed above by Hexter and Glow. It may have 
been this particular consideration that directed his activities towards managing the war 
effort rather than leading it and potentially dividing it. If so, it is possible to speculate 
that parliament might have avoided crisis altogether in the summer of 1643 had Pym 
ignored the question of unity and opted instead for a more vigorous leadership role 
prioritising military victory. However, it is plausible that management, rather than 
outright leadership, enabled Pym to retain the commitment of both Houses to armed 
opposition. Nevertheless, the need to accommodate reluctant Lords points once again to 
the retarding effects of administrative conservatism outlined in chapter two. 
Mark Kishlansky, in analysing the rise of the new model army, explored at 
some length this idea that the early parliamentarian war effort was undermined by a 
simultaneous but contradictory pursuit of both political consensus and military force.71S 
Parliament, Kishlansky observed, continued to operate in its accustomed fashion: 
'reasoned debate and unanimous resolution' characterised 'the proceedings of an 
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commander's hands, thereby preventing a cohesive coordinated strategy employing all the various 
parliamentary forces. S. D. M. Carpenter, Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars (Abingdon, 
2005), p. 65. 
713 J. S. Morrill, 'The unweariableness ofMr Pym: influence and eloquence in the Long Parliament', in 
S. D. Amussen and M. A. Kishlanski (eds.), Political Cultwe and Cultwal Politics in Early Modern 
England (Manchester, 1995). 
114 Ibid., p. 36. 
m M. A. Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Army (Cambridge, 1979). 
138 
institution designed to do the king's business.'716 As there were no formal leaders and 
the principal administrators had joined Charles, the Houses lacked both executive and 
administrative capacities. In addition parliament exhibited an instinctive opposition to 
military and political innovation. The result, argued Kishlansky, was 'a cautious and 
conciliatory' approach to war. Charles, on the other hand, enjoyed the strategic 
superiority of a clearly defined purpose: the suppression of a rebellion and the 
reoccupation of his capital.717 Kishlansky's conclusion strengthens the portrait 
developed in chapter two of an aggressive, vigorous, and motivated monarch pitched 
against a desultory and ineffective parliament. 
Peter Newman took the view that royalist commanders proved to be generally 
more effective than their parliamentarian counterparts. However, it was the king's 
inability to capitalise on his military successes in mid 1643 that saved the hard pressed 
roundheads from defeat.71B As the war progressed, the superior quality of royalist 
commanders compensated for a gradual decline in the number soldiers available to the 
king.719 Newman observed that from 1644 onwards, royalist colonels found increasing 
difficulty in fmancing the regiments under their command, leading to a reduction in the 
size of Charles' armies.72o But in the short term - 1642 to 1643 - the king successfully 
financed his war effort through the private, though ultimately finite, wealth of many of 
his leading supporters. However, the inability of individual royalist colonels to continue 
to fmd money stood in stark contrast to parliament's long.,.term access to the financial 
markets of the City of London. Nevertheless, Newman's belief in the superiority of 
royalist commanders, plus the relative health of the king's finances in 1643 provides, 
once again, a picture of relative royalist strength and parliamentarian weakness during 
the early part of the civil war. 
Martyn Bennett continued the theme of initial royalist supremacy by reiterating 
Newman's conclusion that parliament had only been saved from defeat in the summer 
of 1643 by the king's failure to exploit his military successes.721 But what is interesting 
about Bennett's account is its extreme brevity. Admittedly, the historiography so far 
discussed has not dealt extensively with the causes of parliament's crisis. Indeed, it has 
rarely, if at all, thought fit to apply the label 'crisis'. But it has at least addresses the 
broad question of parliament's 1643 problems in a reasonable if ultimately 
unsatisfactory way. Bennett, however, makes clear his intention to discuss the civil war 
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in terms of a 'Three Kingdoms' approach, integrating the near simultaneous and 
overlapping conflicts in Scotland and Ireland into an all-embracing archipelagic 
narrative. 722 Could it be that the inclusiveness of the 'New British History' 
inadvertently obscures the significance of parliament's inherently English 1643 crisis, 
thereby explaining Bennett's somewhat superficial treatment? Such a suggestion is not 
intended to challenge Bennett's expertise or to question the validity of a three kingdoms 
analysis; indeed, S. R. Gardiner expertly pioneered the concept as long ago as the 
1880s.723 It is merely an attempt to understand what appears to be a dearth of references 
to the causes of crisis in the historiography of the 1990s.724 
In 2004 David Scott alluded to such concerns by admitting that a multiple 
kingdoms framework 'may not be able to answer all the questions we have traditionally 
asked of the period,.72s While warmly endorsing a move away from nation centred 
histories, Scott nevertheless acknowledged the almost inevitable Anglocentrism of an 
integrated approach.726 Recognising English centrality may explain why Scott had 
marginally more to say about parliament's difficulties. He reiterated Russell's point 
concerning the inadequacy of the financial programme in 1642-1643, but attributed its 
shortcomings to the failure of the supply system, rather than, as Russell argued, the 
ineffectiveness of parliament's fiscal innovations. Scott specifically blamed poor 
disbursement for Essex's :frequent shortages of men and money, a problem, as we have 
seen, that similarly affected the armies of Fairfax and Waller.727 Scott's emphasis on 
inadequate distribution points towards an inefficient system of supply rather than 
pronounced difficulties in raising money. In chapter two we saw how in May 1643 the 
speaker of the House of Commons was forced to admit that revenue was quickly 
consumed locally, leaving little for the support of parliament's various field armies. 
In 2007 Ian Gentles provided some very welcome - if somewhat belated - light 
on the historiographical horizon. Gentles revealingly justified his latest study of the 
civil war on the grounds that it 'attempted to weave together the twin narratives of 
politics and war, which are so often treated separately'. 728 While readily accepting the 
validity of a three kingdoms perspective, Gentles appears to imply a mild dissatisfaction 
with the New British orthodoxy, perhaps, as Gentles suggests, requiring some kind of 
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correction or modification. Gentles' conscious interaction of politics and war - the 
'political crisis that gripped the capital in the wake of parliament's multiple military 
defeats in the spring and summer of 1643' - allows the freedom to comment specifically 
on the causes of the 1643 crisis.729 By the end of July parliament had been shaken to its 
very core, but why, Gentles asked, had the king done so well? Charles benefited from 
the generosity of his wealthy supporters, who not only placed large sums of money at 
his disposal, but also raised large numbers of men. In the north-east the royalists out-
recruited parliament by at lest five to one, while across the country they possessed 
better and more numerous cavalry. And in Rupert, Wilmot and Goring the king was 
blessed with better and more effective commanders.73o While Gentles' emphasis on 
royalist military superiority supports the conclusions of Peter Newman, it does not take 
into consideration the issue of cooperation amongst commanders, which was strongly 
flagged up in chapters one and three. 
In 2008 Gavin Robinson's detailed study of parliamentary horse supply 
provided an important insight into the military reverses of 1643.731 Significantly, 
Robinson's research highlighted a rapid deterioration in the parliamentarian war effort 
after a relatively well managed and resourced beginning. 'The overall impression of the 
first half of 1643 is of disorder and crisis, which contrasts sharply with the situation 
before Edgehill, when the cause was united and supplies were plentiful.' 732 Robinson 
revealed that 'Essex's army was better supplied and financed in 1642 than it was in 
1643' and that 'more horses were bought for cash before Edgehill than in the whole of 
1643.,733 Parliament's initial method of supply, a voluntary system of donations known 
as the Propositions, provided Essex with a well equipped army for the Edgehill 
campaign, but proved much less successful thereafter.734 Robinson's findings tend to 
echo those of John Morrill (discussed above), that parliamentarian organisation, 
satisfactory in 1642, became totally inadequate in 1643. This disintegration of 
efficiency appeared to mirror the course of the war itself: centrally well supported in 
anticipation of a short campaign in 1642, but over stretched and inadequately resourced 
when fighting unexpectedly continued and intensified. Robinson's analysis sheds 
important new light on the condition of the parliamentarian cause during the fust half of 
1643, revealing a war effort struggling to meet the demands of a rapidly expanding 
conflict. 
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Finally, also in 2008, Michael Braddick became the first historian to suggest the 
factors that would ultimately bring about parliament's military collapse. Braddick's 
observations, which offer a rare insight, are such a departure from previous 
historiographical comment that they are quoted in full: 
Behind the noise of the day-to-day news it was possible to perceive larger trends 
and deeper problems - the reluctance of armies to move, the difficulty of 
securing an effective strategic control of particular commanders, the problems of 
co-ordinating effort, and of supplying the armies. At various points, both sides 
experienced these handicaps, but they seemed more urgent for the 
parliamentarians by the spring of 1643.735 
Although Braddick addresses the military situation in spring 1643, rather than the high 
summer of July and August, he nevertheless pinpoints a combination of factors that 
would later result in a disastrous lack of parliamentarian cooperation. Here at last is a 
tentative recognition of the deep-seated causes of parliament's military disintegration 
and descent into political crisis. 
Despite a general - though not total - tendency on the part of historians to 
sidestep a specific and detailed examination of the causes of parliament's crisis, this 
survey has nevertheless provided an unmistakeable picture of royalist ascendancy 
during the first half of 1643. Firth, Newman and Gentles have emphasised the military 
superiority of the king's commanders, while Hexter, Glow, Underdown, Morrill and 
Kishlansky have described the detrimental effects of parliament's cautious and peace 
orientated approach to war. To varying degrees, Russell, Newman, Scott and Gentles 
have outlined a potentially significant royalist advantage in terms of financial provision, 
while Morrill and Robinson have identified the inadequacy and deterioration of 
parliament's military organisation in 1643. And finally Gardiner and Braddick have 
highlighted command and organisational deficiencies, which appeared to affect the 
parliamentarians to a greater degree than their royalist opponents. The historiography -
patchy at best - has thrown up four potential causes of parliament's 1643 crisis: first, 
royalist military supremacy; second, parliament's defensive approach to war; third, 
financial inadequacy; and fourth, defective organisation. These findings will be further 
evaluated below, but first we need to examine the causes of crisis presented in chapters 
one and two of this study. 
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Thesis Findings 
The first two chapters of this thesis have provided four potential causes of parliament's 
crisis. Chapter one set out to investigate the quality of parliament's principal 
commanders, but soon became involved in an examination of poor parliamentarian 
cooperation and excellent royalist collaboration. Chapter two began with the defensive 
nature of parliament's approach to civil war, and continued with an exploration of 
parliament's inadequate financial system. These four factors - commanders, 
cooperation, defensive approach, and financial weakness - will now be evaluated in 
greater depth, beginning with the effectiveness of parliament's generals and soldiers. 
As we have seen, the earl of Essex bore the onerous responsibility of bringing 
the king' s army to battle. His strategy was governed to a large extent by the need to 
preserve an army in being, so as to sustain the political cause that depended upon it. 
Outright military defeat would almost certainly result in capitulation. A failure to 
recognise the political component of the Lord General's remit has resulted in an unduly 
hostile historiography. Essex has been castigated as an incompetent and ineffective 
commander.736 Yet the evidence strongly suggests that Essex proved equal to his 
commission. He almost carried the day at Edgehill in October 1642, despite the fact that 
his cavalry were no match for the cavaliers, and successfully defended the capital at 
Turnham Green in November.737 In April 1643, due to a chronic shortage of pay, he was 
denied an opportunity to besiege Oxford before the queen's first supply convoy tipped 
the balance of power in favour of the royalists.738 Though he was ultimately unable to 
deliver the knockout blow his critics demanded, he maintained an army in being and 
skilfully denied the enemy an opportunity to secure victory. Clearly he was not a 
dashing Rupert, but he was careful and methodical, and had he been able to follow the 
capture of Reading with a siege of Oxford the war might have taken a different course. 
It is difficult, in these circumstances, to justify accusations of incompetence of 
inferiority . 
The Fairfaxes, once in arms, proved to be resourceful and tenacious leaders. 
When the earl of Newcastle invaded Yorkshire in December 1642, fellow 
parliamentarian forces based in the county abandoned them.739 Undaunted the Fairfaxes 
carried the fight to the enemy, confounding royalist expectations of a swift and decisive 
victory. In January 1643 Sir Thomas Fairfax captured Leeds in a ferocious assault. And 
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despite the destructive hostility of the Hothams, the arrival of the queen, and the 
defection of Sir Hugh Cholmley, the Fairfaxes remained steadfast and resolute 
opponents. Though Newcastle's numerical superiority confined them to their west 
riding heartland, Sir Thomas astounded the enemy once again by storming Wakefield in 
May 1643.740 With the royalists in disarray, the Fairfaxes may well have thrown 
Newcastle out of the county had Cromwell's 6,000 reinforcements arrived in early 
June.741 Despite a ferocious rear-guard action they were finally overwhelmed at 
Adwalton Moor on 30 June 1643. Nevertheless, Clarendon was forced to concede that: 
It must be confessed, the enemy in those parts, with whom the earl of Newcastle 
was to contend, in courage, vigilance, and insuperable industry, was not inferior 
to any who disquieted his majesty in any part of his dominions ... the Lord 
Fairfax and his son with incredible activity reducing towns when they had an 
anny, and when they were defeated in the field out of small towns recovering 
• 742 
newannles. 
It seems fair to conclude that Sir Thomas in particular proved to be at least the equal of 
Newcastle and his fellow royalist commanders. An inspiring and dashing leader, he 
would prove his worth as general of parliament's war-winning New Model Army. 
Sir William Waller's quality is a little more difficult to determine. By the close 
of 1642 'William the Conqueror' had won a string of minor victories against lightly 
defended royalist garrisons. His success created an impression of dynamism and 
efficiency and he was publicly lauded by a grateful parliament.743 However Waller's 
appointment as major general of the Western Association in February 1643 proved a 
much sterner challenge. Prince Maurice inflicted a comprehensive defeat at Ripple Field 
in April 1643, although in fairness Waller was severely handicapped by a shortage of 
foot and cannon.744 And despite repeated warnings from exasperated parliamentarians, a 
strategic miscalculation allowed the uncontested union of two potent royalist armies at 
Chard in early June.74S Nevertheless, after a fierce confrontation with Hopton and 
Maurice at Lansdown on 5 July, Waller was on the verge of defeating Hopton at 
Devizes when reinforcements under Lord Wilmot annihilated his anny on Roundway 
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Down eight days later. Sir William excelled in defensive situations like Lansdown or 
attacks on enemy strongholds, but in open battles, like Ripple Field and Roundway 
Down, he was less effective. It is fair to say that royalist commanders enjoyed a slight 
advantage over Waller, although it is equally evident that the western campaign, like 
that in Yorkshire, could easily have had a different outcome. 
Parliament's rank and file soldiers presented a number of problems. In 
September 1642 it was reported that Essex's men considered themselves traitors and 
that Essex himself had to plead for money to prevent wholesale desertion.746 Rupert 
mauled his cavalry at Powick Bridge and he was forced to spend four weeks at 
Worcester training his ilI-disciplined force for battle.747 In early November 1642, as the 
king marched towards the capital, Essex appealed for a search of London and the 
county of Essex for the numerous soldiers who had deserted his army since Edgehill.748 
And in June 1643 the Lord General's disintegrating forces were described as sickly and 
undisciplined, while Essex himself complained of the looseness and inconsistency of his 
soldiers.749 The Fairfaxes were slightly more fortunate, successfully recruiting an 
enthusiastic and highly motivated army. Fuelled by fear of a Catholic invasion, many 
Yorkshire puritans flocked eagerly to parliament's banner.7so But by May 1643, as 
Newcastle's numerical might began to tell and supplies dried up, even the Fairfaxes 
faced mutinous troops and the threat of desertion.7sl Waller's soldiers quickly gained a 
reputation for poor discipline and unruly behaviour. In December 1642, despite 
Waller's best efforts, they sacked Winchester and plundered Chichester cathedral.7S2 
And in May 1643 a mutiny at Gloucester immobilised the army for a whole week, 
sabotaging last minute attempts to prevent the union of Hopton's forces with those of 
Maurice and Hertford.7s3 The inconsistency of parliament's r8nk and file lends some 
weight to the argument that parliament's commanders did not suffer in comparison with 
their royalist counterparts. 
It is perhaps surprising, given the magnitude of parliament's military demise 
during the summer of 1643, that the quality of her commanders and soldiers should 
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present such a mixed picture. One might have expected that failure on such a scale 
would be clearly attributable to inferior forces and leaders. Yet this does not appear to 
be the case. The evidence presented in chapter one shows that the disintegration of 
Essex's forces stemmed from disease, desertion, and a lack of pay and supplies; that the 
Fairfaxes were too heavily outnumbered to sustain, without substantial reinforcements, 
continued opposition to the earl of Newcastle; and that Waller's strategic 
miscalculation, despite similar difficulties over pay and supplies, placed the western 
campaign in jeopardy. This is not to ignore the fact the Adwalton Moor and Roundway 
Down were crushing royalist victories, merely to emphasise that battles were heavily 
influenced by a whole host of factors. Taken overall, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
royalist commanders failed to demonstrate a consistent martial superiority, and that the 
often-conjectured pre New Model Army inferiority of parliament's commanders does 
not appear to explain the 1643 crisis. 
The second category of thesis evidence concerns the vitally important but 
historiographically neglected question of military co-operation. During 1643 
parliament's commanders displayed a catastrophic inability to collaborate effectively. It 
was a deficiency that stood in marked contrast to the ready willingness of royalist 
commanders to mount extremely successful combined operations, often at short notice 
and in pressing circumstances. This striking discrepancy in military efficiency brought 
parliament to its knees and the king to the verge of total victory. 
Parliament's crisis began with the destruction of Lord Fairfax's northern army at 
the battle of Adwalton Moor on 30 June 1643. From the very outset Fairfax's campaign 
against the earl of Newcastle's numerically superior forces had been undermined by a 
chronic lack of cooperation. The earl had invaded Yorkshire on 1 December 1642754 at 
the behest of the counties beleaguered royalists, an act of cooperation that stood in 
marked contrast to the conduct of Yorkshire's parliamentarian commanders. . On 
Newcastle's arrival 800 soldiers raised in North Yorkshire and Cleveland returned to 
their homes, while Sir Hugh Cholmley with 700 men, and Colonel Boynton with 800 
more, returned to Scarborough and Hull respectively despite orders to reinforce Lord 
Fairfax. Requests to Sir John Gell in Derbyshire and Sir Anthony Irby in Lincolnshire 
similarly failed to produce any assistance.75s And when the Fairfaxes attempted to 
recruit the poor and religiously radical, the governor of Hull, Sir John Hotham, and his 
son, Captain John Hotham, ceased all cooperation and began secret negotiations with 
754 C. R. Markham. Life of the Great Lord Fairfax (London, 1870). pp. 71-72. 
755 Bell (eel.). Fairfax Correspondence. vol. i, pp. 25-30. 
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the enemy.756 Then, in March 1643, the queen persuaded Sir Hugh Cholmley, the 
governor of Scarborough Castle, to defect to the king.757 But even worse was to follow. 
In late May the failure of 6,000 reinforcements to march to the Fairfaxes' rescue, as 
Newcastle had rescued the royalists, led to disaster at Adwalton Moor.758 Although 
heavily outnumbered the resilient Fairfaxes almost pulled off a sensational victory,759 
and had they been reinforced, might well have avoided disaster or even triumphed. 
However, this latest and most critical parliamentarian failure to cooperate with the 
Fairfaxes resulted in a crushing defeat, which left the north of England in Newcastle's 
hands and cleared the way for a royalist advance on London. The shock waves of 
Adwalton Moor initiated parliament's crisis and created an urgent need for Scottish 
'1' . 760 ml ltary assistance. 
The campaign that led to parliament's second disaster of the summer - the 
annihilation of Sir William Waller's western army at the battle of Roundway Down-
commenced with yet another example of parliamentarian non-cooperation. On 15 May 
1643 forty wagonloads of vital arms and ammunition, despatched from York by the 
queen, reached the royalist capital of Oxford unopposed,'61 despite orders to 'Lord 
Gray, Colonel Cromwell, and other forces in the north' to prevent its passage.762 The 
safe arrival of the convoy replenished the king's principal field army, and pennitted a 
large force of cavalry under Prince Maurice and the marquis of Hertford to reinforce Sir 
Ralph Hopton's Cornish army, enabling the royalists to take the offensive against 
Waller.763 But on 5 July he halted Hopton's advance in a fierce battle at Lansdown 
outside Bath, and pursued the enemy to Devizes where he laid siege to the town. On 13 
July, with Waller poised to complete a remarkable victory, Lord Wilmot arrived from 
Oxford with more royalist reinforcements, and although outnumbered, destroyed 
Waller's entire army on Roundway Down.764 At this critical point in the western 
campaign Wilmot's stunning triumph had turned the tide and averted a royalist 
catastrophe. Cooperation on a truly remarkable scale had saved the king's cause in the 
west, in stark contrast to Yorkshire where the failure of parliament to reinforce the 
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Fairfaxes had resulted in disaster. As the summer of 1643 progressed it was becoming 
increasingly clear that military success depended upon effective cooperation between 
commanders. 
The third catastrophe to rock parliament during the summer of 1643 occurred 
less than two weeks after ROWldway Down with the loss of Bristol. The capture of the 
kingdom's second port and parliament's most important western garrison began, once 
again, with a further example of parliamentarian non-cooperation, and a breathtaking 
example of royalist cooperation. On 13 July, despite orders to intervene, three 
parliamentarian commanders 'with sufficient forces' failed to prevent the second of the 
queen's supply convoys reaching the king.765 Consisting of 3,000 foot, 30 companies of 
horse and dragoons, six pieces of cannon, two mortars, and 150 wagons/66 these 
substantial additions to the to the Oxford army enabled Prince Rupert to quickly 
reinforce Hopton's western army. On 26 July, after a day of bloody fighting, the 
combined forces of Rupert and Hopton breached Bristol's defences and forced the 
garrison to surrender.767 The royalist press reported that the loss of Bristol 'doth more 
astonish them than all the rest of their misfortwtes in the North and West,.768 
Here then, in the campaigns that led to disaster at Adwalton Moor, ROWldway 
Down, and Bristol, we fmd a convincing explanation for parliament's descent into 
crisis. A fatal lack of cooperation, resulting in an inability to mOWlt even the most 
rudimentary combined operations, exacerbated by the exemplary willingness of royalist 
commanders to collaborate with loyal and obedient efficiency. While cooperation and 
strategic movement rejuvenated the king's war in the first half of 1643, disWlity and 
insularity Wldermined parliament. The contrast could hardly have been greater. The 
result was a series of crushing defeats that brought parliament to the brink of political 
catastrophe. 
The third area of thesis evidence concerns parliament's defensive attitude to 
war. This apparent predisposition was rooted in, and sprang from, parliament's normal 
role as an advisory and legislative adjWlct to royal government. The partnership of 
monarch and parliament, well established by the seventeenth century, supported an 
ideological framework of collaboration and mutual dependence. The principles of 
reasoned debate and the search for consensus guided parliamentary procedure. In 
passing laws and taxes, and in offering advice to the king, the Houses sought to speak 
with a single unified voice. Factions were considered disruptive and Wlwelcome, 
765 CSPV, 1642-1643, p. 292. 
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disputes handled in an air of cooperation and conciliation. It was in the light of these 
entrenched philosophies that parliament entered into civil war.769 Yet the prospect of 
military action did not alter parliament's conception of its role as the king's great 
council. The Houses continued to act in an advisory capacity, tempering the means by 
which a resort to arms would ultimately be made. On 22 September 1642 Lords and 
Commons instructed Essex to present a petition to Charles, requesting the king's safe 
withdrawal before the two great armies met in combat. The importance of this 
reverential etiquette may be judged by the fact that it was not until 18 October that 
Essex finally reported the failure of two protracted attempts to present the petition. 
Although in a condition of civil war, the Houses instinctively adhered to traditional and 
&: ·1· I· fun t· 770 J.anll lar par lamentary c IOns. 
Nowhere is parliament's consensual approach to war better illustrated than in 
the aftermath of Edgehill (23 October 1642). As Charles marched towards London the 
House of Lords proposed an immediate reopening of negotiations. But instead of 
rejecting such a move in favour of renewed military activity parliament accommodated 
both positions in a single policy. On 2 November Pym announced that the Committee of 
Safety would issue an address aimed at paving the way for a resumption of talks, while 
at the same time ensuring that the preparation of armed forces would be stepped Up.771 
Although this had the undoubted advantage of preserving parliamentary unity at a time 
when the faint hearted were likely to jump ship, it also meant that the proponents of 
peace carried equal weight with those who believed firmly in military victory. 
Nonetheless, the pursuit of a dual policy meant that within hours of the fmal collapse of 
the Oxford Treaty in mid April 1643 Essex was marching towards the king at the head a 
newly recruited army.772 Though it is debateable whether Essex could have launched an 
offensive any earlier, the fact that the Oxford negotiations continued for more than two 
months suggests a strong parliamentary consensus for diplomacy. It was not until June 
1643 that parliament showed any inclination to abandon its innate reticence. The 
discovery of Edmund Waller's plot to betray London to the king finally heralded a fresh 
and much tougher approach. Two ordinances, a national covenant to reveal further 
royalist conspiracies and an enactment to regulate the press, attempted to 'create a new 
and more forceful regime of war management. 773 That the introduction of stricter 
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controls should emerge only as the result of a highly dangerous enemy intrigue 
highlights the reactive and defensive nature of the early war effort. 
Parliament's traditional function as the king's great council and forum for 
reasoned debate acted, therefore, as a check to those members who wished to prosecute 
a vigorous war. This stood in marked contrast to Charles' determination to settle his 
rebellious parliament by force. Before the Oxford Treaty began on 1 February 1643, the 
king rejected a general disbandment of armies, confirming for many parliamentarians a 
strong royalist preference for military victory. Unlike parliament, Charles had a clearly 
defined strategic goal: the reoccupation of his capital and the suppression of a 
rebellion.774 The crown's willingness to deal with opposition by force had been clearly 
demonstrated in 1639 and 1640. Charles twice mobilised armies to counter Scottish 
disobedience without the financial support of parliamentary taxes. He relied in part, as 
he would in 1642, upon the private wealth of councillors and courtiers. The humiliating 
failure of the Bishops' Wars did not, however, dissuade the king from waging a further 
war without parliamentary consent or supply, this time against parliament itself.775 
But where did the king's determination to supress parliament's rebellion come 
from, what was the basis upon which Charles pursued his war aims with such apparent 
conviction, and how did he rationalise his actions in terms of his position as monarch? 
Richard Cust has written a highly perceptive biography of Charles I, demonstrating a 
remarkable understanding of the king's character and motives. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in his analysis of Charles' attitude towards disobedience in general and 
parliament's rebellion in particular: 
For reasons which often seem to have had to do with a particular sense of 
personal injury and a near paranoia about the ultimate objectives of his 
opponents, he was much keener to punish than to settle. He was not insincere in 
his desire to promote peace and unity; but it had to be on his own terms, which 
generally went so far beyond anything his opponents were likely to agree to that 
they had little choice except but to struggle on until one side emerged as the 
• 776 
victor. 
Cust's portrait is instantly recognisable and certainly accords with the image of the king 
presented in this thesis. But it is possible to go further, to strike at the very heart of 
Charles the man and Charles the monarch. Cust himself hints at these deeper motives, 
commenting that the king' s conscience 'persuaded him not to give ground to those he 
774 Kishlansky, New Model Army, p. 6. 
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perceived to be his, and God's, enemies' .777 In all probability, as Cust suggests, Charles 
would have preferred a negotiated settlement, but his position as king, his coronation 
oath, demanded that parliament's rebellion be put down. His position as God's 
representative in the secular affairs of men justified his actions, no matter how heavy 
handed, insensitive, belligerent, or aggressive. In his view any gamble or policy was 
warranted if it upheld the majesty of kingship and defended royal authority against 
attack. Charles saw himself as the custodian of a cherished responsibility, passed by 
divine right from one monarch to the next. He ruled by the Grace of God, and any 
attempt to challenge the king was, in his view, a blasphemy, an offence against the 
Almighty. Charles shouldered a responsibility that transcended the temporal realm; his 
ultimate duty was to an intangible semi-divine status that many believed he embodied. 
This was a sincerely held and deeply motivating conviction, one, it seems, that guided 
Charles throughout his life. It is a philosophy that explains the king's absolute 
determination to defeat parliament by force, revealing a man preoccupied with the 
crushing weight of secular and divine obligation. 
In conclusion it seems fairly clear that parliament's defensive attitude 
undermined the war effort. The desire to maintain unity stifled a vigorous campaign and 
resulted in a strategy that embraced hostilities only in so far as they were likely to 
induce the crown to negotiate. It is an approach that appears to be the inevitable 
consequence of parliament's accustomed role in government. Parliament was in every 
sense a junior and intermittent player in national politics, only entering the political 
realm when the king chose to summon it, effectively taking the role of servant to the 
king's master. It was an unequal yet well-proscribed arrangement. But even within this 
disadvantageous relationship parliament exhibited a clearly defined attitude to the way 
in which it conducted its affairs. This, as we have seen, tended to result in an overly 
defensive attitude to war. When hostilities commenced parliament was compelled to 
step out of the king's shadow and establish itself as an alternative government. Yet the 
role to which it was accustomed was hardly an appropriate way to prepare for such a 
transformation. It is little wonder that parliament generally erred on the side of caution, 
matching the king where necessary and attempting to avert defeat at all costs. 
Parliament's defensive approach, therefore, undoubtedly played a part in the decline 
that led to crisis, but it emerges as a condition in which a crisis could take place, rather 
than the cause of the crisis itself. 
The final area covered by this thesis concerns parliament's financial strategy. 
Initially parliament planned to manage the war on a voluntary basis. Anticipating a 
m Ibid., p. 468. 
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short campaign followed by a swift resolution, the army raised by the earl of Essex 
consisted of volunteer soldiers supplied and maintained by voluntary contributions. The 
principle was established in the Propositions of 9 June 1642, which appealed to the well 
affected for donations of plate, money and horses.778 Contributions were to be repaid in 
full, including an adjustment of interest in the case of cash payments. All succeeding 
enactments up to the introduction of the Weekly Assessment in February 1643 
attempted to do no more than increase the efficiency of the voluntary system. 
Parliament finally grasped the nettle of systematic taxation in February 1643 when the 
army's treasurer, Sir Gilbert Gerard, announced that money to pay the troops had finally 
run out. 779 Although peace negotiations had commenced in Oxford, the very real 
possibility that the talks would fail persuaded parliament that it had little choice but to 
make financial provision for an escalation of fighting. The Weekly Assessment (24 
February 1643), established in every county and city in England and Wales, together 
with the Sequestration ordinance (27 March 1643), signalled a recognition that the war 
was entering a new stage and that the voluntary system was now inadequate.78o Yet the 
introduction of systematic taxation did not solve parliament's financial problems. In 
April the Commons admitted its capacity to harvest revenue remained insufficient: Lord 
Fairfax's request for assistance was dismissed out of hand, while an ordinance (25 April 
1643) appealed for horses, men, and money to be lent to Sir William Waller. Following 
the successful siege of Reading parliament's parlous finances prevented Essex's army 
continuing its advance upon Oxford - a huge blow to parliament's military strategy. 
County contributions, it appeared, barely covered basic county expenditure, leaving no 
surplus to support the principal field armies.78t In shires closest to the capital parliament 
attempted to remedy the shortfall by increasing the efficiency of the Weekly 
Assessment (3 May 1643).782 It was, it seemed, one thing to introduce a universal 
system of taxation and quite another to gather the anticipated yield. These exactions, as 
Clarendon made abundantly clear, were unprecedented in scale and proved extremely 
difficult to enforce. 783 
And yet the Weekly Assessment and Sequestration ordinances stopped short of 
the full range of revenue raising powers proposed by Pym. In April 1643 an attempt to 
introduce an excise tax on consumer products had been finnly rebuffed.784 At a time 
when the Houses were actively engaged in the Oxford Treaty, the imposition of an even 
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greater financial burden was seen as both unnecessary and highly unpopular. As long as 
the prospect of a negotiated settlement appeared alive, and the military situation 
remained in a state of balance, more draconian legislation had little chance of support. 
Pym's frustration was, however, shared by the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common 
Council of London. In exchange for a loan of forty thousand pounds the City Fathers 
required the Lords to finally pass the ordinance to assess a twentieth part of the estates 
of those who had yet to fully contribute.785 The protracted passage of this contentious 
enactment illustrated two fundamental characteristics of the early war effort. First, it 
was symptomatic of a growing danger that threatened the unity of parliament and its 
principal allies. The apparent unwillingness of the Lords to prosecute hostilities in 
accordance with the wishes of the Commons provoked tension between the Houses and 
resulted in a serious threat to the City Authority's continued support. Second, and just 
as important, it was clear that until parliament faced almost certain defeat even the 
Commons would not sanction further innovations in financial legislation. Though the 
voluntary system of 1642 had given way to an unprecedented regime of taxation in 
1643, it did not amount to the comprehensive programme Pym believed to be essential. 
It seems fairly clear that parliament's revenue-raising programme failed to meet 
the demands placed upon it. The critical point appears to have been reached in February 
1643 when money provided by voluntary subscription fmally ran out. However the 
imposition of unprecedented levels of taxation was both contentious and extremely 
difficult to enforce. The result was that as 1643 progressed parliament's armies suffered 
from serious underfunding. While the Houses could barely keep Essex's army in the 
field, Fairfax's northern army and Waller's western army were gradually starved of 
resources. Financial deterioration clearly impaired the effectiveness of the early war 
effort, preventing, for example, a major offensive against Oxford in April 1643. But it 
does not, in itself, appear to explain the sudden collapse of parliament's armies in the 
summer of 1643. Although the effects were clearly debilitating, financial inadequacy 
appears to constitute a rapidly increasing danger rather than a decisive blow resulting in 
crisis. 
Compantive ADalysis 
Thus far historiography and thesis arguments for parliament's military failure have been 
considered separately. But in order to take the discussion further, it is necessary to bring 
these hitherto independent lines of analysis together. As we have seen, the evidence 
assembled in this study strongly suggests the issue of co-operation as the decisive 
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factor, supported to varying degrees by parliament's financial programme and defensive 
approach. In addition the thesis has argued that the often-supposed inferiority of 
parliament's commanders is not sufficiently supported by available evidence. By 
comparing these findings with the historiography discussed above, we apply the test of 
professional historical judgement: confirming, modifying, or rejecting the thesis 
hypothesis as appropriate. We will begin by reviewing those arguments in which thesis 
and historiography appear to concur, before going on to consider those in which thesis 
and historiography appear to conflict. 
The first area in which historiography and thesis are in agreement concerns 
parliament's defensive attitude to war. This is most clearly delineated in the work of 
Mark Kishlansky and David Underdown, but finds significant, if less overt, expression 
in the research of John Morrill. The collective weight of these distinct but not 
unconnected lines of investigation provides a compelling picture of a defensive and 
reactive parliament. Mark Kishlansky argues that parliamentarian reticence sprang from 
the political situation in which the conflict was bom.786 The resort to arms was intended 
to be a forceful demonstration of intent, a resolute willingness to defend the hard won 
reforms of the Long Parliament, and to deter the king from future aggression. Those 
who supported war sought only to preserve what had been achieved; there was never an 
intention to crush the monarchy, either militarily or politically. Strategy was 
underpinned by the rationale that parliament fought for the king. Charles was to be 
rescued from disaffected councillors, responsible for alienating the monarch from his 
parliament and his people. But as long as parliament claimed to act on behalf of the 
crown, Kishlansky argued, an offensive war was impossible. Innovations in both 
military and political affairs were opposed, and careful deliberation, often supported by 
precedent, preceded each painstaking decision. While parliament's traditional reliance 
upon consensus and unanimous resolution preserved a degree of unity in unprecedented 
circumstances, it nevertheless resulted in a desultory pursuit of the war. Parliament's 
innate moderation and defensiveness, Kishlansky concluded, allied to a deeply 
entrenched attachment to well accustomed but inappropriate methods of operation, 
succeeded only in plunging the institution into one crisis after another. 
Significantly, Kishlansky's diagnosis is firmly endorsed by David Underdown's 
celebrated exposition of Pride's Purge. Though primarily concerned with later 
revolutionary politics, Underdown nevertheless provides an important survey of 
parliamentarian war aims in 1642 and 1643. Like Kishlansky, Underdown describes a 
defensive outlook. designed to counter the king's malignant councillors and to impose a 
716 Kishlansky, New Model Army, pp. 4-6 & 273. 
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strict and enforceable constraint upon the royal prerogative. Parliament's leaders. in 
common with the vast majority of their gentry supporters, favoured a moderate reform 
of both church and state. As far as these men were concerned the war was fought for 
limited goals. and was not intended to alter the fundamentals of either government or 
society.787 However. this conservative coalition was divided between those who 
supported a determined use of military force and those who favoured negotiation at any 
price. The peace party. Underdown continued, trusted in conciliation as the most likely 
means of safeguarding the reforms of 1641. They did not endorse the view of more 
tough-minded members that a vigorous pursuit of military action would establish a 
strong bargaining position. Fighting, as far as it was necessary, could not be permitted 
to hinder the possibility of peace through negotiation. The peace party believed 
implicitly in the king's benevolence: that an accommodation would win royal 
acceptance of parliament's position without the need for a bitter and destructive war.788 
It was against this half-hearted approach, Underdown concluded, that the revolutionary 
minority in the Commons would later act, ridding parliament of the aristocratic 
commanders who had presided over two years of military failure. Godly Reformation 
demanded the complete overhaul of church and state, nothing less than the king's 
unconditional surrender and the imposition of a dictated settlement was acceptable. 
Underdown throws parliament's defensive outlook into much sharper focus. The 
contrast between parliament's revolutionary minority and the hesitancy of the early war 
effort adds considerably to the argument for parliamentarian defensiveness. 789 
Both Kishlansky and Underdown find indirect corroboration in John Morrill's 
penetrating assessment of John Pym's wartime parliamentary career.790 As we have 
seen, Morrill contends that Pym's national standing was far greater than his prominence 
at Westminster. Though he was the most 'visible' of members in the House of 
Commons, this did not equate to, or was indicative of, parliamentary leadership. 791 His 
principal role was administrative: co-ordinating the work of the Houses and the 
Committee of Safety. The emergence of Pym as a manager, rather than as an instigator 
of legislation, has important consequences for this study. He would, of course, have 
been acutely aware of the war's ever-increasing material and financial demands. But if 
Pym's influence were essentially administrative, as Morrill suggests, then his ability to 
meet those demands would have been severely limited. John Adamson has highlighted 
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an important example of Pym's circumscribed powers. 792 In March 1643. following the 
publication of a royal proclamation declaring parliament's association of Surrey. 
Sussex. Hampshire and Kent to be ' An act of High Treason. and an Endeavour to take 
away Our Life from l)s',7</\ Pym was appointed to a committee to prepare a declaration 
vindicating pari iament. 'N4 However. Pym' s defence, which stated that the king had 
fallen under the influence of evil counsels because he was no longer of sound mind, and 
that sovereignty therefore resided with the Houses and not the person of the monarch. 
was too strong for Pym' s fellow committee members and that pan of the text was 
completely deleted. N~ Although the amended declaration was overtaken by events and 
never published. the episode nevertheless indicates the overriding caution of 
parliament's attitude to the king and to the war in general. Thus Morrill's analysis of 
Pym fits the hypothesis of a defensive parliament. Those who supported a more 
aggressive war, such as Pym. were frustrated by a tradition of reverence and a culture of 
circumspection. Until the military situation reached crisis point more radical measures, 
such as pym' s trenchant vindication of county associations, would simply have to wait. 
The notion of a defensive parliament is therefore well established in the 
historiography, confirming the picture of a reluctant and anxious parliament presented 
in chapter two of this thesis. There seems little doubt that this reticent approach 
contributed to the 1643 crisis - the product of a pronounced division between members 
prioritising caution and a corresponding group favouring much stronger action. Perhaps 
the labels 'peace party' and 'war party' require a degree of modification as each of 
these opposing factions acknowledged the necessary co-existence of negotiation and 
fighting. The difference, it would appear, was one of emphasis. The negotiators 
reluctantly accepted the inevitability of a brief resort to anns, but only in so far as the 
shock and horror of an unnatural civil war renewed and revitalised the search for peace. 
By contrast, their parliamentary opponents believed vigorous military action to be the 
only means of bringing Charles to a viable and lasting settlement. In the case of the 
latter it was not necessary for anned force to result in outright victory or the surrender 
of the king's forces. Its principal purpose was to persuade the enemy that a civil war 
was unwinnable, and that the only realistic course of action was to return to the table. 
As long as a complete royalist triumph in the field appeared unlikely, parliament's 
consummate ability to accommodate these seemingly incompatible agendas kept the 
fragile coalition together. 
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A careful and defensive approach therefore predominated because it guaranteed 
unity and accorded with parliamentary custom - but had resulted in an ineffective war 
effort. A political culture in which military victory was subordinate to the requirements 
of a negotiated settlement may have discouraged parliament's commanders from co-
operating as readily as royalist commanders. The widely held expectation that the war 
would end in some kind of agreement created a situation in which military vigour was 
held in check by political caution. The historiography of Kishlansky, Underdown, and 
Morrill finds a resonance in the evidence presented in this thesis: namely parliament's 
protracted attempts to present the king with a petition before the battle of Edgehill, 
Pym's declaration that the preparation of armed forces would take place alongside a 
determined search for peace. and parliament's refusal to enact those unprecedented and 
unpalatable financial measures required for victory. It wasn't until the discovery of the 
Waller plot that the Commons attempted to impose a state of emergency through 
censorship and a covenant to reveal plots. In addition parliamentary caution was 
exacerbated by the determined and relentless attitude of the king. Charles knew what he 
had to do and how he had to do it. His war aims were fixed and provided a clear focus 
for unrelenting action. The crown's strategic objective to end the civil war in military 
victory afforded a distinct advantage over comparatively hesitant opponents. Perhaps 
the thesis view that parliament's defensive approach was merely a condition in which a 
crisis could take place is in need of some modification. The historiography presented 
above makes a very strong case for the damaging effects of parliament's inherent 
circumspection. 
The second area in which existing historiography and thesis appear to be in 
agreement concerns parliament's financial strategy. It will be recalled from chapter two 
that in 1642 parliament planned to pay for its military campaign on the basis of 
voluntary contributions. When. against expectations, the war dragged on into 1643 a 
chronic shortage of revenue forced the introduction of systematic taxation. Though the 
weekly assessment and sequestration ordinances (February 1643) failed to produce 
anything like the amounts required, members of parliament remained firmly opposed 
(April 1643) to the introduction of further unprecedented exactions. It was clear, despite 
a crippling shortage of money to pay the troops, that parliament would not risk the good 
will of its supporters as long as the current financial system managed to avert military 
defeat. The programme of voluntary donations had proved adequate for a single field 
army engaged in a relatively brief campaign. But these arrangements fell well short in 
1643 when the war began to expand and intensify. Although the imposition of 
compulsory exactions and financial punishments had appeared frighteningly radical, the 
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reality wa~ that demand continued to outstrip supply. As arrears of pay led to 
widespread desertion and even mutiny. the war etTort stumbled towards disaster. 
The review presented in this thesis of parliament's revenue raising performance 
during 1642 and 1643 is precisely mirrored by Gavin Robinson's revealing exposition 
of parliamentarian horse supply over the same period.796 Robinson argued that while the 
supply of horses remained sufficient to equip Essex's army in 1642 it proved totally 
inadequate in 1643. As the war developed into a national conflict parliament faced 
rapidly escalating costs. but Robinson argued that the creation of regional forces 
effectively relegated horse supply as a priority for spending. Robinson revealed that 
'more horses were bought for cash before Edgehill than in the whole of 1643' and that 
parliament 'was better supplied and financed in 1642 than in 1643,.797 The voluntary 
system of donations had provided Essex with a large and well-equipped army, and if the 
king 'had been defeated as quickly as he had been in the Bishops' Wars,798 it would 
have been viewed as a successful expedient. However, in 1643 parliament needed to 
raise even greater sums of money, without alienating those who were by and large 
sympathetic to the cause. This, Robinson concluded, proved remarkably difficult to 
achieve. Authority could not be imposed centrally; to succeed parliament required the 
co-operation of local property owners. But as provincial authorities and communities 
lost enthusiasm for the war, so the yield of the voluntary and then the compulsory 
systems declined. 799 'The overall impression of the first half of 1643 is one of disorder 
and crisis, which contrasts sharply with the situation before Edgehill, when the cause 
was united and supplies were plentiful.,8°O Robinson's unequivocal portrait of relative 
stability in 1642 followed by 'disorder and crisis' in 1643 parallels exactly the 
development of parliament's financial programme outlined in chapter two. 
Robinson's invaluable analysis of horse supply provides an important and 
particularly pertinent insight. It informs and confirms the wider management of 
parliament's early war effort. The abiding impression of February to June 1643, firmly 
reinforced by Robinson. is one of insurmountable difficulty in financing a conflict that 
had got horribly out of control. It was becoming increasingly clear that revenue was 
insufficient to meet the demands of an ever-expanding war effort. Though the principal 
of systematic taxation had been embraced in the Weekly Assessment, and that of 
financial punishment in the Sequestration Ordinance, the Houses would not support 
further extraordinary measures such as Pym's Excise Tax. Despite the desperate 
796 Robinson. 'Horse Supply'. pp. 126. 129. 136 & 140. 
7'l7 Ibid. p. 140. 
7'11 Ibid. 
'799 Ibid. 
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shortage of ready money the majority of members advocated an overhaul of existing 
revenue raising methods rather than the introduction of a draconian levy on consumer 
products. The consequences of this half way house policy impacted directly upon 
parliament's capacity to finance the war. In April the Lords announced that 'in the 
general combustion of the kingdom' the Weekly Assessment barely met the operational 
needs of the counties in which it was levied. In addition the City was so hard pressed 
that 'it can hardly support the Lord General's army. unto which a great arrears remains 
unpaid. both for pay and supplies of the magazine.'801 These difficulties may in part be 
explained by David Scott's argument that a general inadequacy in the system of 
disbursement. rather than the legislation itself. resulted in damaging shortages of 
revenue and resources.S02 Yet whatever the precise truth, the inability of the financial 
system to fund parliament's principal field armies clearly imperilled the success of the 
ffi rt SO.l ware 0 . 
Following the capture of Reading on 26 April Essex informed parliament that he 
could not advance on Oxford. the royalist capital, until his troops were paid.804 By mid 
May the position had become so desperate that the Lord General returned to 
Westminster in order to plead for money and provisions. Without prompt supply there 
was no possibility of capitalising upon the capture of Reading.8os In order to bring the 
conflict to a resolution Essex had to engage the king as quickly as possible, before 
critical supplies from the north reinforced the royal army. But as long as the Lord 
General's soldiers remained unpaid and poorly supplied parliament's principal military 
objective had no hope of realisation. In Yorkshire the situation was even worse. On 23 
May both Lord Fairfax and Thomas Stockdale complained to the Commons that unless 
the crippling shortage of pay, supplies and reinforcements was quickly redressed, what 
remained of their increasingly mutinous army would soon be overwhelmed, leaving 
little alternative but to accept 'dishonourable' conditions of surrender. Stockdale 
warned that a severe lack of cavalry prevented any exploitation of Sir Thomas Fairfax's 
stunning capture of Wakefield: a chance 'to utterly rent the enemies in this country, or 
shut them up in holes,' would be lost unless reinforcements were quickly received. An 
immediate failure to act, Stockdale continued, would only permit a royalist recovery, 
and then 'we shall be in danger to perish, if the enemy draws his whole force upon 
101 Journal of the Hause of Lords. vol. vi, p. 18. 
101 Scon, PolitiCS and War in the Three Stuart Kingdoms. pp. 62-63. 
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was consumed by the county in which it was raised, leaving lin Ie or nothing for the Treasurers at War in 
London. It was not until 1645 that it began to operate more efficiently. Edwards, 'Logistics and Supply', 
&.265. 
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US. ,806 And in the wcst a chronic dearth of revenue produced similarly disastrous 
consequences. At the end of May. while Waller belatedly strove to prevent the 
conjunction of Hopton's western royalists with forces under the command of Prince 
Maurice and the marquis of Herford, a mutiny broke out amongst his troops at 
Gloucester. Lack of pay meant that Sir William's existing regiments could not be 
replenished or new ones recruited. The mutiny immobilized Waller's army for a whole 
week, during which timc his royalist adversaries joined forces at Chard in Somerset.807 
The breakdo\\n of military authority at Gloucester denied Sir William a final 
opportunity to prevcnt this critical union, placing parliament's western campaign firmly 
on the defensive and providing the royalists with a huge advantage. Across all theatres 
of combat parliament's inability to resource its armies severely retarded operations and 
prevented the exploitation of crucial military successes. 
While parliament struggled to cope with the financial and logistical demands of 
an escalating conflict. the king's armies were effectively handed the initiative. The 
argument that monetary deficiency played a key role in the summer 1643 crisis is 
supported by evidence concerning royalist funding and supply over the same period. It 
is often argued that if the king were to win the civil war he would have to do so before 
parliament's access to the financial markets of London proved decisive. Such an 
assertion assumes economic parity or even royalist advantage in the early stages of the 
conflict. Remarkably, perhaps, this does indeed appear to have been the case. At the 
outset Charles relied to a large extent upon the generosity of his wealthiest supporters. 
The earl of Newcastle claimed to have spent over £900,000 in the king's cause, while 
many other peers and members of the gentry personally financed the regiments they 
raised and commanded.IOB According to Michael Braddick, 'sixty-seven men paid 
£70,000 between them for baronetcies', while 'the marquess of Worcester paid 
£318,000 in one go,' and 'the earl of Pembroke was said eventually to have spent 
£ 1,000,000 in the royal service. ,B09 Research shows that in 1643 royalist administration 
operated with increasing efficiency, and that shortages of arms, men and money were 
largely overcome.BIO This confinns Ian Gentles argument that royalist military 
superiority was partly based on access to more money and more soldiers.BII Initially, 
therefore. the king competed with parliament on at least equal terms, and may well have 
enjoyed a greater and more ready access to revenue and resources. But as the conflict 
106 Ibid. vol. vi. p.67. 
107 HMe. Portland M:u. vol. i, p. 712. 
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progressed into 1644 and 1645. so the inability of individual royalist colonels to 
produce yet more money led to a reduction in the number of soldiers in the king's 
armies. As 'certain royalist regiments more or less melted away', the reliance on 
personal wealth. which had hitherto proved so advantageous, became an increasingly 
difficult handicap to overcome.81 :! Parliament suffered from both its own financial 
inefficiency and from the substantial wealth of the king's principal supporters, a 
situation that was not overcome until much later in the war. The weight of 
historiographical opinion, therefore. strongly suggests that financial issues played a 
much more significant role in parliament's demise than the thesis evidence would 
allow. Royalist solvency served to exacerbate the effects of parliament's monetary 
difficulties, seriously impairing the early war effort, and providing the king with both 
the flexibility and freedom to exploit a rapidly developing situation. 
Historiography and thesis therefore agree that parliament's defensive approach 
to war and inadequate financial strategy account in no small measure for parliament's 
military demise. However there are two further arguments advanced in this thesis for 
parliamentarian failure that clearly conflict with the historiography: the quality of 
parliament's commanders and the question of cooperation. We will begin with the 
quality of parliament's commanders. 
The historiography tends to support the popular belief of dynamic and effective 
royalist annies pitted against less able parliamentarian opponents. This is not to say that 
historians endorse the romantic image of dashing cavaliers running rings around inept 
roundheads. merely that the notion of royalist military superiority - at least in the early 
stages of the civil war - is fairly well established. Certainly C. H. Firth had little 
hesitation in declaring that parliament's initial advantage in numbers and equipment 
was lost through the fault of the earl of Essex and the inferior quality of his soldiers. 
The failure of Essex, Firth continued, was compounded by a serious deficiency in 
parliamentarian organisation. The result was that in 1643 and 1644 parliament never 
regained the superiority of resources it had enjoyed at the beginning of the war; a 
superiority Essex and his anny had helped to squander.813 While Firth appears only too 
willing to castigate parliament's early war effort, Peter Newman takes a much more 
circumspect approach. Though Newman believes that royalist field commanders were 
generally better than their parliamentarian opponents, he nevertheless offers a more 
sober and even-handed analysis. Newman acknowledges that the earl of Essex has been 
under-rated by historians, and that, on balance, Sir Thomas Fairfax was probably a 
112 Newman. Alias of the English Civil War, p. 13. 
m Firth. Cromwell's Army, p. 30. 
161 
better anny commander than Prince Rupert. Newcastle, more of a poet than a soldier, at 
least chose his advisers rcasonably astutely, while Sir Ralph Hopton, Waller's opponent 
in the west. was. in Nc\\man's view, the king's best general. Ne\\man's belief in a 
discemable royalist advantage in ficld officers is supported by the fact that the majority 
of commanders who had gained military experience in Europe before the civil war 
elected to servc the king. 814 Thus both Firth and Newman, admittedly to differing 
degrees, endorse a gcneral royalist superiority in officers and soldiers. 
Despite Firth's confident assertion of parliamentarian inferiority, it is Newman's 
more measured assessment that accords with the less clear-cut picture provided by this 
thesis. The early campaigns of the earl of Essex, Ferdinando Lord Fairfax, and Sir 
William Waller (presented in chapter one) do not support the hypothesis of a universal 
royalist superiority. True, there are occasions when a royalist advantage can be 
demonstrated, but the overall impression is that instances of this kind do not in 
themselves account for the disintegration of the parliamentarian war effort. The abilities 
of Essex, Fairfax. and Waller were as often as not compromised by factors over which 
they had little or no control. The question of commanders is simply not straightforward 
enough to be reduced to a general assertion of royalist ascendancy. As we have seen in 
chapter one, the suggestion that the collapse of parliament's forces in the summer of 
1643 must be attributable to the failings or inferiority of its military leaders is not 
entirely convincing. Though the historiographical notion of cavalier superiority in 1642 
and 1643 may at first glance appear compelling. the reality is a good deal more 
complex. 
For example. this study has been at considerable pains to reiterate the point that 
parliament's Lord General, the earl of Essex, operated under the combined weight of 
political responsibility and military leadership. This has to be understood before his 
actions in 1642-1643 can be properly appreciated. The parliamentarian cause depended 
fundamentally upon the earl and his army. If Essex was defeated and his forces 
destroyed. if the principal parliamentarian army ceased to exist, then meaningful 
resistance would quickly collapse. Once the fighting began political opposition to the 
king was entirely dependent upon the fate of the war effort. Throughout the 1642-1643 
campaigns - the battle of Edgehill, the confrontation at Turnham Green, the siege of 
Reading. and the enforced march towards Oxford - Essex prioritised the preservation of 
his army.8lS This created an impression of a negative and reactive commander, laying 
the earl open to accusations of incompetence on one hand and a reluctance to face the 
II~ Newman. Atlas of the English Civil War. pp. 10-12; For a similar conclusion see R. B. Manning. An 
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king on the other. But what Essex's accusers failed to recognise was the raw and 
undisciplined condition of the parliamentarian army that fought at Edgehill;816 the shell-
shocked remnant. albeit reinforced, that barred the road to the capital at Turnham 
Green;817 the disease. desertion, and want of regular pay that debilitated the anny during 
the siege of Reading:818 the catastrophic lack of pay that prevented an immediate attack 
upon Oxford: and the rapidly shrinking and destitute force that finally marched, under 
political pressure. towards the royalist capital in June 1643.819 Essex had little control 
over circumstances that completely undermined his capacity to fight an offensive war. 
But what should not be forgotten is that it was the Lord General's resolute leadership of 
his infantry that almost won the day at Edgehill. Once on the battlefield Essex proved 
himself a most courageous and capable commander. In addition he consistently placed 
the parliamentarian cause ahead of his own interests. No matter how difficult or 
demoralising the war became. the Lord General never wavered in his loyalty or 
commitment to the Houses. Thus, as Newman suggested, Essex has indeed been 
underrated. When one considers the manner in which he strove to carry the war to the 
king, while simultaneously shouldering a political responsibility that depended upon the 
success or otherwise of his army, it is at once apparent that a condemnatory judgement 
is not appropriate. 
There can be little doubt that as military leaders Ferdinando Lord Fairfax and his 
son Sir Thomas Fairfax compared very favourably with their royalist counterparts. Once 
in arms the Fairfaxes proved resourceful and tenacious opponents.820 Even before the 
earl of Newcastle invaded Yorkshire in December 1642, the Fairfaxes had demonstrated 
their mettle. In October they successfully repulsed an attack upon Bradford and drove 
the shattered royalists to take refuge in York.821 And despite the fact that Newcastle's 
intervention forced them on to the defensive, they lost little time in striking back. 
Following a hasty retreat to Selby, Sir Thomas stormed Leeds in January 1643 with a 
small but ideologically committed army recruited in the west riding cloth towns.822 
Even the arrival of the queen and her reinforcements - which led to collusion between 
Newcastle and the disaffected Hothams, the defection of Sir Hugh Cholmley, and a 
further withdrawal to Leeds - couldn't prevent Sir Thomas Fairfax's staggering capture 
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of Wakefield in May 1643.111 .1 With the royalists in disarray, Oliver Cromwell's 6,000 
reinforcements might well have destroyed Newcastle's army and secured the county for 
parliament. As it was Cromwell and his fellow officers failed to intervene, leaving the 
vulnerable and isolated Fairfaxes to face the inevitability of a further royalist 
offensive. 814 Time and again Ferdinando and the dynamic Sir Thomas defied a 
numerically superior enemy, and at Adwalton Moor in June 1643 almost achieved a 
sensational victory. Had they enjoyed the luxury of an equally large army it is difficult 
to see how Newcastle and his commanders could have defeated them. The very fact that 
the Fairfaxes continually confounded their royalist opponents demonstrated a 
remarkable ability. It is true that an initial reluctance to take up arms alienated the 
Hothams and placed their political judgement in some considerable doubt.825 But as 
commanders of anned men the Fairfaxes more than matched their royalist counterparts, 
both before and after Newcastle's arrival in the county. Tenacious and unrelenting, they 
maintained an anned resistance in testing and deteriorating circumstances. There is no 
evidence here of parliamentarian military inferiority. 
The question of Sir William Waller is perhaps less clear. While the evidence of 
1642-1643 demonstrates an energetic and sincere commitment to the parliamentarian 
cause, his record as a commander reveals a contradictory mixture of genuine ability and 
serious errors of judgement. By the close of 1642 a string of successes against lightly 
defended royalist garrisons had earned 'William the Conqueror' a glowing reputation. 
This tended to overshadow the fact that at Edgehill Waller's regiment of horse had been 
ignominiously swept away along with the rest of the parliamentarian cavalry. 
Nevertheless Waller's victories projected an image of military effectiveness at a time 
when the wider war effort was beginning to falter.826 Consequently, in February 1643, 
he was appointed sergeant major general of the newly formed Western Association. He 
immediately vindicated his commission by destroying a force of newly levied cavaliers 
threatening Gloucester.127 However Waller's success provoked a formidable royalist 
response in the form of the king's nephew, Prince Maurice. Two months later Waller 
was soundly defeated by Maurice at Ripple Field, a setback partly explained by the fact 
that it was his first experience of command in a traditional battlefield situation. 
Nevertheless the comprehensive nature of the defeat put his previous victories into 
I2J Binns. Yorkshire in the Civil Wars. p. 67; BL IT. E. 106[2), Mercurius Aulicus. 22. 28 May - 3 June 
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perspective. and it would not be long before he faced an even sterner test. 828 When, on 
16 May. Sir Ralph Hopton defeated parliament's Devonshire forces at Stratton, Charles 
attempted to exploit Hopton's success by despatching reinforcements under Maurice 
and Hertford into the West Country. However, a serious error of strategic judgement, 
allied to a weeklong mutiny at Gloucester, allowed Maurice and Hertford to complete 
an unopposed rendezvous with Hopton in early June. Disastrously Waller's 
miscalculations permitted the concentration of two formidable royalist forces.829 And 
despite Waller's subsequent success against Hopton at Lansdown, a crushing defeat at 
Roundway Down cast further doubts upon his early reputation. However, it should be 
emphasised that Waller's major shortcomings appear to be those of strategic judgement 
rather than military ability. 
The case studies of Essex, Fairfax and Waller demonstrate that roundhead and 
cavalier commanders were too closely matched to support a clear-cut argument for 
royalist superiority. As we have seen, Essex proved a worthy opponent, the Fairfaxes 
had the edge over Newcastle, and Waller almost inflicted a decisive defeat on Hopton at 
Devizes in July 1643. Overall, the relatively even quality of rival commanders tended to 
cancel each other out, failing to provide a decisive advantage for either side. Perhaps 
surprisingly the generally held assumption of royalist martial superiority is not 
satisfactorily demonstrated, and rather fails to provide a convincing explanation for 
parliament's military collapse in the summer of 1643. 
The second area in which historiography and thesis appear to diverge concerns 
the issue of co-operation. The reluctance or inability of parliament's commanders to 
work together as effectively as their royalist counterparts has emerged as the principal 
finding of chapters one and three. It seems clear that a lack of collaboration played a 
fundamental part in the demise of the parliamentarian war effort during the summer of 
1643. Yet this conclusion, with the possible exception of Gardiner and Braddick, does 
not feature as a coherent or consistent theme of the historiography. Precisely why poor 
co-operation has been largely overlooked as an explanation for parliamentarian failure 
is not entirely obvious. To help understand this discrepancy we need to return to the 
historiography and to the work of John Morrill in particular. 
Morrill has argued that parliamentarian difficulty in 1643 and 1644 stemmed 
from a failure to reorganise the two-tier military structure that had been devised in the 
summer of 1642.830 Initially the trained bands remained under the control of their 
respective Lords Lieutenant, and were expected to pacify the locality in which they 
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were raised. Simultaneously the recruitment of a volunteer field army - intended to 
confront and defeat the king in battle - was placed under the command of the earl of 
Essex. This. Morrill contended. was eminently sensible as long as the war was 'short-
lived and decisive'. but patently unworkable once the conflict expanded in 1643 and 
became more complex. Although in theory the Lord General's authority encompassed 
all parliamentarian field armies, in reality provincial forces 'were left too independent 
of each other' to be militarily effective. In addition the right of the Houses to consult 
with the Lord General over questions of strategy meant that ultimate responsibility for 
the war effort remained unclear. The outcome was a curious contradiction. Outwardly 
the direction of military operations appeared to rest wholly with the Lord General, but 
in practice provincial forces proved to be far too autonomous. Added to which 
parliament itself retained the power to intervene in military affairs. 
Morrill's analysis strongly suggests organisational deficiency as the root cause 
of parliamentarian ineffectiveness. The original military structure divided authority 
between the Lords Lieutenant, responsible for the trained bands, and the Lord General, 
commander of the volunteer field army. When the battle of Edgehill failed to provide a 
decisive outcome, the shortcomings of the 1642 system became apparent. In 1643 this 
structure was simply extended to take account of the new situation. Associations of 
counties were created within the existing framework, inheriting something of the 
independence that had previously separated the trained bands from the volunteer field 
anny. This binary arrangement blurred political and military functions and diluted the 
real authority of the Lord General. The result was a structure that reinforced county 
priorities and militated against a co-ordinated military strategy. The crux of Morrill's 
argument is that the reorganisation of late 1642 and early 1643 (the association of 
county forces) amounted to no more than an adaptation of the old system. It did not 
constitute the radical rethink required by a new and unanticipated situation. 
Parliament's ineffective war effort and subsequent crisis were therefore a direct 
consequence of this failure to reorganise. Morrill's organisational explanation hints at 
the thesis emphasis upon poor parliamentarian co-operation but does not take the 
argument any further. To understand this we need to consider two separate but related 
issues. First. John Morrill's contention that parliament failed to reorganise, and second, 
the effectiveness of the Lord General's authority. 
Despite Morrill's criticisms it is possible to view parliament's post Edgehi1J 
legislation as a genuine reorganisation, conscious of the need for flexibility, and more 
than a simple adaptation of the existing structure. It has been argued that the fonnation 
of three regional associations in December 1642 was in fact a major strategic initiative, 
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specifically intended to overcome the inherent localism of the county-based Lords 
Lieutenant and trained bands.83 I Parliament sought the formation of larger regional 
armies operating under a more flexible system of command. The major general of the 
Midland Association (eight counties covering a vast area) was authorised 'to lead and 
carry the said forces to such places as he shall think fit. ,832 There was no geographical 
limit to the major general's area of responsibility, or any constraint placed upon his 
power to direct the amalgamated county forces. This was possibly because the Midland 
Association stood in the front line, with Newcastle's large and threatening army to the 
north, and the king's Oxford army, led by Prince Rupert, to the west. However, the 
Eastern Association (five counties covering an equally large area) was not accorded the 
same degree of unrestricted freedom, a decision which may have reflected the 
association's relative safety from royalist activity. Though the new major general was 
explicitly required to remain within the association's boundaries, it remained incumbent 
upon him to lead his forces to the defence of any part of the association. This stipulation 
was included in the ordinance because previous commissions did not authorise county 
commanders to operate beyond their county boundaries.833 The insistence upon cross 
county flexibility also underpinned the association of Staffordshire and Warwickshire. 
But in this case, possibly because of the association's small size and proximity to 
enemy forces, the major general was required to command in 'parts adjacent' as well as 
within the association itself. 834 
It seems fairly clear that the problem of localism was one reason for the 
establishment of the new associations, although this study has argued that they were 
principally intended as a defensive barrier protecting the capital from royalist forces in 
the north and Thames Valley. Combining county forces into regional armies, each 
answerable to a single overall commander, appeared a sensible and logical reaction to 
the demands of the post Edgehill military situation. Associations were planned to 
operate across, and to draw their manpower from, whole swathes of neighbouring 
counties; thereby addressing the need for both flexibility and greater strength. To 
override (on such a huge scale) deeply entrenched county priorities surely constitutes, 
despite John Morrill's reservations, a rational and ambitious reorganisation of 
parliamentarian resources. However, where Morrill is undoubtedly correct - and this 
brings us to our second point concerning the effectiveness of the Lord General's 
authority - is the question of ultimate responsibility for military affairs. Parliament's 
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practice of consulting with the Lord General over matters of strategy, Morrill argued, 
ensured that the issue of supreme power was never adequately clarified.835 A striking 
example of this dangerous ambiguity can be found in two of the three ordinances 
establishing the first regional associations. 
Although the earl of Essex was empowered to commission an association's 
major general. it is clear from the ordinance to associate the eastern counties, and the 
ordinance to associate Staffordshire and Warwickshire, that the original selection of a 
major general rested ";th parliament. Thus it was the combined authority of the Lord 
General and the Houses of Parliament that enabled a major general to assume overall 
control and direction of an association's forces. This concentration of responsibility in 
the person of a single major general might well have worked had it not been for the 
additional stipulation that an association's county commanders (Lords Lieutenant, 
Deputy Lieutenants. Colonels and Captains) had to 'observe from time to time, such 
other directions and commands, as they shall receive from both Houses of Parliament, 
or from the earl of Essex Lord General. ,836 Under these regulations county commanders 
could be subjected to orders of equal authority from three separate sources: the 
association's major general, the earl of Essex, and the Houses of Parliament. This, in 
effect. meant that both parliament and the Lord General reserved the right to undercut a 
major general's authority by means of direct commands to subordinate county officers. 
At best such complexity must have given rise to a fair degree of uncertainty, and at 
worse a plausible excuse to disregard controversial or unwelcome orders. More to the 
point, it may help to explain the damaging failure of parliamentarian co-operation at 
two critical moments during May 1643. 
First, on 12 May, Essex complained to the House of Lords that orders to 
intercept the queen's supply convoy had been neglected by Lord Gray, Colonel 
Cromwell and other forces in the north, resulting in the safe arrival in Oxford of forty 
wagon loads of crucial supplies and munitions.837 This, as we saw in chapter one, 
transfonned the balance of power in the Thames Valley, prompting a jubilant Charles to 
write to parliament proclaiming that God clearly favoured the royal cause.838 And 
second, on 27 May, an urgent Commons request that the Lord General recommend the 
immediate dispatch of reinforcements to Lord Fairfax in Yorkshire once again came to 
nothing. While 6,000 parliamentarian troops assembled at Nottingham, their various 
commanders (including Oliver Cromwell and the disaffected Captain Hotham) 
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concluded that an invasion of Yorkshire was no longer warranted.839 The failure to 
support Lord Fairfax. despite the commands of parliament and the earl of Essex, led 
directly to the battle of Adwalton Moor and the destruction of Fairfax's northern 
army.840 These examples demonstrate that neither the authority of the Houses nor the 
orders of the Lord General were sufficient to enforce strategy when subordinate 
commanders. for whatever reason, took a different view. Ambiguity over ultimate 
responsibility for military affairs crippled parliament's ability to impose authority and, 
consequently. to co-ordinate forces effectively. While, on the one hand, Essex failed to 
control forces theoretically under his command, the king, on the other, experienced little 
difficulty combining separate field armies in pursuit of strategic objectives. 'Military 
affairs'. Michael Braddick has observed, 'were handled by Charles personally, with a 
council of war' in which 'there was a clearer executive authority.'84I Parliament's 
unsuccessful attempts to impose military policy provide a clear and telling contrast with 
the effectiveness of the royalist chain of command, centred, as it was, upon the absolute 
authority of the king. 
Parliamentarian confusion over final responsibility for military affairs resulted 
in a catastrophic inability to enforce strategic authority. The breakdown in military 
discipline materialised as a damaging unwillingness amongst parliament's commanders 
to obey orders and cooperate effectively. It is possible - probable even - that this 
weaknel's in the chain of command was a direct consequence of the very nature of 
parliament's authority. The power wielded by the Houses was not perceived to carry the 
same weight as that invested in the person of the king. Parliament did not constitute an 
independent source of political authority that could equal or rival that of the monarch. 
Parliament's mandate derived from its partnership with the crown; divested of royal 
sanction by civil war parliament was effectively stripped of its former power. 
Parliament's commanders, therefore, may not have felt obliged to obey the orders of the 
Houses, or the earl of Essex, as they would have obeyed, without question, the 
commands of their king. This diminution of political power crippled parliament's ability 
to dictate military strategy and to mount crucially important combined operations. As 
we saw in chapter three, the consequences of this strategic impotence almost cost 
parliament the civil war. 
139 Journal o/the Howe o/Commom, vol. iii, p.I06. 
140 Bell (ed.). Fairfax Correspondence, vol. i, pp. 46-47. 
14. Braddick. God's Fur),. England's Fire, p. 284. 
169 
Conclusion 
The issue of cooperation provides a convincing explanation for parliament's military 
disintegration. While financial strategy and defensive approach to war undoubtedly 
created an unstable environment. it was not sufficient to tip the war effort into crisis. In 
addition the suggested inferiority of parliament's principal commanders has been 
rejected by this thesis. Non-cooperation, alongside effective and efficient royalist 
collaboration. has emerged as the principal cause of the 1643 crisis. A deadly cocktail 
of parliamentary reluctance and insubordination - allied to a collective royalist 
dynamism - provided the king with a string of crucial victories and a war-winning 
opportunity. In the first half of 1643 Charles out-manoeuvred his opponents, 
concentrated forces quickly, and brought parliament to the brink of catastrophe. These 
findings represent a new interpretation of the military course of events in 1643 and a 
new understanding of the causes of parliament's summer crisis. 
But what was it about the respective war efforts that resulted in such a lack of 
parliamentarian cooperation and such a plethora of royalist collaboration? 
Unquestionably the king. as reigning monarch, provided a clear apex to the pyramid of 
royalist authority. Historians have not been slow to emphasise the potential of this 
advantage. but it does not account for the chronic inability of parliamentarian 
commanders to cooperate effectively. So where, precisely, are the roots of 
parliamentarian disunity to be found? As we have seen, John Morrill highlighted a 
profound confusion in parliament's command structure, which appeared, at times, to 
empower the Houses, the Lord General, and even some subordinate regional 
commanders in equal measure. Yet even this uncertainty would not produce the scale of 
non-cooperation witnessed in the first half of 1643. 
There has to be another explanation, one that accounts for the unwillingness of 
parliament's commanders to unite against the king. One possibility concerns the state of 
the war in 1643. Many were reluctant to push themselves further into a conflict that 
might yet be resolved by negotiation. or by other commanders fighting in different parts 
of the country. It would appear that some senior parliamentarian officers were content 
to exercise no more than the specific remit of their original commission. a reluctance to 
march beyond their areas of responsibility and to engage in unwelcome confrontations 
with the king's annies. This, of course, goes back to the old problem of localism and 
provincialism that many historians have previously highlighted, and may account for 
the reticence of parliamentarian commanders to respond to orders from the centre. But 
beyond this organisational reluctance there is, perhaps, one further factor to be 
considered. 
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Many parliamentarians were acutely aware that armed opposition to the king 
constituted an act of treason punishable by death. As some historians have pointed out, 
parliament hoped that a determined show of force would be sufficient to persuade the 
king to come to terms. Yet when the war began it seems that a reluctance to do more 
than the absolute minimum undermined the war effort and handed the royalists a clear 
advantage. We have already seen that in March 1643 parliament failed to refute a royal 
proclamation declaring the association of neighbouring counties to be an act of high 
treason. 842 The king made specific reference to 'Commanders or Officers now in 
Rebellion against Us'. stating that it was the duty of 'all His loving Subjects' to 
apprehend such persons and hand them over. 843 The fact that this royal proclamation 
remained unanswered may have created an air of uneasiness among parliament's 
provincial commanders, perhaps explaining the reluctance of regional armies to 
cooperate together against. for example, the queen's vitally important supply convoys. 
It was as if the king's influence over parliament's officers was as great as that of the 
earl of Essex or of parliament itself. The failure of Edgehill to end the war left many 
parliamentarians rather unwilling to take part in further fighting. An escalating and 
uncontrollable conflict would demand more of men whose support was perhaps 
conditional at best. The civil war was not for the faint hearted. But it was probably 
easier to be faint hearted many miles from Westminster and the Houses of Parliament 
than it was to commit an • Act of High Treason' against the reigning monarch. 
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Chapter Five 
REACTIONS TO CRISIS 
AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1643 
It is a contention of this thesis that the significance of parliament's 1643 crisis is not 
fully represented in the historiography of the civil war. In order to develop this 
argument further it is appropriate to examine both parliamentarian and royalist reactions 
to the events of summer 1643. The manner in which parliament, on the one hand, and 
the king, on the other, responded to parliament's military collapse provides important 
contemporary evidence of how serious the crisis was perceived to be, and how close it 
came to ending the conflict in 1643. The following analysis will show how the Houses 
attempted to extricate themselves from disaster, enacting a series of ordinances aimed at 
reorganising the war effort, and forging a vitally important military alliance with the 
Scots. But to stave off defeat long enough for these initiatives to come to fruition, 
parliament was forced to march its one remaining anny deep into enemy territory to 
raise the siege of Gloucester. As we shall see, failure to rescue the stricken city, and to 
bring the relieving anny back to the capital, would have left parliament at the mercy of 
the king. 
Emergency Ordinances 
Parliament's immediate response to cnSlS took the fonn of a frantic legislative 
programme, designed to re-impose shattered political unity, rebuild armies, and reassure 
desperately needed Scottish allies. As we have seen in chapter three, the seeming 
inevitability of a royalist victory in the summer of 1643 persuaded the House of Lords 
to draw up peace propositions amounting to surrender. But on 7 August, menaced by 
the threat of a City backed political coup, the Commons threw out the proposals in a 
dramatic knife-edge ballot that had to be taken twice. Having rejected any immediate or 
foreseeable recourse to negotiations, parliamentarian survival now depended on a 
vigorous prosecution of the conflict. The Venetian ambassador reported that 'All ways 
to peace being abandoned .,. [parliament] are plunging headlong into war' .844 The 
defeat of the Lord's propositions effectively silenced the peace lobby at Westminster, 
and opened the way for those who were convinced that Charles could only be brought 
to an acceptable settlement by force of anns . 
..... A. B. Hinds (ed.), Calendar o/State Papers Venetian (CSPV) (London, 1925), 1643-1647, p. 13. 
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Parliament justitied the rejection of peace talks on the basis of the military 
situation. 'We could not in this time of imminent and pressing danger,' a Commons 
statement declared. 'divert our thoughts or time from those necessary provisions as are 
to be made for the safety of the kingdoms. ,845 By focussing on the threat posed by the 
king's victories. parliament attempted to divert attention away from the failed peace 
proposals and the simmering anger and frustration of the Lords. In any case the 
Commons declaration was hardly an understatement: the dangers facing the Houses 
were indeed imminent and pressing. The pro-royalist Venetian ambassador summed up 
the seriousness of parliament's military weakness: 
Of the three armies kept up by the rebels two have been completely routed, 
while the third. under the Earl of Essex, is so reduced and disheartened that 
instead of besieging His Majesty in Oxford, as it was charged to do, it has 
thought it safer to retire within a short distance of London. 846 
On the back of these catastrophes the ambassador described the capital as a 'confused, 
divided and wretched city. ,847 And a Scottish observer, the Presbyterian minister Robert 
Baillie, reported the 'horrible fears and confusion in the city; the king everywhere 
. . ,848 
vlctonous. 
Even the parliamentarian press made little attempt to disguise the scale of the 
disaster. By 10 August it was reported that Essex had retreated to Kingston, his army 
estimated to consist of less than four thousand horse and foot. About half were sick with 
camp fever, deterring desperately needed recruits from enlisting. In the north Newcastle 
occupied most of Yorkshire and Lincolnshire, and although parliament held on to Hull 
and Boston, Cromwell, with nine hundred infantry and six hundred cavalry, had 
retreated to Stamford and Peterborough. And in the west, following the surrender of 
Bristol, it was believed that the enemy had already laid siege to Gloucester. 
Expectations for the defence of parliament's only remaining western garrison were not 
high, although the governor, Colonel Edward Massey, was known to be a valiant 
soldier.849 An alarmed Commons - perhaps more in hope than anything else -
despatched an urgent plea to the governor and townsmen encouraging them 'to hold out 
defence of that place. ,850 On all fronts the situation appeared critical. It Gloucester 
sutTered the same fate as Bristol nothing of substance would stand between the king's 
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western army and an advance towards the capital. And 'If Newcastle could break 
through Cromwell's scanty band of troopers, London and with it the whole 
parliamentary cause, would be gravely imperilled.'851 It was absolutely imperative that 
the seemingly endless tide of bad news be brought to a halt. What remained of 
Parliament's weakening resolve might evaporate altogether under the impact of yet 
another major defeat. 
The disastrous military situation strained parliament's morale to the limit. As the 
royalist threat grew so the risk of further disaffection and disunity grew. The defeat of 
the Lords' peace propositions raised the alarming possibility that the house of peers 
might abandon the cause altogether. It was clear from the propositions themselves852 
that the Lords supported peace at virtually any price, and that half of the Commons 
agreed. Acutely aware of the danger, Pym ordered an explanation to be presented to the 
Lords, justifying the rejection of the propositions and calling, almost pleading, for 
solidarity in this time of unprecedented crisiS.853 But as far as the peace Lords were 
concerned Pym's diplomatic exhortations were irrelevant, the Commons' refusal to 
recommence negotiations with the king signalled the end of their lukewarm support for 
the war. Seven Lords quickly left the capital, five of whom made their way to the king 
at Oxford. On 28 August the Venetian Ambassador claimed that the defection of the 
peace Lords reduced the upper chamber to only six 'obstinate' peers.854 In addition a 
growing number of members were requesting leave to go abroad, effectively 
abandoning the cause and greatly disheartening those who remained loyal. Deserting 
parliament not only encouraged the enemy but also deterred overseas supporters who 
contributed arms and finance. It was a business, one news book complained, 'which 
ought to be looked into very narrowly.'8ss These untimely defections sent out an 
unmistakeable message. weakening the credibility of parliament and strongly 
vindicating the royalist cause. 
However, as far as men like Pym were concerned the war effort could not 
survive without the continued adherence of the upper chamber. It remained absolutely 
essential that the time-honoured procedures of both Lords and Commons continued to 
project an image of legality at a time when the king openly challenged the legitimacy of 
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parliament.K'b If the handful of remaining Lords abandoned ship the entire war effort 
would be undermined. severely diminishing parliament's authority, and deepening the 
wider sense of crisis. 857 Now that the Commons had committed itself to continuing the 
war. it was essential to preserve the remnants of political unity, and to retain the 
standing atTorded by the adherence of the Lords. Thus on 10 August, only three days 
after the rejection of the peace propositions, the upper House was persuaded to approve 
a series of ordinances and orders rebuilding and reorganising parliament's demoralised 
war effort. Representing a significant advance in terms of recruitment, finance, and 
administration. parliament's new programme addressed the scale of the military 
emergency. 
First. an ordinance to introduce conscription empowered the London militia 
committee. Deputy Lieutenants, and county committees to impress soldiers under the 
direction of the Houses and the Lord General. 8S8 After a year of fighting, this radical 
and draconian measure marked a watershed in the political management of the war. 
Although an undeniable infringement of personal liberty, it was an inevitable 
consequence of parliament's unprecedented and unrelenting crisis. While it has been 
argued that conscription was principally intended to end Essex's 'dependence on the 
virtually moribund volunteer system, ,859 a contemporary report suggests it might have 
been a direct response to the slow recruitment of Waller's new City army.860 The 
royalist press were predictably less charitable, claiming that men would not serve 'as 
volunteers in an army so disheartened, because always beaten' .861 Whatever the precise 
truth, conscription demonstrated a toughening of parliament's approach to war. Essex 
and Waller had to be provided with new armies - and in the absence of willing 
volunteers there was simply no alternative. Pressing soldiers, as Gardiner 
euphemistically observed, marked 'the sense entertained by the Houses of the growing 
fth . . ,862 dangers 0 e situation. 
Second, parliament introduced a package of measures intended to overhaul the 
military and administrative structure of the Eastern Association. Crucially, the 
association's six counties stood in the path 'of the specific threat posed by the advance 
U6 On 20 June 1643 Charles issued a proclamation 'warning all His Majesties good subjects no longer to 
be misled by the voles, orders, and pretended ordinances, of one or both Houses.' BL IT, 245: 669. f.7 
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of Newcastlc's "Popish" army. ,863 Essex was requested to commission Manchester as 
Sergeant Major General, while the association's forces were to be increased to ten 
thousand foot and dragoons. In addition the Cambridge committee was reorganised so 
that it became, in effect, the administrative hub for all six counties.864 Manchester's 
appointment should have provided the association's army with a very powerful cavalry 
arm.86~ Towards the end of July parliament had intended to place a 'flying army' of 
seven thousand newly raised horse under his command.866 However, large numbers of 
horses acquired in the capital and counties south of the Thames were diverted to Waller, 
while others reinforccd Essex's army. The need to allocate resources in response to the 
military emergency meant that Manchester's flying army failed to materialise as 
planned. Nevertheless his allocation, although diminished, provided the association with 
a respectable body of cavalry.867 
The reconstitution of the association's Cambridge committee aimed to provide a 
greater awareness of enemy activity and more efficient direction of its military forces. It 
was a direct response to 'the earl of Newcastle' who was 'marching towards, and ready 
to fall upon, the associated counties. ,868 On 8 August the Houses had learned of the loss 
of Lincoln and the headlong retreat of parliament's remaining Lincolnshire forces to 
8oston.869 Centralising administration in Cambridge established a 'standing and 
constant' committee, empowered to direct the affairs of all six counties.87o It was 
specifically instructed: 
To have a special care, that all the frontiers, and the Isle of Ely, be supplied with 
fitting forces, to resist all sudden surprises or invasions; and shall from time to 
time send out scouts to discover how and in what manner any enemy approaches 
near to the frontiers; that thereby they may have and give timely notice of any 
h· d 871 approac 109 anger. 
Commissioners from each of the associations' constituent counties were required to 
attend the committee on a rotational basis until further notice. The association was, in 
effect, placed on 'red alert': Cambridge was now parliament's forward command post 
'in these times of imminent danger. ,872 
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Third. there was a determined efTort to provide Sir William Waller with a re-
equipped and refinanced anny. On 7 August, before the resumption of the debate on the 
propositions. Essex had reluctantly commissioned Waller, 'subordinate to the Lord 
Mayor'. to command the independent forces recruited by the City of London.873 The 
Venetian Ambassador reported that Sir William: 
will he more acceptable to the parliamentarians than anyone else, as one of their 
0\\11 members and over whom they can claim greater powers in any differences 
which seem to be threatened, between the City and parliament.874 
However, this appeared to some members of the Commons to place a restriction upon 
Waller's freedom of operation. It was feared that an independent army would become a 
defence force for the capital, whereas parliament needed campaigning armies to take the 
war to the king. And so, on the following day, Essex was requested to issue a further 
commission granting Waller command of a new army of ten regiments of foot and ten 
regiments of horse.87s Two days later, on 10 August, the Lords approved an ordinance 
for ten thousand pounds, raised in and within twenty miles of London, to be paid 
exclusively and without interruption to Waller.876 Following the defeat of the Lords' 
peace proposals Waller's supporters in the Commons held a much stronger position. 
Forcing Essex to issue a further commission enabled Waller's new army to supersede 
that of the City and to fight in any part of the kingdom. Sir William's establishment as 
an • Independent General' was symptomatic of the new mood in the Commons.877 The 
evidence suggests that this earnestness to equip and finance a new army was intended to 
separate Waller from the growing influence of the City, and to make him more 
responsive to the commands of parliament. It seems clear that his second commission 
was an attempt to regain political control lost to the City in the days leading to the 
. th . . 7 A 878 rejectIOn of e peace proposItIOns on ugust. 
Parliament's detennination to prosecute a vigorous war stood in marked contrast 
to the old policy of granting negotiations equal priority. The programme of ordinances 
and orders approved by the Lords on 10 August signalled a new approach and a new 
begiMing. Parliament was now taking a much tougher military line. The emphasis had 
switched to raising new annies and strengthening the administrative infrastructure. 
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Negotiations. for the immediate future at least, were no longer part of the equation.879 
Parliament's refusal to concur with the propositions meant that talks would only resume 
from a position of security. Through determined and unflinching military action the 
king had to be made to realise that he could not prevail. But the problem with 
parliament's new strategy. as Gardiner succinctly pointed out, was that 'the greater part 
of the three armies as yet existed only upon paper. ,880 The enactments of 10 August 
were a bold statement of intent, but they could not come to fruition overnight. In the 
meantime parliament had to defend itself against a victorious enemy poised to strike the 
final blow. Just three days later on 13 August the Venetian ambassador reported that 
parliament's final hope rested with the ScotS.881 
As we have seen in chapter three, the earl of Newcastle's victory at Adwalton 
Moor on 30 June left the Houses with no alternative but to pursue a Scottish alliance. 
Robert Baillie wrote that 'the report of Fairfax's defeat has been a spur at last to the 
parliament. much as it is thought against the stomachs of many'. 882 Hull - parliament's 
one remaining Yorkshire stronghold - was the only obstacle which could now prevent 
Newcastle marching south towards the capital. Scottish assistance was therefore 
imperative: both to re-establish a strong military presence in the north and to mount a 
direct challenge to the earl of Newcastle. But as July progressed the military situation 
deteriorated further. and by the first week of August the need for assistance was greater 
than ever. Parliament's commissioners finally arrived in Edinburgh on 7 August, the 
very day the propositions were defeated. Indeed, parliament's negotiations with the 
Scots were one of the principal reasons given by the Commons for the rejection of the 
peace proposals. As a result the commissioners' remit included an instruction assuring 
the Scots 'that no pacification or agreement for peace shall be concluded by the Houses 
of Parliament without sufficient caution and provision for the peace and safety of that 
Kingdom.' The Commons had explained to the Lords' that their peace propositions 
'would alter those instructions and make them void in the most material parts ... And so 
debar us of their assistance.'883 It is difficult to imagine how parliament's 
representatives in Edinburgh could have continued with their work if the Lords' 
propositions had been accepted. The ground would have been cut from beneath them, 
and the likelihood of securing an alliance all but destroyed. Yet the evidence suggests 
that the Commons debate of 7 August and the closeness of the ensuing vote was, in 
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itself, sufficient warning to place the Scots on their guard. Robert Baillie was convinced 
that the peace initiative was the work of those peers who subsequently abandoned 
parliament once the proposals were defeated. 'Good for the parliament these had been 
gone before'. Nevertheless Baillie remained aware that the propositions had received 
strong support in the Commons, and that they had been defeated with the greatest 
difficulty.884 
From both an English and Scottish perspective the Lords' propositions couldn't 
have come at a worse time. As far as the English were concerned it was only a month 
since the Houses had agreed to send commissioners to Edinburgh. Now parliament was 
discussing terms to be presented to the king. The English must have feared that their 
commitment to an alliance appeared unprincipled and opportunistic. After the near 
acceptance of the propositions, parliament had to convince the Scots that they remained 
serious about winning the war. From a Scottish point of view, the danger that 
parliament might conclude an English peace which excluded Scottish interests was 
particularly worrying. The Scots, as one historian has commented, 'did not wish to be 
caught unawares by a sudden rapprochement between their allies and their enemy, and 
they demanded the right to participate in any future negotiations. ,885 Although the Scots 
realised only too well that the English call for assistance stemmed from military 
weakness, it was, nevertheless, an opportunity they were determined to exploit: 
For the present the parliament side is running down the brae. They would never, 
in earnest, call for help, till they were irrecoverable; now when all is desperate, 
they cry aloud for our help.886 
An alliance with parliament offered protection against future royalist reprisals. Scottish 
security depended upon a parliamentarian victory in England. And yet it seems that 
parliament did not realise just how anxious the Scots were to participate in the war. The 
Kirk in particular was determined to ensure that when the fighting was over Charles was 
in no position to repeat his Scottish campaigns of 1639 and 1640. On 26 July Robert 
Baillie explained: 
We thought the necessity of putting our country in a posture of arms great, and 
our assisting of the parliament of England also necessary against that party, 
whom, we doubted not, intended our overthrow no less than theirs. 887 
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The Bishops' Wars, as Baillie intimated, taught the Scots that an unrestrained English 
monarchy threatened the very survival of the Presbyterian Church. 
It is significant. therefore, that the final terms of the Solemn League and 
Covenant should stipulate that 'no cessation, nor any pacification, or agreement for 
peace whatsoever shall be made by either kingdom, without the mutual advice and 
consent of each kingdom. ,888 The clause strongly suggests that the Scots were well 
aware of events at Westminster during the first week of August, and were anxious to 
prevent a repeat of the peace propositions without their knowledge or approval. Indeed, 
as we have seen, the Commons made precisely this point in their explanation to the 
Lords. The English were as keen as the Scots to reaffirm their appetite for a vigorous 
war. Now that parliamentarian commissioners had reached Edinburgh, independent 
negotiations in England placed Scottish military assistance in jeopardy. The Commons 
were acutely aware that any sign of weakening English resolve would have a 
detrimental impact north of the border. However, the situation at Westminster during 
the first week of August actually increased Scottish determination to enter the war, and, 
moreover, to secure a place at the negotiating table when fighting finally came to an 
end. Parliament's willingness to grant such concessions confirmed the desperation of 
the military situation. The unavoidable need for assistance meant that Scottish demands 
had to be met - whatever the cost. 
Royalist Strategy 
Parliament's 1643 crisis is one of the most neglected aspects of the English Civil War. 
That this should be the case is almost entirely due to the unexpected failure of royalist 
military strategy following the fall of Bristol. Because the decisions of Charles and his 
Council of War did not produce the rapid victory so widely expected, the real 
significance of parliament's crisis, readily apparent during the summer of 1643, quickly 
diminished and eventually faded. Parliament's surprising survival had the effect of 
recasting the crisis as a difficult period rather than a near terminal event. But as the 
remainder of this chapter will demonstrate, the contemporary perception of parliament's 
crisis was far more evident than later historiography has generally allowed. There was a 
real understanding in mid-I643 that parliament's military collapse heralded the end of 
the civil war and that the king stood on the verge of total victory. It is, therefore, 
important to understand the development of royal strategy during August 1643. In 
failing to bring the civil war to an end, the deliberations of the king and his Council of 
... Journal of the House of Lords, vol. vi, p. 290. 
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War have inadvertently produced a historiography that underestimates the true 
significance of parliament's crisis. 
We arc fortunate that Clarendon's close proximity to the king and his advisers 
has provided an extensive account of the considerations that influenced royalist decision 
making during the critical days of early August 1643.889 The king, Clarendon records, 
was anxious to maintain momentum following the success of Bristol. However, matters 
were complicated by the fact that two separate royalist armies had participated in the 
capture of the town: Prince Rupert's Oxford army and Sir Ralph Hopton's army of the 
west. The first question was whether or not to unite these armies, and the second 
question was how best to deploy them. Surprisingly perhaps, a great many arguments 
were advanced against an amalgamation of forces, and because none of these appeared 
to the slightest detriment of the royalist war effort, a decision to divide the armies was 
resolved upon.89O Hopton, along with Maurice, was to return to Devonshire and Dorset 
to complete the conquest of the west, while Rupert's Oxford army was to remain with 
Charles. The remaining decision, therefore, was how best to deploy the Oxford army. 
At a council of war convened on 3 August there were two rival views: an 
immediate advance on the capital, intended to exploit parliament's current disarray, or a 
temporary diversion to subdue Gloucester before proceeding to London.891 'Everyone 
agreed,' Clarendon recalled, 'that if Gloucester could be reduced quickly and with little 
loss of men it would be very important to the king's cause. ,892 Gloucester was 
parliament's one remaining garrison between Bristol and Lancashire. Its capture would 
secure the river Severn, open up Worcester and Shrewsbury to supply from Bristol, and 
increase customs revenue. In addition the entire area would fall under royalist control, 
permitting the uninterrupted collection of weekly contributions, and freeing Welsh 
forces to join the king's army. It was confidently expected that the surrender of the town 
'would encourage London to accept the pointlessness of further resistance'. 893 There 
was however one very serious and important caveat. None of these reasons was deemed 
sufficient to justify a time consuming siege, parliament could not be permitted to 'both 
recover the fear that was upon them ... and recruit their armies.,894 The enemy must not 
1'9 W. D. Macray (ed.), The History o/the Rebellion by Edward Earl o/Clarendon (Oxford, 1888), vol. 
iii. pp. 126-132. 
190 According to Clarendon five equally sound reasons persuaded the king to separate his forces. Ibid., 
ri.. 126-128. 
I J. Adamson, 'King Charles I Wins the English Civil War', in A. Roberts (ed.), What Might Have Been 
(London, 2004). p. 45. 
892 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 129. 
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be let off the hook; a siege of Gloucester could only take place if it was clear that the 
town would fall swiftly. 
It was at this juncture that Charles and his advisers received information that 
arguably turned the course of the war. Although accounts vary, the importance of the 
development is described in a letter addressed to Charles from his secretary at Oxford: 
This gentleman. Captain Presland Molineux, hath this day been with the Lords 
here. and told them that he is an ancient and intimate acquaintance of Captain 
Massey. who is Governor of Gloucester, that he knows Massey's affections are 
to serve your Majesty ... Captain Molineux doubts not, but if he may be 
permitted to go to Massey, he shall persuade him to render himself and 
Gloucester into your Majesty's hands.895 
Clarendon reported a broadly similar tum of events, differing only in detail. Apparently 
Massey had made it known that he would defend Gloucester if threatened by an army 
under Prince Rupert, but that he would willingly surrender the town if His Majesty 
would only appear in person before it. Massey was adamant that it would be contrary to 
'his conscience to fight against the person of the king.'896 And so it seemed certain that 
the information provided by Captain Molineux at Oxford, broadly corroborated by 
Clarendon, meant that the king could look forward to a relatively quick and painless 
capture of Gloucester. Indeed Clarendon declared that 'this message turned the scale.' 
None of the king's advisers now objected to summoning the town because it would not 
delay or prevent any other course of action. Thus, declared Clarendon, Charles 
'resolved for Gloucester, but not to be engaged in a siege. ,897 
However, what was confidently expected to be a mere formality quickly 
deteriorated into a tactical quagmire. Despite firm intentions to accept Gloucester's 
surrender with a minimum of fuss, two totally unanticipated developments threw the 
king's plans into turmoil. First, on 10 August, Charles' summons received a surprising 
rebuff. Two citizens, 'insolent and seditious,' declared that the mayor, the governor, and 
thirteen of the most substantial citizens, had resolved to 'keep the city according to the 
commands of his majesty signified by both Houses of Parliament. ,898 This affront to 
royal dignity was considered so shocking that many felt the king honour bound to take 
195 Secretary Nicholas to the king, Oxford, 8 August 1643, in Eliot Warburton (ed.), Memoirs of Prince 
Rupert and the Cavaliers (London, 1849), vol. ii, p. 278. 
I'HI Macray (cd.). Clarendon. vol. iii, p. 131. 
197 Ibid .. pp. 131-132. 
191 Macray (cd.). Clarendon. vol. iii, p. 133; Rushworth reported Charles' wondennent at the citizen's 
confidence. replying 'Waller is extinct and Essex cannot come.' J. Rushworth, Historical Collections 
(London. 1721). vol. v. p. 287. 
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the city by force. SIN In the heat of the moment all former resolutions were discarded, 
and attention quickly turned to the practicalities of a siege.90o As the old walls were in 
poor condition and unlikely to withstand a bombardment, it was felt that the town 
would capitulate in less than ten days. In addition, it was anticipated that Gloucester's 
royalist faction would to rise up and overthrow the rebels. Moreover, parliament did not 
possess an anny capable of relieving the town, and even if they managed to raise one, it 
would have to fight at a considerable distance from London, while the king's forces 
would be easily supplied from the surrounding country.901 But before a final decision 
had been taken. a second equally unexpected development forced the king's hand, 
committing the royalist to a course of action debated ever since. 
When Charles was first informed of the capture of Bristol he despatched an 
urgent message to his northern commander the earl of Newcastle: if Hull proved too 
difficult to capture, Newcastle was to leave the port surrounded and proceed with the 
remainder of his forces into the Eastern Association. The king would then march at the 
head of his own army towards London, so as to threaten the capital from two different 
directions. But just as Charles arrived before Gloucester the messenger returned. It was 
impossible for Newcastle to comply with the king's orders because his army wasn't 
large enough to blockade Hull and advance south. On top of which his Yorkshire 
regiments and their officers utterly refused to leave the county until the port was 
taken.902 Newcastle's apparent inability to comply with the king's demands, together 
with the Council of War's belief that Gloucester would fall in ten days, persuaded 
Charles to lay siege to the town.903 Perhaps mindful of the heated controversy that 
would soon follow, Clarendon pointedly declared that not one man in the council of war 
opposed the decision.904 
Royalists across the country received news of Gloucester with a mixture of 
consternation, incredulity and despair. The queen was incensed. Her opinion, strongly 
endorsed at Oxford. supported an immediate advance upon London. A siege of 
Gloucester, she protested, merely imposed an unnecessary delay on what was expected 
to be a straightforward victory. In her anger she believed Charles had taken Rupert's 
199 The royalist newsbook Mercurius Aulicus invited the world to judge 'whether these desperate rebels 
deserve any mercy.' BL IT, E. 65[26], Mercurius Aulicus, 30, 6 - 12 August 1643, p. 434. 
900 Robert Baillie considered it 'a divine providence' that Charles had been compelled to besiege 
Gloucester. Laing (ed.). Letters and Journals o/Robert Baillie, vol. ii, p. 100. 
901 Macray (ed.), Clarendon. vol. iii, p. 133. 
902 According to Sir Philip Warwick Newcastle was averse to amalgamating his anny with the king's 
because he did not wish to serve under Prince Rupert. Sir Philip Warwick, Memoirs o/the Reign 0/ King 
Charles I (London. 1701). p. 243. 
903 'It would have taken a much more confident commander than Charles to go against such clear 
~ofessional advice.' R. Cust, Charles I A Political Life (Harlow. 2005), p. 380. 
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advice in preference to her own.9OS The Venetian ambassador, a close observer of all 
that transpired in the troubled capital. firmly echoed the queen's view: 
But the event. which is the real test shows that the queen's advice, after the 
taking of Bristol, to move straight to attack this city, was the more 
advantageous. as the confusion among the people here was very great, nothing 
was provided, and this is subsequently being made good. 906 
Sir Philip Warwick, courtier and intimate of the king, likewise bemoaned Gloucester as 
'that fatal resolution •. 907 while the earl of Sunderland, in a letter to his wife, summed up 
the general sense of bewilderment: 
The king's going to Gloucester is in the opinion of most very unadvised. I find 
the queen is unsatisfied with it; so is all the people of quality. I am unable to 
give you any account upon what grounds the king took his resolution.908 
Sir Richard Bulstrode, a royalist anny officer, believed that a march on London would 
'in all probability' have 'made an end of the war', but the king 'trifled away time to no 
purpose in that unfortunate siege,.909 But perhaps the final verdict should rest with 
Clarendon, who was arguably better placed than any to appreciate all sides of the 
controversy: 
And so the king was engaged before Gloucester, and thereby gave respite to the 
distracted spirits at London to breath and compose themselves, and ... to prepare 
for their preservation and accomplishin~ their own ends; which at that time 
seemed almost desperate and incurable.91 
The unanimity with which the queen, Clarendon, the Venetian ambassador, Sir Philip 
Warwick, the earl of Sunderland, and Sir Richard Bulstrode questioned the wisdom of 
the siege reinforces the seriousness of parliament's crisis. Charles and his advisers, it 
appeared, had thrown away a golden opportunity to win the war. It is implicit in the 
reactions of these leading royalists that Gloucester was considered a colossal error of 
judgement. Even the parliamentarian Bulstrode Whitlocke admitted 'that when the king 
went to Gloucester, if he had marched up to London, he had done his work. ,911 
Contemporaries could not understand why the king dallied at Gloucester when the 
905 Gardiner. Great Civil War, vol. i., 201. 
906 CSPV, 1643-1647. p. 13. 
907 Warwick, Memoirs, p. 261. 
901 J. Washboum. Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis (Gloucester. 1825). p. 1. 
909 Sir Richard Bulstrode. Memoirs and Reflections Upon The Reign And Government o/Charles I and 
Charles II (London. 1721). pp. 94-95. 
910 Macray (ed.). Clarendon, vol. iii. p. 134. 
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obvious course of action was to march directly on London. Royalist disbelief 
demonstrated how fully parliament's crisis was understood; victory was at hand if only 
Charles would adopt the correct strategy. 
Tbe Strugle to Save tbe Cause 
By the middle of August 1643 the civil war had reached a crucial stage. The king had 
swept all before him and his victorious armies, massing in the north and west, were 
poised to deliver the coup de grace. Parliament faced a moment of truth. Would the 
Houses cower behind the walls of the capital, waiting for the king's inevitable advance, 
or would they take the offensive, attempt to rescue Gloucester, and preserve a toehold in 
the west? The crisis had reached a climax; parliament had to act before it was too late. 
Remarkably, out of the gloom and despondency, came a ray of hope that signalled the 
start of a parliamentarian fight back. 'United under a common sense of danger', a 
consensus quickly emerged that something quite extraordinary had to be done to save 
Gloucester.912 Governor Massey's defiance in the face of 'tremendous odds provided 
parliamentarians everywhere with a rallying point. ,913 Robert Baillie wrote that the 
unexpected courage of the besieged inhabitants served to embolden parliament.914 The 
strategic advantages that had persuaded Charles to delay an advance upon the capital in 
favour of capturing Gloucester were equally apparent at Westminster. It would enable 
the king to exploit, completely unhindered, the human and material resources of the 
entire region. Charles would be free to assemble and provision a formidable army, 
including large numbers of previously untapped Welsh recruits. If Gloucester were lost 
the war, it seemed, would be as good as over. 
The parliamentarian press made little attempt to disguise the magnitude of the 
danger or the immediacy of the threat. One newsbook candidly reported: 
our scout met with a royal scout who tells him that the king's forces so soon as 
they have taken Gloucester, intend to march in all haste for Windsor, and so to 
London.9ls 
Parliament had to prevent the royalists reaching the outskirts of the capital. It was 
feared that the appearance of the king at the head of a vast army would prove too much 
for most if not all of those still committed to the cause. Yet Massey's heroic stand 
galvanised parliament, providing an opportunity to save the stricken city and with it the 
912 Washboum. Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis, p. Ixv. 
913 V. F. Snow. Essex the Rebel (University of Nebraska, 1970), p. 387. 
914 Laing (cd.), Leiters and Journals o/Robert Baillie, vol. ii, p. 100. 
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cause. It appears to us now that the prospect of imminent defeat enabled Pym to stage-
manage a remarkable relief effort, skilfully persuading the City of London to abandon 
its animosity towards the earl of Essex and throw its weight behind a last-ditch attempt 
to rescue Gloucester. But the truth was entirely different. It was only at the eleventh 
hour. following ten days of hectic diplomacy, that the the militia committee - hitherto 
detennined to establish an independent force under Sir William Waller - finally agreed 
to reinforce the Lord General's shattered army. As we shall see, while hastily raised 
conscripts in the Home Counties were augmented by regiments of London's regular and 
auxiliary trained bands, what should have been Essex's new army was in fact anything 
but. The composition and chain of command of the relief force demonstrated very 
clearly that the City of London continued to dominate the parliamentarian war effort, 
and that following its success in defeating the Lords' peace propositions at the 
beginning of August. it was not yet prepared to relinquish its hold on power. 
It is important to detail the political struggle that resulted in a relief effort 
because only the most cataclysmic of circumstances could have enabled Pym, 
temporarily at least. to persuade the City to support an army commanded by the earl of 
Essex. It was clear that the City wished to place its resources at the disposal of Waller, 
and it was equally clear that Essex would not mobilise his desperately depleted forces 
unless supplied and recruited. But Pym, undeterred, must have detected signs that the 
deadlock was breakable, otherwise the negotiations that subsequently took place would 
have been dead in the water. Pym, it appears, began by sounding out the City of 
London. On 14 August - four days after the siege began - he impressed upon the lord 
mayor, court of aldermen, and committee for the militia the absolute need for Essex to 
set out for Gloucester as soon as possible.916 It was imperative, Pym argued, that the 
City employed all means at its disposal to supply the Lord General and his army. 
However, the response of the City was scarcely what Pym must have hoped for. The 
following day, in a meeting that must have been as anxious as it was difficult, he 
explained to Essex that the City was prepared to offer 'the readiness of the citizens [of 
London] to remove all impediments, if they lie in their power.'917 It was a 
disappointingly lukewarm pledge, clearly well short of what the situation demanded, 
and hardly likely to convince Essex that he was taken seriously by the City. 
From this point onwards it becomes clear that parliament was prepared to 
concede anything the City demanded in return for money and soldiers. On 16 August, 
pym headed a Commons delegation into London 'to stir up the City to use all 
916 JOlII'na/ o/the House o/Commons, vol. iii, p. 204. 
911 Ibid., p. 205. 
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expedition in the providing and sending of monies to the army ... and to consider of the 
speedy recruiting of my Lord General's army. ,918 But once again Pym did not receive 
the response he was hoping for. Instead of a firm commitment to finance the relief of 
Gloucester the London authority raised concerns of its own, requesting, or even 
demanding. the power to enforce martial law within the City. Fear of a royalist rising 
was very real. and it seems that the City fathers were reluctant to venture their money 
and soldiers until granted the autonomy to deal with insurrections themselves. Within 
twenty-four hours parliament issued an ordinance enabling the London Militia 
Committee to disann and detain any citizen who refused to take an oath to defend 
London against the king. In addition all 'tumults and unlawful assemblies' were to be 
suppressed and those responsible 'punished or executed' as the committee 'shall think 
fit'. And finally the committee was empowered to order, 'as occasion shall require,' the 
'shutting up of all shops' so that 'all persons according to their power and vocation be 
and continue in a readiness and fitting posture for the defence of the said City and parts 
adjacent. ,919 In effect the City had demanded and received the right to police the capital 
independently of parliament, and to dispense justice as it thought fit. One shocked 
observer recorded that 'the city of London has already usurped practically absolute 
power' .920 But parliament was hardly in a position to object. The authority wielded by 
the City prompted the royalist press to observe that ordinances were now made by the 
'Three Houses: the House of Lords, the House of Commons, and the Common Council 
House of London,.921 Although a lampoon, it nevertheless indicated the increasing 
power of the City and the increasing impotence of parliament. 
Rebuffed once again by the City, parliament embarked on a new strategy aimed 
at applying pressure equally to the City and to the earl of Essex. By playing one off 
against the other, it seems parliament hoped to overcome the impasse and enable the 
relief of Gloucester to finally begin. On 18 August the Commons elected two 
committees: one to persuade the City to provide money, and a second to convince Essex 
that the needs of his army would be fully met. 922 The first committee, led by Pym and 
including gentlemen from Surrey, Sussex, Kent and Hampshire, headed for the City to 
press the matter of finance, while the second committee, led by Sir Henry Vane, 
remained at Westminster to enact measures to assist the Lord General's army. Orders 
were given to press two thousand men in London and a further two thousand in Kent, 
'III Ibid .. p. 207. 
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Surrey, Sussex and Hampshire. In addition Essex's trusted friend, Sir Philip Stapleton, 
was appointed to "TIte to the Lord General requesting officers to collect the recruits.923 
The purpose of this two pronged strategy - Pym's visit to the City and Vane's military 
preparations - became apparent the following day when parliament launched a 
concerted effort to break the deadlock between the London authority and Essex. 
On 19 August the Houses appointed a committee of Lords and Commons to 
petition the Lord General. The committee - carefully briefed - carried the results of 
Pym's negotiations with the City and Vane's newly enacted legislation.924 Firstly Essex 
was to be informed that notice had been taken of his requirements and that consequently 
orders had been issued to press four thousand recruits. However, the urgency of the 
situation meant that the Lord General would have to mobilise his army before all of the 
recruits could be supplied. It had become apparent to the Houses, whenever they 
attempted to raise money, that 'nothing can induce those who are masters of it to a 
consent of parting with it (without which the army cannot march), as much as that the 
armies were in a marching posture. ,925 Therefore Essex was to be asked to fix a date 
and location for a general rendezvous, to which the army could first march. Then, it was 
to be explained, if supplies of men and money were not forthcoming the blame would 
not lie with the Lord General. He would have done all in his power, and it would be 
clear that others were at fault. And to prove parliament's commitment, Essex was to be 
informed that a meeting with the London authority had already been arranged for later 
that evening at which the same committee of both Houses would press his demands. 
The committee's carefully worded instructions revealed the depth of the City's 
animosity towards Essex. London's financiers were not prepared to back an army that 
remained idle in its quarters, complaining endlessly of a lack of money, men, and 
supplies. They wished to place their resources at Waller's disposal, a commander who 
had demonstrated an unwavering commitment to military victory.926 The City, even in 
the depths of crisis. demanded evidence that Essex would march before they parted with 
a peMY of their money. This shows the scale of Pym's task, and how important it was 
to persuade the Lord General to make the first move. Essex however was prepared to 
respond, and readily agreed to begin his march for Gloucester as soon as possible. Pym 
- no doubt relieved - wasted little time in reporting the good news to the Commons: 
92) Ibid., p.21O. 
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My Lord General ... is desirous to move this night or tomorrow, but hath 
pitched upon Tuesday next to march with his army; and the place of rendezvous 
to be on Hounslow Heath. He doth desire, according to the propositions of both 
Houses. that there may be a committee of both Houses there, to see in what 
condition the army is; and doth hope, against that day, care will be taken, 
recruits. clothes. and money. will be ready: and desires that the City may know 
of it: and that you will interpose so, that he may have as many additional forces 
as can be procured, especially horse. This answer was with much readiness.927 
A critical obstacle had been overcome. If Essex had refused to march until recruits and 
supplies appeared. Pym would have had nothing to take to the City. Negotiations would 
have been deadlocked and any possibility of relieving Gloucester all but lost. 
Characteristically Essex had shown a readiness to answer the call. The committee of 
both Houses. headed by Pym, set out for the City later that same evening, armed -
crucially - with the Lord General's agreement to muster his forces on Hounslow 
Heath.928 
Two days later on 21 August Pym's strategy appeared to have scored a 
resounding success. The committee for the London militia declared that it had been 
'moved' by the committee of both Houses and by the earl of Essex 'to send forth some 
speedy aid.' and had therefore resolved, 'forthwith to send out a force, both of horse and 
foot, for the relief of the said city of Gloucester.' Regiments of the London trained 
bands plus auxiliary forces were therefore appointed to take part in the expedition. The 
militia committee it appeared had been won over, stating that 'the City of London, and 
parts adjacent. cannot be long in safety if that city be lost' .929 It seems that the 
arguments deployed by Pym in negotiation with Essex had been marshalled with equal 
skill in talks with the militia committee. If the Lord General was prepared to act 
selflessly in the name of parliament, but was callously deserted by the City, whose duty 
it was to provide both men and money, then people would draw their own conclusions. 
Pym skilfully exploited the bitter rivalry between Essex and the London authority, 
bringing together. albeit reluctantly, these erstwhile antagonists. But what appeared to 
be a stunning diplomatic success turned out to be another example of the City's growing 
dominance. As we shall now see, a detailed examination of the terms on which the 
militia committee agreed to support the relief effort reveals, once again, the extent to 
which the City of London was dictating events. 
With time rapidly running out Pym was forced to capitulate, undercutting the 
authority of the Lord General and handing control of the City'S reinforcements to the 
927 Journal 0/ the House 0/ Commons, vol. iii, p. 212 
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London militia committee. On 23 August an ordinance for the relief of Gloucester made 
it clear that the capital's forces were to be commanded by officers appointed by the 
militia committee. and would return once the expedition had been completed. The 
London trained bands and auxiliary regiments were authorised to reinforce the Lord 
General's army for the sole purpose of relieving Gloucester. They would, in effect, form 
an independent contingent and would not become part of the army to which they were 
temporarily attached. Ostensibly commanded by Essex, the Londoners would remain 
under the direct control of the militia committee via their regimental officers.93o The 
conditions imposed by the City reveal the extent to which the relief of Gloucester has 
been misunderstood by historians. Hexter, for example, confidently stated that Pym and 
the middle group: 
took the London militia away from Waller, the hero of the fiery ones, and sent it 
marching to the relief of Gloucester under the command of the Lord General the 
931 ' 
earl of Essex 
Hexter cultivates an image of an all-conquering Pym, bending the City to his will with 
consummate political skill. But as we have seen the reality of the situation was entirely 
different. The ordinance for the relief of Gloucester specified that the London forces 
were to be placed under the direction of the Lord General with the consent of the militia 
committee, and that they were 'straightly charged and required to be observant and 
obedient to the commands of the said committee'. 932 Rather than the unparalleled 
prowess of Hexter's 'King Pym', we are in fact presented with a City authority 
imposing the regulations by which London's Trained Bands may serve in parliament's 
anny. Essex - in effect - was side-tracked, allowing the City to assume control of the 
capital's soldiers through the express commands of the militia committee. The Venetian 
ambassador vividly described the City's usurpation of power: 
They have formed a council for the militia, composed of citizens with supreme 
authority to do what is considered necessary for self defence, while for the 
equipment of the anny and its despatch they are raising money and men, 
punishing those who refuse obedience by way of court martial, even with death, 
an unprecedented and illegal course.933 
The City had taken control of the relief effort. 
9)(1 Firth &: Rail (cds.), Acts and Ordinances, vol. i, pp. 260-261. 
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As promised. on 24 August, the earl of Essex mustered his forces, some 10,000 
strong. on Iiounsiow Heath. With members of the Lords and Commons in attendance, 
the Lord General reviewed the conglomeration of veterans, willing volunteers, and 
reluctant conscripts that made up his new army. On 1 September at Brackley Heath in 
Northamptonshire. approximately half-way to Gloucester, he rendezvoused with the 
regular and auxiliary regiments of the London trained bands.934 Even with an army 
approaching 20.000 men, the odds against success must have seemed high. Such a 
perilous adventure would only have been undertaken in the most desperate of 
circumstances. The fact that both parliament and the City were prepared to risk so large 
a number of troops, many miles from safety in the heart of enemy territory, provides 
overwhelming evidence that the relief of Gloucester was a last throw of the dice. In 
order to rescue the town. and with it the cause, Essex had to: 
march over a campania [open unenclosed terrain] near thirty miles in length, 
where half the king's body of horse would distress, if not destroy, his whole 
army. and through a country eaten bare, where he could find neither provision 
9JS for man nor horse 
The enonnity of the undertaking would have been obvious to all. Essex, by committing 
himself to so hazardous an expedition, clearly recognised that he was risking his life. 
Yet this was a chance to prove his critics and doubters wrong. In many ways Essex was 
the right man at the right time. Fuelled not only by a fervent desire to serve the cause, 
the Lord General also harboured a burning ambition to vindicate himself and to 
confound his detested enemies, In a dramatic letter to the Commons he declared: 
I am tomorrow, God willing, beginning my march, and if the army be as willing 
to march as I shall be to lead them (and the town hold out until we can release 
them), I shall endeavour it, or perish in the act.936 
Tbe Relief of Gloucester and tbe Battle of Newbury 
By any measure the relief of Gloucester was a remarkable achievement. Following 
twenty-six days of royalist assaults the situation in the besieged town was critical. Yet, 
quite miraculously, Essex arrived just in time.937 His army had skinnished daily with a 
9)4 Rushworth. Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 292. 
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shadowing force of two thousand five hundred royalist horse commanded by Lord 
Wilmot, and on 4 September, at Stow on the Wold, Essex was confronted by Prince 
Rupert at the head of four thousand massed cavalry. But the Lord General repulsed the 
attacks, skilfully marshalling his troops in a slow and well-defended march. On 5 
September Essex drew up his entire army on Prestbury Hills, overlooking Gloucester, 
only to discover that the king's forces, notified of his approach, had abandoned their 
trenches and raised the siege.lus It was a critical moment in the history of the civil war, 
raising parliamentarian morale, and dealing a vital check to the seemingly inexorable 
progress of the royalist war efTort.939 Clarendon confessed that the town's stubborn 
resistance • gave a stop to the career of the king' s good success,' describing the event as 
a pivotal moment, and ascribing to it 'the greatness to which they [parliament] 
afterwards aspired.,940 A contemporary parliamentarian account declared that 'nothing 
but an extraordinary blessing of God' could explain such an astonishing reversal of 
fortune. Considering Essex faced a march of eighty miles, 'through counties already 
harried by the enemy.' which, it was asked, was more wonderful, 'that he undertook it, 
or that he did it:941 Another source reported that Gloucester's salvation prompted a 
great deal of discussion, that 'all men both friends and enemies agreed that Essex herein 
perfonned a very gallant soldier like action. ,942 Royalist forces besieging Gloucester 
thought it inconceivable that Essex could even attempt such a seemingly impossible 
task. They believed he might just be capable of threatening Oxford, and thereby draw 
the king's army away from Gloucester.943 Contemporaries, both parliamentarian and 
royalist alike, were truly astounded. The totally unanticipated relief of the beleaguered 
town was seen as an extraordinary event. The king's march to victory had been halted: 
Essex, it appeared, had raised parliament from the dead. 
The Lord General was quick to appreciate that his epic march would have been 
in vain if Gloucester had fallen. On 10 September he despatched a breathless report to 
the Speaker of the House of Commons describing the gallant resistance of Colonel 
Massey: 
931 Whitelocke. Memorials o/the English Affairs. pp. 68-69; Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, 
fR·290.292. 
One parliamentarian broadsheet. quoting biblical texts. described the deliverance of Gloucester as the 
fulfilment ofa divine prophecy. BLIT. E 250[9J. Good news/rom all quarters of the kingdom, 12 
September 1643. pp. 1·3. 
940 Macray (ed.). Clarendon, vol. iii, p.171. 
94\ Bt IT, E. 70[ 10). A true relation o/the late expedition 0/ his Excellency. Robert earl of Essex. for the 
relie/o/Glollcester(London. 7 October 1643), p. 2. 
942 White1ocke, Memorials o/the English Affairs, p. 69. 
943 Macray (ed.). Clarendon, vol. iii. p. 170. 
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we came very seasonably, for the governor had not above two or three barrels of 
powder letl: yet he had managed his business with so much judgement and 
courage. that the enemy not knowing of such want, had but small hope of 
obtaining their desires.944 
Massey had defended Gloucester for almost a month against overwhelming odds, 
uncertain. it appears. whether or not relief was on the way. Another two or three days 
and he would. in all likelihood, have been compelled to surrender, leaving Essex adrift 
in enemy territory. The writer Robert Codrington, who accompanied Essex throughout 
the long and hazardous march, observed that: 
The siege was most resolutely sustained by the valour, industry and dexterity of 
the heroic governor Colonel Massey, who contrived all the stratagems, and 
occasioned all the sallies for the ruin of the enemy, and the protection of the 
. 94S 
city. 
Clarendon joined the chorus of praise, commending the 'great courage and resolution' 
of the besieged and describing Massey as a 'vigilant commander. ,946 
As one might expect, Gloucester's epic rescue was gratefully received by 
parliament. On 16 September Colonel Massey was granted one thousand pounds, of 
which five hundred pounds were to be paid immediately, while Essex was ordered to 
'prefer him some place of honour and profit.' And as a reward for their outstanding 
service, the garrison's officers and soldiers were to have their arrears made up without 
delay, plus the addition of a further one-month's pay. It was also ordered 'that public 
thanksgiving be given, on the next Lords day, in all the churches of London and 
Westminster.' And finally a letter was to be sent to Essex 'acknowledging the great 
service he has done in the conducting of his army in the difficult march to the relief of 
Gloucester. ,947 
Parliament had been unexpectedly reprieved, but as far as the royalists were 
concerned Gloucester amounted to no more than a stay of execution. Although Essex 
had succeeded in saving the stricken town, 'he could neither stay there, nor possibly 
retire to London. without being destroyed in the rear by the king' s army. ,948 In order to 
prolong the war until negotiations taking place in Edinburgh could bring Scottish 
944 W. B. Devereux. Lives and Letters of the Devereux Earls of Essex 1540-1646 (London, ) 853), vol. ii, 
e 379. 
S R. Codrington. The life and death of the illustrious Robert Earl of Essex (London, 1646), p. 30. 
946 Macray (ed.). Clarendon. vol. iii, p. 165. M' JOlITnal of the House of Lords, vol. vi, p. 218 . 
... Macray (ed.). Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 170. 
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soldiers to parliamenfs assistance, Essex had somehow to bring his weary and 
vulnerable army back to the capital. If the Lord General failed the war would be as good 
as over. 
It is generally assumed, therefore, that Essex's sole objective was to slip away 
and march for home. However one source gives the impression that Essex sought an 
engagement - victory would clear his path - but the enemy 'fled before him and refused 
to stand to the ha7.ard of a battle:949 Realising that the king's principal intention was to 
cut otT provisions, the Lord General was forced to turn and run before starvation took 
hold. With great skill Essex decoyed north towards Worcester before veering sharply 
south to capture a royalist supply train at Cirencester.9so On 19 September his army 
marched for Newbury, 'in great want of victuals, both for men and horse.'951 But a 
fierce attack by Rupert's cavalry allowed the pursuing royalists to reach the town first, 
effectively blocking the road to London. The king, so it seemed, had now recovered the 
advantage lost at Gloucester. The army upon which parliament's survival depended was 
cornered. Tired after long and arduous marches, the troops were quartered in open 
fields. bereft of shelter and supplies. The royalists, meanwhile, refreshed themselves in 
and around Newbury, with the garrisons of Wallingford and Oxford at hand to supply 
whatever was required. Charles held all the aces, whereas Essex was trapped with 
nowhere to tum. There was no going back, the only option was to fight a way through 
or starve.9S2 
The battle of Newbury was a long and bloody affair. From first light on 20 
September fierce fighting continued unabated throughout the day. Alert and determined 
Essex took the initiative, capturing a hill, occupied by the enemy, which commanded 
the battlefield. To the north and south of this high ground the parliamentarian army 
established their positions, resolutely holding their ground against wave after wave of 
royalist attacks. Even Prince Rupert's fearless horsemen could not penetrate the pikes of 
the London trained bands. Whenever the royalists threatened to break the hard pressed 
and often disordered parliamentarian lines, their assaults were somehow repulsed and 
the danger averted. As darkness fell the fighting finally fizzled out, the royalists were 
spent and any hope of a decisive victory had evaporated. During the night, short of 
powder and dispirited, the king withdrew leaving Essex in possession of the field and 
949 Codrington, Life and death, p. 30. 
9~ Rushworth. Historical Collections. vol. v. p. 292. 
'"I Whiteloc:ke, Memorials of the English Affairs, p. 70. 
'"2 Macray (ed), Clarendon, vol. iii, pp. 173-174. 
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the road to London:~5.l Crucially. after a day of unrelenting fighting, he also remained in 
possession of the parliamentarian cause. 
At Newbury the royalists had confidently expected to rectify the frustration of 
Gloucester by inflicting a resounding defeat, thereby bringing the civil war to a 
resounding conclusion. Yet the unanticipated resilience, skill and bravery of 
parliament's army left the king's party with little alternative but to acknowledge the 
scale of Essex's achievement. 
Without doubt, the action was performed by him with incomparable conduct and 
courage. in every part whereof very much was to be imputed to his own personal 
vinuc. and it may well be reckoned amongst the most soldierly actions of this 
9S4 
unhappy war. 
The very fact that the royalists pressed their attacks from dawn till dusk shows that 
Newbury was believed to be the battle that would finally decided the war. 
Contemporary opinion considered it significant that the king' s army expended no less 
than eighty barrels of powder, fully 'twenty more than served their turn at Edgehill. ,955 
In 1643 Newbury was recognised as a landmark event. The royalists strained every 
sinew to deliver a knockout blow, one that would enable Charles to return to his capital 
in triumph. Even parliamentarians were surprised that Essex and his makeshift army 
had withstood the fierce onslaught: 
In humane probability, the king' s army was the more likely to have prevailed, 
their horse more and better than the parliaments, and their foot were as good, 
their advantages greater and their courage higher, and their confidence too much 
... [but) God was pleased to raise the courage of the parliament's forces and to 
. th the 9S6 give em success 
Robert Codrington. who witnessed the fighting first hand, was in no doubt where the 
battle was won and lost: 
951 White locke. Memorials o/the English Affairs, p. 70; Macray (cd.), Clarendon, vol. iii, pp. 174-175; 
Codrington. Life and death, pp. 32-33; Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, pp. 293-295. For fuller 
and more detailed accounts of Newbury see Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, pp. 210-218;Young & 
Holmes, The English Civil War, pp. 144-150; S. Reid. All the King's Armies: A Military History o/the 
English Civil War 1642-1651 (Staplehurst, 1998), pp. 61-65. 
~ Macray (ed.). Clarendon, vol. iii, p.176. 
955 Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p.295. 
956 Whitelocke. Memorials a/the English affairs, p. 71. 
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The Trained Bands of the City of London endured the chief heat of the day, and 
had the honour to win it. for being now upon the brow of the hill, they lay not 
only open to the horse. but the canon of the enemy, yet they stood undaunted957 
And Codrington's heartfelt tribute to the earl of Essex conveyed a sense of what was at 
stake. how the fatc of parliament had depended on the courage and leadership of the 
Lord General: 
But above all, the renown and glory of this day is most justly due unto the 
resolution and conduct of our general, for before the battle was begun, he did 
ride from one regiment to another, and did inflame them with courage. I have 
heard that when in the heat and tempest of the fight some friends of his did 
advise him to leave off his white hat, because it rendered him an object too 
remarkable to the enemy: No replied the earl, 'It is not the hat, but the heart, the 
hat is nor capable either of fear or honour. ,958 
After a day of unrelenting carnage, the battle of Newbury failed to deliver the victory 
that would have ended the war in royalist triumph. The courage of the Lord General and 
his valiant anny ensured that the war would continue, and that the cause for which 
parliament had taken up anns would remain alive. 
Two days later on 22 September Essex reached Reading from where he wrote to 
the Commons.9S9 The Houses immediately despatched a committee to congratulate him 
upon his success and to ascertain what necessities were required to replenish the army. 
Simultaneously a second committee was ordered to acquaint the City with the good 
news and to negotiate further supplies of money and ammunition.960 The speed with 
which parliament acted suggests, perhaps, that a second engagement was anticipated. It 
may have been feared that the royalists would once again overtake Essex and force 
another battle, or pursue the Lord General to the gates and attempt to overawe the 
,capital. Certainly. the fevered response of parliament appeared to indicate that the 
immediate danger had not yet passed. 
In the event, however. Essex entered London on 25 September to a tumultuous 
welcome, Parliament's saviour was received as a conquering hero 'with all imaginable 
congratulation and triumph. ,961 The Venetian ambassador declared that Essex 'moves in 
a halo of glory here' and has 'vindicated himself with the citizens of London .• 962 The 
~7 Codrington. Life and death, p. 35. 
~. 'hid. pp. 33-34. 
9S9 Rushworth. Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 294; House of Lords Journal, vol. vi, p. 230. 
960 Whilelocke, Memorials of the English Affairs, p.70. 
961 Macray (cd.), Clarendon. vol. iii, pp. 190-191. 
962 CSPY. 1643-1647, p. 29. 
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following day. 26 September. the speaker, together with the House of Commons, visited 
the Lord General to congratulate him on his 'happy success and valour in the late 
business at Newbury: In recognition of their deliverance 'under God,' a record of 
Essex's achievement was entered into the journal book of parliament, to the honour of 
his posterity. The Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London, resplendent in their scarlet 
gowns. complimented Essex 'as the protector and defender of their lives and fortunes, 
and of their wives and children.' And as the Lord General passed the trained bands he 
was cheered with 'loud acclamations of his praise.'963 
Conclusion 
The adulation accorded Essex by both parliament and the City of London emphasised, 
once again. the enonnity of the crisis. Only salvation from impending catastrophe could 
account for official gratitude on this scale. The City, amongst the Lord General's 
bitterest critics, now paid fulsome tribute. Essex, in the words of his principal 
biographer, 'had saved not only the cities of Gloucester and London but the whole 
cause.·964 Parliament was imbued with fresh optimism: certain defeat had been averted 
and the prospect of Scottish military aid dispelled any thoughts of ignominious 
capitulation.96s Clarendon, predictably cynical, nevertheless captured something of the 
new parliamentarian spirit: 
The passion and animosity which differences of opinion had produced between 
any members was totally laid aside and forgotten, and no artifice omitted to 
make the world believe that they were a people newly incorporated, and so 
finnly united to one and the same end as their brethren the Scots; of whose 
concurrence and assistance they were now assured, and satisfied that it would 
come soon enough for their preservation966 
Essex had won a valuable reprieve, enabling parliament to secure the services of twenty 
thousand anned Scots. As Sir Richard Bulstrode put it, 'the House of Commons were 
ready to truss up bag and baggage: but Essex's success at Gloucester changed the scene 
of public affairs' .967 In relieving Gloucester and blunting the royalists at Newbury, 
Essex re-established his military reputation and justified his appointment as Lord 
General. Newbury ensured that the war would continue and that Charles would be 
denied a victory that had seemed inevitable. 'The defeat of Essex in the summer of 
Q6) Whilelocke. Memorials of the English Affairs, p.70. 
'164 Snow. Essex the Rehel. p. 394. 
96' A letter written on 28 August confidently predicted that 'these good brethren of ours will take care of 
the north'. Cited in Hexter. King Pym, p. ISO. 
966 Macray (cd.), Clarendon. vol. iii, p. 191. 
961 Bulstrode. Memoirs And ReflectiOns, p. 96. 
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1643: it has justifiahly been argued, 'might well have changed the whole course of our 
history:%8 An unprecedented crisis, universally expected to end in parliamentarian 
disaster. had been miraculously overcome. A rejuvenated parliament now looked 
forward to a Godlv invasion from north of the border.969 
961 Young and Holmes, English Civil War, p. ISO. 
969 The MP Walter Yonge wrote in his diary, 'The coming of the Scots will add strength and reputation 
to the cause both at home and abroad.' I. Gentles, The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three 
Kingdoms 1638-1652 (Harlow, 2007), p. 207. 
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6 
REPERCUSSIONS OF CRISIS 
Chapter six will show how the precarious military situation south of the border drove 
the English parliament and their Scottish counterparts to enter into an alliance - the 
Solemn League and Covenant - and how this imperative compelled both sides to make 
significant and at times uncomfortable compromises. In addition it will be argued that 
the emergence of the Independent-Presbyterian split was a direct consequence of 
parliament's 1643 crisis, and that the Scottish alliance, together with the divisions 
between Independents and Presbyterians, played a fundamental part in shaping the 
subsequent course of the civil war. Finally, it will be shown that in 1644 the dramatic 
upturn in parliament's military fortunes was due to a transformation in cooperation 
between commanders and a corresponding failure of cooperation amongst royalist 
commanders. 
The Solemo League aod Coveoaot 
The Solemn League and Covenant, described by one historian as 'parliament's single 
most important strategic measure of the whole war, ,970 transformed a decidedly English 
conflict into something approaching a war of three kingdoms. But as the following 
analysis will demonstrate, the shared desperation of parliament and Scots to cement a 
military alliance was, from an English point of view, greatly diminished once the threat 
of imminent defeat receded. Until the collapse of the parliamentarian war effort in the 
summer of 1643, an Anglo-Scottish agreement had been firmly resisted by the English. 
This. as we shall see, is a vitally important point, indicating that parliament's Scottish 
policy was driven by the military crisis in England and the need for armed assistance. A 
neglected correlation, linking the negotiation of the Solemn League and Covenant with 
the condition of the parliamentarian war effort, provides significant supporting 
evidence. However, we need to begin by examining pre-crisis events in Scotland during 
the early summer of 1643. The perception of royalist policy north of the border explains 
Scottish eagerness to forge a military alliance well before the English parliament was 
prepared to endorse such a course of action. 
On 6 June 1643 Scotland had been thrown into turmoil by the discovery of the 
so-called • Antrim Plot': a royalist conspiracy consisting of a cease-fire with the 
970 I. Gentles. The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms J638-J652 (Harlow, 2007), 
p.205. 
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Catholic rebels in Ireland followed by an invasion of western and southern Scotland.971 
Even if. as Gardiner has suggested, the plot 'could be shown to be an intention rather 
than a definite scheme accepted by the king', Charles's apparent willingness to ally 
himself \\ith papist in an attack on the Scottish mainland caused great alarm.972 The 
Bishops' Wars of 1639 and 1640 taught the Scots that the king could not be trusted: the 
Antrim Plot confirmed suspicions that a royalist victory in England would result in 
further armed attempts to re-impose the detested Book of Common Prayer. Robert 
Baillie. a Church of Scotland minster, wrote that 'the plot of Antrim had wakened in all 
a great fear of our safety, and distrust of all the fair words that were or could be given 
us .. 973 On 22 June the Scots convoked a Convention of Estates, a body less formal and 
powerful than a parliament, and therefore less likely to offend Scottish royalists and 
moderate covenanters.914 but nevertheless intended to consider the royalist threat to 
national security.91S It was assumed, as Robert Baillie observed, that the English 
parliament would fully comprehend the meaning of the Convention, and would quickly 
dispatch commissioners to Edinburgh. But as June dragged on into July no English 
representation appeared, an unaccountable neglect that left Scottish political and 
religious leaders greatly perplexed.976 
When, on 14 July, a relieved Robert Baillie reported that John Corbett, a 
representative of parliament, 'is come at last with some word for us,' the waiting finally 
appeared to be over. Frustratingly for Baillie and his fellow countrymen, Corbett had no 
authority to negotiate, and, significantly, in terms of the argument pursued here, carried 
no request for military help. He explained that despite parliament's apprehension over 
the Antrim Plot, a royalist conspiracy against London and the need to constitute an 
Assembly of Divines, to which the Scots were invited, had caused the delay. However, 
he went on to announce that properly appointed commissioners would be sent to 
Edinburgh as quickly as possible.977 The Scots immediately complained to parliament 
'that the convention of the estate of this kingdom has long expected committees ... with 
instructions and power ... that expectation being hitherto disappointed. ,978 The Scots 
would soon come to realise that parliament's belated interest was not motivated by a 
971 L. Kaplan, • Steps to War: the Scots and Parliament 1642-1643', Journal of British Studies, IX 2 (May 
1970). p. 57. 
972 R. R. Gardiner. History of the Great Civil War (London, 1904), vol. i, p. 177. 
97) D. Lang (cd.), The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie (Edinburgh, 1841), vol. ii, p. 80. 
914 D. Stevenson, The Scoltish Revolution /637-/644 (Newton Abbot, 1973), p. 176. 
915 Kaplan, 'Steps to War', p. 58. 
976 Lang. (cd.), tellers and Journals of Robert Baillie, vol. ii, p. 79. 
971 Kaplan, 'Steps to War,' p. 59; Lang (cd.). Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, vol. ii, p. 80; 
Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i. pp. 177-178. 
971 The complaint was issued on 17 July 1643 by the Convention of Estates as part of a series of 
instructions to be presented to the Houses of Parliament. T. Thompson and C. Innes (cds.), The Acts of 
the Parliament 0/Scolland(l2 vols, 1814-1875), vol. vi, p. IS. 
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concern for Scottish security. Parliament's commissioners, to which Corbett referred, 
were intended for an altogether different purpose, one directly related to the military 
situation in England. On 30 June, eight days after the Convention convened, 
parliament's northern army. commanded by Ferdinando Lord Fairfax, had been all but 
destroyed by the earl of Newcastle's forces at the battle of Adwalton Moor.979 The 
catastrophe left most of northern England, save for the port of Hull, in royalist hands. 
Adwalton Moor transformed parliament's attitude to its northern neighbours,980 
rendering 'an alliance with the Scots the only viable option to wrest control of the north 
from the king and to avert an outright royalist victory.,981 
On 5 July the terrible news was broken to a shocked parliament, resulting in an 
immediate request for Scottish military assistarJce.982 Although both Houses agreed to 
name commissioners as quickly as possible, the process was disrupted by the refusal of 
two Lords. the earl of Rutland and Lord Grey of Warke, to accept nomination. 
Clarendon claimed that parliament's appeal for Scottish help 'was thought so desperate 
a cure' that 'the earl [of Rutland] upon indisposition of health procured a release' while 
Lord Grey 'so peremptorily refused to meddle in it that he was committed to the 
Tower. ,983 This untimely disarray in the Upper House helps to explain Corbett's rather 
apologetic appearance in Edinburgh on 14 July. Despite these difficulties it is clear that 
parliament's desperation for Scottish aid derived solely from the military crisis in 
England. The royalist threat to Scotland, revealed in early June by the discovery of the 
Antrim Plot, had not prompted parliament to seek Scottish assistarJce. Even though the 
Scots signaled a state of national emergency by convening a Convention of Estates, it 
was not until the disaster of Adwalton Moor that parliament ordered the negotiation of a 
military alliance. A frustrated Robert Baillie complained that English 'slowness in all 
their affairs is marvelous. ,984 
9,., In January 1643 a parliamentary agent in Edinburgh reported that the prospects for a military alliance 
with the Scots appeared good and that the 'coals now want only blowing from England and this Kingdom 
[Scotland) will soon be on fire.' What the agent did not realise was that parliament would only blow the 
Scottish coals when outright defeat was staring it in the face. S. D. M. Carpenter, Military Leadership in 
the British Civil Wars (Abingdon. 2005). p. 79. 
'110 Corben's original instructions to attend the Convention of Estates were granted on 27 May 1643 as a 
result of the discovery of the Antrim Plot, a conspiracy held by one member of the Commons to confirm 
'a fixed resolution in the Popish party unerly to extirpate the true Protestant religion in England, Scotland 
and Ireland.' Significantly. these instructions were amended after the battle of Adwalton Moor on 30 
June 1643 to include reference to the future arrival in Edinburgh of properly constituted parliamentary 
commissioners. Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, pp. 177-178. 
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But from parliament's point of view the situation was entirely different. In 1641, 
during treaty negotiations in London following the Second Bishops' War, the Scots had 
demanded 'unity in religion and uniformity in church government between England and 
Scotland as a means to preserve peace. ,985 Although a firm commitment to introduce 
Scottish Presbyterianism had been successfully avoided, parliament knew full well that 
a resumption of talks would inevitably result in further Scottish demands for unity and 
uniformity. Hence parliament's reluctance to request military assistance until defeat in 
the civil war appeared virtually certain. Only a crisis of unprecedented proportions 
could persuade a majority of Lords and Commons to concede the kind of unpalatable 
religious demands that had been opposed by both Charles and parliament in 1641.986 
Clearly the military situation - and the military situation alone - determined parliament's 
attitude to Scotland. 
Meanwhile the Scots observed parliament's deteriorating war effort with 
growing concern. In the exasperating absence of English commissioners they attempted 
to increase the diplomatic pressure for an alliance. On 17 July, four days after the 
complete annihilation of Sir William Waller's army at the battle of Roundway Down, 
the Convention of Estates declared the dangers facing their southern neighbours to be 
identical to those facing the Scots.987 This carefully calculated strategy, articulating the 
fate of both nations in terms of a common royalist enemy, assumed even greater 
importance after the devastating loss of Bristol to Prince Rupert on 26 July. In 
Edinburgh it was becoming increasingly clear that diplomatic overtures could not 
guarantee national security: it was time to make independent military preparations, 
before parliament was overwhelmed and defeated. Mobilization of forces was a 
necessary defensive measure, but it was also intended to emphasize Scottish impatience 
to enter the civil war on parliament's side. On 28 July, the Convention of Estates 
ordered the raising of six thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry. 988 
Yet six days later. on 3 August. Robert Baillie was still reporting the great 
distress of his countrymen over the continued absence of the English Commissioners, 
'of whose coming' he complained 'we were well near out of hope.' It was widely 
believed in Edinburgh that pro-royalist members of the House of Lords had prevented 
the issuing of commissions. while others suspected that parliament's neglect was 
.. 5 Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, pp. 220-221. 
916 David Scott has shown that significant support for a Scottish alliance came from northern members of 
parliament whose estates had been seized by the earl ofNcwcastle, a situation that would have been 
inconceivable were it not for Adwalton Moor: Scott, 'Northern Gentlemen', pp. 347-348 & 354 . 
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intended to obviate the need for an alliance by compelling the Scots to take unilateral 
action.qgq The Scots were clearly beside themselves with anxiety, unable to comprehend 
parliament's failure to hasten representation to the Convention of Estates. As news of 
each royalist victory spread north across the border, the civil war appeared to be 
spiraling out of control. imperiling parliament and endangering Scottish security. Robert 
Baillie's agitated concern is, therefore, an important point of evidence for this study. It 
confirms that the critical nature of parliament's military collapse was fully recognized 
in Scotland. and that it constituted a source of rapidly increasing national apprehension. 
One correspondent revealingly explained to the Scots that 'if [the English] could do the 
business by themselves they would save you a labour and themselves much money and 
credit' .rm 
On 7 August. to palpable Scottish relief, parliamentary commissioners finally 
landed at Leith. Their intention was to secure a minimum of 10,000 Scottish infantry 
and 1,000 cavalry to fight in England.991 Robert Baillie recalled how the Scots 'were 
exhorted to be more grave than ordinary', so that all might be achieved 'with much 
more awe and gravity than usual,.992 They explained to their English guests that 'they 
well understood how much the fate of Scotland was involved in what should befall the 
parliament in England ... if the king prevailed by force. ,993 On 17 August, after less 
than ten days of bargaining, the Convention of Estates ratified an Anglo-Scottish 
alliance: the Solemn League and Covenant.994 It was observed that this was a 
remarkably short time given the fact that the respective parties entered the talks with 
different objectives.99s One contemporary believed that the agreement was nothing short 
of miraculous given the fractious history of Anglo-Scottish relations over the past three 
hundred years. 9% 
The English, as was to be expected, stressed military assistance, but the Scots, as 
a price for co-operation, pursued national interests through a religious and political 
agenda. These considerations were reflected in the title of the alliance, Covenant 
representing Scottish religious aspirations and League denoting parliament's military 
919 Laing (ed.), Leners and Journals of Robert Baillie, vol. ii, pp. 85-86. 
9'JO Kaplan. 'Steps to War', p. 61. 
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9'N Gardiner, Greal Civil War, vol. i, p. 231; The Covenant 'called for the suppression of episcopacy, 
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Hamilton and Castleherald (London, 1677), p. 239. 
996 E. Vallance. '''An Holy and Sacramentall Paction", Federal Theology and the Solemn League and 
Covenant in England', English Historical Review, vol. 116,465 (February, 2001), p. 67. 
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priorities.~n According to Robert Baillie, a private letter from the English divines to 
their Scottish counterparts. expressing the urgency of the situation, was: 
so lamentable. that it drew tears from many. Above all, diligence was urged; for 
the report was going already of the loss of Bristol, from which they feared his 
Majesty might march to London, and carry it.998 
It is little wonder that the respective negotiators worked at such a prodigious rate. The 
fact that an agreement had been reached in only ten days demonstrates the 
overwhelming need. recognized by both parliament and the Scots, for an immediate 
military alliance. The threat of a royalist victory was driving the political agenda on 
both sides of the border. 
On 18 August, the day after the Solemn League and Covenant was agreed in 
Edinburgh, the Scots made ready for war. Although the treaty had yet to be approved by 
the English parliament, the Convention of Estates placed all able-bodied men on forty-
eight-hour standby.9W Three days later a party of Scottish Commissioners boarded ship 
for Westminster, among them Robert Baillie, who feared that the king would get to 
London before they did. 1OOO On 22 August the Scots stepped up their preparations by 
nominating commanders for the new army and selecting Alexander Leslie, earl of 
Leven, to serve as Lord General. lOOI These plans culminated on 26 August when the 
Convention of Estates made a commitment to send 18,000 infantry and 2,100 cavalry to 
parliament's assistance. This was a hugely significant and potentially decisive addition 
of manpower. As an indication of Scottish alarm the message could not be clearer. lOO2 
This new army of the Covenant was twice as strong as the force parliament originally 
requested, 'making it the largest army, at least on paper, then in parliamentarian 
. .100) 
servIce. 
The urgency of Scottish military preparations suggests that unilateral action was 
under active consideration. Parliament's precarious military situation threatened defeat 
within weeks or even days, and following the loss of Bristol a royalist advance on 
9IJ7 Gentles. The English Revolution. p. 206; 'the English pressed chiefly a Civil League, and the Scots a 
Religious one: Burnet. Memoires o/Hamilton andCastleherald. p. 237. 
em Laing (ed.). Leiters and Journals 0/ Robert Bail/ie, vol. ii, p. 89. 
999 'A proclamation proclaimed throughout the kingdom of Scotland. August 18 1643, for all persons 
from 16 10 60 years old to appear in arms' J. Rushworth, Historical Collections (London, 1721), vol. v, 
PL 387-504. 
Laing (ed.). Leners and Journals o/Robert Baillie, vol. ii, p. 98. 
1001 Furgol. 'The Civil Wars in Scotland.' p. SO. 
1001 'Within len days ... the solemn league and covenant had been agreed, and within twenty days the 
treaty for sending an army to England had also been completed.' Stevenson, Scollish Revolution, p. 287. 
100J A 1 Macinnes. 'The Scottish Moment 1638-45'. in J Adamson (ed.), The English Civil War 
(Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 138-140. 
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London wa. . widely expected and greatly feared. 1OO4 The Scottish call to arms, therefore, 
provided the capability to secure the border at extremely short notice and to advance 
rapidly in to the southern kingdom in the event of further disasters. It is important to 
note that the mea. . urcs taken between 18 and 26 August - effectively placing the 
Scottish nation on a war footing - occurred well before the Solemn League and 
Covenant was agreed at Westminster. These independent preparations indicate an 
expectation of imminent parliamentarian surrender or defeat, an eventuality that would, 
of course. have left the Scots isolated and vulnerable. Scottish determination to establish 
an autonomous military capability independent of the embryonic Anglo-Scottish 
alliance provides a telling commentary on the dangerous state of the civil war. In 
particular it underlines how little confidence the northern partners in the Solemn League 
and Covenant had in their southern counterparts to withstand the king' s victorious 
armies and stave off military defeat. 1005 
While the Scots prepared for the worst, events in England confirmed that 
parliament's desperation for an alliance was driven solely by the military situation. On 
26 August, with 'horrible fears and confusion in the City; the king everywhere 
victorious: 1006 a copy of the Solemn League and Covenant reached Westminster:007 
Importantly for this study, Clarendon emphasized the fact that the treaty had been 
hurried to the capital 'with all possible expedition ... in the time of their great 
consternation, and before the relie/o/Gloucester [italics mine].,1008 Twelve days later, 
on 7 September, as Scottish commissioners arrived in London to conclude an alliance, 
the Covenant, which had been amended by the Divines, was forwarded to the Lords. 1009 
Although Essex had rescued Gloucester two days earlier on 5 September, the military 
outlook remained as bleak as ever. There can have been little expectation that the Lord 
General, isolated in enemy territory. could avoid destruction and bring his army back to 
the capital. On 10 September Essex had written to the Commons from Tewkesbury 
complaining: 
mine own army is in such extreme necessity for want of pay, being now in an 
enemy's country. and at this time within four or five miles of the king's army, 
1004 As already noted. Robert Baillie. reporting the departure of Scottish Commissioners for London on 
21 August 1643. commented that 'it was feared the king should get London before they could be there.' 
Laing (ed.). L~lIen and JOIU'nals of Robert Baillie. vol. ii, p. 98. 
100' Robert Baillie complained that parliament 'would never in earnest call for our help till they were 
irrecoverable. now when all is desperate, they cry aloud for our help.' Ibid., ii, p. 83. 
lea Ibid .• p. 99. 
1007 Gardiner. Greal Civil War, vol. i, p. 232. 
1001 Macray (ed.). Clarendon, vol. iii. p. 221. 
1009 Gardiner, Gr~at Civil War. vol. i, p. 234. 
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where no provision can be had but for ready money, and so little hope have I of 
l". 1010 
a supply arom you. 
And at approximately the same time a royalist reported that 'Essex is here in a strait and 
wishes himself at London again.' 1011 The sense of impending disaster was further 
increased by the revelation. long anticipated, that on 15 September the king had finally 
signed a one-year truce with the Irish rebels. Fear of a royalist led Catholic invasion 
greatly strengthened the impetus for an Anglo-Scottish alliance. IOl2 In Edinburgh it 
con finned suspicions. first aroused by the Antrim Plot, that Charles would collaborate 
with papists. 10 13 and at Westminster it created a majority in favour of the Covenant (as 
distinct from a simple military alliance). 1014 
But with Essex seemingly at the mercy of the king's army and the threat of an 
Irish landing looming ever larger, the Scots took matters into their own hands. On 16 
September the six thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry authorized on 28 July 
mustered on Leith Links, and four days later, on 20 September, re-occupied the garrison 
town of Berwick-on-Tweed. lols Seizing control of this strategically important fortress 
not only secured the eastern border but also provided a staging post for an invasion of 
England. 1016 With all able-bodied men on forty-eight hour standby, it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that the demise of Essex's army would have triggered unilateral 
Scottish action. Although negotiations to secure a religious Covenant were nearing 
completion in London, an agreement would count for little in Edinburgh if parliament's 
last remaining army were destroyed. The Scots had demonstrated very clearly in 1639 
and t 640 that they would not hesitate to confront the crown if their political and 
religious interests were threatened. 
Finally on 25 September, as Essex entered the capital following the battle of 
Newbury, the Covenant was signed by the House of Commons and the Assembly of 
Divines. 1017 The urgency of the negotiations, which had commenced in Edinburgh on 7 
1010 W. B. Devereux (ed.), Lives and Letters o/the Devereux Earls o/Essex 1540-1646 (London, 1853), 
~. 380. 
011 C. V. Wedgewood. The King's War 1641-1647 (London, 1958), p. 248. 
lOll D. Ston. Politics and War in the Three Stuart Kingdoms 1637-1649 (Basingstoke, 2004), p. 66. 
lOll Kaplan. 'Steps to War" p. 67. 
101. Ston, Politics and War. p. 72; Robert Baillie observed that 'most of all the Irish Cessation made the 
minds of our people embrace that means of safety' Laing (ed.), Letters and Journal 0/ Robert Baillie, vol. 
ii. r. 103. 
101 furgol. 'The Civil Wars in Scotland', p. 50; Macinnes, 'The Scottish Moment', p. 139. 
1016 Although parliamentary troops had taken control of Berwick in August 1643 the Stots demanded that 
their army be pennincd to reoccupy the town. Desperate for Scottish assistance, the English 
commissioners in Edinburgh had little option but to agree, despite instructions that the garrisoning of 
Carlisle. Newcastle and Berwick had to be approved by the Houses. HMC, Portland Mss, vol. i, pp. 129 
&. 136-137 cited in Kaplan. 'Steps to War', pp. 66-67; Journal o/the House o/Lords, vol. vi, p. 141. 
1017 Gardiner. Greal Civil War, vol. i, pp. 232-234; Journal o/the House o/Commons, vol. iii, p. 254; 
Rushworth. Historical Collections, vol. v, pp. 475 &. 480. 
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August. had heen driven by the precariousness of the military situation. As long as it 
seemed certain that parliament was heading towards disaster, the Scottish and English 
commissioners worked at a prodigious rate, overcoming, as we shall shortly see, 
fundamental differences. But once Essex saved the cause at Newbury on 20 September 
and brought his shattered army back to the capital parliament's attitude appeared to 
change. Robert Baillie. who observed the transformation with a mixture of frustration 
and resignation. commented: 
We know the best of the English have very ill will to employ our aid, and the 
smallest hopes they got of subsisting by themselves [makes them less fond) of 
us. The march of Essex to Gloucester; his raising of that siege; his return to 
London. with some advantage at Newbury; Manchester's taking of Lynn; his 
clearing of Lincolnshire, with some prosperous skirmishes there; Newcastle's 
repulse from Hull, puts them in new thoughts' 1018 
Baillie's revealing comments highlight a striking and highly significant shift at 
Westminster. Essex's unexpected success explains why the military details of the 
Solemn League and Covenant - as distinct from the religious and financial terms agreed 
on 25 September - were not settled until 29 November. 1019 Furthermore it was not until 
19 January 1644 that the Scottish army finally crossed the Tweed into England, fully 
four months after Essex saved the cause at the battle of Newbury. 1020 It seems pretty 
clear that once the immediate danger of a royalist victory had receded, all sense of 
parliamentarian panic melted away. The Scots were so alarmed that on 15 October they 
dispatched Sir Henry Vane, one of the English commissioners who had remained in 
Edinburgh, to Westminster to plead for official confirmation of the alliance and a 
supply of money to enable the assembled Scottish army to march. 1021 
The cooling of English enthusiasm for a Scottish alliance is a vitally important 
point for this thesis, presenting the historian with a revealing and neglected 
lOll Laing (ed.), Leiters and Journals o/Robert Baillie, vol. ii, pp. 103-104. In the autumn of 1643 
parliament's fortunes began to improve. On 16 September the earl of Manchester captured Lynn, which 
had unexpectedly declared for the king, while on II October Oliver Cromwell and Sir Thomas Fairfax 
won a cavalry banle at Winceby in Lincolnshire. Also on II October the earl of Newcastle abandoned his 
month long siege of Hull following a fierce attack by garrison forces led by Ferdinando Lord Fairfax. 
Rushworth. Historical Collections. vol. v, pp. 280-284; P. Young and R. Holmes, The English Civil War: 
A Military History o/TlveeCivil Wars 1642-/65/ (London, 1974), pp. 151-158. 
1019 Kaplan. 'Steps to War', p. 68; Robert Baillie complained that 'The English treaty .,. came not to 
Leith before the 2111 November' Laing (ed.), Leiters and Journals 0/ Robert Baillie. vol. ii, p. 127. 
1020 Journal of the Hou.se o/Lords, vol. vi, p. 364; Furgol, 'Civil War in Scotland,' p.50. 
1021 Journal of the Hou.se o/Lords, vol. vi, p. 275; On 6 November the Venetian ambassador reported 
that 'One of the English commissioners has arrived from that country with news that they are ready, but 
they are amazed because for a long time they have received no news, not to speak of money, from the 
parliament here. A. B. Hinds (cd.), Calendar o/State Papers Venetian (CSPV) (London, 1925),1643-
1647, pp. 35-46. 
207 
correlation. 10'::':: What emerges is a clear relationship between the negotiation of the 
Covenant and the corresponding condition of the parliamentarian war effort. During the 
period of greatest peril both parliament and the Presbyterian Scots raced against time to 
secure a binding agreement. But following Essex's triumph at Newbury, the English, as 
Baillie complained. appeared markedly less inclined to rush into an alliance. As this 
study has shown. a military treaty with Scotland was definitely not a parliamentarian 
priority before the battle of Adwalton Moor on 30 June 1643. And the imperative of 
such an agreement was greatly reduced once Essex returned to London on 25 
September 1643. It was only during the intervening period of acute crisis, when 
parliament's military collapse appeared to herald total defeat, that the successful 
negotiation of an Anglo-Scottish alliance became a matter of life or death. This crucial 
relationship reinforces the argument that parliament's Scottish policy was a direct 
consequence of the calamitous military situation. As one Scottish historian succinctly 
put it. 'in 1643 the negotiations had been founded primarily on political pragmatism and 
'1' . ,1023 rnl ltary necessity . 
Compromise aDd AgreemeDt: tbe Military Imperative 
The first section of this chapter highlighted a neglected correlation between the 
negotiation of the Solemn League and Covenant and the state of the parliamentarian 
war effort. This section shows how the desperate need of both parliament and the Scots 
to negotiate a military treaty resulted in significant compromises on both sides.1024 This 
is an important issue for this thesis, emphasising the seriousness of the royalist military 
threat in the summer of 1643 and the real depth of parliament's crisis. 
Parliament was prepared to pay for a Scottish anny and accept the imposition of 
Presbyterianism upon the English church because it did not believe it could survive the 
crisis without Scottish assistance. 102S The Bishops' Wars of 1639 and 1640 had 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the Covenanter anny, which had defeated ill-prepared 
English campaigns to overthrow the prayer book rebellion of 1638. In particular the 
Scottish victory at Newburn on 28 August 1640 had shown what a nationally 
conscripted standing army could achieve, especially one sustained by religious zeal and 
1022 For example. none of the following secondary sources make any reference to this corollary aspect of 
the Solemn League and Covenant negotiations, Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, pp. 228-236; 
Wedgwood, King's WCU', pp. 256-258; A. Woolrych, Britain in Revolution (Oxford, 2002), pp. 270-272; 
Scott, Politics & War. pp. 65-67. 
1023 Macinnes. 'The Scottish Moment', p. 139. 
1024 'But for both covenanters and parliamentarians the need for an alliance was so urgent that they were 
willing to make concessions.' Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, p. 284. 
102' 'Parliament's covenant with the Scottish Presbyterians would effect its salvation,' Gentles, The 
English Revolution, p. 207. 
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a centrali7.cd govcrnment. I026 Many Englishmen applauded the Scots, a nation clearly 
delivered from Popish oppression by virtue of a National Covenant with God. 1027 
Parliamcnt was now threatened by precisely the same dangers that had confronted their 
northern ncighbours in 1639 and 1640. Defeat in England would lead to the dissolution 
of the Westminster Assembly of Divines and an end to any hope of a non-Episcopalian 
reformation of the English church. 
Parliament was therefore prepared to compromise a new religious settlement by 
accepting Scottish participation in it. Indeed parliament's commissioners emphasized 
that 'this so much desired reformation' would be 'utterly disappointed' by reason of the 
'Papists ... and other malignant enemies' without 'the necessary supplies and aid now 
desired of our [Sconish) brethren'. 1028 Parliament's appeal for military aid was targeted 
at Scottish concerns for the future of Protestantism in all three kingdoms, particularly as 
the Scots had been advocating uniformity of religion for over a year. 1029 And in addition 
to religious concessions parliament was also prepared to pay the full asking price for 
Scottish military assistance, £30,000 per month plus £100,000 to be paid in advance. I030 
The English commissioners reassured the Scots that their army would be paid for out of 
the 'revenues of Papists, malignants and other delinquents' .1031 But the costs did not 
seem exorbitant; for as more than one historian has pointed out, twenty one thousand 
Scottish soldiers would soon purchase the survival of the beleaguered parliamentarian 
use 
1032 ca . 
If parliament was desperate for Scottish assistance, then the Scots, it seems, 
were even more desperate to provide it. One neglected but highly significant aspect of 
the Solemn League and Covenant is the degree to which the Scots were prepared to 
compromise their religious agenda in order to secure a military alliance. On two critical 
occasions. one in Edinburgh during August and the other at Westminster in September, 
the Scots conceded points of principle in order to save the treaty. As we shall now see, 
these crisis points demonstrate the often-ignored fact that military intervention in the 
civil war was a greater priority for the Scots than exporting Scottish Presbyterianism to 
England. 
The first point of conflict arose as a result of Scottish insistence that both nations 
adopt a vow for 'the preservation of the true Protestant reformed religion in the Church 
of Scotland. in doctrine. worship, discipline, and government, and the reformation of 
1026 Macinnes, 'The Scottish Moment', pp. 128, 131. 
1021 E. Vall~e, "An Holy and Sacramenta II Paction", p. 68. 
lOll Journal of lite House o/L ords , vol. vi, p.142. 
1029 Kaplan, 'Steps to War', p. 63. 
10)0 Gardiner, Gnat Civil WQI', vol. i, p. 231. 
lOll Journal oflhe House o/Lords, vol. vi, p. 141. 
1012 Kaplan, • Steps to War', p. 68; Macinnes, 'The Scottish Moment', p. 140. 
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religion in the Church of England. according to the example of the best refonned 
churches .. Ion The Scots. Clarendon observed, 'doubted not' that the only suitable 
example of a reformed church 'would be their own Presbytery' .1034 The English 
commissioners. led by Sir Henry Vane, 'one of the gravest and ablest of that nation,'1035 
recogni7.oo that an agreement enshrining the perfection of the Scottish refonnation was 
unlikely to find acceptance either in parliament or the Assembly of Divines. Therefore, 
in order to salvage the treaty he had been entrusted to negotiate, Vane proposed two 
amendments: first. to preserve 'the Church of Scotland in doctrine, worship, discipline, 
and government according to the Word of God', and second, 'the refonnation of 
religion in the Church of England according to the same Holy Word and the example of 
the best reformed churches.' 1036 
Clarendon believed that Vane intended to make the meaning of an agreement 
'doubtful enough to bear many impressions,' 1037 but Ian Gentles has argued that Vane's 
real purpose was to ensure that the Bible, rather than the Scottish version of refonned 
Protestantism. formed the basis of ecclesiastical reform in England. 1038 Edward 
Vallance has suggested that the clause was intended to 'ease the taking of the Covenant 
by Independents'. 1039 Interestingly Vane's amendments echo the parliamentary 
ordinance of 12 June 1643 by which the Westminster Assembly of Divines was 
established. The ordinance called for a 'more perfect reformation' in which the 
government of the English church would 'be most agreeable to Gods Holy Word ... and 
nearer in agreement with the Church of Scotland and other reformed churches 
abroad.' 1040 Vane, it appears, was attempting to tie the Scots to a text already agreed by 
parliament, one that would be readily endorsed by the newly convened Divines. These 
were the terms on which the Scots would have been invited to the Assembly had there 
been no need for a military alliance. The Divines, it seems, would have worked towards 
a new settlement with due reference to the Scottish church, but only as one 
'd . 1041 COnsl eratlon among many. 
10)) Gardiner. Greal Civil War, vol. i, p. 230. 
10).4 Macray (ed.). Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 202; Burnet, Memoires of Hamilton & Castleherald, p. 240. 
103' Laing (cd.), Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, vol. ii, p. 89. 
1036 Gardiner. Greal Civil War, vol. i, p. 230; Kaplan, • Steps to War', p. 63. 
IOJ7 Macray (cd.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 221. 
10JI Gentles. English Revolution, p. 206; One near contemporary source claimed that Vane intended to 
protect parliament from 'the inroads of Scottish Presbytery,' and that • in the contriving of that article' 
Vane and the Scots 'studicd to outwit one another.' Burnet, Memoires of Hamilton & Castleherald, p. 
240. 
10)9 Valance. "An Holy and Sacramentall Paction", pp. 55-56. 
1040 C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait (cds.), Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660 (London, 
1911). vol. i., pp. 18()"184. 
1041 Michael Braddick suggests that the religious imperative of the ordinance was to some extent 
compromised by the need to reach a nearer agreement with the Scottish church and refonned churches 
abroad. However it can equally be seen, as I have attempted to argue here, that the ordinance represented 
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Nevertheless. Vane's amendments were strongly opposed by the Scottish 
negotiators. and it appeared for a time that the talks might break down completely. 
Robert Baillie observed that the English commissioners, 'were more nor we could 
assent to for keeping a door open in England to Independency'. 1042 As Edward Vallance 
has intimated above. Vane's intervention was seen by Baillie and others as a rather 
crude attempt to circumvent a Presbyterian settlement in England by permitting the 
inclusion of Independent congregations. 1043 With negotiations teetering on the brink of 
collapse, a secret meeting of prominent religious and secular leaders resolved to accept 
Vane's changes and proceed with the treaty. The Kirk and the Convention of Estates, 
once infonned of the clandestine deliberations, quickly endorsed the decision and an 
agreement with the English commissioners soon followed. I044 Scottish willingness to 
concede Vane's amendments. contrary to firmly expressed religious aspirations, is a 
matter of great significance for this study. The Scots, terrified by the magnitude of 
parliament's crisis and the prospect of a royalist victory, were forced to accept that even 
their most cherished ecclesiastical objectives could not stand in the way of a military 
alliance. 
The second occasion on which Presbyterian principles were compromised 
occurred after the arrival of Scottish commissioners in London on 7 September. As 
noted above, a copy of the newly signed Solemn League and Covenant had reached 
Westminster on 26 August. Unexpectedly the agreement ran into a storm of opposition, 
both in the House of Commons and the Assembly of Divines. The English objected to 
the implication (resulting from Vane's first amendment) that the Church of Scotland, 
both in constitution and practice, was according to the Word of God. On 1 September, 
'after a long, sad, and serious debate,' the Commons voted to amend the clause by 
adding 'so far as we do or shall in our consciences conceive the same to be according to 
the Word of 000.'1045 Or to put it another way, Englishmen would decide for 
themselves whether or not the ecclesiastical government of the Kirk provided the best 
model for refonn. When the Scottish commissioners learned of parliament's unilateral 
alterations, the negotiations were once again thrown into crisis. 'This they [the Scots] 
took in evil part,' Robert Baillie reported, 'that any letter should be changed without our 
advice.' Total disaster was only averted when a committee drawn from both Houses and 
parliament's original intentions and therefore formed the English negotiating position in Edinburgh. M. J. 
Braddick. 'History, liberty, reformation and the cause: Parliamentarian military and ideological escalation 
in 1643' in M. J. Braddick and D. L. Smith (eds.), The Experience o/Revolution in Stuart Britain and 
Ireland (Cambridge, 2011). p. 130. 
1042 Laing (ed.), L.",rs and Journals 0/ Robert Baillie, vol. ii, p.90. 
104) Vallance, "An Holy and Sacramentall Paction", pp. 55-56. 
1044 Kaplan, 'Steps to War', p. 65. 
1045 Journal o/the House o/Commons, vol. iii, p. 242. 
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the Assembly of Divines - 'the most able and best-affected men' - finally satisfied the 
Scots that 'all alterations' were 'for the better.,1046 Nevertheless, this was the second 
occasion on which the Scots had accepted a formula of words that jeopardized Scottish 
Presbyterianism a.'i the model for an English reformation. 
Furthermore the final version of the Covenant, agreed in November 1643, 
completely omitted the disputed amendment, removing any suggestion that the Scottish 
church had been reformed in accordance with the Word of God. However Vane's 
second amendment (proposing reform of the English church according to the same Holy 
Word and the example of the best reformed churches) was retained, freeing the 
Assembly of Divines from any specific reference to the Church of Scotland.1047 Once 
again the Scots appeared perfectly willing to accept these alterations, even though they 
undermined the Presbyterian Kirk as the basis for reform of the English Church. I048 
This provides clear proof that Scottish priorities focused very firmly upon entering the 
civil war while there was still a war to fight. Defeating the king was clearly more 
important than demanding parliament's wholesale adoption of unadulterated Scottish 
Presbyterianism. Religious conformity was important, but 80t as important as 
preventing a royalist victory in England. 1049 Scottish willingness to sacrifice the 
exemplar of Scottish Presbyterianism shines a new light on the severity of parliament's 
military demise. English preparedness to meet Scottish demands was mirrored by a 
Scottish preparedness to make uncomfortable compromises. There was simply no 
alternative. Belligerent intransigence would only result in disaster, both for the English 
parliament and the Scottish Kirk. The triumph of pragmatism and compromise over 
deeply cherished ideals is a vitally important point for this study, emphasizing the real 
danger of parliament's crisis and the shared Anglo-Scottish dread of a royalist victory. 
IDdepeDdeDts aDd PresbyteriaDs 
Another important but equally neglected repercussion of the 1643 crisis concerns the 
direct relationship between the collapse of the parliamentarian war effort and the 
emergence of the Independent-Presbyterian split. The key to this pivotal development 
lay in the ecclesiastical impact of the Solemn League and Covenant. For some members 
of the Presbyterian Kirk the Covenant enshrined the idealism of a religious crusade, 
1046 Laing (N.). Lenus and Journals of Robert Baillie, vol. ii, p. 102. 
1041 BL TI. 24S: 669.f.7[S7J. A Solemn League and Covenant (London, 16 November 1643); Gardiner, 
Great Civil War, vol. i, p.234. 
1041 Kaplan. 'Steps to War: p. 64n. 
104' It is significant that in the negotiations following the Second Bishops War, which resulted in the 
Treaty of London in August 1641. Scottish insistence on unity in religion and uniformity in church 
government were secondary to a lasting alliance with England - an approach the Scots were compelled to 
resurrect in 1643. MKinnes, 'The Scottish Moment', p. 135. 
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defending Scottish Presbyterianism against the papist onslaught of the English crown, 
and rescuing the prostrate English parliament from imminent destruction. It represented 
nothing less than 'an embodiment of fundamental Christian duties that could not be 
revoked by temporal authority'. 1050 'Surely,' declared Robert Baillie: 
it was a great act of faith in God, and huge courage and unheard of compassion, 
that moved our nation to hazard their own peace, and venture their lives and all, 
for to save a people irrecoverably ruined both in their own and in all the world's 
eyeslO~1 
It was widely believed that a Covenant made with God could make amends for the sins 
of a nation and obtain deliverance from the Almighty's displeasure. 10s2 However, 
parliament and the Scots would soon discover that the Covenant amounted to a 
Pandora's Box of political and religious tensions, the repercussions of which would 
overshadow the war effort for the reminder of the conflict and beyond. 
Despite the negotiation of the Solemn League and Covenant it seems that 
parliament was determined to impose its original intentions on the Assembly of 
Divines. On 12 October 1643, in a reiteration of the Assembly's establishing ordinance 
(12 June 1643), the Houses instructed the Divines to: 
forthwith confer, and treat among themselves, of such discipline and 
government as may be most agreeable to God's Holy Word, and ... [to procure] 
a nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland and other refonned churches 
abroad. IDS, 
The Scots however were becoming increasingly insistent that 'the chief aim' of the 
Covenant should be 'the propagation of our church discipline to England and 
lreland.'los4 The result was that religion became 'a greater source of division in the 
parliamentarian ranks than it had been before.' lOSS As David Scott has pointed out, it 
was 'the fear of spiritual bondage under Scottish-style Presbyterianism' that lay behind 
the emergence of the Independents • as a vocal lobby in the Westminster Assembly and 
among the London godly.' 1056 Thus the religious implications of the Solemn League 
I~ Vallance. "An Holy and Sacramental I Paction", p. 51. 
1051 Laing (cd.>, Letters and Journals 0/ Robert Baillie, vol. ii, pp. 99-100. 
Ion Vallance, "An Holy and Sacramental Paction", p. 63. 
105) Journal o/the House o/LOI'ds, vol. vi, p. 254. 
10S4 Laing (cd.). utters and Journals 0/ Robert Bail/ie vol. ii, p. 103. 
10" Woolrych. Britain in Revolution, p. 272. 
1056 Scon, Politics and War, p. 85. 
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and Covenant brought the issue of Presbyterians and Independents to the fore. 1057 And 
as the Covenant was a direct consequence of parliament's crisis, we are presented with 
a clear but historiographically unacknowledged link between the collapse of the war 
effort in the summer of 1643 and the factions that were to characterise the 
parliamentarian cause. 
During the final months of 1643, fearful that the Scots might impose 
Presbyterianism by force. some Independent sects opened secret negotiations with the 
king. It is possible they were prepared to accept a moderate Episcopal system in return 
for religious toleration. By December it seems that both the Committee of Safety and 
the Scottish commissioners knew of the negotiations but were reluctant to expose the 
guilty for fear of dividing parliament. Instructions may have been issued to the 
Presbyterians in the Assembly of Divines to accommodate the Independents as far as 
possible. lOSS Even parliamentarians who supported the Covenant were adamant that it 
was an agreement with God rather than the Scots, and that Scottish Presbyterianism 
would not necessarily fonn the model for refonnation in England. 1059 Consequently, as 
Robert Baillie reported on 1 January 1644, the Scots were prepared to ease their 
insistence upon Presbyterianism until they were in a position to dictate events: 
It was my advice ... to eschew a public rupture with the Independents, till we 
were more able for them. As yet a Presbytery to this people is conceived to be a 
strange monster. 1060 
Baillie's patient strategy once again illustrates Scottish willingness to tolerate the 
religious scruples of the English; clearly nothing could be allowed to jeopardize the 
Covenanter's military objectives. 1061 Pursuing a religious agenda too forcefully ran the 
risk of destabilizing parliament at a crucial juncture. For the moment the Scots were 
prepared to be patient, 'confident that Leven's army would defeat the king in such short 
order that parliament would be in no position to deny them anything.'I062 These 
developments demonstrate that as early as 1643 the issue of Independents and 
Presbyterians was a major consideration for both the Scots and parliament in their 
10" In ecclesiastical terms Presbyterians rejected episcopacy in favour of an official church government 
based on a coercive enforcement of discipline. The Independents, on the other hand, embraced a number 
of sects united by a common hostility towards state-regulated worship, supporting instead a system of 
autonomous congregations or gatherings of believers in which the lay element prevailed. Gardiner, Greal 
Civil War, vol. i, p. 263; P. R. Newman, Companion to the English Civil Wars (Oxford, 1990), pp. 78 & 
121. 
IO~' Gardiner, Greal Civil War, vol. i, pp. 264-267. 
1~9 Vallance. "An Holy and Sacramentall Paction", p. 65. 
1060 Laing (ed.>, Letters and Journals of Robert Bail/ie, vol. ii, p. 117. 
1061 The Sconish army invaded England on 19 January 1644, several weeks after Baillie urged caution in 
dealing with the Independents. 
1062 Scott, Polilics and War. p. 66. 
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respective dealings with each other. Clearly this burgeoning ideological conflict was not 
a matter confined to the later years of the civil war; it was of growing concern from the 
moment parliament signed the Solemn League and Covenant. This is a point of 
considerable significance for this study. As far as I am aware this is the first time the 
1643 crisis. the Scottish alliance, and the Independent-Presbyterian schism have been 
directly connected in this way. The collapse of the war effort can therefore be seen as a 
catalyst. sparking the political and religious divisions that were to characterise the 
parliamentarian cause. 
Austin Woolrych has drawn attention to the fact that during 1644 the Scottish 
commissioners to the Westminster Assembly of Divines were urging the establishment 
of a Presbyterian model of church government. Although a large majority of English 
divines were prepared to accept Presbyterianism in outline, a small group of 
Independents. kno\\n as the Dissenting Brethren, strongly opposed such a system. 1063 
Towards the end of 1643 they published an Apologeticall Narration, a carefully 
constructed defence of their beliefs and concerns. 1064 They broadly argued that the need 
to move closer to the Presbyterian system meant that those who looked to the early 
churches of the Apostles were being subjected to a form of ecclesiastical government 
and discipline that appeared to be at odds with God's intentions. They were supported 
by 'Independent' MPs like Bulstrode Whitelocke, a Commons delegate to the 
Assembly, who in one debate vigorously disputed the assertion that the Church of 
Scotland was According to the Word ojGod. 106S Robert Baillie prophetically warned of 
'a very troublesome schism ... if we carry not the Independents with us' .1066 This was 
borne out in parliament were the growing influence of lay Independents twned Scottish 
optimism to despair and distrust. A small minority of Independents in the Assembly of 
Divines could do little to twn the tide of Presbyterianism, but in the Commons the 
situation was different. On 13 September 1644 the lower House passed the 
Accommodation Order. a plea to the parliamentary committee liaising with the Scots: 
to take into consideration the differences in the opinion of the members of the 
Assembly in point of church government ... to endeavour the finding out some 
106) Woolrych. Britain in Revoilltion, p. 291. 
IQ60I Bl TI. E. 80(7), An Apologeticall Narration, humbly submitted to the Honourable Houses of 
Parliament (london, 1643). Michael Braddick has pointed out that Thomason acquired a copy of the 
Apologetical/ Narration on 3 January 1644, again emphasising that this was a contentious issue well 
before the close of 1643. M. Braddick, God's Fury. England's Fire (London, 2008). p. 338. 
106' R. Spalding (ed.), The Diary ofBu/strode Whiteloclce 1605-1675, Records of Social and Economic 
History. New Series (Oxford, 1990), vol. xiii, p.IS3. 
1066 Laing (ed.). Lellel'S andJoll1'nals o/Robert Bail/ie, vol. ii, p. 122. 
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way how far tender consciences. who cannot in all things submit to the common 
rule lof Preshyterianism] which shall be established, may be borne with. 1067 
'This' Raillie complained of the Independents: 
is the fruit of their disservice, to obtain really any act of parliament for their 
toleration. before we have gotten anything for Presbytery either in assembly or 
. I' 1061 an par lament. 
The ScOl<\. who had waited patiently to press their ecclesiastical claims, were angered 
by what they saw as a blatant breach of the Covenant's commitment to religious 
uniformity. They believed Oliver Cromwell, 'a known Independent or favourer of 
Sects' .1069 was behind the Accommodation Order, and their sense of betrayal increased 
further when they discovered that Sir Henry Vane, whose amendments to the Covenant 
they had accepted in 1643. was another of the principal architects. 107o 
As a result the Scots moved closer to the lay Presbyterians in parliament. They 
broadly endorsed the same religious objectives as well as sharing a growing antipathy 
towards Cromwell and the lay Independents. Fearing that a total defeat of the king 
might bring the detested Independents to power, the Scots gradually adopted the lay 
Presbyterians' preference for a negotiated settlement. In fact the treaty of Uxbridge, 
convened in early 1645. was based on peace proposals initiated by the Scots in 
November of the previous year. 1071 Such a development would have been inconceivable 
in 1643 when the Scots were desperate to crush Charles as quickly as possible. 1072 
Conrad Russell's view that the issue of Independents against Presbyterians did 
not become serious until after parliament had won the civil war (and that during the 
civil war opposing groups are better known as peace and war parties) fails to recognize 
the immediate impact of the Solemn League and Covenlplt in the Assembly of Divines 
and in parliament. 1073 According to Thomas Juxon, the parliamentarian activist and 
diarist. the struggle between Presbyterians and Independents dominated Westminster 
well before the royalists were finally defeated. In September 1645 Juxon reported that 
parliament would settle Presbyterianism on the church, but without coercive power, 
because 'both parties are too considerable to be disobliged,' while a month later he 
1067 JOlUnol o/tM House o/Commons. vol. iii. p. 626. 
1061 Laing (cd.). Lellers and JOIUno/s 0/ Robert Baillie, vol. ii, p. 230 
1069 Ibid. p. 229. 
1070 C. V. Wcdgwood, The King's War 1641-1647 (London, 1958), pp. 367-368. 
1071 Woolrych. Britain in Revo/Illion, p. 300. 
1072 'In 1643 the Covenanters still regarded Charles as the greatest threat to their imperial church vision. 
Within linle over I year, however, they would begin to perceive a threat to both crown and church from a 
new quarter, the English Independents.' Scoo, Politics and War, p. 66. 
107) C. Russell, Th~ Crisis o/Parliaments: English History 1509-1660 (Oxford, 1971), p. 350. 
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commented that the military successes of the New Model Anny were regretted by the 
Presbyterians and celebrated by the Independents. 1074 And in 1646, with the war all but 
lost. Charles attempted to rescue his political future by exploiting these divisions to his 
advantage. In March he wrote to his close adviser George Lord Digby that he was 
'endeavouring to get to London' where he aimed 'to draw either the Presbyterians or 
Independents to side with me. for extirpating the one or the other,' and that he was 
confident 'I shall really be king again.'I075 The perceptions of both Thomas Juxon and 
Charles I demonstrate that by 1645 at the very latest parliamentary politics were defined 
by the Presbyterian-Independent schism. 
The conflict between Independents and Presbyterians is, of course, one of the 
principal themes of the English Civil War. It is a subject of considerable complexity and 
undeniable importance. but it is one that can only be touched upon here. The critical 
point. in tenns of this study, is the direct connection between parliament's military 
collapse in mid 1643 and the subsequent emergence of the Independent-Presbyterian 
divide. Under the tenns of the Solemn League and Covenant the Church of England 
was broadly required to adopt a Presbyterian system bearing some resemblance to the 
Scottish model. It was in opposition to the threat of religious subjugation at the hands of 
the Scots that the Independents emerged, first as a dissenting minority in the Assembly 
of Divines and then. led by Cromwell and Vane, as an increasingly significant faction in 
parliament itself. Thus we can trace the beginning of an Independent-Presbyterian 
political realignment to the military disasters that overwhelmed parliament in the 
summer of 1643. It is an important yet seemingly neglected connection. 
Scottisb Inteneption Ind tbe Tum of tbe MilitIa Tide 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have suggested that the collapse of the 
parliamentarian war effort during the summer of 1643 was caused by a catastrophic lack 
of cooperation amongst military commanders. The following analysis will show that in 
J 644 it was the royalists who suffered from an inability to cooperate, and that it was the 
parliamentarians who at last benefited from effective combined operations. It was a 
remarkable transformation: strongly indicating that cooperation was the vital factor 
underpinning military success in both 1643 and 1644. It is an issue that has been largely 
overlooked by historians, but it is one that provides an important insight into the course 
of the civil war in J 643 and the first half of 1644. 
1074 K.Undley and D. Scon (eds.), The Journal o/Thomas Juxon 1644-/647 (Camden Society, Sib series, 
vol. xiii. 1999). pp. 86 &88-89. 
I07S R. Cust. Charles / If Political Life (Harlow, 2005), pp. 411-413. 
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To fully appreciate this critical point it is necessary to begin with the 
establishment of the Solemn League and Covenant as a working military alliance. The 
entry of the Covenanter anny clearly necessitated some fonn of executive innovation to 
co-ordinate the greatly increased Anglo-Scottish forces now at parliament's disposal.1076 
The solution was the Committee of Both Kingdoms: a body composed of twenty-one 
Englishmen and four Scots. endowed with sweeping powers 'to order and direct 
whatsoever doth or may concern the managing of the war.,I077 However, legislation to 
set up the new committee led to a bitter struggle between two opposing factions: one 
demanding that it should be restricted to an advisory role, and the other detennined that 
it should assume direct control of military strategy. 'It is our intent', declared Essex's 
supporters in the Lords. 'to leave the active part to my Lord General' who 'must be 
trusted. and cannot be directed by those who are remote'. But more radical elements in 
the Commons. dissatisfied with the inefficiency of the old Committee of Safety and its 
close association with Essex, argued that 'without such a committee [of Both 
Kingdoms] the war will be carried on without the two Houses.' In other words, Essex 
would continue to exercise a perceived predilection for a negotiated settlement 
th . h f I' 1078 independent of e WlS es 0 par lament. 
The issue therefore was whether or not Essex should be by-passed and the new 
committee granted complete autonomy to order and direct the war as it saw fit. 'Few 
pieces of legislation before the Self-Denying Ordinance', argues John Adamson, 
'provoked fiercer divisions within, and between, the two Houses than this bill' .1079 
Eventually. on 16 February 1644, the Lords gave wayl080 leaving Thomas Juxon to 
observe that 'all things are to be agitated by this council.' Juxton rather ominously 
added that 'there wants nothing now but a dictator.'I081 Although the Committee of 
Both Kingdoms was initially established for only three months (finally re-appointed on 
22 May 1644),10&2 Juxon's remarks nevertheless indicate the scale of the political 
transformation at Westminster, and the remarkable powers now vested in this new 
1071> Ston, Politics and War, p.70; Gentles, English Revolution, p. 209; Lindley and Scott (eds.), Journal 
of,Thomas Juxon. p. 46. 
I 77 C. H. Finh and R. S. Rait (eds.), Acts and Ordinances o/the Interregnum 1642-1660 (London, 
1911). vol. i. pp. 436-437; J. Adamson, 'The Triumph of Oligarchy: the Management of War and the 
Committee of Both Kingdoms 1644-1645' in C. R. Kyle and J. Peacey (eds.), Parliament at Work 
(Woodbridge. 2002), p. 101. 
1071 Journal of the House o/Lords, vol. vi, p. 423. 
1079 Adamson, 'Triumph of Oligarchy,' p. 107. 
1010 JOllrnal o/the House o/Commons, vol. iii, p. 400. 
1011 Lindley and Ston (cds.), Journal o/Thomas Juxon, p. 47. 
lOll Baillie reported that Essex and his supporters ploned in to prevent the renewal of the committee, but 
when their plans were foiled they anempted to load the committee with their own members. Laing (ed.), 
Lellers and Journals 0/ Robert Baillie, vol. ii, p. 187. 
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Anglo-Scottish committee of state. IOU 'Here in embryo', argues Ian Gentles, 'were the 
future Independent and Presbyterian parties' :084 The political Independents, who 
wanted rid of Essex, would thus be associated with a military conclusion to the war, 
while the political Presbyterians, fearful of the Independents' desire to crush the king, 
would become synonymous with a negotiated settlement. The conflict over the 
establishment of the Committee of Both Kingdoms provides further evidence of the 
powerful legacy of the 1643 crisis. In contrast to the religious conflict generated by the 
Solemn League and Covenant, the Committee of Both Kingdoms resulted in a fierce 
battle for political control of the war effort. The religious and political strife generated 
by the Scottish alliance provides clear evidence that the repercussions of parliament's 
crisis were both fundamental and wide ranging. 
On 19 January 1644, while the struggle to establish the Committee of Both 
Kingdoms was dividing Westminster, the army of the Covenant crossed the border into 
England. loss The advent of around 20,000 Scottish soldiers tipped the balance of power 
in northern England finnly in parliament's favour. By the standards of the English Civil 
War this was a huge army, substantially enhancing parliament's capacity to wage an 
offensive war. More to the point, it provided a gilt-edged opportunity to bring the 
conflict to a relatively swift conclusion. But the question now was whether the Anglo-
Scottish armies could complete their task before the political and religious implications 
of the alliance proved to be an even greater danger than the king's forces. 
It is important to detail the early impact of Scottish armed intervention because 
it underpins a central argument of this thesis that military success was dependant upon 
cooperation between commanders. At the end of Januaryl644, leaving a relatively small 
army to defend Yorkshire, the king's northern commander, the marquess of Newcastle, 
led such forces as he could muster into Northumberland to oppose the Scots.1086 
Newcastle's departure presented the Committee of Both Kingdoms with a golden 
opportunity to take full control of Yorkshire. On 5 March, Lord Fairfax and Sir Thomas 
Fairfax were ordered to unite their forces and march towards the Tees, thereby 
hindering the flow of Yorkshire reinforcem~nts to Newcastle's army:087 The Fairfaxes, 
despite the committee's instructions, resolved instead to storm Selby, destroying on 11 
101) For a detailed analysis of the battle to establish the Committee of Both Kingdoms, see Adamson, 
'Triumph of Oligarchy,' pp. 102-110. 
1014 Gentles, English Revolution, p. 209. 
IOI~ Rushworth. Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 606. 
1016 Writing from York on 28 January 1644, Newcastle informed Rupert that he could scarcely raise five 
thousand foot and that his cavalry were poorly armed, while the Scots, who had already taken Morpeth, 
numbered fourteen thousand men. E. Warburton (ed.), Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers 
(London, 1849), vol. ii. p. 368. 
1017 Rushworth, Historic Collections, vol. v, pp. 616-617. 
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April those forces Newcastle had left behind to protect the county. 'This good success,' 
reported Sir Thomas. 'put them in great distractions and fears at York.' 1088 Newcastle 
was left with little option but to abandon his campaign against the Scots and return to 
the king's northern capital before it fell to the enemy. 1089 
By early June 1644 York was besieged by no fewer than three armies: the 
Scottish anny of the Covenant, the earl of Manchester's Eastern Association forces, and 
Lord Fairfax's northern troopS.I09O On 14 June, under mounting pressure, Charles wrote 
a desperate and confused letter to Prince Rupert (then in Lancashire) ordering him, 
amongst other things, to relieve the stricken city. Disastrously for the royalist cause, the 
king's nephew took this famously ambiguous missive as an absolute command to raise 
the siege and to bring the combined rebel armies to battle. 1091 Rupert's appearance 
before York on 1 July set in chain a sequence of controversial events that resulted in the 
catastrophe of Marston Moor. The material point, as far as this study is concerned, is 
that the combined operations of parliament's armies forced the royalists into a corner. 
At last parliament began to reap the rewards of military cooperation, and as the 
following will show, it was the royalists who now suffered the consequences of 
disunity. 
Upon Rupert's approach the allied armies lifted the siege and began to 
withdraw, prompting a relieved Newcastle to invite the Prince into York to discuss 
strategy.I092 However, Rupert's lieutenant general, George Goring, appeared instead, 
ordering all the city forces to join the Prince on Marston Moor by 4 o'clock the 
following morning. 1093 This, as Peter Newman has observed, 'was an unfortunate 
situation from the point of view of military courtesy.' Newcastle's command was 
independent and not subordinate to that of the Prince, who, however, held a commission 
that was superior to Newcastle's. Rupert, 'in his disdain for etiquette had affronted the 
dignity of the marquess.'l094 Lord Eythin, Newcastle's lieutenant general, took 
exception to the Prince's high-handed approach. Eythin had served under Rupert on the 
continent, and blamed his rashness for the defeat at Vlotho in 1638, in which the Prince 
1011 Thomas Lord Fairfax, 'A Short Memorial of the Northern Actions During the War There, From the 
Year 1642 till 1644', Yorkshire Archaeological Journal, vol. viii, (1884), p. 220. 
1019 Newcastle. by this time established at Durham, received news of the Selby disaster on 13 April; he 
entered York on 19 April pursued by the Scottish army. Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 620. 
10'10 P. R. Newman. Atlas o/the English Civil War (London, 1985), p. 53. 
1091 Cust. Charles I. pp. 388-389. 
1092 C. H. Firth (ed.). Life a/William Cavendish by Margaret Duchess o/Newcastle (London, 1906), p. 
38. 
l09l Sir Hugh Cholmley, 'Memorials touching the Battle of York', English Historical Review, vol. v, no. 
XVII (1890). p. 347: Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 374. 
1094 P. R. Newman and P. R. Roberts, Marston MoorJ644: The Battle 0/ Five Armies (Pickering, 2003), 
p. 30: Michael Braddick has pointed out that a similar situation arose between Rupert and the earl of 
Lindsey. Lord General of royalist forces, before the battle of EdgehiU. M. Braddick, God's Fury, 
England's F;,~ (london, 2008), p. 284. 
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was captured.'O'iS Although Newcastle ordered the implementation of Rupert's wishes, 
his troops could not be prevented from plundering the now abandoned allied siege 
trenches. Accordingly Newcastle visited Rupert at about 9 o'clock the following 
morning to explain the delay, assuring the Prince that Lord Eythin would bring up the 
garrison as quickly as possible. Rupert, somewhat frustrated by Newcastle's failure, 
announced his intention to fall upon the still disordered enemy with his own 
unreinforced anny.l096 But Newcastle urged the Prince to wait. Intelligence suggested 
that serious disagreements between the allied generals would shortly separate their 
combined armies. In addition, three thousand royalists under Colonel Clavering would 
arrive from the north in the next couple of days. Rupert replied that he had 'a letter from 
His Majesty with a positive and absolute command to fight the enemy,' leaving 
Newcastle with little option but to inform the Prince 'that he was ready and willing ... 
to obey his Highness '" [as] if His Majesty was there in person himself.' 1097 
Although Newcastle had given his word, some of his close associates advised 
him not to engage in battle. The marquess was told that 'his dignity was compromised' 
and that 'he had ceased to control his own army.'1098 But Newcastle was adamant, 'he 
would not shun to fight, for he had no other ambition but to live and die a loyal subject 
to His Majesty.'l099 Despite Newcastle's protestations it was almost 4 o'clock in the 
afternoon before a disgruntled Eythin arrived with the York regiments, provoking a 
heated exchange with Rupert, who eventually decided that the day was too far gone to 
attempt an engagement. Newcastle had originally excused the non-appearance of the 
York infantry on the grounds that they had been plundering allied lines and could not be 
brought to order. But this hardly accounts for the delay of a further twelve hours before 
Eythin finally appeared. IIOO There is some evidence to suggest that Eythin may have 
intended to sabotage Rupert's instructions by ordering that the garrison should not 
march until it was paid. I 101 Whatever the truth, it is clear that the inability of Newcastle 
and Eythin to cooperate with Rupert prevented the Prince taking the offensive on the 
. f2 J I 1102 mornmgo uy. 
I~ G. Trease. Portrait of a Cavalier (London, 1979), p. 133. 
10% Cholmley, 'Memorials touching the battle of York,' p. 348. 
10'» Firth (ed.), Life of William Cavendish, pp. 38-39. 
1091 Newman &: Roberts, Marston Moor 1644, p. 31. 
1099 Firth (ed.), Life o/William Cavendish, p.39. 
1100 Stanley Carpenter has argued that Newcastle's 'reluctance to cooperate fully with Rupert and the 
inability to maintain discipline among his troops squandered a priceless opportunity to attack the enemy's 
weak rear in force and assault the allied foot strung out along a long and vulnerable line of march. ' 
Carpenter. Military leadership, p. 95. 
1101 Cholm\ey, 'Memorials touching the battle of York,' p. 347. 
1102 Trease. Portrait of a Cavalier, p. 134; The historian and former general Frank Kitson argues 
persuasively that Rupert's reasons for seeking an immediate engagement with the enemy on 2 July were 
tactically superior to Newcastle's belief that battle should be delayed on account of reports that the allied 
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Meanwhile the allied generals, alanned by Rupert's concentration of forces on 
Marston Moor, quickly abandoned their original plan to block the prince's southern 
escape route towards the king. The allied soldiers, strung out along the road to 
Tadcaster, were urgently recalled to face the massed ranks of royalists occupying the 
moor. By the time Eythin arrived with Newcastle's infantry the allied anny was fully 
deployed. and any chance of exploiting the enemy's earlier disarray had long since 
disappeared. Rupert, as we have seen, gave orders to stand down, believing nothing 
could be achieved until the following morning. The allied generals thought otherwise. 
At seven o'clock in the evening they gave the order to advance. Although the battle of 
Marston Moor is remembered as a sweeping parliamentary victory, the outcome seemed 
far from certain for at least an hour. Indeed some allied generals fled the field believing 
all was lost. 1103 Ultimately Oliver Cromwell and the Scottish general of horse, David 
Leslie. turned the tide and inflicted a crushing defeat. 1104 In a famous letter written 
three days after the battle Cromwell declared that: 
In this great victory given unto us, such as the like never was since this war 
began ... we never charged but we routed the enemy. God made them stubble to 
d II os our swor s. 
Prince Rupert, who was not accustomed to defeat, is reported to have attributed the 
disaster to an altogether different kind of intervention: 
I am sure, said he, my men fought well, and therefore know no reason of our 
rout, but this, because the devil did help his servants. I 106 
Later that night, as the scattered remnants of Rupert's army returned to York, a 
confrontation took place that proved to be as detrimental to the king's cause as the 
battle itself. In the bitter aftermath of defeat it was reported that 'warm words passed 
between Prince Rupert and the marquess of Newcastle,' each charging the other with 
the cause of the rout. Rupert declared 'that [Newcastle] made not good his promise in 
generals were in disagreement and likely to go their separate ways. F. Kitson, Prince Rupert: Portrait 0/ 
a Soldier (London. 1994), pp. 184-185. 
110) Stanley Carpenter has argued that had the second line ofallied infantry, Sir James Lumsden's raw 
Scottish levies, broken the battle would have been lost. 'Thus a few Scots. exceedingly well commanded 
by a minor gentry laird, may well have preserved the English Revolution.' Carpenter, Military 
Leadership, p. 97. 
1104 Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, pp. 632-637 provides a detailed contemporary account of 
the battle and the events leading to it. 
1105 S. C. Lomas (ed.), The Letters andSpeeches o/Oliver Cromwell by Thomas Carlisle (London. 1904). 
~. 176. 
106 BL TT, E 4(6], A Contimlation o/True Intelligence 10 - 27 July 1644 by Simeon Ash, chaplain to the 
earl of Manchester, p. 2. 
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his assistance.' hut the marquess 'replied in such a manner as moved much passion.' 
Finally it was asserted that the two generals, upon whom the fate of the royalist north 
depended. 'parted in great discontent.' 1107 These ill-tempered recriminations,1I08 which 
curtailed any prospect of further cooperation between Rupert and Newcastle, were to 
cause irreparahle long-tenn damage to the king's afTairs. l109 
The 'very next morning after the battle' a distraught Newcastle 'took a 
resolution to forsake the kingdom.' 1110 Making his way to Scarborough in the company 
of Lord Eythin and several other gentlemen, the marquess, 'being loath to have 
. h"'1 fi H b 1111 A d' th V . aspersions cast upon 1m, set Sat or am urg. ccor mg to e enetlan 
Ambassador Newcastle was so angry that Rupert had ignored his advice and forced an 
unnecessary banle that he 'threw aside all interests and considerations.' 1112 Newcastle's 
inconsolable rage was born of the fact that Marston Moor had resulted in the total 
destruction of his northern infantry regiments. I I 13 The late arrival of these campaign-
hardened veterans, ostensibly under Eythin's command, suggests that this was a battle 
Newcastle did not want to fight. Indeed, as far as the marquess and his senior 
commanders were concerned there was absolutely no need to fight. York had been 
relieved, the enemy had withdrawn, and the object of Rupert's heroic march into 
Yorkshire had been achieved. It seems clear that Newcastle deserted the cause because 
he held Rupert responsible for the annihilation of his infantry. The marquess had not 
received an order from Charles to place his forces under Rupert's command. He 
resented the princes' failure to recognize his absolute authority in the north and to 
consult with him accordingly.1I14 Clarendon was adamant that Rupert's unilateral 
decision to risk a 'sudden and unnecessary engagement,' in which all the forces raised 
by Newcastle were 'in a moment cast away and destroyed,' so consumed the marquess 
with despair that: 
1107 BL IT, E 2(1), A Continuation o/True Intelligence 16 June - /0 July 1644 by Simeon Ash, chaplain 
to the earl 0/ Manchester, p. 8. 
lUll 'Rupert threw the blame on the sluggishness of Newcastle, and Newcastle threw the blame on the 
rashness of Rupert.' Gardiner, Great Civil War, vol. i, p. 382. 
1109 This damaging inability to cooperate stands in marked contrast to the successful collaboration of 
royalist commanders during summer 1643. 
1110 Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 637. 
1111 Firth (ed.), Life o/William Cavendish, p. 41. 
1112 CSPV, 1643-1647, p. 123. 
III) For a detailed examination of the almost systematic annihilation of Newcastle's infantry see 
Newman &. Roberts, Marston Moor 1644, pp. 88-109; Clarendon wrote that most of Rupert's cavalry and 
infantry had either fled the field or retreated to York, 'the great execution having fallen upon the northern 
foot' Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, pp. 376-377. 
1114 This is strongly suggested by Sir Hugh Cholmley, the governor of Scarborough Castle, who 
conversed with the marquess and his entourage before they took ship for the continent. Cholmley, 
'Memorials touching the battle of York,' pp. 349-350; Clarendon states that the principal cause of the 
defeat was Rupert's haste to precipitate a battle without 'consulting at all with the marquess of Newcastle 
and his officers' whose knowledge of the enemy greatly exceeded that of the prince. Macray (ed.), 
Clar~ndon, vol. iii, p.379. 
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he could not compose himself to think of beginning the work again, and 
involving himself in the same undelightful condition oflife, from which he 
might now be free. illS 
Newcastle. it appears, was in no mood to uphold a cause in which his authority so 
clearly counted for nothing. Rupert, in his arrogance, had overruled the marquess and 
his commanders with catastrophic consequences. There can be little doubt that 
Newcastle felt personally slighted and deeply angry. His emotional state of mind must 
have influenced his decision to leave England. But it is also possible that both 
Newcastle and Lord Eythin feared condemnation at the hands of a court marshal for 
failing to support Rupert at a critical moment. 1116 Whatever the precise truth, Marston 
Moor demonstrated the critical importance of effective collaboration. The allied 
generals had worked well together and shown great detennination, while the inability of 
the king's commanders to synchronize troop concentrations had allowed a vital early 
advantage to slip through their fingers. The contrast with 1643 could hardly be greater. 
If Newcastle's abandonment of the cause wasn't bad enough, even worse was to 
follow. Rupert gathered together what forces he could, about six thousand cavalry plus 
a smaller number of infantry, and headed for Shropshire intent upon recruiting his 
army. 1117 The sudden departure of both Newcastle and Rupert was a huge blow for the 
governor of York, Sir Thomas Glenham, and the garrison forces left under his 
command. 1 \lB Sir Henry Slingsby, a colonel in one of the city regiments, summed up 
the despair of the beleaguered city: 
Thus we were left at York out of all hope of relief, the town much distracted, 
and everyone ready to abandon her ... many left us, not liking to abide another 
siege. 1114 
On 4 July, two days after Marston Moor, the allied armies returned to their former 
positions encircling the city and renewed their attacks. Clarendon complained that the 
governor was left with no option but to deliver York on the best possible terms. 1120 
1115 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 384. 
1116 Kitson. Prince Rupert Portrait of a Soldier, pp. 200-20 I. 
1117 Gardiner. Great Civil War. vol. i, p. 382; Warburton, Memoirs of Prince Rupert, vol. ii, p. 470; 
Rushworth. Historical Collections, vol. v, p. 637. 
1111 The abandonment of York by Rupert and Newcastle after Marston Moor stands in marked contrast to 
the stout defence of Hull by Lord Fairfax following the battle of Adwalton Moor. 
1119 D. Panons (ed.). The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby (London, 1836), p. 86. 
1120 Macray (ed.). Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 377. 
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Articles for surrender were agreed on 15 July and the following day Sir Thomas 
Glenham's garrison forces marched out of the city.1J21 
The loss of York, the king' s northern capital, was an unmitigated disaster for the 
royalist cause. Clarendon declared 'that the like was never done or heard or read 
before.' It was inexplicable that Rupert, who 'had still a good army left,' and 
Newcastle. who possessed 'an absolute commission over the northern counties,' could 
agree 'in nothing else but in leaving that good city and the whole country as a prey to 
the enemy:lI2:! Sir Hugh Cholmley, the governor of Scarborough, felt certain that had 
Newcastle remained: 
it would have given encouragement to the king's friends and party there, 
whereas upon his departure almost everyone quit the king's service and went to 
their homes. I 123 
But Clarendon reserved his bitterest censure for Rupert, whose desertion of the city was 
'most inexcusable, because most prejudicial and most ruinous to the king's affairs in 
those parts.'1124 Clarendon's vehemence betrays the psychological damage inflicted by 
Marston Moor and the shameful abandonment of York by the king's two most 
successful generals. Philip Warwick vividly recalled the impact upon royalist morale: 
After this day, we may say the king's whole party fell into convulsive fits, or 
made strong motions, which were but indicators of a dying body.Il2S 
Clearly this was the most serious blow to the royalist war effort since the conflict began, 
brought about, as we have seen, by the disastrous failure of Newcastle, Eythin, and 
Rupert to cooperate effectively together. In a situation were the outnumbered royalists 
had to work together to have any chance of success, their inability to cooperate, both 
before and after Marston Moor, sacrificed what advantages they had and enabled the 
enemy to complete a spectacular success. 
The desertion of York and the north of England was not an inevitable 
consequence of Marston Moor. As Jack Binns has pointed out, 'they were lost because 
Prince Rupert in effect abandoned the city and the north and Newcastle abandoned the 
war: 1I26 The consequences, however, were immediately apparent. The Venetian 
ambassador wrote that the 'result is of unhappy augury for the king's interests, which 
1121 Rushworth, Historical Collections, vol. v, pp. 637-640. 
1122 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, pp. 376-377. 
1m Cholmley, 'Memorials touching the battle of York,' p. 350. 
1114 Macray (ed.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 380. 
1125 Warwick, Memories o/the Reign o/King Charles /, p. 287. 
1126 J. Binns. Yorbhire in the Civil Wars (Pickering, 2004), pp. 92-93. 
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suffer a great disadvantage from such a loss.' 1127 Conversely, the allied generals, who 
had entered York on 16 July. informed the Committee of Both Kingdoms that 'we 
conceive this county to be in such a condition as being well managed and provided for, 
the affairs of the kingdom may receive a great advantage thereby.'1128 In strategic terms 
the north of England was now lost with no prospect of immediate recovery. 11 29 It was a 
disaster made all the worse by the fact that the north was in every sense a royalist 
heartland. a region in which, for example, the king recruited more regimental colonels 
than any other. Peter Newman, the historian of the king's northern armies, has argued 
that: 
To regard Yorkshire, the north-east and the north-west as a royalist stronghold 
from 1642 until 1644 is wholly justified ... It was an area in which parliament's 
friends were unable to mount an effective challenge until the Scottish invasion 
gave them the edge they needed. Four of the five counties came readily under 
Newcastle's authority - no other Grandee could have said so much - and in the 
fifth he established control by invitation and sheer weight of numbers ... That 
the counties concerned were therefore exceptional in the ~eneral Civil War 
experience of England and Wales goes without saying. 1 \3 
In 1642 and 1643 the counties of Northumberland, Durham and Yorkshire provided 
Newcastle with between 15,000 and 20,000 men, a huge army in the context of the civil 
war, and comparable in size with the Scottish army of the Covenant. The abandonment 
of the north meant that these vast recruiting grounds would no longer be exploited, and 
as the war progressed into 1645 the king's armies became consequently weaker. This 
reduction in the availability of soldiers seriously undermined the royalist war effort. The 
conflict condensed into a smaller geographical area in which parliament enjoyed greater 
support and could more easily recruit men. 
Marston Moor was not a decisive battle, it did not lead to the end of the war, but 
its repercussions were momentous, profoundly affecting the king's capacity to sustain 
an effective war effort. 1131 Despite royalist victories over Waller in June 1644 at 
Cropredy Bridge in Oxfordshire and against Essex at Lostwithiel in September 1644, 
David Scott has argued that 'in strategic terms' these successes 'failed to make up for 
1127 CSPV, 1643-1647. p. 123. 
ml Calendar o/State Papers Domestic (CSPD). 1644. 18 July. 
112'1 Kitson. Prince Rupert Portrait 0/ a Soldier. p. 206. 
11)0 P. R. Newman. The Old Service: Royalist regimental colonels and the Civil War 1642-1646 
(Manchester. 1993). p. 266 
III I Stanley Carpenter has argued that 'In effect, the war ended in the north. A few royalist strongholds, 
such as Pontefract and Scarborough along with Newcastle and Carlisle, held out for some time, but the 
royalists never again mounted a major offensive or raised significant troops north of the River Trent. 
Marston Moor set in motion the eventual demise of royalist fortunes throughout the country.' Carpenter, 
Military Leadership, p. 101. 
226 
the loss of northern England.' 1132 Clarendon conceded as much, describing Marston 
Moor a<; 'this fatal blow, which so much changed the king's condition that till then was 
very hopeful. .1133 And Ian Gentles has declared that 'more than anything' ultimate 
victory in the civil war was 'due to the Solemn League and Covenant that produced 
21,500 able troops in 1644 to fight for parliament and sweep the king' s forces off the 
field at Marston Moor'. 1134 
Parliament was palpably incapable of achieving a success on the scale of 
Marston Moor until an alliance of three separate armies made it possible. Almost 
exactly one year earlier a dramatic failure of cooperation had led to catastrophe at 
Adwalton Moor, plunging the war effort into crisis. In 1644 the concentration of allied 
armies in northern England forced Charles and Prince Rupert to take drastic action. 
However, an acrimonious dispute between the king's senior commanders resulted in 
defeat at Marston Moor and the loss York and the old royalist north. This critical failure 
in military cooperation stood in marked contrast to the steadfast collaboration of the 
allied commanders, which not only brought the king's forces to battle on 
disadvantageous tenns, but also saw the allies to victory when the tide of the battle 
appeared to be turning against them. Such a transformation in the fortunes of king and 
parliament is remarkable. In 1643 the cooperation of royalist commanders and the 
destructive disunity of parliament's commanders almost brought the war to an end. A 
year later in 1644 the exact opposite led to calamity for the king and rejuvenated 
parliament's flagging war effort. The evidence seems relatively clear, spotlighting 
cooperation as the key to military success in 1643 and 1644. It is an aspect of the civil 
war that has tended to evade historians, yet it is one that helps to explain the course of 
the conflict in a new and important way. 
11)2 Scon, Politics and War, p. 75. 
liB Macray (cd.), Clarendon, vol. iii, p. 385. 
11)4 I. Gentles, 'Parliamentary Politics and the Politics of the Street: The London Peace Campaigns of 
1642-3', Parliamentary History, vol. 26, pt. 2 (2007), p. 159. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is surprising that an event which almost brought the English Civil War to an end has 
failed to attract an appropriate degree of recognition. Parliament's 1643 crisis is not a 
subject that brings to mind a series of well-known books or journal articles. It seems 
that parliament's military collapse has not been considered sufficiently important to 
justify examination in its own right. Not only are academic studies conspicuous by their 
absence. so are specific chapters in general histories of the civil war. And because the 
events of mid-I643 are not properly acknowledged, they have yet to find a clearly 
defined place in the chronology of the conflict. When mentioned at all, it is as a fleeting 
difficulty, one that could have become more serious, but was overtaken by subsequent 
developments. Even the relationship between the crisis itself and the events that sprang 
from it are not adequately expressed. What this thesis has attempted to show is that 
parliament's crisis was a fundamental and clearly defined phase of the civil war, 
resulting from specific and identifiable causes, and encompassing both the military and 
political conduct of the parliamentarian war effort. 
Parliament's crisis dominated the summer of 1643, and was confidently 
expected to result in a rapid royalist victory. The magnitude of the emergency threw the 
parliamentarian movement into disarray. While the House of Lords attempted to 
orchestrate a negotiated surrender, militants in the City of London threatened to take 
control of the war effort. The very fact that parliament stood on the verge of collapse, 
and the king on the verge of victory, is never seized upon as a pivotal moment worthy 
of detailed investigation. Similarly, the repercussions of these momentous events are 
predominantly examined in their own right, devoid of any specific attempt to relate 
them to the conditions in which they were born. It is almost as if the crisis never 
existed, its constituent events reduced to discrete episodes, unrelated to any causal 
agency. It is this absence of coherence that has prevented the elucidation of the crisis as 
a turning point in the civil war. 
Instead attention has focussed on those aspects of the conflict that appear to 
constitute the big questions. A never-ending amount of energy has been devoted to the 
causes of the civil war, and a similar amount of intellectual effort has analysed the 
emergence of the New Model Army and the politicisation of parliament's rank and file 
soldiers. This is not to say that these particular investigations have unduly monopolised 
the attention of historians, merely to point out that they are seen as fundamental and are 
therefore treated accordingly. This thesis has set out to demonstrate that parliament's 
1643 crisis is similarly fundamental, and that it merits a higher profile and a much wider 
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recognition. Of course, the crisis was neither a cause of the civil war or a factor in its 
conclusion. but it was a crucial moment nonetheless. 
The manner in which the civil war unfolded and finally reached a climax has 
militated against a clear recognition of the crisis. The triumph of the New Model Army 
has tended to relegate the early war years to something of a supporting role. It is here of 
course. in this subsidiary phase, that we find parliament's crisis, one of many twists and 
turns that predated the New Model Army and the defeat of the king. To an extent this is 
understandable. One would expect to focus on the causes of the civil war and the means 
by which it was won. However, this is a conflict that waged for four long years, one, 
moreover, that has been subjected to continual scrutiny ever since. It is surely 
remarkable that the 1643 crisis has not been singled out for particular attention. Maybe 
it is a point that requires some comment, although it is probably for others to take this 
particular aspect of the discussion further. 
Clearly the justification for this study is the fact that parliament's near fatal 
collapse has never been properly scrutinised or evaluated. Evidence provided by the 
campaigns of 1643 strongly suggests that the issue of cooperation proved to be the key 
to military success. Parliament's disintegration was precipitated by an acute failure of 
collaboration amongst commanders, exacerbated by a corresponding readiness of 
royalist commanders to work effectively together. Three catastrophic defeats, 
emanating from the efficient mobilization of the king's armies, and the negligent 
insubordination of parliament's commanders, plunged the war effort into crisis. 
The first of these disasters resulted from a disagreement amongst commanders 
which prevented six thousand reinforcements marching into Yorkshire. The consequent 
destruction of Lord Fairfax's northern army at the battle of Adwalton Moor on 30 June 
initiated parliament's crisis and necessitated the negotiation of the Solemn League and 
Covenant. The second catastrophe took place two weeks later at Roundway Down in 
Wiltshire when a remarkable relief operation enabled Lord Wilmot's cavalry to 
annihilate Sir William Waller's Western Association army. And the third calamity 
occurred on 26 July when two royalist armies combined to capture Bristol, the country's 
second port and parliament's most important western garrison. 
The campaigns leading to Roundway Down and Bristol were made possible by 
further examples of parliamentarian non-cooperation and royalist collaboration: the 
unopposed passage of two vital royalist supply convoys from York to Oxford. In May 
the first of these shipments re-provisioned the king's main field army and permitted the 
substantial reinforcement of Sir Ralph Hopton's Cornish army. And the second, which 
arrived at Oxford in July, allowed Lord Wilmot to destroy Sir William Waller's army at 
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Roundway Ixmn. and Prince Rupert to march the entire Oxford army to join Hopton in 
the capture of Bristol. In responding to the operational needs of the war effort, linking 
forces originally deployed in different parts of the country, these convoys typified the 
effectiveness of royalist cooperation. On each occasion, despite specific orders to the 
contrary. parliamentarian commanders conspicuously failed to combine forces in 
opposition to these crucial supplies. It is no exaggeration to claim that the queen's 
convoys were a lifeblood - maintaining the king's campaigns at a critical period in the 
conflict. and leading to stunning successes at both Roundway Down and Bristol. 
The emphasis placed by this thesis on the issue of military cooperation has 
thrown up a further and equally significant insight. In a traditional military analysis 
attention tends to centre on the battlefield itself, concentrating on those events which 
determine the outcome of a specific engagement. But in this analysis attention has 
shifted to the campaigns that preceded the battles. The search for answers has taken the 
thesis to areas normally viewed as background, essential to a large degree, but 
nevertheless subsidiary to the battle narrative and the quest for understanding. It is in 
the campaigns of 1643, rather than the battles themselves, that we discover the basis of 
parliamentarian failure and royalist success. In the assembling and coordination of 
armed forces. in the direction of supplies from one theatre of combat to another, and in 
the willing subordination of the individual commander to the common good, we find the 
secrets of royalist triumph. And conversely, in the narrow provincialism of self-
preservation, in the elevation of personal rivalry over common cause, and in the callous 
disregard of orders and commands, we find the reasons for parliamentarian failure. Here 
the scope of military investigation is widened to incorporate a broader panorama. 
Analysis is redirected from the primary events of battlefield combat to the myriad 
complexity of logistics, discipline, and personal motives; characteristics typical of the 
amorphous and less tangible world of the supporting campaign. During the first haIf of 
1643 Charles out-manoeuvred his opponents, concentrated forces effectively, and 
created the circumstances in which the summer victories were achieved. It is in the 
efficiency of royalist cooperation and the dysfunctional approach of their opponents that 
the seeds of parliament's military collapse are to be found. 
Parliament's crisis reached a climax in the first week of August 1643 when the 
House of Lords drafted a series of peace proposals amounting to surrender. The ensuing 
battle between those determined to send the propositions to the king, and those equally 
determined to defeat them, has been characterised as a struggle between the peace and 
war parties. However, this thesis has proposed an alternative interpretation in which 
opposition to the peace proposals was directed by Lord Mayor Isaac Pennington and a 
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militant faction in the City of London. A campaign of intimidation and the threat of a 
political coup overturned a Commons majority favouring peace and imposed a second 
ballot rejecting the proposals. It was a decisive moment, a struggle for the future of the 
parliamentarian war effort. Would the Commons vote to present the king with a 
negotiated surrender, or would coercion and the City's threatened take-over quash the 
propositions. Here. in the tumultuous days of early August 1643, the fate of parliament 
and the civil war was sealed: peace was discarded and mob rule prevailed. 
The repercussions of parliament's unexpected survival had a fundamental 
impact on the subsequent course of the civil war. A Scottish alliance - the Solemn 
League and Covenant - represented parliament's principal reaction to the threat of 
defeat. However, historians have tended to neglect an important relationship between 
the negotiation of the treaty and the corresponding condition of the parliamentarian war 
effort. As long as the king appeared to be heading for total victory, the English and the 
Scots worked feverishly to cement a binding agreement. But once Essex relieved 
Gloucester, survived the battle of Newbury, and returned to London, parliamentarian 
enthusiasm began to wane. The correlation between the talks taking place in Edinburgh 
and the wider course of the war effort shows that parliament's Scottish policy was a 
direct consequence of its military collapse. Had there been no crisis there would not 
have been a Solemn League and Covenant. 
The willingness of the English parliament to entertain the demands of the Scots, 
and the reciprocal willingness of the Scots to compromise those demands, reveals the 
seriousness of parliament's position. Fear of a royalist victory prompted both parties to 
sacrifice previously held positions in the quest for a military alliance. Parliament was 
forced to accept terms that in any other circumstances would have been rejected out of 
hand, while the Scots were prepared to dilute their insistence on the adoption of 
Presbyterianism in England. As far as both sides were concerned defeating the king was 
the primary objective. Nothing indicates the gravity of parliament's collapse as much as 
the shared anxiety of the English and the Scots to rush into an alliance. 
Another overlooked aspect of parliament's crisis concerns the direct connection 
between the disintegration of the war effort in mid-I643 and the emergence of the 
Independent-Presbyterian split. The Solemn League and Covenant ensured that Scottish 
ecclesiastical ambitions would playa much more prominent part in English politics. It 
was the fear of religious extirpation at the hands of the Scots that brought the 
Independents to the fore, both as a dissenting voice in the Westminster Assembly of 
Divines and as an increasingly vocal lobby in parliament itself. The political and 
religious rivalries of the Independents and Presbyterians became a fundamental and 
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determining characteristic of the civil war and the events that led to the execution of the 
king. The significant point in terms of this study is that this key schism traces its 
ancestry to the military emergency that resulted in a Scottish alliance. 
One final effect of the Solemn League and Covenant concerns the issue of 
military cooperation. The invasion of northern England by a Covenanter army in 
January 1644 resulted in three allied forces, of which the Scots were the largest, laying 
siege to York. The threat to the king's northern capital prompted Prince Rupert to 
march to its relief. But, as this thesis has emphasised, subsequent disagreements 
between the prince and William Cavendish earl of Newcastle led, in July 1644, to defeat 
at Marston Moor and the loss of York and the north. This catastrophic blow, from 
which the royalist war effort never recovered, marked a transfonnation in 
parliamentarian cooperation and a disastrous failure of royalist cooperation. While three 
allied armies combined to attack York, quarrels amongst the king's commanders 
sabotaged any chance of defeating the enemy and rescuing the city. It was, as Clarendon 
stated. a • fatal blow'. 1135 The old royalist north, a vast reservoir of recruits and 
resources, would never be made good. However the critical point, as far as this study is 
concerned. is that the issue of cooperation is once again emphasised. Parliament's 
military disintegration in mid-1643 and the king' s loss of the north one-year later in 
mid- I 644 were based on a disastrous breakdown of operational collaboration. 
This thesis has attempted to highlight an underrepresented period of the English 
Civil War. The 1643 crisis was a pivotal moment, bringing parliament to within a hair's 
breadth of surrender, and fundamentally shaping the remainder of the conflict. The 
sheer drama and epic significance of the emergency do not figure prominently in our 
current historiography. A general reader, academic even, familiar with traditional 
accounts of the civil war might be surprised by the claims of this thesis. But the 
evidence suggests that the 1643 crisis was indeed a turning point, one that has been 
obscured by the accumulated weight of subsequent events. This thesis has emphasised a 
strong contemporary consensus that parliament's military collapse signalled the end of 
the war. It is a conclusion borne out by the actions of the House of Lords: for how else 
can one account for a series of peace proposals amounting to capitulation. And the City 
of London's unprecedented threat to usurp control of the war effort provides an equally 
vivid demonstration of the critical nature of parliament's crisis. 
It would appear that the subsequent course of the civil war has clouded the real 
significance of mid-I643. The military and political turmoil of July and August have 
"" W. D. Macray (eci.), The History o/the Rebellion by Edward Earl o/Clarendon (Oxford, 1888), vol. 
iii. p.38S. 
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been displaced by the equally dramatic but ultimately decisive events that decided the 
conflict. This. to a certain degree, is as it should be. The military victories and political 
developments that brought the civil war to a conclusion quite rightly constitute a focus 
of attention. But this is not to say that other equally significant events, which inform 
that final victory. are not deserving of the same degree of recognition. Of course, it has 
to be acknowledged that parliament's 1643 crisis did not bring the civil war to an end. 
Nevertheless. the military and political ramifications of the emergency played a huge 
part in the subsequent development of the conflict. It is a legacy that would have been 
much more apparent to those who survived these tumultuous events than those who 
attempt to analyse them three and a half centuries later. This, perhaps, is the real 
problem. Like a long lost Atlantis, parliament's 1643 crisis has tended to slip beneath 
the waves of historical enquiry. 
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Appendix 
SIR SIMONDS D'EWES - CAN WE BELIEVE HIM? 
This appendix is necessitated by an article published in 1995 in which John Morrill 
asked some very serious questions about the veracity of Sir Simonds D'Ewes' 
parliamentary diaries. 1136 Although prompted by the publication of a section of the 
journal covering the period from 2 June to 17 September 1642,1137 Morrill's criticisms 
nevertheless apply equally to the later unpublished transcription of the diary used in this 
thesis. Morrill drew attention to a series of speeches D'Ewes claimed to have made in 
the House of Commons which no other diarist 'felt it worthwhile to record or even 
mention in passing'. Morrill admitted to 'a gnawing doubt' that the real purpose of 
D'Ewes journal was to create a series of 'contexts within which he could record the 
speeches he dearly wished he had had the courage, the self-confidence, the gumption to 
make'. As D' Ewes 'is almost never referred to by other diarists', Morrill asked if 
D'Ewes was 'the Walter Mitty of the Long Parliament'. Morrill therefore concluded by 
urging historians 'not to quote the journals at all', they are 'rarely the words of the 
speaker and to cite them as such is to mislead the reader' . 1 \38 
A spirited defence of the private parliamentary journal was provided by Maija 
Jansson of the Yale Centre for Parliamentary History, publishers of the work to which 
Morrill had taken exception. 1 139 'The important point', Jansson argued, 'is when 
quoting a speech or anything else from D'Ewes journal the proper manuscript number 
be cited'. Moreover, 'one does not cite, for example, to John Pym's speech, but rather to 
the account of John Pym's speech in D'Ewes journal'. And in any case 'such sources' 
often consist of more than just speeches - 'commands from military generals, accounts 
of council and board meetings' - and that the 'responsibility for using these 
multifaceted sources has always rested with the historian'. Jansson maintained that 
quoting was important because in many instances these sources 'provide unique 
accounts of occurrences in particular days in history, and they express a mood and 
capture a contemporary vocabulary'. In urging historians not to quote the journals at all 
11.16 J. Morrill, 'Paying One's D'Ewes', Parliamentary History, vol. 14, pt. 2 (1995), pp. 179-186. 
lin V. F. Snow and A. S. Young (eds.), The Private Journals of the Long Parliament, 2 June to /7 
Sf,ember /642 (New Haven, 1992). 
II Morrill, • Paying One's D'Ewes', pp. 184-186. 
Ill" M. Jansson, 'Dues Paid', Parliamentary History, vol. IS, pt. 2 (1996), pp. 215-220. 
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Morrill is asking 'historians of Stuart England to abide by rules absent in the historical 
r.. I ' \140 prOICSSlOn at argc . 
Clearly this is a thorny problem. To what extent can the historian rely on 
surviving materials from the period under investigation? In this thesis anything taken 
from f)'Ewes is attributed to the author in the text and not simply left as a footnote 
reference. In addition I have resisted the temptation to quote at length, and have 
confined myself, with one notable exception, to pertinent extracts concerning events 
described by other primary sources. In short I have tried to concentrate on D'Ewes 
references to actual events rather than his speecbmaking. However, on one or two 
occasions I have quoted from speeches, but only where there is once again a direct 
reference to matters confirmed by other sources. It is inevitable that a work such as this, 
which relies exclusively on D'Ewes at a central moment, should have to quote in this 
way - regardless of Morrill's objections. As Maija Jansson stated in her reply, it has 
always been the duty of historians to use such materials responsibly and to make 
abundantly clear the manner in which they are being used. 
1140 Ibid .• pp. 21S. 217, 220. 
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